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InTroduCTIon
The Netherlands is a small, but densely populated Western European coun-
try, a large part of which was reclaimed from the sea. Once a prominent play-
er in world history, it is now a middle-sized partner in the European Union. 
There have been times when the Dutch were proud of their accomplish-
ments and their position in the world, other times when they were self-ef-
facing or frustrated, and often all of these at the same time. This Dutch am-
bivalence has also caught the eye of foreign commentators. The British 
historian Simon Schama observed that even at the zenith of their power and 
wealth in the seventeenth century the Dutch were constricted by an ‘embar-
rassment of riches’.
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The image of the Netherlands in the Golden Age is of a country of indus-
trious workers, adroit merchants, ruthless colonialists, and God-fearing 
Protestants who took pleasure in their wealth with mixed emotions. This 
society was reputed to be exceptionally tolerant of religious diversity, to 
have a flourishing cultural and scientific life, to be a magnet for migrants, 
and a state that rejected the notion of a hereditary monarchy. The Republic 
liked to see itself as setting an example. But over the next few centuries it was 
increasingly cut down to size until it became a modest player on the world 
stage, significant in world politics largely because it managed to maintain 
its position as a colonial power, with the Indonesian archipelago as the pearl 
in its crown. And thus it remained, even after it became a monarchy follow-
ing the Napoleonic Wars and, in 1848, a parliamentary democracy – albeit 
initially a strongly elitist one.
The Second World War brought the German occupation of the Nether-
lands, the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies, and American 
and British protection of the Dutch Caribbean colonies of Suriname and the 
Netherlands Antilles. It was not until later that the extent to which the Neth-
erlands had suffered from its imperial overstretch became clear; the way in 
which the political elite stubbornly tried to avert Indonesian independence 8 postcolonial netherlands
revealed a provincial mentality that did anything but tally with the domes-
tically, widely-held conviction that the Dutch could teach the world, not just 
its colonies, about selfless development and gradual emancipation.
Indonesia refused to be appeased, let alone repressed any longer; only the 
two small Caribbean colonies voted to remain Dutch. ‘Indië verloren, ramp­
spoed geboren’ (The East Indies lost, a disaster born) is how the colonial lobby 
presented the change to the Dutch, but this pessimism turned out to be un-
founded. Even without its colonial wealth, the Netherlands showed robust 
economic growth in the post-war years, growth that was partly translated 
into a gradually expanding system of generous collective provisions. De-
cades of almost uninterrupted development once again turned the Nether-
lands into one of the most prosperous countries on the planet. The Nether-
lands also became a consumer society. In this it differed little from other 
countries in the Western world, but it was often experienced as a more pro-
found rupture with the past, because the archetypical image of the Dutch 
had long revolved around a strong work ethic and great thrift.
Decolonization and increased prosperity brought great demographic 
changes. Just as in the Golden Age, the Netherlands once again became a 
land of immigration. In 1945, the population numbered around nine million 
inhabitants; today over 16.5 million. In 1945 the Dutch population was al-
most entirely white, today there are around three million ‘migrants’, first 
and second generation, most of whom come from the global South. The 
number of Dutch people with roots in the colonies is estimated to be around 
one million – colonial history has, literally, come home.
At the same time a radical shift occurred in the realm of religion and ide-
ology. The image of the Netherlands as a Calvinist country may have re-
mained unduly strong for centuries, as Catholicism continued to dominate 
regions outside the urban agglomeration of Amsterdam-Rotterdam-
Utrecht, the Randstad. However, more decisive was the way in which reli-
gious and ideological differences had been pacified since the late nineteenth 
century. Verzuiling or ‘pillarization’ was key to this. Catholics and Protes-
tants, but also socialists and liberals, organized themselves into their own 
‘pillars’, presenting their members with a broad spectrum of duties, mores 
and services. Education, from primary school to university, was segregated 
into Catholic, Protestant and ‘public’ (non-confessional) institutions and 
each pillar had its own political parties, press, unions, and broadcasting 
corporations. Even the leisure sphere was subject to verzuiling, right down 
to the ideological persuasion of women’s magazines and sports clubs.
In the post-war Netherlands, which had emerged destitute from the Sec-
ond World War, this system – which has been termed ‘consociational de-introduction 9
mocracy’ by the political scientist Arend Lijphart – had a stabilizing effect 
initially.
2 As the pillars’ leaders kept their grassroots in line, trying to keep 
them away from other pillars, they increasingly found themselves having to 
reach compromises at a political and labour-relations level, where each pil-
lar had something to gain. The post-war reconstruction of the country owed 
much to this policy of compromise. The turbulence of 1960s and ‘70s brought 
the first cracks in this pattern. The Netherlands launched into a rapid pro-
cess of secularization and a strong wave of individualization pulled the rug 
from under verzuiling, which was increasingly experienced as claustropho-
bic. Within a matter of decades the Netherlands had changed from a sober 
and prudent country to one that was overwhelmingly secular, in which citi-
zens took less and less notice of the traditional authorities. As sociologist 
Frank J. Lechner puts it, ‘Once a stodgy backwater, the Netherlands earned a 
reputation as part of the international liberal vanguard’.
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The loss of the traditional socio-political compartmentalization of soci-
ety and the arrival of large numbers of migrants from the global South were 
two unrelated phenomena. In retrospect we can establish that the way the 
issues of migration and multiculturalism were addressed by politicians and 
society as a whole was strongly influenced by the removal of traditional reli-
gious and socio-political divisions. On the one hand this was expressed in a 
drastic underestimation of the continuing significance of religion for new-
comers, especially Muslims – the naïve notion was that they, as the Dutch 
had earlier, would soon lay aside their religion or at least come to regard it as 
a strictly private issue. On the other hand, and entirely within the spirit of 
the old verzuiling, there was an acceptance of religious and cultural diversity 
in the opinion that newcomers could easily retain their own culture while 
simultaneously integrating in the Netherlands.
The change, when it came at the end of the twentieth century, was dra-
matic. Whereas the post-war Netherlands had previously been praised for 
being a tolerant nation, which did not begrudge newcomers a safe place to 
live and where there was no room for racism, the social climate suddenly 
and dramatically hardened. Globalization brought enormous pressure to 
bear on the welfare state, giving rise to ever more open discussion, followed 
by ever harsher judgements, of the cost of immigration – despite continuing 
low unemployment, the levels of participation of certain groups of migrants 
in the labour market were perpetually low, while take-up of social provi-
sions and levels of representation on the wrong lists of statistics (school 
drop-outs, crime etc.) was correspondingly high and therefore expensive. 
The theme of national identity was latched on to and far more parochially 
defined than it had been before. The bone of contention was the supposed 10 postcolonial netherlands
unwillingness of Muslims – almost a million citizens – to identify them-
selves with the Netherlands and to regard their religion merely as a private 
issue.
This was the Netherlands that around 2000 brought forth the phenome-
non Pim Fortuyn, a flamboyant anti-politician who turned increasingly 
more fiercely against what he called ‘backward’ Islam and a political estab-
lishment which, in his view, had condemned the Netherlands to a pathetic 
and counterproductive multiculturalism. Fortuyn was murdered in 2002, 
not by a Muslim – to the relief of many – but by a radical, white, animal 
rights’ activist. Yet, his party enjoyed considerable success at the general 
election shortly afterwards, the effects of which echo down to the present 
day. In 2004, commentator, writer and filmmaker Theo van Gogh, famous 
for his tirades against Muslims (‘goat shaggers’) was slaughtered, his throat 
cut, in an Amsterdam street. In Murder in Amsterdam, Ian Buruma presents 
a penetrating picture of a new Netherlands in which praise of multicultur-
alism was silenced and replaced by enormous doubts about whether Mus-
lims could or, especially, wanted to integrate into the Netherlands.
This sentiment remained and in the 2010 general election the party of 
Fortuyn’s political epigone, Geert Wilders, became the third largest party. A 
laborious cabinet formation process resulted in a right-wing, minority cab-
inet of the conservative liberal party, the vvd, and the Christian democratic 
party, cda. The cabinet had to agree its policies in advance with Wilders’ 
pvv (Freedom Party), to guarantee pvv support in parliament, and it will 
have to continue to do so. And so the Netherlands, which in the past had a 
progressive and open reputation is now jointly governed from behind the 
scenes by a politician whose trademarks are a frontal attack on Islam, on 
migrants from the global South and on what he calls ‘left-wing hobbies’, 
such as multiculturalism and the arts.
Of course, no more than fifteen per cent of the population voted for the 
populist pvv and, of course, the vvd and cda were heavily criticized for 
putting themselves in a position that made them so dependent on Wilders. 
The Netherlands is still a comparatively open society without hard, formal 
ethnic divisions and is still a land where open racism is not socially accept-
able. But this does not diminish the fact that the social debate has incontro-
vertibly hardened. In the early 1970s, British scholar Christopher Bagley 
praised the Netherlands for being ‘one Western country which can claim a 
measure of success in its race relations’ – that type of tribute is certainly not 
the first thing that comes to mind today.
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In the many debates about the problems and petulance of the contempo-
rary Netherlands, it often appears as if migration, especially from the global introduction 11
South, almost by definition leads to higher economic costs and an attack on 
social cohesion. The issue of migrants over the last few decades, in part in-
fluenced by the 9/11 attacks, has implicitly narrowed down to the Muslim 
population. Postcolonial Netherlands focuses on migration from the former 
colonies, which was largely an earlier and predominantly non-Muslim post-
war migration from the South, and on the formation and relatively success-
ful integration of the postcolonial migrant communities – one million, 
mainly non-white Dutch citizens. It is, moreover, a study of the national 
identity of a country that has come to realize – only in the last few decades 
and after the fact – that it has fundamentally changed; beyond its tradition-
al verzuiling, secular, more firmly integrated into Europe, postcolonial and, 
whether it likes it or not, multicultural.
Let me continue this Dutch story from a personal perspective. In August 
1961, just six years old, I set foot for the first time into my primary school. The 
German occupation was still recent history. My Johannes Post primary 
school, in the Amsterdam suburb of Amstelveen, had been named after a 
resistance fighter who had been executed by the Nazis. He had belonged to 
the Dutch Reformed Church and my school was a Dutch Reformed Church 
School; that is how things were organized in the verzuilde, compartmental-
ized, Netherlands of the day. Verzuiling was a matter of course and the war 
was still fresh in the memories of my parents and the stories of my teachers.
The Netherlands at that time was still almost entirely white. And yet, in 
my class, there was a Chinese-East Indian boy, a Moluccan boy and an Afro-
Surinamese boy. These specifics did not occur to me until later. I played with 
them; the Chinese boy was later even best man at my wedding. I cannot re-
member having learned at school about where they came from or why their 
parents had come to the Netherlands. I do not think we ever talked about it 
amongst ourselves, even though they looked different and I may have 
thought, well what?… that they were just a bit different.
The school supported Protestant missionaries in Suriname – the Nether-
lands East Indies had been ‘lost’ and most Antilleans were Roman Catholics 
and consequently, I understand now, none of our business. We collected for 
the Evangelical Brotherhood, an offshoot of the Moravian Protestant mis-
sion. We sold boxes of glasses house to house, six in a box representing the 
‘types’ that lived in Suriname. I remember an Amerindian, an Afro-Carib-
bean Creole, a Maroon and a Javanese, but there must have been an Hindu-
stani and a Chinese too, or perhaps a boeroe (descended from poor Dutch im-
migrant peasants). In geography we probably also learned about the Antilles 
and Suriname, perhaps Indonesia as well, but I cannot remember having 12 postcolonial netherlands
any idea why so many different ‘types’ lived in Suriname.
The decolonization of the East Indies was over and I associated wartime 
suffering only with the German occupation. At secondary school in Am-
sterdam we learned a bit about colonial history; the ‘West Indies’ were a foot-
note. When, in 1975, I saw TV news images of Surinamese in Amsterdam 
celebrating the transfer of sovereignty on the night of 25 November, I asked 
myself with casual amazement why they had come to live here in the first 
place. By that time I had begun to study social sciences and history at univer-
sity and would ultimately specialize in Latin America. I did not learn about 
colonial history until late in my studies and then only as an optional subject. 
I learned nothing about that migration. I could quite easily have graduated 
in history without knowing a thing about colonial history or postcolonial 
migrations.
Since I graduated, the focus of my academic research for the last quarter 
of a century has been the colonial and postcolonial history of the Nether-
lands. The Netherlands has changed dramatically in this time, in part due to 
migration. I never imagined that I would end up married to the daughter of 
a postcolonial migrant. At primary school I sometimes harboured vague 
worries about what would happen if I were to fall in love with a Catholic, but 
I never dreamed that she might also be a different colour and come from a 
different background.
What is striking about the postcolonial Netherlands is that the religious 
difference that was so significant in our youth seemed to be irrelevant two 
decades later and never provoked any comment. The process of seculariza-
tion has been thorough. The churches have almost entirely disappeared 
from our own lives and little thought is given to this around us. ‘When two 
religions lie on one pillow, the devil lies between’ is a disqualification of dif-
ferences within Christianity from a distant past. No less illustrative of the 
postcolonial Netherlands is that the differences in our colours has always 
been a theme, but that only one of these colours is always noted. This does 
not detract from the fact that today there is a level of familiarity, intimacy 
even, with ethnic differences that was inconceivable in my youth.
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Forty years after leaving the Johannes Post primary school, I attended 
and was involved in the organization of two commemorations of the colo-
nial past, partly in my professional role as director of the Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, founded in 1851 as an 
integral part of the Dutch colonial enterprise and today one of the world’s 
largest libraries and research centres for these areas. On 20 March, 2002, a 
solemn ceremony in the Ridderzaal (Knight’s Hall) in The Hague marked the 
founding of the voc (Dutch East India Company) on the very same spot four introduction 13
centuries earlier. Queen Beatrix and PvdA (Labour) Prime Minister Wim 
Kok, surrounded by prominent figures from all kinds of social bodies, add-
ed lustre to the occasion.
More than three months later, on 1 July, the day on which in 1863 slavery 
was abolished in Suriname and the Antilles, the National Monument to 
Dutch Slavery was unveiled in Amsterdam’s Oosterpark. A more modest and 
select number of prominent figures attended here – the business commu-
nity was not interested in this event – but once again Queen Beatrix and 
Prime Minister Kok were in the front row. By attending both events they in-
dicated that while the history of the voc was still something to be proud of, 
its counterpart in the West, the wic (West India Company), whose core 
business had been the slave trade, should fill us with shame.
That is fine, but it raises a question of consistency. Historians are not 
keen on competitions about misdeeds and victimhood, but they do like 
comparisons. As it happens, the voc was no less involved with slavery and 
the slave trade than the wic, but this fact has apparently been forgotten. The 
broader question then arises as to why certain episodes in colonial history 
have been forgotten and others remembered, with pride or shame, but sel-
dom neutral. There seems to be a pattern here. Our understanding of the 
past reflects, to a degree, ‘how it really was’, but also the inclination to meet 
half way those groups who feel strongly attached to certain themes. In the 
most favourable instances, this can lead to new insights and a more bal-
anced view of the past. In the worst instances, history is rewritten according 
to the motto ‘Please everyone all of the time’.
Postcolonial migrants have played an important part in this ongoing pro-
cess of reviewing our history and hence our national identity. A million 
Dutch citizens were born in the Netherlands East Indies, Suriname or the 
Antilles, or have one or both parents who come from the former colonies. 
Their arrival and assimilation were linked to post-war decolonization and to 
a broader history in which the Netherlands became a rich country and a 
more or less multicultural society.
6
Postcolonial Netherlands is about these migrants and the country they 
found when they arrived and which they helped to shape, not always in har-
mony with the indigenous Dutch and other migrants. My aim is not to pres-
ent a complete history of the highly diverse experiences of these postcolo-
nial migrants, and even less of post-war society in the Netherlands as a 
whole. What I have tried to do is present a broad picture of the way in which 
migration changed the country and how, in the postcolonial Netherlands, 
such notions as ‘citizenship’, ‘identity’, ‘community’ and ‘nation’ have shift-14 postcolonial netherlands
ed. This research seems to me to be essential to a better understanding of the 
debates that are raging today on the subject of Dutch identity.
This raises more than enough questions. What desires were fostered by 
postcolonial migrants regarding full citizenship? How and by whom were 
these desires articulated? What space was given or demanded for this and to 
what extent did it change Dutch views of national identity and citizenship? 
Is there any point to continuing to view migrants from the former colonies 
and their descendants as separate communities?
Each of these questions requires elucidation. Desires regarding full citi-
zenship have a hard edge; this relates to unhindered rights to travel to and 
take up residence in the Netherlands, to enjoy all the same rights that estab-
lished citizens have and to put these rights into practice. Citizenship also 
has a softer side, often articulated in terms of the possibility of such intan-
gible notions as identity and the space granted to all citizens, regardless of 
their differences, to join together in the national community, to belong. Ef-
forts were made to retain cultural specificity, while also recognizing that 
precisely this specificity is part of the national identity. Processes that are 
described as bonding and bridging run through one another continuously.
I argue that postcolonial migrants took part in identity politics. This 
term refers to a form of social and political organization which aims to rep-
resent the interests of a group that feels itself to be ‘different’ from the rest of 
society. Ethnicity and cultural specificity are often the markers of differ-
ence. Identity politics demands the right to be different from what is regard-
ed as being the norm. Postcolonial Netherlands reviews significant organiza-
tions and leaders, their strategies and forms of action. I have gradually 
become convinced that, in recent Dutch history, the successful integration 
of postcolonial migrants was a condition rather than consequence of iden-
tity politics, although the articulation of ‘ethnic’ desires according to the 
laws of ‘strategic essentialism’ could strengthen the significance of bonding 
a ‘community’.
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The space (‘political opportunity structure’) that was dedicated to post-
colonial identity politics grew over the years. This corresponded with 
changes in Dutch society, in particular the declining importance of verzui­
ling and the development of a minorities policy and ideas on multicultural-
ism. Where gradually more space was allowed for identity politics, it 
stemmed from the attractive, but empirically elusive assumption that this 
would boost identification with Dutch society and hence, ultimately, inte-
gration too – perhaps an echo of the ‘pacification policy’ of verzuiling, or the 
subsequent policy of ‘repressive tolerance’. I draw the conclusion that post-
colonial migrants were given more room for identity politics than other 
newcomers from the South.introduction 15
Views on national identity change all the time and did so in the post-war 
Netherlands too. The loss of the colonies, the Netherlands East Indies in par-
ticular, played an important part in this, but so too did such factors as ont­
zuiling (secularization and the declining importance of verzuiling), the large 
numbers of migrants who took up residence in the Netherlands, and Euro-
pean unification. Migrants from the East Indies were confronted by a far 
more provincial country than later arrivals – though it remains a puzzle to 
what extent the intensive pre-war relations with the colonies would linger 
in the collective mentality of the Netherlands.
8 Both the loss of the Nether-
lands East Indies and the establishment of an Indisch community forced a 
reappraisal of pre-war views of the Dutch nation. This process has contin-
ued ever since, with the first generation of postcolonial migrants paving the 
way for a broadening of minds. New conceptions of Dutch identity gradu-
ally emerged and the significance of the colonies within it. The rediscovery 
of colonial history also led to new and remarkable inconsistencies and si-
lences.
One cannot think, as a matter of course, in terms of one general or more 
‘postcolonial’ communities. First one needs to establish that there is virtu-
ally no point to describing Dutch people from Indisch or Indonesian, Suri-
namese or Antillean backgrounds as a single community. This is not how 
they see themselves, is not how they organize themselves, and they do not 
behave either individually or collectively within these terms. More interest-
ing is the question of whether the separate ‘national’ groups can be regarded 
as individually having a special relation to and place within the Nether-
lands. This was only true to a limited degree when they first arrived and, it 
seems to me, to have become even less relevant over time. From the colonial 
perspective, the extent of the sense of community was linked to such factors 
as ethnic difference and class distinctions. In the Netherlands, the idea of 
community was undermined by the changing of the generations, exogamy 
(long-term relations outside one’s own group) and the declining importance 
of transnational orientations – even though in these respects considerable 
differences still exist between the various segments of the postcolonial 
Dutch. In any case, strategic essentialism grew to be increasingly at odds 
with the evaporation of a firm ‘community’.
In Postcolonial Netherlands I introduce the notion of the ‘postcolonial bo-
nus’. Migrants from the colonies had both individual and collective advan-
tages over other non-Western migrants. This involved both ‘hard’ judicial 
civil rights, advantages in the realm of cultural capital (knowledge of and 
familiarity with the Dutch language and culture) and the space that could 
be demanded for cultural specificity. This postcolonial bonus generally 16 postcolonial netherlands
eased their integration and extended the duration of the different postcolo-
nial communities. It also explains why in debates about Dutch history and 
identity over the last few decades, a relatively large amount of room has been 
extracted for postcolonial perspectives on colonial history. However, this 
postcolonial bonus is, I argue, now evaporating, along with the notion of 
‘postcolonial community’ and hence, one may also predict, the end of post-
colonial identity politics.
The history of postcolonial migrants takes place within a broader con-
text in which the Netherlands became multi-ethnic and more or less multi-
cultural without, moreover, needing or wanting to give up what were felt to 
be fundamental values and norms. I interpret both postcolonial identity 
politics and the political responses to it as an element in the process of these 
groups’ integration. ‘Integration’ is a gauge for the degree to which a com-
munity, in this case immigrants, conquer a space for themselves in a soci-
ety. My premise is that integration is worth striving for and even inevitable, 
if marginalization is to be avoided. One-sided and complete cultural assim-
ilation is, however, not at stake. Where most newcomers and their descen-
dants, while retaining elements of their own culture, over time adopt the 
most dominant public conventions of the land in which they have settled, 
they also always contribute to the development of these conventions. There 
has never been a culturally homogeneous understanding of nationhood in 
this continuous process, although an urgent demand did arise for what the 
influential Dutch commentator Paul Scheffer called ‘a defined idea of the 
Netherlands’.
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There are different dimensions to integration. ‘Hard’ socio-economic 
criteria, such as income, labour-market participation, levels of education 
and housing, are considered to be relevant to this book and are looked at in 
brief, but not discussed in detail. More attention is paid to socio-cultural 
participation (politics, societies, religion) and, above all, to the process of 
identification with Dutch culture – whether aspired to or not – and how this 
culture was changed in the process and became more clearly ‘postcolonial’. I 
argue that the desires of postcolonial migrants seldom conflicted with the 
core values of Dutch society; this explains why so many were ultimately ac-
cepted, but also raises the question why this sometimes took such an excru-
ciatingly long time.
I should also clarify my use of the term ‘postcolonial’. It has a simple descrip-
tive meaning, of course, in the sense of after the colonial period, after de-
colonization and after the end of the Dutch colonial empire. Furthermore, 
in the next chapter I argue that even this apparently simple, chronological introduction 17
explanation requires qualification. The ‘repatriation’ from the Dutch East 
Indies was indeed a direct consequence of decolonization and occurred pri-
marily during the transition and shortly after independence. The exodus 
from Suriname was set in motion by the prospect of a rapid transfer of sov-
ereignty and took place largely prior to this transfer. Permanent migration 
of Antilleans to the Netherlands was a consequence of the Antillean refusal 
to accept independence. The decision to choose a postcolonial arrangement 
of non-sovereignty implies the continuing right to free access to the metro-
pole.
However, in this book I use ‘postcolonial’ more broadly than simply in a 
temporal or demographic sense. Here it also alludes to the ways in which the 
colonial past and decolonization have left their material and immaterial 
legacies, ranging from metropolitan demographics, politics and culture, to 
the ongoing ideological and, possibly, psychological impact on all the na-
tions involved. On the other hand, I do not consider my work as belonging to 
the paradigmatic field of postcolonial studies and the related field of cul-
tural studies. As I will discuss towards the end of the book, I have serious 
concerns about the use of what I consider to be idiosyncratic jargon and the 
moralizing, heavily politicized character of, and lack of empirical research 
inherent to, much of this branch of academia.
Postcolonial Netherlands opens with a chapter in which I examine the rela-
tion between decolonization and migration, the characteristics of the dif-
ferent groups of postcolonial migrants and the course of their integration.
10 
I discuss how one group benefited more from the postcolonial bonus than 
another and what role class played in this. I argue that it is becoming ever 
less fitting to speak of postcolonial ‘communities’, particularly in the con-
text of changing generations and the frequency of exogamy.
The next two chapters discuss how postcolonial migrants’ organizations 
struggled for full citizenship against the background of the development of 
a Dutch migration and integration policy. Where this involved the ‘hard’ di-
mension, the right to unhindered access and full entitlement, this struggle 
was, on the whole, successful. Where it was about compensation for unset-
tled accounts associated with involuntary migration to the Netherlands – at 
least for the repatriates from the Dutch East Indies – and what they experi-
enced as a cold reception when they got there, the outcome was less satisfac-
tory. Partly as a consequence of this, there was a far from unambiguous 
identification with the receiving society. Nonetheless, the assumption that 
Dutch with colonial roots grew to become citizens more than other mi-
grants from the global South would seem to be justified.18 postcolonial netherlands
Speaking of postcolonial migrants as members of a separate community 
presumes there is a distinct identity and an associated unique cultural heri-
tage. This presumption cannot be taken for granted. In the fourth chapter I 
first examine whether these migrants saw themselves as bearers of a sepa-
rate identity and how they defined and disseminated this uniqueness, then 
and now. I also look at the (dis)continuities between characteristics and dis-
courses in the colonial world and in the postcolonial Netherlands. With this 
I once again question the notions of ‘community’ and ‘identity’.
The struggle for the recognition of colonial history, a preeminent ele-
ment in identity politics, is addressed in Chapter 5. Bridging and bonding 
were intertwined in the call for recognition and public remembrance: draw-
ing on the past united the migrants, while at the same time linking them to 
the wider society, compelling it to broaden the terms of the imagined na-
tional community. New canonical formulae for Dutch history were thus for-
mulated. However, such new conventions were far from consistent and of-
ten created new silences.
Research into relations between postcolonial migrants and their descen-
dants and the country of origin can provide insight into the extent to which 
they are still distinct from the broader society and internally bond. In the 
sixth chapter I conclude that the meaning of transnationalism has distinct-
ly diminished with successive generations and that there are clear and ex-
plainable differences between the different segments. This too has implica-
tions for the usage of ‘community’. After all, where the orientation to the 
country of origin declines, postcolonial singularity and communality be-
come correspondingly less important.
Comparison is vital to this research: between the different groups of mi-
grants from the colonies, between these groups and other migrants, but also 
between the Netherlands and other countries. The Netherlands is just one of 
a series of European countries confronted with mass migration after the 
Second World War, both from their own colonies and elsewhere. The Dutch 
case is placed in an international context in Chapter 7. The most relevant 
comparisons turned out to be with France and the United Kingdom, al-
though I also draw comparisons with other former colonial powers, Euro-
pean and others. There are significant differences in the leeway that was 
granted to (postcolonial) migrant culture and to critical views of colonial 
history. These contrasts relate partly to national memorial culture and part-
ly to the scale and nature of the postcolonial migration.
In the final chapter I look back briefly on the arrival and rise of postcolo-
nial communities, how they have broadened or become diluted, the evapo-
ration of the idea of ethnic uniqueness and the simultaneous widening of introduction 19
the symbolic boundaries of Dutch citizenship, as well as the controversial 
and often inconsistent expansion of the imagined community of the na-
tion. To this I add a short tour around postcolonial heritage policy – domes-
tic, but primarily foreign. Here too a picture emerges of change, of a broader 
acknowledgement of the significance of colonial history for the Netherlands 
today. Postcolonial migrants played a pioneering role in the broadening of 
the national horizon, but this phase appears to be reaching its end. This does 
not mean that there is no longer social deprivation among postcolonial mi-
grants or their children, much less that every Dutch citizen has made the 
colonial baggage its own. The focus of policy and debate has shifted to other 
migrants, who have no (post)colonial relation with the Netherlands. This 
raises questions, I argue, about the doctrine at the heart of postcolonial 
studies, with its strong emphasis on historical continuity between colo-
nialism and contemporary postcolonial societies.
A pile of excellent studies have been published over the last few years on the 
migration from the Netherlands East Indies; the history of Caribbean mi-
gration has been less thoroughly chronicled, but is certainly not a blank 
page. The literature on migration and integration in the Netherlands is over-
whelming. I have tried to make good use of all this scholarship, but, in view 
of the framework of this book, I have had to limit myself considerably: main-
taining distance, remaining incomplete. This has meant that I have rarely 
portrayed postcolonial migrants, their organizations and leaders in detail, 
although I have addressed specific questions through many conversations 
and recently through a questionnaire.
11 The same applies to the institutions, 
leading players, and Dutch society at large. I have abstracted more than some 
readers would like. At the same time, I have incorporated many personal ex-
periences, which on the whole are not named; experiences of an often sur-
prised contemporary who has played his small part in the rediscovery of 
colonial history.
Over the last few decades I have, in a variety of roles, spent much time in 
close contact with Dutch citizens with postcolonial backgrounds. I have 
witnessed the emotional significance of colonial history as it is rooted in 
solidarity, including the outrage at things that were felt to be unjust, wheth-
er past or present. Emotions sometimes ran high and have not left me un-
moved. But I have usually remained an outsider, by choice and/or ascrip-
tion. My engagement has been founded on a more intellectual and critical 
premise, towards all the parties involved. This has sometimes led to incom-
prehension and impatience, back and forth. I have also commented on the 
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how little the average white Dutch person knows about their backgrounds, 
while their own interest in other migrant communities, even postcolonial, 
is equally limited. I have seldom seen a Moluccan attend the 1 July ceremony 
to commemorate Caribbean slavery, an Antillean at an Indisch event, a Hin-
dustani on Aruba Day; and seldom a ‘postcolonial Dutch’ person at 4 May 
Remembrance Day ceremonies. People tend to celebrate and remember in 
their own social circles and complain about the lack of a widespread recog-
nition that they themselves are unable to muster for others. Furthermore, it 
is striking that the modest numbers who do attend these events contrasts 
starkly with the size of the supposed grassroots.
I have discussed such observations at length with prominent members 
of all these groups. At times these were difficult conversations, especially 
when my observations were interpreted as a denial of emotions and justifi-
able desires. It was often difficult to convince them that this is not for me the 
issue. The final line of defence for some of my interlocutors was that even the 
Dutch commemorations on 4 May – the day of the German surrender in 1945 
and since then the national war remembrance day – has become less and less 
a matter of course and less broadly attended: that is simply the way things 
go, over time. This objection, which in itself is correct, merely underlines 
that little can be taken for granted in Dutch memorial culture today. Yet, it is 
not incompatible with my position: that the time for postcolonial commem-
oration is drawing to a close.
In Postcolonial Netherlands I sketch a picture of political and intellectual 
processes around identity and community. How individual (post)colonial 
migrants and their descendants experienced their backgrounds in the past 
and how they do so today has largely been left out of this picture. This does 
not mean that I believe these experiences to be unimportant, that those in-
volved have themselves forgotten or try to forget their own origins, nor that 
I think they should. The experience and celebration of ethnicity as a feeling 
of solidarity and security goes far deeper than passing nostalgia.
12 I am 
equally not suggesting that the wider society has come to accept the differ-
ent postcolonial communities without any questions or doubts, and I am 
certainly not saying the Netherlands is free of racism. Rejection frequently 
pushes people precisely to identify more strongly with their own ethnic 
group. My argument is simply that a postcolonial background provides less 
and less grounds for political organization and that identity politics defined 
along ‘ethnic’ lines will only continue to lose its force. In my view, this shift 
was possible partly because the Netherlands, quite rightly, became postco-
lonial, also in how it grasped and tentatively accepted colonial history and 
its legacies.introduction 21
Thus the Netherlands became more open than it had been before – cer-
tainly more open than when I, sitting on the school benches at Johannes Post 
primary school, could assume that ‘we’ were all born and brought up in the 
Netherlands and that brute violence was something that had been inflicted 
on our country long ago by Spanish Papists and recently by Nazi Germany.
13 
Colonial history returned, came ‘home’, with the migrants from the colo-
nies. Since then we have been trying to find a way to accommodate this past, 
sometimes refreshingly, perhaps all too predictably, often guiltily, fre-
quently inconsistently; always looking for an elusive balance.23
1
deColonIzaTIon, mIgraTIon 
and The posTColonIal bonus
In retrospect, the story of postcolonial migrations to the Netherlands pres-
ents itself as three straight-forward series of cause and effect. The indepen-
dence of Indonesia unavoidably led to the exodus of the groups which had 
been linked to the colonial regime. The hastily executed ‘model decoloniza-
tion’ of Suriname inevitably led to the migration of half a nation. The deci-
sion to keep the Netherlands Antilles within the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands meant that Antilleans would continue to settle in the wealthier, 
European region of the Kingdom. 
In reality, decolonization nowhere went according to predetermined 
planning and Dutch politics was, time and again, surprised by the unfore-
seen phenomenon of postcolonial migrations. Successive generations of 
Dutch politicians failed to shine in terms of vision or sense of realism. In 
this they differed little from their colleagues in neighbouring countries. As 
psychologically and strategically unprepared for decolonization as the colo-
nial powers were on the eve of, and even following the Second World War, 
they equally failed to anticipate the scale of the migrations that would write 
the final chapter in their colonial histories. 
This chapter discusses and compares the dominant themes of post-war 
migrations from the three former Dutch colonies and the patterns of inte-
gration that ensued. This history is then placed within the broader context 
of migration, integration and government policy in the post-war Nether-
lands. Migrants from the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia, Suriname and the 
Antilles all had the benefit of a ‘postcolonial bonus’ which, however, has be-
come devalued, little by little, along with the notion of the ‘postcolonial 
community’.
1
The term ‘postcolonial’ requires some clarification. In the narrow sense 
of the word it simply means ‘after the colonial era’, in this case also post-war. 
Following this, postcolonial migrants came to the Netherlands, which was 
no longer a colonial metropole and hence now postcolonial itself. Reality postcolonial netherlands 24
was more complicated than that. The Netherlands decolonized in fits and 
starts and with surprising outcomes. The migrants from the Netherlands 
East Indies indeed arrived in the Netherlands shortly after decolonization, 
forced to leave Indonesia or at least convinced that there was no future for 
them there. The term ‘postcolonial migrants’ fits this otherwise heteroge-
neous group without further qualification. 
However, most migrants from Suriname left for the Netherlands not af-
ter, but on the eve of independence. They voted more or less with their feet 
against the transfer of sovereignty. The link between their arrival and de-
colonization is, therefore, somewhat different, but can nonetheless be clear-
ly defined as ‘postcolonial’. The relation between the migration of large 
numbers of citizens from the six islands of the Netherlands Antilles and 
decolonization is different again. The explicit and consistent refusal of the 
islands to accept the ‘gift’ of independence gave rise to a complicated postco-
lonial arrangement which combines elements of autonomy and neocolonial 
subordination. One of these elements is the full citizenship of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands and, consequently, the unrestricted access of Antilleans 
to the ‘metropole’. Hence, the Antillean community in the Netherlands did 
not come about as a result of independence, but precisely because this step 
was not taken. For these reasons it will also continue to grow and a decision 
to choose independence later will be almost impossible. The 2010 dissolu-
tion of the constitutional entity of the Netherlands Antilles meant that the 
six islands seceded from one another, but remain within the fold of the 
Kingdom. The notion of ‘postcolonial’, therefore, only applies to the Antil-
lean community if we qualify current kingdom relations as such. And there 
are valid arguments for doing so. 
The Netherlands can also be described as ‘postcolonial’, at least in the 
sense of ‘after decolonization’, in that it took its leave of Indonesia and Suri-
name in succession and settled into permanent postcolonial political ties 
with the Antilles. However, more is contained within this term: the sugges-
tion of a continuation of a colonial history, not only through the migrants, 
but also through contemporary legacies and obligations stemming from 
the colonial period, which somehow affect all Dutch citizens. Much of the 
postcolonial debate in the Netherlands, as will become clear later on, re-
volved around the interpretation and acknowledgement of the colonial past, 
including possible continuities into the present. 
Speaking of ‘postcolonial migrants’ might suggest closed communities 
which feel a natural bond with one another. Neither of the two applies. There 
were strong internal divisions within each of the three postcolonial ‘com-
munities’ when they arrived in the Netherlands, and since their arrival inte-One of the last boats carrying ‘repatriates’ from Indonesia arriving in the Netherlands in 
about 1962. By far the largest number of migrants from the former colony disembarked 
between 1945 and the mid 1950s. The last, minor peak in 1962 was caused by the handover 
of New Guinea to the United Nations and hence, indirectly, to the Republic of Indonesia.  
(collection international institute for social history)
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gration and exogamy have blurred the borders between them and the sur-
rounding society. Equally, there was no natural sense of solidarity between 
migrants from different colonies: Dutch with colonial roots associated 
themselves with the Netherlands East Indies, Suriname or the Antilles, but 
rarely with the broader context of colonialism itself.
2
The three postcolonial migrations more or less succeeded each other. 
This meant that the migrants arrived in a country that was becoming more 
clearly postcolonial over time. Immigration from Indonesia peaked in the 
first five years after the Second World War, coming to a halt by the early 
1960s. At the beginning of this period the Netherlands was destitute, to the 
extent that many Dutch were themselves emigrating. Fifteen years later, by postcolonial netherlands 26
which time immigration from Indonesia had trickled to a standstill, the 
Netherlands found itself in the midst of a period of stupendous economic 
growth, yet the social structure was still firmly anchored in verzuiling. The 
Surinamese exodus dates from the 1970s. By this time the Netherlands had 
become a land of immigration, an initially painful transition to a postcolo-
nial economy was taking place, and secularization and impatience with old 
socio-cultural models was leading to the breakdown of verzuiling and to so-
cial and political renewal. Antillean migration did not peak until the 1990s. 
The Netherlands by then had become wealthier, more European and more 
multicultural than ever before, but it was increasingly divided on the sub-
ject of the integration of minorities and questions of national identity.
from The IndIes/IndonesIa
Post-war migration from Indonesia was the most voluminous of the three 
postcolonial migrations. The history that led up to it, the migration process 
itself, and the episodes of settling and integrating in the Netherlands have 
all been thoroughly described in recent studies, in far more depth than the 
later Surinamese and Antillean migrations. It is striking that these studies 
– in particular Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben, De oude Indische wereld; Hans 
Meijer, In Indië geworteld; Wim Willems, De uittocht uit Indië; Bosma, Raben 
and Willems, De geschiedenis van Indische Nederlanders; and Henk Smeets and 
Fridus Steijlen, In Nederland gebleven – were government funded. They were 
commissioned not only in the hope that they would mark the end of an era, 
but also as a final gesture of respect for the first and second generation mi-
grants, perhaps even a compensatory gesture.
3
The migrants from Indonesia were ethnically diverse. In all cases they 
were minority groups which had had a direct relationship with the colonial 
regime. The colonial system distinguished in law between three ethnically 
defined groups. Europeans and ‘foreign Orientals’ (vreemde oosterlingen, pri-
marily Chinese and Arabs) formed small minorities alongside the over-
whelming ‘native’ majority. The juridical category Europeans included im-
migrants from the Netherlands and their offspring (totoks), as well as 
Indo-Europeans, or Indos. Later, this group, with its stronger cultural and 
ethnic ties to the East Indies than the totoks, became known as Indisch 
Dutch.
4 In 1942, during the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East In-
dies, around 300,000 ‘Europeans’ lived on the archipelago, 175,000 of whom 
were Indo-European, just under 100,000 totoks, and a few tens of thousands 
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eve of the Second World War there were 70 million inhabitants in the colony. 
The Japanese interned the totoks in camps during the occupation, sepa-
rating men from women and children. Many Indo men were interned as well; 
other men and most women and children from this group lived outside the 
camps, but also in perilous conditions. Indonesian independence was de-
clared on 17 August, 1945, two days before the Japanese surrendered. This 
was followed by the anarchic bersiap period (named after the motto ‘be pre-
pared’) and futile attempts by the Dutch to restore their authority – four 
years of the kinds of atrocities that are inherent to contested decolonization 
processes.
5 Between the end of the war and the final chapter of decoloniza-
tion – the handover of New Guinea in 1962 – almost all who were European 
under colonial law opted for repatriation, often reluctantly.
The composition of the migrant community gradually became broader 
than it had been just after the war, when totoks had dominated. The majority 
of those designated as ‘rooted in the East Indies’, i.e. the Indos, also sought 
sanctuary in the Netherlands. Depending on their class, many had a degree 
of knowledge of the Dutch language and culture, but only a small minority 
had any firsthand experience of the Netherlands. Their more-or-less Asian 
appearance made them visibly ‘different’. In the colony, class and colour dis-
tinctions had divided the ‘Europeans’ – the totoks versus those who were 
‘rooted in the East Indies’, and had resulted in subtle subdivisions within the 
Indo group. In the Netherlands, such distinctions would over time become 
somewhat erased by the memory of a shared past and resentment about de-
colonization and the ‘chilly’ reception all had received in the Netherlands. 
The ‘repatriation’ of the lion’s share of those defined as European, total-
ling between 250,000 and 300,000 people, was no party.
6 In the Dutch East 
Indies, most totoks and at least some Indo-Europeans had enjoyed a good life 
and considerable status. During the war and the bersiap they had endured a 
wretched time. The hope of returning to their old lives afterwards turned 
out to be an illusion. Almost always disillusioned and often destitute they 
accepted the involuntary ‘journey back’, leaving behind a number of lost 
years. If only the Netherlands had protected them better from ‘the Japs’ and 
the ‘collaborator’ Sukarno, who in their view had misused the Japanese oc-
cupation to further his despicable nationalist programme…
In the Netherlands, as many were to experience, there was little and de-
creasing sympathy for the resentment they felt about the end of colonialism 
and their complaints about inadequate accommodation and the cold recep-
tion they had received. Requests for compensation for lost possessions and 
unpaid salaries were turned down. The Netherlands was too busy with its 
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attention to the Dutch repatriates. Moreover, they increasingly came to be 
regarded as reactionaries who longed to return to a gilded colonial exis-
tence. The initially silent Indos, now designated Indisch Dutch, were still 
seen as outsiders, for the time being – difficult to place and not taken com-
pletely seriously in a country that was still almost entirely white. In most 
later studies of ‘European’ repatriates, the distinction between totoks and 
Indisch Dutch is more diffuse, more so than it had been in the Netherlands 
East Indies. Estimates of the total size of the Indisch population often in-
clude all the migrants who came from the former colony, although the pic-
ture was dominated by the largest group, the Indos. Crucial is how unrepre-
sentative the migration from Indonesia was. The category that was defined 
as European under colonial law consisted of only a fraction of the colonial 
population, but dominated the migration. Almost no totoks remained be-
hind in Indonesia and only very few Indisch Dutch; with the exodus their 
history in the archipelago came to an abrupt end. 
This did not apply to the three groups of non-European migrants: Moluc-
cans, Chinese and Papuans. The contemporary Moluccan community in the 
Netherlands descends mainly from a group of 12,500 immigrants who ar-
rived in 1951, a vast majority of them soldiers in the Royal Dutch East-Indian 
Army (knil) and their families; almost all were Christians.
7 They were de-
mobilized in the Netherlands against their will. Most of these Moluccans 
were poorly educated, spoke limited Dutch, had had modest social status 
under colonial rule, and were regarded as ‘natives’. Their ties to the colonial 
authority and their post-war support for the struggle for an independent 
republic, Republik Maluku Selatan (rms), made them pariahs in the new 
Indonesia – and in the meantime they had come to make up just a small part 
of the entire Moluccan population in Indonesia. In the Netherlands too, 
their post-war history would be marked by marginalization. 
Measured in terms of command of the Dutch language, levels of educa-
tion and social status, the cultural capital of the Moluccans was as weak as 
that of the ethnic Chinese who settled in the Netherlands was strong. There 
had been a large Chinese population in the colony for centuries. This pera­
nakan Chinese population had developed an elite which, in the higher ech-
elons of the late-colonial hierarchy, was put partially on an equal footing 
with the Europeans. Their children went to Dutch schools, some became 
Christian, a few hundred studied at Dutch universities. From this group, a 
small minority – less than 10,000 – ultimately decided to settle in the Neth-
erlands; the ethnic Chinese population in Indonesia was well over a million. 
Their socio-economic integration in the Netherlands was highly success-
ful, though in socio-cultural terms this group remained relatively closed for a long time. These Indisch or peranakan Chinese, in a recent study re-
ferred to as ‘initiated outsiders’, are only briefly touched upon in this book. 
This in part reflects their small number – estimates range from 20,000 to 
40,000 – and the fact that this well-educated and socially successful group 
rarely features in debates about minorities. What is more important is that 
they have displayed remarkable internal cohesion, but have never contrived 
to translate this, either symbolically or politically, into identity politics – 
not in Dutch society and even less so towards Indonesia, where many famil-
ial and commercial ties are maintained to this day.
8
Papuans are also not addressed in this publication. Their numbers in the 
Netherlands are small, in the order of a few thousand. In 1962, the Dutch 
government under severe international pressure handed the former New 
Guinea over to Jakarta ‘for the time being’, in anticipation of a free referen-
dum that never came. From that moment on, a few isolated Papuans in the 
Netherlands agitated for independence. The struggle of these men – Nico-
laas Jouwe, Marcus Kaisiepo, and later Saul Hindom and Victor Kaisiepo – 
was fruitless, as was the struggle that was fought in Papua itself. There were 
internal divisions and the militant Papuans in the Netherlands became in-
creasingly less relevant to independence fighters in Papua. The Hague ig-
nored them as much as possible and they went almost unnoticed in Dutch 
society.
9
The Netherlands, we may safely assume, was not eager to accommodate 
all these newcomers. And there were many reasons for this. Initially there 
was the illusion that the Dutch East Indies could be retained and the migra-
tion consequently symbolized defeat. More consequential post-war factors 
were the desperate state of the Dutch economy; the housing shortage; the 
belief that, with nine million inhabitants, the country was already full; and 
pessimism about the future. Indeed, in the early post-war years, the govern-
ment actively stimulated the emigration of around 350,000 Dutch, mostly to 
Canada and Australia.
10
This is why it was possible for people to express their doubts in public, 
and even more so in private, about the wisdom of allowing into the Nether-
lands those who were ‘rooted in the East Indies’. Certainly, their European 
status gave them the right to come. Moreover, their position in Indonesia 
became stickier by the day. But what were the chances of successful integra-
tion in the Netherlands and would they really want to assimilate? Members 
of government and top civil servants expressed their considerable reserva-
tions in private. Labour Prime Minister, Willem Drees (PvdA), felt that ac-
cepting a large group of Indisch Dutch was ‘highly contestable’. However, in 
public he spoke of the Dutch ‘duty’ to ‘welcome’ them. In so doing, he acted 
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from a conviction that would dominate for decades to come: that the politi-
cal elite must not allow any room for xenophobia, it being hard enough as it 
is to accommodate newcomers.
11
What happened next is well known. By far the majority of ‘repatriates’ 
wanted to integrate as quickly as possible and were even prepared, if neces-
sary, to become fully assimilated ‘potato gobblers’.
12 The government inter-
vened wherever necessary, in particular through an active housing policy. 
The gradual improvement of economic conditions also facilitated their en-
try into the labour market. And so the integration of the Indisch Dutch ran 
smoothly in the end. A success story, judged the British sociologist Christo-
pher Bagley in the late 1960s. His study The Dutch Plural Society states that the 
Dutch held few prejudices for people of a different skin colour, as long as 
they adapted. Respect for other cultures, Bagley claimed, was deeply an-
chored in Dutch society. The government helped a bit by investing massive-
ly in social areas where immigrants needed some initial help. A contempo-
rary study published under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture, 
Recreation and Social Welfare, exuded the same optimistic, even self-satis-
fied air.
13
Different times! Few academics today would so unreservedly sing the 
praises of Dutch openness. The change is unsurprising. At the time Bagley 
carried out his research, the number of ‘newcomers’ in the Netherlands was 
in the order of 400,000, a vast majority of whom were ‘Europeans’ from Indo-
nesia. A lot has changed since then. The number of immigrants has multi-
plied, far more problems have arisen, and the minorities debate has become 
focused on Islam. Bagley was able to paint such a rosy picture of Dutch toler-
ance around 1970 because it had barely been tested by the ‘repatriates’ from 
the Dutch East Indies. Tolerance, it seems in retrospect, was also a euphe-
mism for indifference.
It is telling that once Dutch minorities policy got going in the 1970s, the 
Indisch experience played little more than a background role. In early stud-
ies, such as Allochtonen in Nederland (Verwey-Jonker, 1971) and Immigratie en 
minderheidsvorming (Van Amersfoort, 1974), some attention was still paid to 
the Indisch Dutch, but they later disappeared from view. They played no 
part in subsequent minorities policies, thanks to what was regarded as their 
‘silent’ integration. They also did not feature in the increasingly more de-
tailed documentation of ‘problematic’ migrants.
The profile of the largest postcolonial community in the Netherlands, 
labelled ‘Western migrants’ in contemporary statistics, can only be approx-
imately determined (Table 1).  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008
Total  11.4  13.0  14.1  14.9 15.90 16.4
population  million million million million million million
indisch dutch
Total      404,200a  403,900a  458,000b
1st generation  203,000a 204,000a    140,000a 138,900a 179,000b
2nd  generation      264,000a 265,000a 280,000b
moluccan
Total   25,900c 35.200c      42,349
1st  generation        ca. 10,000
2nd  generation        32,349
surinamese  12,900a 28,985d 157,091  232,776  302,514 335,799#
Total
1st generation      126,107 158,772 183,249 185,284
2nd generation      30,974  74,004  119,265 150,515
antillean*   approx.   13,630  40,726  76,552  107,197  131,841#
Total  2,500d 
1st generation      29,515 54,881 69,266 78,968
2nd generation      11,211 21,671 37,931 52,873
moroccan  approx.   17,400e  69,464  163,458  262,221  335,127#
Total  100 e 
1st generation      57,502  112,562 152,540 167,063
2nd generation      11,962  50,896  109,681 168,064
turkish
Total ca. 100e  23,600e  112,774  203,647  308,890  372,714#
1st generation      92,568 138,089 177,754 194,556
2nd generation      20,206  65,558 131,136 178,158
   Source: Statistics Netherlands (cbs), 
unless stated otherwise:
  a.  Nicolaas & Sprangers, ‘Buitenlandse 
migratie’, 38, 40, 44; including Moluccans.
  b.  Including Moluccans. Beets et al., 
Demografische geschiedenis, 79-82, Beets, Van 
Imhof & Huisman, ‘Demografie’, 58 
(458.000 Indische Nederlanders, 2001), 
Nicolaas & Sprangers, ‘Buitenlandse 
migratie’, 38, 40, 44. The illusory growth 
between 2000 and 2008 stems from 
differences in definition.
  c. Penninx, Schoorl & Van Praag, Impact, 19.
  d.  Oostindie & Klinkers, Knellende koninkri­
jksbanden, ii, 225.
  e.  Blok, Bruggen bouwen, 61.
  *  From all six islands of the (former) 
Netherlands Antilles; the vast majority 
are from Curaçao. 
  #  Statistics Netherlands’ estimates for the 
third generation: 22,000 of Surinamese 
origin; 9,300 of Antillean origin; 3,100 of 
Moroccan origin; and 5,000 of Turkish 
origin.
Table 1. Population figures of the Netherlands, proportion of postcolonial 
and non-Western groups, 1960-2008
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the announcement by the Surinamese cabinet of Henck Arron in February 1974 that 
Suriname would become independent at the end of 1975. About a third of the population 
voted with their feet and chose the security of the former ‘metropole’ over the young 
republic. (collection international institute for social history)
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The number of the first and second generation of Indisch Dutch and repatri-
ates is estimated to be more than half a million, if one includes the Moluc-
cans and the almost 15,000 Chinese who came from the Dutch East Indies. 
The Moluccan community contains almost 45,000 souls. There are no repre-
sentative socio-economic or cultural statistics available. It is clear that the 
Moluccans are still less integrated. They are, therefore, also the only com-
munity with Indisch roots that still falls under Dutch minorities policy, 
even though they have been registered as ‘Western immigrants’ since 2000. 
Is it still relevant to speak of an ‘Indisch’ community and if so, who be-
longs to it? That depends. In Ons Indisch erfgoed, Lizzy van Leeuwen demon-
strates that for totoks the emphasis placed on their Indisch experiences was 
a matter of choice, whereas for Indos it was unavoidable. In his biography of 
the Indisch protagonist Tjalie Robinson, Wim Willems makes clear the ex-
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The notion of an ‘Indisch identity’ could be taken less and less for granted. 
The Moluccans were initially a community apart. Only in the last decade 
have the various groups begun to draw closer together, both in the cultural 
realm and in relation to government, where the main concern is publicly 
coming to terms with the war. The Chinese Indisch community has not 
manifested itself as a collective part of the Indisch world. Insofar as one can 
speak of an Indisch ‘community’, this is manifested mainly in a socio-cul-
tural and political sense around questions of identity.
14 
The picture is demographically complicated too. The totok group has 
more or less invisibly dissolved into Dutch society; this is not the case with 
the other three groups. However, the integration of these segments has 
clearly proceeded at the level of interpersonal relations. As early as the 1950s, 
a small minority of Indisch Dutch started marrying indigenous Dutch, a 
pattern that has continued ever since; the same applies to the Moluccans.
15 It 
is therefore possible that half of all Dutch with ‘Indisch roots’ have parents 
and/or partners who are not, or are only partly Indisch or Moluccan. This not 
only makes every estimate of the scale of this postcolonial ‘community’ con-
testable, it also makes clear that the very existence of a distinct community 
has become highly debatable, especially now we are talking about a third or 
fourth generation. 
from surIname
Shortly after the war, there were a few thousand Surinamese living in the 
Netherlands; in 1970 this was 30,000; in 1980 almost 160,000; today there are 
more than 335,000 (Table 1). This number is still way below the total popula-
tion of Indisch origin, but, for Suriname, it reflects a far more dramatic his-
tory. Where the migration from Indonesia was by no means representative 
in ethnic terms and in demographic terms only of minor significance, the 
migration from Suriname took on the character of an exodus. More than a 
third of the population, a representative section of the population, left the 
country in the mid 1970s. Ever since, the Surinamese population has grown 
faster in the Netherlands than in Suriname; today around 40 per cent of all 
Surinamese live in the former metropole.
16
Once again, decolonization provided the impetus for the migration, but 
the context for what Henk Wesseling says was ‘the first true colonial hang-
over’ was entirely different.
17 Where post-war Dutch governments had tried 
to retain the Netherlands East Indies within the Kingdom, around 1970 it 
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pendence. There were various reasons for this. The Hague was weary of its 
colonial image and wanted to avoid having to intervene in the policies of 
Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, which were autonomous countries with-
in the kingdom. Alongside this, economic aid to both countries increased 
considerably, which provoked many questions back home. Finally, the mi-
gration issue began to play a role. The presence of more than 40,000 Suri-
namese and Antilleans in the Netherlands was felt to be undesirable; a 
transfer of sovereignty would also bring an end to Caribbean migration. 
History ran a different course from the one planned by The Hague. Dutch 
politicians failed to convince the Antilles to accept independence, but they 
were able to do business with Suriname. In February 1974, the Surinamese 
government, under Prime Minister Arron, announced that Suriname 
would accept independence at the end of 1975 – news that struck most of Su-
riname like a bolt out of the blue. The announcement led to frantic negotia-
tions, deep divisions within Suriname itself, ever more concessions from 
The Hague – intended to ensure the separation went ahead – and the begin-
nings of a veritable exodus. Independence, consequently, lost much of its 
gloss straight away and the Republic of Suriname got off to a seriously weak 
start. Economic and political problems in the years that followed led to more 
emigration, which was ironically eased by the generous terms for access to 
the Netherlands that the Surinamese government had negotiated prior to 
independence.
Doubts about whether the Surinamese could integrate successfully in 
the Netherlands were expressed more broadly and more loudly in adminis-
trative circles, the press, and socially than they had been in relation to the 
Indisch migration: ‘Stop the Bijlmer express!’ read the weekly Elsevier’s 
headline in 1974.
18 Suriname, so the argument ran, was much less socio-eco-
nomically developed and levels of education and work experience among 
migrants were far lower; this could only cause problems for the Dutch job 
market and put too much demand on what by now was a sophisticated Dutch 
welfare state, but which had been under strain ever since the oil crisis. Ra-
cial arguments were rarely used openly. Concern about the ability of the new 
arrivals to adapt were expressed in veiled terms, just as the worries about 
those ‘rooted in the Indies’ had been previously. The fact that the Surinam-
ese immigrants were ethnically and educationally highly heterogeneous 
played almost no part in the Dutch debate. The rights of the Surinamese to 
Dutch citizenship and, consequently, residence in the Netherlands, ulti-
mately remained intact up until the transfer of sovereignty on 25 November, 
1975 and, in actual fact, until 1980. Only then did the Surinamese become 
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Despite the initial widespread pessimism, thirty-five years on Surinam-
ese integration in the Netherlands is often praised for its success. There is 
good cause for this. The unemployment figures among Surinamese Dutch 
have gradually fallen and are now lower than any other non-Western minor-
ity group. The Surinamese are also relatively successful in the realms of edu-
cation and income; only the figures for juvenile delinquency are unfavour-
able. However, this good news has to be qualified on two points. A gulf 
between the Surinamese and indigenous Dutch populations is still visible, 
even in the second generation and it is unclear whether this gap will close in 
the third generation. It is also doubtful whether all ethnic segments of the 
entire Surinamese-Dutch community integrate equally successfully. 
This question brings us back to the ethnic composition of the Surinam-
ese community. This seems to be a reasonable reflection of the Surinamese 
population around 1975.
19 At that time, Surinamese of African descent made 
up just under fifty per cent of the population and Surinamese of Asian de-
scent just over. The Afro-Surinamese, also known as the Creoles, fell into 
‘urban Creoles’ and Maroons. The Creole urban middle class was the most 
‘Dutch’ in terms of religion, culture and language, the Maroons the least; 
culturally, most Afro-Surinamese fell somewhere between the two poles. 
The majority of the Asian population was of British Indian origin and a mi-
nority hailed from Java. The majority of the former group was Hindu, a sig-
nificant minority was Muslim, as were most Javanese. 
Suriname was not (and is still not) a melting pot, but a pluralist society in 
which ethnic difference continued to play a vital role. Nonetheless, the edu-
cation system served nation-building in a paradoxical way. Through this 
system, Dutch, which was not the first language of any ethnic group, be-
came the binding national language. This would ultimately facilitate inte-
gration in the Netherlands, but prior to that gave rise to an exclusive orienta-
tion towards the metropole, which would culminate in the exodus around 
independence that was so tragic for the republic.
How significant were ethnic differences for the integration of Surinam-
ese in the Netherlands? There are remarkably few hard facts available on this 
subject, because it is a methodologically complex topic, but perhaps also 
because it is considered to be a thorny subject. The little comparative re-
search there is suggests that inter-ethnic differences are not (yet) very large; 
the question is whether this research is representative and, above all, wheth-
er it is indicative of the future. After all, one cannot assume that all ethnic 
groups integrated equally easily. In Suriname, the Asian groups have man-
aged to turn their initial disadvantage around and are now regarded as more 
successful than Afro-Surinamese; there are indications that a comparable 36 postcolonial netherlands
process is taking shape in the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom ethnicity 
is an obvious indicator of social mobility, whereby Hindus are far more suc-
cessful than ‘Black Britons’.
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From this perspective it is risky to interpret general indicators of the so-
cial integration of Surinamese Dutch very optimistically. Relatively favour-
able statistics for the whole community may disguise ethnic differences 
and poor performance of the Afro-Surinamese segment. Indeed, concerns 
about this have been expressed in recent years by this very community. It is 
feasible that a number of negative indicators for social integration that ap-
ply to Antilleans in the Netherlands, but which are equally relevant to West 
Indians in the United Kingdom, or Afro-Surinamese in Suriname itself, al-
so apply to a section of the Afro-Surinamese community in the Netherlands. 
This issue is only lightly touched upon in this book, namely, insofar as eth-
nic distinctions within the Surinamese community are thematized as such. 
This usually occurs, unsurprisingly, only furtively. 
Surely, then, it is hard to speak of a single Surinamese community in the 
Netherlands. Just as with earlier migrants from the Netherlands East Indies, 
it is not simply a question of ethnicity, but also class – the higher the class, 
the more Western the education and orientation – and, again, generation. 
Soon the second generation of Surinamese Dutch will be larger than the first 
and the third generation is already estimated to be 22,000. But how ‘Suri-
namese’ are those later generations, even in demographic terms? Once again 
the estimates are extremely tentative, but, as with migrants from the Neth-
erlands East Indies, they suggest a strong increase in the frequency of inter-
ethnic relations and, consequently, children of mixed descent. This means 
that the notion of ‘community’ also changes with the advance of the genera-
tions and refers more to a choice of identity than to origins. To make things 
even more complicated, interethnic relations with white Dutch are more 
frequent among the traditionally more Western-oriented and overwhelm-
ingly Christian Afro-Surinamese (and Antilleans) than the culturally and 
religiously more closed communities of Asian Surinamese. Afro-Surinam-
ese are therefore closer to the indigenous Dutch population in this respect.
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from The anTIlles
Of the three postcolonial migrations, the one from the Antilles was the last 
and the least voluminous, but has since become the most controversial. This 
can be explained by recent problems with Curaçaoan migrants and the fact 
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from the consistent rejection of independence, which has enabled Antille-
ans to retain their citizenship of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and there-
by unhindered access to the Netherlands. Once again there is a direct link 
between the course of decolonization and the postcolonial migration, but 
this time it is antithetical. Free access to the Netherlands even became An-
tillean citizens’ most important argument against independence – and such 
a large proportion of the Antillean population now lives in the Netherlands 
that the perspective of political separation has, in fact, vanished.
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The Antillean migration can be called ‘postcolonial’ because the Charter 
of the Kingdom (1954) marked the formal end of the colonial era. Over the 
last few decades it is precisely Antillean politicians who have resisted pres-
sure from The Hague to accept a transfer of sovereignty arguing that decolo-
nization was completed in 1954. In this view, which is now considered na-
tionalistic by the islands, the postcolonial phase began more than half a 
century ago. But outsiders continue to describe the current political rela-
tionship, including the migration, as colonial or neocolonial – just as the 
relations between France and her overseas départements or the United States 
and Puerto Rico. As will become clear later on, there are several parallels 
between these post- or neocolonial arrangements and the ensuing migra-
tion processes.
23 
Strictly speaking, it is inaccurate to speak of the Antilles or the migra-
tion. The six islands, which shortly after the war were given the collective 
name ‘the Netherlands Antilles’, were previously referred to as ‘the Colony of 
Curaçao’ or ‘Curaçao and Dependencies’. The political construction of the 
Netherlands Antilles-of-Six ended in 1986 when Aruba was allowed to step 
out of the Antillean relationship, while still remaining within the King-
dom. The dismantling of the country of the Antilles-of-Five was completed 
in 2010. The terms ‘Antilles’ and ‘Antilleans’ used in this book are, therefore, 
conceptually imperfect, but still the most useful. 
When speaking about Antillean migration, moreover, we need to specify 
that by far the largest number of these migrants originated from Curaçao. If 
we compare the scale of the ‘Antillean’ population in the Netherlands 
(132,000) with that of the six islands (around 300,000), we have to speak of an 
exodus. The comparison becomes even more telling when we realize that 
more than 100,000 Curaçaoans live in the Netherlands and around 140,000 
on the islands.
A majority of Antilleans is of African descent, the most important ex-
ception being the large mestizo population segment of Aruba. The official 
language of the Leeward Islands is Papiamentu, on the Windward Islands 
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pean standards, which implies, among other things, that most Antilleans 
speak mediocre to poor Dutch. What are the other characteristics of the An-
tillean migration to the Netherlands, apart from the spectacular increase 
since the 1990s? First, there is the circularity, continuing problems with in-
tegration and, partly as a consequence of this, political controversy. The cir-
cularity, the character of the to-ing and fro-ing, is linked to the possibilities 
citizenship offers; unlike migrants from Indonesia or Suriname, Antilleans 
have the right to settle now here, then there, without having to worry about 
being refused entry into either the Netherlands or the Antilles. 
The problems around integration are relatively large, at least in relation 
to a section of the Antillean population. In contrast to a well-educated and 
integrated middle class, there is a large group that is poorly integrated and 
which scores highly on all the wrong kinds of lists – from dropping out of 
school, through unemployment, to crime. The association of Antillean mi-
gration with social order issues explains why the ‘Antillean dossier’ has be-
come politically highly controversial over the last decade for the first time in 
parliamentary history. Through the Dutch minorities debate, the islands of 
the Antilles became the subject of such substantial parliamentary contro-
versy that, against The Hague’s better judgement, a definitive split with the 
islands (imposed independence) became a topic of political debate once 
again. 
The large scale of Antillean migration reflects a paradox that is no less 
characteristic of other non-sovereign islands in the Caribbean. Compared 
with the rest of the region, the standard of living is high, and civil rights and 
freedoms, the functioning of democracy and territorial integrity are all ex-
cellently protected. That much of this is thanks to the ‘neocolonial’ status of 
these islands is something the local population on all six islands under-
stand all too well; this is why they consistently refuse to take the final step 
towards independence. At the same time Antilleans know that many things 
are even better organized in the metropole. And, precisely because they have 
the right as Dutch citizens, many choose to seek such opportunities across 
the ocean. 
This is also the story of Antilleans in the Netherlands. That their migra-
tion at first generated few problems, but now more, is not illogical. Initially 
it was mainly the middle class that settled in the Netherlands, often tempo-
rarily, to study. This segment is still there, but the long-term deterioration 
of the situation on Curaçao has had drastic consequences. Over the last ten 
or fifteen years, unemployment has been consistently high on the island, 
education standards have dropped, including the command of the Dutch 
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These social problems have been translated to the Netherlands. A growing 
section of the Antillean – primarily Afro-Curaçaoan – migrants was under-
privileged and poorly educated. They spoke inadequate Dutch, and often 
had no options open to them other than social security benefits, income 
from petty crime, or both. In addition, the majority came from single, young 
mothers, which is a well-known risk factor. In other cases, national borders 
would close in the face of such migrants, but not inside a political entity 
such as the Kingdom; chain migration did the rest. 
Thus a picture formed that of all postcolonial migrants in the Nether-
lands, precisely the Antilles – the only collection of tropical (is)lands still 
constitutionally tied to the Netherlands – produced and, moreover, contin-
ue to produce the least successful migrants. This may be too sombre a pic-
ture. There is also a group of highly successful Antilleans in the Nether-
lands. Furthermore, the history of mass Curaçaoan migration is still 
relatively young; it is perhaps too easily forgotten that in the initial phases, 
the earlier migrations from Indonesia and Suriname were also accompa-
nied by integration problems. However, these subtle distinctions do not 
necessarily lead to optimistic prognoses.
mIgraTIon and InTegraTIon In The neTherlands
In 1945, the population of the Netherlands was just over nine million, today 
it is 16.5 million, more than three million of whom are post-war immigrants 
and their offspring. This demographic development alone is spectacular, 
certainly from the perspective of the early post-war years, when the Nether-
lands was said to be full and the government organized mass emigration. 
Add to this the changing ethnic composition of the Dutch population: more 
than a million postcolonial migrants; over 800,000 Muslims, mainly from 
Morocco and Turkey; and smaller groups of migrants from all over the 
world. The Netherlands as a whole is becoming multicultural, a condition 
that has characterized the big cities for quite some time. 
A lot of social unease surrounds immigration and integration issues. 
One reaction to this, intended to be reassuring, is that the Netherlands al-
ready has a long history of immigration, the outcome of which in the past 
was, on the whole, positive. This is true, especially in the period when the 
Netherlands was a rich oasis in Europe, but the relevance of this nuance is 
disputed. Integration is never straightforward and takes time. Even so, the 
question remains whether the result is always positive. One question is 
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in earlier centuries migrants usually came from neighbouring, culturally 
more similar countries. A second consideration is that the labour market in 
the past was not ‘disrupted’ by government provisions: migrants who found 
no work or could not hold down a job had little opportunity to stay long in 
the Netherlands. Moreover, the correspondence between earlier migrants 
and the labour market was more favourable than it is today in a post-indus-
trial economy. The weight of these respective factors is hotly debated among 
scholars and politicians alike.
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What is clear is that the Netherlands in 1945, unlike France and the Unit-
ed Kingdom, had only limited recent experience of foreigners settling per-
manently in the country and even less so of colonial migrants.
25 Equally, 
there was no geographical centre operating an active policy to bind separat-
ist regions to the national culture. The verzuilde, ‘pillarized’, Netherlands 
had no strong tradition of directed nation-building and felt it could also do 
without; the verzuilde institutions would help willing newcomers to assim-
ilate. The hesitation about whether to allow large numbers of Belgian refu-
gees into the country during the First World War, or Jewish refugees from 
Nazi Germany during the interwar period, was prompted by economic or 
political motives, not by concern about national identity. The free access of 
migrants from the colonies to the pre-war Netherlands was not a serious 
topic of discussion, because their numbers were so small. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that the post-war arrival of people ‘rooted in the East In-
dies’ provoked many concerns, as the arrival of Surinamese and Antillean 
migrants was to later. It is more surprising that the initial agitation about 
the first wave of migrants of colour had no consequences for government 
policy and that in the recruitment of migrant labour from the Mediterra-
nean region, little thought was given, by neither the left nor the right, to the 
possibility of these foreigners settling permanently in the Netherlands.
In the 1950s and ’60s, the reception of repatriates from the Netherlands 
East Indies was arranged at a basic level – more targeted, but frugal and pa-
ternalistic. The government organized and financed things like (dispersed) 
housing, otherwise leaving as much as possible to private, primarily church, 
initiatives. Assimilation was the undisputed goal. In the 1970s, the Nether-
lands, now much wealthier, was taken more or less by surprise by the mas-
sive influx of Surinamese and Mediterranean migrants. National coordina-
tion was meagre, policies for the different minorities were fragmented 
across three ministries, and local councils had to concoct their own poli-
cies. The illusion of return, but also a more open social climate, led to a 
slackening of the goal of complete integration. Consequently, in the 1970s, 
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and migrants’ organizations came to qualify for government funding.  
The Etnische minderheden report (Ethnic minorities report, 1979) by the 
Scientific Council for Government Policy (wrr) articulated what was still a 
controversial realization at that time, that the migrants would stay in the 
Netherlands. By now there had been the Moluccan train hijacking and a few 
small ‘race riots’ and the rise of a small number of xenophobic politicians 
like Hans Janmaat had begun to take shape; something was brewing, it 
seemed. In 1983, outlines for a relatively systematic integration policy were 
laid down in the first Minorities Bill, this time from the Ministry of the Inte-
rior and Kingdom Affairs. A general policy (for the disadvantaged) became 
the norm, while policy aimed at specific minority groups was seen as second 
choice. Socio-economic integration was increasingly more explicitly en-
dorsed as a top priority almost across the board in the House of Representa-
tives. Nonetheless, the next Scientific Council for Government Policy re-
port, Allochtonenbeleid (Immigration Policy, 1989), concluded that the policy 
had failed, that too much focus was still being placed on cultural issues, 
making minorities too dependent on government provision. Once again the 
Council was proved right. Work, education, and assimilation were the 
spearheads of the policy, including in the Purple Coalition’s bill Integratie­
beleid etnische minderheden (Policy for the integration of ethnic minorities, 
1994). Half a decade later, anti-establishment political leader Pim Fortuyn 
would successfully argue that it had all been too lax – and ever since all par-
ties have hardened their positions and multiculturalism and even prudent 
cultural relativism has become regarded with suspicion or quite simply as 
an anathema.
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Discontent about the multicultural Netherlands over the last few years 
has led to a caricature of the policy that was implemented; it is presented as 
if (left-wing) The Hague had thrown the borders wide open for immigrants, 
without placing any demands on them in terms of integration and assimila-
tion, and, under the flag of multiculturalism, had discarded national cul-
ture. The reality was just a bit different. Like its European neighbours, the 
Netherlands had tried from the 1970s to execute a restrictive immigration 
policy; but this too had only a limited effect, until recently, because the in-
struments were inadequate and social resistance was, indeed, strong. The 
room to experience cultural specificity was considerable; however, this can 
sooner be attributed to avoidance and the absence of a policy, rather than the 
deliberate encouragement of diversity. 
Integration, argue migration historians, takes time; only in the third 
generation can anything meaningful be established about whether a spe-
cific group of immigrants has integrated successfully or not. The disadvan-42 postcolonial netherlands
tages and problems experienced by the first two generations obscure other 
more favourable developments, which require more time to evolve. In this 
view, Dutch immigration policy suffers from counterproductive impa-
tience. This optimistic view is not without its challengers. Sceptics stress 
that migration history also teaches us that not all groups of migrants inte-
grate with the same ease. Certainly not if they take their problems with 
them to other – in terms of work and education – far more demanding 
worlds, where welfare provisions conceal rather than solve the problems. 
The more pessimistic view has, over the last decade, translated into ever 
broader criticism of what has been described as ‘weak’ or ineffective integra-
tion policy. The Blok parliamentary committee (2002-2004) seriously ques-
tioned whether this policy, which cost 1.6 billion euros between 1980 and 
2003, had indeed had any impact on integration.
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Questioning the effectiveness of the policy is not the subject of this book. 
Yet, it must be said that the image of a naive, multiculturalist immigration 
policy is one sided. The decision at the end of the seventies to adopt a na-
tional minorities policy was prompted by significant concerns about the 
integration of Moluccans, Surinamese and ‘guest workers’ from Mediterra-
nean countries. The glorification of diversity at that time was simply not an 
issue. The Minderhedennota (Minorities Bill, 1983) mentioned a ‘multicultur-
al society’ and ‘adjustment on both sides’, but explicitly expected the immi-
grants largely to adapt.
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In line with the long tradition of verzuiling, a lot of room had already been 
created and subsidized for minority organizations from the 1960s, also on 
religious grounds; far more, unsurprisingly, than in centralist France with 
its republican tradition.
29 In the decades that followed, the government con-
tinued to attune its policies to the leaders of these organizations. This some-
times led to naive aims, making it possible for ‘integration while retaining 
one’s own identity’ and ‘education in one’s own language and culture’ to be 
looked back on in scorn. However, political and thus financial support for 
that policy rapidly evaporated.
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In the 1980s, the government settled on a policy in which the role of the 
‘categorial’ welfare institutions for individual ethnic minority groups was 
limited. This policy has not altered since. The government finally set up the 
national minorities consultation platform lom (Landelijk Overleg Minder­
heden, 1997) which included representatives from sio (Surinaams Inspraak 
Orgaan), lowm (Landelijk Overlegorgaan Welzijn Molukkers) and ocan (Over­
legorgaan Caribische Nederlanders). The government subsidized the cost of an 
office for each group and that was all. At a national level, at the time, the 
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government, foundations and associations were often more important; 
their role, however, has gradually been limited. Decisions about allocating 
funds to minority organizations have for years essentially been governed by 
the question of whether or not they build bridges to the wider society.
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In short, neither financing nor promotion, but rather the tolerance of 
cultural difference within the boundaries of gradually more defined norms 
has marked Dutch policy. Unlike the United Kingdom, multiculturalism 
has never formed the core of minorities policy, let alone been raised to the 
level of an ideal underlying policy, and the rhetorical celebration of cultural 
diversity has never been dominant. Public support for multiculturalism 
was limited from the start.
32 This was confirmed by the view popularized by 
Pim Fortuyn, that the glorification of multiculturalism was primarily a dis-
course of the indigenous Dutch (leftist) elite. But the policy had never been 
deliberately radical, rather it was a pragmatic and therefore more indulgent 
policy than in retrospect was deemed desirable. With its moderate multicul-
turalism, the Netherlands swung back and forth between the British and 
French models. The primacy of socio-economic integration was never aban-
doned, space for the cultural freedom of minorities was highlighted – some-
times more, sometimes less, but gradually more with words than funds. 
Multiculturalism was implicitly abandoned as early as the 1990s, thereafter, 
under the influence of the Fortuyn revolt, also explicitly.
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Over the last decade, the demands for ‘full citizenship’ in a cultural sense 
have tightened and the alleged incompatibility of a specific culture with 
peaceful integration – Islam, which is often presented as homogeneous – 
has been explicitly put on the agenda. Only a small minority of postcolonial 
migrants are Muslim. Consequently the Islam debate barely touches upon 
them and is perhaps positive when it does – they are seen as the opposite of 
the Muslims whom many believe find assimilation so difficult. The Dutch 
minorities debate has come overwhelmingly to focus on Islam. Historical 
survey works, from Nieuwkomers (Jan Lucassen and Rinus Penninx) to Ko­
men en gaan (Herman Obdeijn and Marlou Schrover), still comprehensively 
address postcolonial migration. However, recent books on integration by 
such opinion makers as Paul Scheffer (Het land van aankomst, translated as 
The land of arrival) and Ian Buruma (Dood van een gezonde roker, previously 
Murder in Amsterdam), or the report Bruggen bouwen (Building bridges) by the 
Blok parliamentary committee, barely mention postcolonial migration, if 
at all.
34 This fits into a broader and perhaps somewhat overly optimistic view 
that postcolonial migrants will ultimately all integrate successfully. Revis-
iting Bagley, it might give some a sense of triumphant satisfaction that it is 
not Dutch aversions, but purely due to the Muslims themselves that they are 
less well integrated. 44 postcolonial netherlands
Meanwhile, all groups of postcolonial migrants over the last few decades 
have become more and more explicitly players in a broader social debate 
about national identity. In this debate, which came about through the influ-
ence of migration and advancing European unification, postcolonial mi-
grants had a significant rhetorical advantage over all other migrants. After 
all, only they can trace their presence in the Netherlands back to centuries of 
colonial rule overseas and the associated, ambivalent affinities. They em-
body a history that has come home and are therefore, many argue, one up on 
other immigrants. This provided excellent, fertile ground for identity poli-
tics, for which The Hague developed a certain sensitivity and which held up 
even when the general minorities policy hardened. 
This is also interesting in comparative terms. The Netherlands is one of 
four European countries which were confronted with mass migration from 
their former colonies in the post-war period. In France, the United King-
dom, and Portugal a majority of post-war immigrants came from the former 
colonies, whereas in the Netherlands there was a second wave of immigra-
tion, comparable in size to the first, from countries with which it had no 
existing historical ties. In view of the central role given to Islam in contem-
porary debates on minorities and integration, it is significant that, unlike in 
the United Kingdom and France, there is little overlap in the Netherlands 
(and Portugal) between the categories ‘postcolonial migrants’ and ‘Mus-
lims’. It seems therefore logical that these differences would have repercus-
sions for the comparatively benevolent tone used in the Netherlands to 
speak of postcolonial ‘communities’ and their longing for the acknowledge-
ment of (post)colonial injustices. 
The dIsappearanCe of The posTColonIal  
CommunITy and bonus
Migrants rarely have an easy time. Whether they leave for economic, politi-
cal or other reasons, they settle elsewhere in the hope of a better life for 
themselves and possibly their offspring. Sometimes they achieve this, 
though it usually takes time, sometimes they do not. They are often wel-
comed onto the labour market, but rarely are they welcomed with open arms 
as (potential) new citizens. Even less so if they are perceived by the popula-
tion of the new country to be fundamentally different – culturally, ethni-
cally, religiously, or racially.
This also applied to postcolonial migrants in the Netherlands. And yet 
their history is different from that of postcolonial migrants elsewhere in 
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determined the successive postcolonial migrations to the Netherlands. Un-
like France or the United Kingdom, the needs of the Dutch labour market 
were not a decisive factor, on the contrary. The ‘repatriates’ from Indonesia 
arrived at a time when a larger number of Dutch, with government help, 
were emigrating in the belief that the country was full. The Surinamese exo-
dus reached its conclusion just at the point when the Netherlands had al-
ready ended labour recruitment and hoped to minimize further immigra-
tion. Antillean immigration coincided with a boom period, but this group 
connected poorly with the labour market.
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In none of these cases did the demands of the Dutch labour market deter-
mine the arrival of the migrants, unlike in the case of guest workers. Other 
migrants would have been refused entry in similar circumstances. The fact 
that postcolonial migrants were admitted was a direct consequence of colo-
nial history. By far the majority of migrants from the Dutch East Indies/In-
donesia were Dutch nationals; those who were not were later allowed Dutch 
citizenship on political grounds. All Surinamese who chose to settle in the 
Netherlands in 1975, and even up to 1980, had the right to do so; many more 
Surinamese were granted Dutch citizenship after that on political grounds. 
Antilleans are citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and therefore still 
have the right to settle and live in the former metropole. 
This is a crucial postcolonial bonus. Most migrants from these three 
countries could claim citizenship on legal grounds, which migrants from 
elsewhere could not, or only with a great deal more difficulty. Of course, 
these rights were at times controversial and attempts were indeed made by 
The Hague to reign them in. However, more importantly, citizenship for 
postcolonial migrants remained intact and in many cases was extended on 
political grounds to citizens from the former colonies who had no (longer a) 
formal right to it.
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The postcolonial bonus was of broader significance. Whether we look at 
the reception in the Netherlands or at the characteristics of the migrants, 
the picture is none too rosy. Dutch society was no exception to the rule that 
the arrival of ‘strange’ newcomers was seldom rejoiced at. Many studies and 
innumerable memories of Indisch, Surinamese or Antillean migrants con-
firm this. But equally clear is that there was a particular sensitivity in po-
litical and intellectual circles for arguments in the realm of ‘we are here be-
cause you were there’ – arguments and deeply-felt emotions which were 
often translated into the demand for compensatory treatment, even if only 
to ease colonial suffering. Migrants from elsewhere could not play this priv-
ileged register. 
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were able to pull other more direct advantages out of their colonial baggage. 
To differing degrees they had at their disposal social or cultural capital that 
advanced their integration into Dutch society. This capital included having 
been educated in a system that had been based on the Dutch system, a com-
mand of the Dutch language, and a familiarity and often affinity with Dutch 
culture. In this respect, successive generations of postcolonial migrants 
were in a better starting position than other newcomers. This was certainly 
the view of policy-makers in The Hague. Of all postcolonial minorities only 
the Moluccans, who were to remain isolated for a long time, were still 
deemed eligible for (modest) financial support for education in their own 
language and culture.
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Needless to say, this social and cultural capital was unevenly distribut-
ed. Class was a determining factor for all groups; the higher the class, the 
greater the familiarity with the Dutch language and Dutch culture, and the 
greater the chance of integrating successfully. The more laborious integra-
tion of the Moluccan and Antillean population is in part linked to the low 
levels of education and limited command of Dutch among the first genera-
tion. Class was also reflected in the degree of cultural proximity – where all 
postcolonial migrants to a certain extent were bearers of a colonial mixed 
culture, the strength of the Dutch component corresponded with their so-
cial and socio-economic position.
In the current Dutch minorities debate, a great deal of importance is at-
tached to minorities’ cultures, in particular Islam. This is seldom positive 
and often with an amazing underestimation of the importance of socio-eco-
nomic factors. But be that as it may, this pessimistic culturalist perspective 
is fairly irrelevant in the case of postcolonial migrants. Almost all migrants 
from the Netherlands East Indies belonged to the Christian minority in an 
overwhelmingly Islamic country. Almost all Antilleans and Afro-Surinam-
ese are also Christian. In terms of religion, the vast majority of postcolonial 
migrants therefore merged seamlessly with the Netherlands as it had been 
before it became secularized. The only segments that did not fit into this 
meanwhile diluted picture of a Christian nation, were the Surinamese of 
Asian descent. Most of them were Hindus; the total number of Muslims 
would not have been more than 50,000. This leads to the cynical conclusion 
that the postcolonial bonus may also be formulated in the negative: ‘not 
Muslim’ and hence not suspected of holding strongly differing values and 
norms. 
The postcolonial ‘community’, however heterogeneous it may have been, 
therefore benefitted from the beginning from a bonus that went beyond 
strictly juridical aspects of citizenship. Measured against hard integration decolonization, migration and the postcolonial bonus 47
indicators, postcolonial migrants have been more successful than the other 
two large groups of migrants, the Turks and the Moroccans.
38 The postcolo-
nial bonus is not the only explanation for this. The class structures of the 
postcolonial communities when they arrived was already more varied and 
favourable. Moreover, postcolonial migration got underway earlier, so the 
integration process has had more time to develop. 
However, it is now becoming clear that the postcolonial bonus is not 
granted for eternity. The comparative advantages held by first-generation 
postcolonial migrants eventually decline. The advantage of free access is no 
longer relevant to the settled citizen. In the second and later generations, 
postcolonial Dutch have no more rights than any other citizen with roots in 
another country; everyone is equal before the law. In terms of government 
provisions or the labour market there is no formal preferential treatment for 
any group of ‘migrants’ or any ethnic minority. What remains of a possible 
advantage for postcolonial communities is merely the intergenerational 
transfer of social and cultural capital inherited from the colonial era. How-
ever, it is rapidly becoming apparent that other ethnic groups are making 
this Dutch cultural capital their own, especially through education, while 
on the other hand, intractable integration issues in parts of the Moluccan 
and Afro-Caribbean communities suggest that the bonus is less effective 
there. 
It is not only the bonus that evaporates; so too does the notion of postco-
lonial ‘community’. This is in part a question of demographics. High de-
grees of exogamy mean the second generation of postcolonial Dutch is al-
ready, to a large extent, mixed – a process that is both visibly and predictably 
continuing in subsequent generations. This demographical ‘dilution’ is am-
plified in cultural terms, because only a minority of citizens with postcolo-
nial roots mix mainly with people from their own segment in public. This 
all contributes to making it less and less obvious to speak of an Indisch, Mo-
luccan, Surinamese or Antillean ‘community’, or to link the identity of 
these citizens primarily to their postcolonial roots. This presents a dilem-
ma to the spokespeople of each of these groups. As will become apparent in 
the next chapter, they grounded their struggle for recognition on references 
to the unique, but misunderstood or denigrated the background and iden-
tity of their grassroots. Over the years this struggle for recognition took on a 
surprising additional charge, namely, to defy the creeping evaporation of 




The photo of a Moluccan demonstration at the Dutch parliament square Bin-
nenhof in The Hague in the 1950s tells a clear story of identity claims. The 
banner ‘Christelijk Nederland doe ons recht!’ appositely expresses the mood of 
the demonstrators: you Dutch are Christians, so are we (because you colo-
nized us), so be just to us! No favors were being asked, it was simply a de-
mand for rights. The desire for those rights stemmed from a centuries-long 
colonial alliance and were further underlined in the appeal to a shared reli-
gion. The Netherlands should not shirk its Christian duty.
The Hague, and Dutch society as a whole, has shown itself sensitive to 
this appeal from kindred spirits over the last 65 years. A large majority of 
postcolonial migrants were able to settle in the Netherlands and become 
rightful citizens without having to undergo complicated procedures with 
uncertain outcomes. Their Dutch citizenship gave them legitimate entry 
into the mother country. Although there were strong objections in The 
Hague circles to the idea that judicial rights stemming from the colonial 
period should be translated into full citizenship of the Netherlands, what is 
more relevant is that these rights were ultimately accepted. The acceptance 
of the right to cultural difference, which Indisch community leader Tjalie 
Robinson defined forty years later as a ‘civil right’, was trickier.
1
Citizenship has many dimensions, even if we ignore recent debates on 
transnational and postnational citizenship and look exclusively at citizen-
ship within a single nation state that assigns rights and exacts duties. Be-
sides the formal criterion of legal insider status, there are the dimensions of 
civil rights and participation in all spheres of society. Ideally, every citizen 
in a democratic society has equal access to these, but in practice this is often 
not the case. Finally, there is the dimension, even harder to quantify, of be-
longing, of affinity with the society and feeling at home within it. The de-
gree to which migrants identify with their new society varies enormously. Moluccan demonstration, parliament square Binnenhof, The Hague, 25 April 1953, in 
support of an independent Moluccan Republic.   (collection museum maluku)
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This has to do with their own history and culture, but also with the space the 
receiving society grants diversity.
2
Three interlocking dimensions of citizenship are addressed in this chap-
ter. First I will examine how discussions about the granting of Dutch citi-
zenship invariably ended with the acceptance of postcolonial migrants’ 
rights, but also raised questions about the meaning of their citizenship. I 
will then discuss the participation of this category of newcomers in Dutch 
society and subsequently the political field. The assumption here is that for 
postcolonial organizations and politicians with Indisch Dutch, Surinam-
ese or Antillean backgrounds the bond with their country of origin re-
mained important, but that participation within Dutch society gradually 
took higher priority. Finally, I will indicate how citizenship and identifica-
tion related to each other – a step towards the struggle for recognition of a 
separate identity and thereby for a broadening of the meaning of ‘Dutch’ cul-
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The rIghT To remaIn duTCh
For centuries, two interpretations of citizenship have stood diametrically 
opposed to one another. On the one hand jus soli (related to birthplace) and 
on the other jus sanguinis (inherited and, therefore, ethnically determined). 
The first allowed more scope to acquire state citizenship, as long as the new 
citizens adapted to the dominant culture; the French republican model   
is the perfect example of this. In practice, the relevance of this polarized   
approach has been drastically devalued. Even a country like Germany, where 
citizenship was traditionally tied to jus sanguinis, has seen that this liter-
ally exclusive definition cannot be maintained in the face of large and di-
verse ‘migrant’ communities. It was no different in other countries in ‘old’ 
Europe. Almost everywhere, large and permanent immigrant communities 
prompted a more pragmatic approach to diversity and thereby a more open 
interpretation of citizenship and national identity. This again led to violent 
reactions against what was experienced as excessive multiculturalism; a 
‘return’ to a romanticized, monocultural society is, however, inconceivable.
The Netherlands took a third way, in accordance with their tradition of 
verzuiling or ‘pillarization’, the compartmentalization of society around 
‘pillars’ organized along religious and political lines. Under a policy of mod-
erate multiculturalism, this allowed a great deal of room for diversity with-
out requiring immigrants to distance themselves from their ‘own’ culture. 
Acquiring Dutch citizenship was, until recently, a strictly legal affair. The 
culturalization of citizenship did not become an explicit element in minor-
ities policy until about 2000.
3 Theoretically, civic integration (inburgering), 
now also defined as identification with Dutch culture, is a precondition for 
acquiring citizenship for new immigrants. For earlier generations of im-
migrants who already hold citizenship, this identification has also increas-
ingly come to be seen as a normative obligation.
Formally, this discussion has only limited relevance to the history of 
postcolonial migrants in the Netherlands. With the exception of the Moluc-
cans, the majority of migrants from the former colonies were able to capital-
ize on their previous Dutch citizenship, a part of the postcolonial bonus. 
The prime question is what the response within these communities was to 
the defensive and dismissive reactions of the Dutch and whether, following 
the completion of decolonization, attempts were made to extend ‘colonial’ 
rights to those who stayed behind overseas. The question of the normative 
meaning of Dutch citizenship simmered in the background long before it 
came to the fore in the integration debate, as did the idea of obliging citizens 
of the Netherlands Antilles to take a civic integration course, despite being 
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Studies by John Schuster and Guno Jones have shown that politicians in 
The Hague had serious doubts about maintaining or granting citizenship to 
citizens of the former colonies.
4 Such doubts were not directed at Dutch re-
patriates, but against non-whites: the Eurasians ‘rooted in the East Indies’, 
the Moluccans, and the migrants from the Dutch Caribbean. Racist argu-
ments were rarely used openly; this would have been an anathema to the 
post-war, postcolonial Netherlands. The scepticism surrounding the capac-
ity of immigrants to conform to Dutch society was frequently articulated in 
cultural terms, often with complete disregard for the crucial factor of class.
For the majority of migrants from the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), 
retaining or formally acquiring Dutch citizenship was not difficult, even if 
people grumbled in the Netherlands about the arrival of Indisch Dutch. The 
metropole was now forced to live with the colonial logic of a judicial, tripar-
tite division of the population into Europeans, alien Orientals, and natives. 
There was some confusion regarding the in-between categories. The ques-
tion of which Chinese or natives could be considered as ‘equal’ to Europeans 
and their rights in a colonial context were not clearly arranged. For the In-
disch Dutch, there was the formal criterion that the father had to be legally 
European and to have formally recognized the child as his own; the off-
spring of a European mother and a native father were not legal Europeans. 
This had led to confusion in the colonial period and continued to do so in the 
postcolonial migration process.
Objections from the Dutch to the immigration of Indisch Dutch were of-
ten expressed in sniggers; however, the fact that they were associated with 
Dutch colonial authority and held Dutch citizenship also carried moral ob-
ligations. Practical arguments were used to object to the migrants: the poor 
economic climate, the housing shortage and the fact that the Netherlands 
saw itself as a land of emigration rather than immigration. But what gave 
rise to the greatest number of concerns was the presumed inability of lower-
middle class Eurasians to adapt; from 1945 on, members of administrative 
circles remarked constantly that their presence was both problematic for 
the Netherlands and not in their own interest. Although the word ‘race’ was 
never used, these ‘Indies-rooted’ migrants were presented as being so com-
pletely different, that Schuster speaks convincingly of ‘racialization’.
5
Their arrival was, therefore, discouraged. ‘They would only be unhappy 
in the Netherlands and present the risk of forming an antisocial element’, 
opined a civil service report. In 1953, Minister of Social Work, F.J. van Thiel 
expressed the conviction ‘that the interests of the majority of those born and 
bred in Indonesia, who hold Dutch citizenship, would be best served by their 
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‘mixed-blooded’ people, who in Jones’ words were ‘construed as being in-
competent and alien citizens’ who did not understand that they had no fu-
ture in the Netherlands.
6 Yet by the mid-1950s, when it became clear that the 
Indo-Europeans who remained in Indonesia had little hope of a future in the 
new Republic of Indonesia, it was reluctantly accepted that most of them, 
known as spijtoptanten or ‘regretters’, should be allowed to come to the Neth-
erlands after all.
Such dismissive reasoning among the highest echelons of society sheds 
a revealing light on the myth of a broadminded and tolerant land; it suggests 
too that colonial prejudices had found their way into the postcolonial Neth-
erlands. Yet, in retrospect, it should be no less surprising that all these ob-
jections had so little effect. In the end, almost all Indisch Dutch migrated to 
the Netherlands, some before the transfer of sovereignty, some long after. In 
almost all cases, their rights as Dutch citizens were recognized and hon-
oured, and their travel and residence were financially and organizationally 
facilitated. This was also the case after 1949 when, it could be argued, the 
formal rights of the colonial period no longer applied.
This grudgingly supportive policy stemmed from a sense of responsibil-
ity among Dutch politicians, a sense of commonality kept alive by an influ-
ential lobby of earlier repatriates and migrants from the East Indies who 
placed the responsibility for decolonization and forced repatriation firmly 
at the feet of the Netherlands.
7 Organizations arguing for a generous admit-
tance policy for spijtoptanten enjoyed broad support in the Indisch commu-
nity. The admittance of the leaders of this lobby to The Hague elite, includ-
ing prominent, often right-of-centre Members of Parliament, was crucial. 
Crucial, but not surprising. An administrative elite of totok (an Indonesian/
Malay word for full-blooded Europeans) repatriates and Indisch elites were 
able to make their own pre-war experiences and affinities with Indonesia 
resound powerfully through the administrative centre of post-war Nether-
lands, where many of them went on to pursue administrative careers.
More complicated was the question of nationality for the Moluccans. 
However Dutch-leaning and, above all, monarchist they were, the Moluc-
cans who served in the Royal Dutch East-Indian Army (knil), were consid-
ered neither European, nor equal to Europeans. They and their families, 
consequently, had no natural right to Dutch citizenship. There were also 
serious doubts about their ability to assimilate into Dutch society. The same 
Van Thiel declared that they would not find ‘happiness’ in the cold Nether-
lands.
8 This played no part in their admittance to the Netherlands, which 
was intended as a pragmatic, temporary solution. On arrival in the Nether-
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soned into a political vacuum. The Netherlands tried to repatriate them as 
soon as possible and would have preferred them to accept Indonesian citi-
zenship. However, Indonesia was not prepared to do this as long as this 
group continued to support the movement for a Republic of the South Mo-
luccas (Republik Moluku Selatan or rms). The Moluccans were interested in 
neither Dutch nor Indonesian nationality, because they cherished the hope 
of returning to an independent Moluccan republic.
As a consequence, by the end of the 1960s, 80 per cent of the Moluccans 
lived in the Netherlands and were still stateless. This stalemate was broken 
much later. Today, almost all Moluccans have Dutch citizenship. The judi-
cial chapter of the integration of the Moluccans contains little for any of the 
parties to be proud of; it was concluded in silence.
9 Meanwhile, so much 
time had passed that there was no hope of a political lobby on behalf of the 
spijtoptanten or those who had been refused transportation to the Nether-
lands fifty years earlier. The Moluccan community in the Netherlands now 
had other priorities, mainly in the Netherlands. It is striking that through-
out the preceding decades, during all the negotiations between representa-
tives of the Moluccan community and the Dutch government, The Hague 
silently presumed de facto Dutch citizenship. That this was not stated aloud 
reflects a characteristic reluctance to acknowledge that the rms and remi-
gration were illusions.
By the time of the Surinamese exodus, the Netherlands had already be-
come a country of immigration, but was disinclined to admit it. The Hague 
had finished recruiting guest workers and was operating a policy of remi-
gration and deterring family migrations. This policy was to fail, just as it 
did in neighbouring countries. The exodus that followed the 1974 announce-
ment of a speedy independence for Suriname was precisely what The Hague 
had hoped to avoid by accelerating the transfer of sovereignty. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, administrative task forces secretly discussed the option of calling 
a halt to migration by making a legal distinction between Dutch as opposed 
to Surinamese and Antillean citizenship. The conclusion that was reached, 
time and again, was that although this approach might have been legally 
possible, it was politically undesirable.
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The first part of this conclusion is still disputed, but the second part is no 
less interesting. The argument was constantly put forward that rapid 
growth in migration from Suriname would not only be disastrous for the 
country itself, it would also be problematic for the Netherlands. Reference 
was made to the difficulties Afro-Surinamese from the lower classes were 
expected to have with adapting – there was no anticipation of an exodus of 
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already evident in crime figures for Surinamese in the Netherlands. The op-
tion to follow the earlier British model of simply shutting the borders did 
not suit the political climate of the 1960s and 1970s and even less so the cen-
tre-left cabinet of the social democrat Prime Minister Joop den Uyl. During 
the independence negotiations, members of the government did nothing 
that would jeopardize the desired transfer of sovereignty or create an image 
of the Netherlands as an inhospitable, even racist country. By adopting this 
attitude, the cabinet ignored the majority of its own population, which sup-
ported immigration restrictions.
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The irony is that the concessions offered to the Indian opposition during 
the negotiations leading up to the transfer of sovereignty in Suriname in-
cluded the prolongation of the right to retain Dutch citizenship. The Hague 
had commenced the negotiations with the idea that most of the 30,000 Suri-
namese in the Netherlands would adopt Surinamese nationality and go 
back. The final outcome was utterly different. Not only were all Surinamese 
able to choose Dutch citizenship by taking up residence in the Netherlands, 
this option was extended for five years after the transfer of sovereignty, up to 
1980.
Surinamese already living in the Netherlands, supported by Henck Ar-
ron’s cabinet in Suriname, were mainly interested in retaining their Dutch 
citizenship or, if possible, attaining dual citizenship; they were only suc-
cessful in achieving the former.
12 Meanwhile, one-third of the entire Suri-
namese population moved to the metropole between 1974 and 1980. Follow-
ing the military coup in 1980 and the December Murders of 1982, Surinamese 
organizations in the Netherlands contributed to The Hague’s decision to 
allow thousands of spijtoptanten to settle in the Netherlands. But there were 
limits. This political lobby was not strong enough to ensure support for the 
reopening of Dutch borders.
Antillean immigration has not yet been subject to legal restrictions. 
Again, there were concerns and secret task forces, but the conclusion once 
more was that restrictive admittance policies were legally possible, but po-
litically undesirable. It wasn’t until the late 1990s that the Dutch parliament 
began to consider a tough line, particularly with respect to lower-class and 
potentially delinquent Antillean migrants.
13 To this day, these ideas have 
not been transformed into policy. Antillean migrants, therefore, continue 
to benefit from a juridical bonus that no longer exists for migrants from In-
donesia and Suriname.
To summarize: in all cases there was social and political resistance in the 
Netherlands to large-scale postcolonial migration. These were sometimes 
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instances is that, in the end, the right to take up residence in the Nether-
lands as a citizen of the former colonies was not rescinded until the transfer 
of sovereignty and, indeed, for several years beyond. This meant that all 
postcolonial migrants retained the right of abode and the same civil rights 
and duties as any other Dutch citizen.
It has been claimed that Moroccan, Turkish and other migrants’ dual 
citizenship symbolizes an ambivalent loyalty to the Netherlands which, it is 
claimed, impedes their ability to integrate. This has never been an issue in 
the debate about postcolonial migration; only in the case of the Moluccan 
minority was the question of nationality a burning and unresolved issue for 
many years. Among the first generation of Surinamese, a minority may still 
have dual citizenship, as do some people from the same generation in Suri-
name. However, in the Netherlands this is never a matter for discussion and 
the question is irrelevant for Antilleans. In the Netherlands, an engagement 
with Indonesia or Suriname is praised and encouraged rather than problem-
atized. This is in marked contrast with the suspicion that resounds in de-
bates about the dual loyalties of other, usually Islamic migrants.
posTColonIal organIzaTIons: profIles and meanIng
Citizenship implies the right to self-organization for socially acceptable 
ends. What is deemed acceptable may vary from society to society. In open 
societies this can include anything that is not regarded as criminal. Ethnic 
forms of organization are facilitated and supported unevenly. The Nether-
lands, with its tradition of verzuiling and, later, its moderate form of multi-
culturalism, took a relatively positive stance on this subject for a long time. 
The underlying view was that religious and/or ethnic groups should have 
the right to maintain bonds with each other, while self-organization could 
also serve as a bridge to the broader society and thereby promote integra-
tion.
14
But a bridge cannot be built from one end. General provisions also need 
to be adapted to fit the changing composition of the population. This not 
only applies to political systems, but also, for instance, to the media. The 
Dutch government played a significant role here. Since the 1980s, the public 
broadcasting company has been obliged to dedicate a percentage of its pro-
gramming to ethnic minorities. Such regulations cannot be imposed on 
other parts of the media. Although there is no doubt that the landscape of 
broadcast and print media today is less white than in the past, discussions 
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Dutch society. Meanwhile, ethnic minorities continue to support and use 
their own media as well.
15
Postcolonial migrants’ orientation to the media in their country of ori-
gin is modest compared with most other migrant groups. Satellite dishes 
are useless to them. Their easy use of the Dutch language plays a significant 
role as does the psychological distance that separates the Indisch commu-
nity from contemporary Indonesia. Considering the small scale and more 
limited means of Suriname and the Antilles it is not surprising that media 
transfer is mainly one-directional: all the media in Suriname and the Antil-
les make extensive use of Dutch products.
Postcolonial societies and associations have a long and rich history in 
the Netherlands. Even before the Second World War, migrants and tempo-
rary residents from the colonies organized themselves into societies.
16 This 
tendency really took off once migrants were no longer counted in the thou-
sands, but hundreds of thousands. Bosma and Alferink have been able to 
identify around 2,600 organizations that were founded by, with, or for post-
colonial migrants. They indicate that this number may have been higher in 
reality, but that a number of these organizations only existed for a short 
time or were dormant.
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The development of postcolonial organizations is remarkable. Between 
1945 and the end of the 1960s, no more than ten new organizations were set 
up annually across all the groups combined. In the subsequent two decades 
the picture was very different. There was an increase across all groups. The 
number of new Indisch organizations was just under ten on average, while 
for the far smaller Moluccan community it was higher. Spectacular growth 
characterized Surinamese organizations. The annual number of registered 
new organizations grew between 1973 and 1985 from ten to fifty, but dropped 
back after that. Even so, in the early years of the new millennium, the figure 
was still as high as twenty. Antillean organizations did not take off until the 
1980s; in the next two decades about ten societies were started each year. De-
mographics only partly explain this growth. Another factor may have been 
the Dutch government’s subsidy policy. However, Bosma and Alferink re-
fute the view that there is a direct and consistent link between subsidies and 
the founding of societies and associations. A significant factor is that the 
migration process by this time had been closed off for all groups except the 
Antilleans; on the whole, the first generation of migrants dominates the 
founding of ethnic organizations. In absolute numbers, according to Bosma 
and Alferink’s research, the highest number of ethnic organizations found-
ed prior to 2007 were for Surinamese Dutch (1223), followed far behind by 
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(338). Relative to the current size the ethnic grassroots, the number of Mo-
luccan organizations is highest, while those with an Indisch character are 
the lowest in number. The ratio for Surinamese and Antillean organizations 
falls somewhere in between, and is of the same order as for Moroccans and 
Turks.
18
But why did these different groups organize themselves and why are the 
differences in the ratios of migrants to organizations so great? We may out-
line a few broad tendencies, with reference to Bosma’s thorough analysis 
Terug uit de koloniën (Back from the Colonies). The Indisch pattern of rela-
tively few organizations does not necessarily reflect a low density of organi-
zations, invisibility or a weak lobby. The opposite is more likely to be true. 
The first post-war generation founded a number of organizations with a 
broad range of paying members or subscribers. This was all about self-orga-
nizing in the interests of repatriates and spijtoptanten in the Netherlands 
and in Indonesia, and they were led mainly by men who had direct access to 
Dutch government circles. Then there were organizations that aimed to 
maintain an Indisch identity. In the 1980s, new organizations were founded, 
often with the same political aims. What is striking in all of this is the im-
pressive membership of organizations like the Nederlands­Indische Bond van 
ex­Krijgsgevangenen en ­Geïnterneerden (nibeg 1945. The Netherlands-East 
Indies Union for Former Prisoners of War and Internees), the Pelita founda-
tion (1947), a magazine like Tong Tong (1958), a festival such as Pasar Malam 
Besar (1959), or more recently, the umbrella organization Indisch Platform 
(1991).
The comparatively modest number of Indisch organizations cannot sim-
ply be explained by efficient concentration. The decision to organize them-
selves into separate clubs was not an obvious one for the first generation of 
migrants from Indonesia. Government policy in the first few decades after 
the war offered little room and even less money for private, let alone ethnic, 
organizations. Social welfare was still in its infancy and was left largely to 
church organizations. An umbrella organization was set up to coordinate 
the integration of Indonesian migrants, the Centraal Comité van Kerkelijk en 
Particulier Initiatief voor Sociale Zorg ten behoeve van Gerepatrieerden (cckp 
1950. Central Committee of Church and Private Initiatives for Social Care for 
the Repatriated) in which Indonesian organizations were well represented. 
The establishment of separate religious societies was unnecessary, since 
migrants from Indonesia were almost all Christians and could join existing 
churches. Here too, the social capital they brought with them linked in well 
with Dutch society. By the time the government began to operate an active 
integration policy two decades later, the Indisch ‘community’ was already 
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It should therefore not come as a surprise that a large number of Indisch 
organizations focused on addressing the colonial past. One theme was the 
recognition of the suffering caused by the Japanese occupation, the violent 
bersiap period that followed, and finally the ‘repatriations’ caused by decolo-
nization. The other theme was the defence and, consequently, celebration of 
Indisch culture. The first appealed strongly to the claim for full Dutch citi-
zenship, the second stressed the right to cultural diversity.
The underlying argument was that the Indisch ‘community’ had a right 
to all of this, precisely because it had always been Dutch. Such Indisch claim-
making was supported by Dutch repatriates, often in high places. The char-
acteristic colonial differences between the totoks and Eurasian Indos also 
faded somewhat. Furthermore, the 120,000 soldiers who fought the last co-
lonial war between 1945 and 1949 came increasingly to belong to the ‘Indisch 
generation’. This is typified by former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ben Bot, 
a totok in the Dutch East Indies, who in 2005 was given the task of reconciling 
repatriates and former military men with the new government line that the 
Netherlands had ‘stood on the wrong side of history’ in Indonesia. Bot was 
considered the best man to put the message across as he was regarded to be 
an ‘Indisch chap’.
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In making amends, Bot was not referring to colonialism itself, but to the 
Dutch position in the decolonization process. It was, of course, the Indisch 
lobby, in which repatriates played a major role, that had kept The Hague cap-
tive in a dismissive attitude towards the Indonesian nationalists for so long. 
At the end of 1946, a ‘petition’ for the ‘unity of the state’ organized by this 
embittered group and sent to Queen Wilhelmina was signed by 300,000 
Dutch citizens in the space of just two weeks.
20 Organizations in these cir-
cles continued to agitate strongly against compromising with Indonesian 
nationalists, right up to Indonesian independence in 1949 and even until 
1962 when Irian Barat (formerly Dutch New Guinea) was temporarily placed 
under the administration of the United Nations. Although Dutch conserva-
tives, totoks and Indos could all count on each other’s support, it was ulti-
mately in vain. Here there are clear parallels with agitation carried out by 
repatriated pied noirs in France against the decolonization of Algeria. How-
ever, opposition in the Netherlands never became violent, as it did in France.
The Indisch community was more successful in its struggle to gain 
Dutch citizenship for the spijtoptanten, Indisch Dutch who had initially re-
mained in Indonesia, but who no longer saw a future for themselves there 
and wanted to move to the Netherlands after all. The Nationale Actie Steunt 
Spijtoptanten in Indonesië (nassi. National Action Support ‘Regretters’ in In-
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less than twenty local branches. As a result, ten thousand more Indisch 
Dutch were able to acquire Dutch citizenship and settle in the Netherlands.
21
The history of Indisch organizations presents a picture of concentration, 
intense participation, good connections with administrators in the Nether-
lands, and a focus on rights and recognition. Acknowledgement was a key 
issue for the Moluccans too, but history took a completely different turn in 
their case. In the beginning, it was primarily the national organization Door 
de Eeuwen Trouw (ddet 1950. Faithful Down the Centuries) that articulated 
the ideal of returning to an independent Moluccan republic. The associa-
tion’s magazine De Stem van Ambon (The Voice of Ambon) was printed in un-
believably large editions of several tens of thousands.
22 The enormous num-
ber of organizations at a national and local level reflects a long tradition of an 
orientation towards the islands of origin, a long-held refusal to see the Neth-
erlands as the final destination and, partly as a result of this, a continuing 
impediment to integration that persists to the present day. The Badan Per­
satuan association (1966) came to stand at the heart of this, behind ddet, 
and saw itself primarily as a government-in-exile of the future, free Moluc-
cas.
This is how the overwhelmingly Protestant Moluccans came to form 
their own churches instead of joining existing churches, to organize them-
selves for transnational political aims for which there was next to no sup-
port in the Netherlands or elsewhere, and why the first generation, especial-
ly, preferred self-organization and collective housing in segregated camps, 
and later in neighbourhoods, to settling amidst the Dutch population. 
Badan Persatuan, which enjoyed the support of almost the entire communi-
ty, initially resisted the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Welfare’s (crm) 
cautiously implemented integration policy. Badan Persatuan insisted that 
‘maintaining our own identity’ was a part of Moluccan welfare and was in-
deed successful in persuading the Dutch government to grant it a large 
number of seats on the government-initiated discussion platform Inspraak­
orgaan Welzijn Molukkers (1976. Moluccan Welfare Platform). It is striking to 
see how strong the ties remained between the Moluccan grassroots and its 
organizations throughout the rest of this history and how the Dutch gov-
ernment was unable to develop any policy without these organizations.
23
Taking into account the weak socio-economic position of their grass-
roots, the leaders of the Moluccan organizations’ persistent grip on an in-
creasingly unrealistic political programme seems to have considerably de-
layed integration. Academics and administrators, of course, hotly debate 
the impact of ethnic organizations on integration.
24 If a single case supports 
the pessimistic vision of the link between self-organization, participation Moluccans resisting being moved from a camp to a housing estate in 1963. The desire to 
keep their own community intact, as well as militant group coercion, extended the 
isolation of the first and second generation of Moluccans in the Netherlands by several 
decades.  (collection international institute for social history)
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and integration, then it is the early history of the Moluccan organizations. It 
was not until the 1990s that they and the Dutch government began to pursue 
a joint integration policy. By then, a large number of Moluccans had married 
outside their own community or had gone to live outside the Moluccan 
camps and neighbourhoods. Such individual choices may well have had a 
far more significant impact on Moluccan integration than all the policy ef-
forts put together.
The landscape of Surinamese organizations in the Netherlands is marked 
by fragmentation along ethnic lines, which in part explains the different 
characters of the ethnic groups. While most Afro-Surinamese joined exist-
ing Christian churches, Hindus and Muslims needed to develop their own 
religious institutions. Yet even where joining forces for the benefit of socio-
economic integration would have seemed an obvious strategy, and one also 
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ethnic factions. Consequently, the organizational culture of Suriname was 
duplicated in the Netherlands.
Until the 1970s, Surinamese migration was to a large extent an Afro-Suri-
namese (‘Creole’) affair, as was the composition of societies and associa-
tions. The most important associations were Ons Suriname (1919. Our Suri-
name) and Wie Eegie Sanie (1951. Our Own Things), both of which were 
explicitly anti-colonial. Afro-Surinamese nationalism would characterize 
the nature of associations and societies for a long time, even after the exodus 
had culminated in a sobering reality.
During the exodus of the mid 1970s, the Dutch government made rela-
tively large amounts of money available for welfare. The pattern that evolved 
was one of the Surinamese being represented by subsidized foundations or 
associations, in contrast to the Indisch community with their grassroots of 
paying members. An active housing policy led to most Surinamese being 
given more or less reasonable accommodation relatively quickly, although 
this was not distributed evenly across the country as had been hoped. The 
Surinamese-Dutch population remained concentrated in the Randstad ur-
ban agglomeration in the West, with the majority of Afro-Surinamese mov-
ing to Amsterdam and Rotterdam and a majority of Indians to The Hague. 
The pattern of Surinamese organizations would continue to reflect these 
ethnic profiles across the country.
Between 1975 and 1984, the main destination, Amsterdam, made more 
than five million guilders available annually to primarily Afro-Surinamese 
organizations, more than to any other minority group ever.
25 However, this 
ethnic-specific funding fell away in line with a national policy in which a 
generic, rather than multiculturalist, policy had become the norm. Work-
ing at the national level was the Landelijke Federatie van Welzijnsorganisaties 
(1973. National Federation of Welfare Organizations), with an overwhelm-
ingly Afro-Surinamese framework. This led, predictably, to resentment 
among the second largest group, which set up as a counterweight the Indian 
foundation Lalla Rookh (1975, named after the first ship carrying Indians 
that landed in Suriname). Initially the government reluctantly went along 
with this development, not through any desire for multiculturalism, but 
with the pragmatic conviction that forced collaboration would not work. 
The two organizations did not fuse into the Surinaams Inspraak Orgaan (sio 
1985. Surinamese Participation Organization) to secure government sup-
port until much later.
The way Surinamese organizations developed is evidence of the prefer-
ence, particularly among Asian Surinamese, to organize along ethnic and 
religious, rather than national lines.
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to social integration? In Indian circles today, the ethnic route, sometimes 
with reference to the Dutch model of verzuiling, is recommended with few 
reservations. Indian organizations, the argument goes, offer room to expe-
rience a culture and religion which is foreign to the Netherlands, but which 
links their members with Indians in Suriname and elsewhere in the world. 
At the same time, they performed a bridging role in an integration process 
that has already been judged to have been successful: Indian culture, even 
though of a different religion, shares much in common with Dutch culture 
in socio-economic terms.
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A minority of the Surinamese Indians and almost all Surinamese Java-
nese are Muslims. For this group, religion, coupled with ethnicity, was the 
dominant factor in their self-organization, which, of course, need not keep 
them from feeling equally at home in wider Surinamese or Muslim circles. 
The postcolonial (linguistic) bonus explains why they were prominent in 
general Islamic organizations.
28 Their visibility among Surinamese organi-
zations remained modest.
What gives rise to confusion when identifying organizations with a spe-
cifically ethnic profile is that Afro-Surinamese, with the exception of the 
Maroons, largely referred to themselves simply as Surinamese. This usage 
was adopted by outsiders and also had a bearing on the organizations’ 
names. The proportion of religious organizations was relatively low among 
(Afro-)Surinamese organizations; most had traditional aims in the realm of 
representing the interests of their members and maintaining contact with 
Suriname. Over the last decade the number of organizations with aims re-
lating to identity have increased significantly, with slavery and Afro-Suri-
namese culture as core issues. An important number of (Afro-)Surinamese 
institutions were and are foundations without members – their continuing 
existence remained dependent on a government policy which, from the 
1980s on and with mixed success, attempted to distance itself from welfare 
organized along ethnic lines.
Just as the Surinamese community in the Netherlands has maintained 
strong ties with its country of origin, the same initially held true for its or-
ganizations. This will be addressed later. However, one question that should 
be addressed here is whether Surinamese organizations also followed the 
Indisch example and struggled on behalf of spijtoptanten. Initially, such a 
lobby was unnecessary, because in the transfer of sovereignty the Surinam-
ese had demanded and been granted a five-year window following indepen-
dence during which people were free to choose between the Netherlands and 
Suriname. During the years of the military dictatorship (1980-1987) the Minister Brinkman of Welfare, Health and Culture visiting a Hindu prayer room, 
Bijlmer, Amsterdam, 7 March 1986. Indian and Javanese Surinamese organizations, 
unlike Afro-Surinamese ones, were mainly formed along ethnic and, especially, 
religious lines. (collection national archives)
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Netherlands accepted several tens of thousands more Surinamese and 
granted them Dutch citizenship. The level of influence of Surinamese orga-
nizations on this policy is difficult to measure, but it is safe to assume that 
regular demonstrations and a constant lobby to keep Suriname on the po-
litical agenda contributed to this relatively open Dutch policy.
Just as most Antillean migrants came from Curaçao, the bulk of Antil-
lean organizations were also dominated by migrants from this, the largest 
island. The organizations that represented the other islands specifically 
were in the minority. The pattern is familiar: the number of organizations 
increased strongly as the Antillean community grew, representing the 
members interests as well as offering a home way from home. There were 
few religious organizations; Antilleans usually joined existing churches.
Like the Surinamese migrants before them, the Antilleans who left prior 
to the exodus were more highly educated than those who came later. Conse-
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an anti-colonial hue. More recent organizations are associations like the An­
tilliaans Netwerk (Antillean Network) and various student societies. What 
they all had in common with the early associations of better-educated Antil-
leans was precisely the same middle-class character. The difference lies in 
the way the anti-colonial rhetoric has faded into the background. Unlike 
three or four decades ago, a significant majority of students now remain in 
the Netherlands to live and work after they have graduated. And the younger 
generation also seems to take more distance from political life on the islands 
than was the case in the past.
In the meantime, problems arose around the integration of migrants 
from lower social classes. The Dutch government could no longer manage 
without newly-founded Antillean welfare organizations, in which language 
was a major factor: it was almost impossible to communicate with under-
privileged Antilleans in Dutch. This continued to be the forte of Antillean 
welfare groups which went under the collective name Forsa (1991). Problems 
with integration did not improve and around the country municipal ad-
ministrators in the ‘Antillean municipalities’ came to the table to talk with 
Antillean organizations for whom there was no longer space at the level of 
national policy. Such organizations worked under the national umbrella 
Overlegorgaan Caraïbische Nederlanders (ocan 1985. Consultation platform 
for Caribbean Dutch, 1985).
Unlike other postcolonial groups, Antillean organizations in the Neth-
erlands were rarely formed to influence Dutch policy on the country of ori-
gin, or to exercise direct influence on the governments there. This was logi-
cal as the islands and the country the Netherlands Antilles have their own 
governments which negotiate with the Dutch government all the time. They 
saw migrants, on the whole, as self-selecting outsiders and were able to 
maintain this view because conflicts with the Dutch government rarely be-
came very serious and because the islands never had a crisis of the order of 
Indonesia or Suriname.
It is characteristic of Antilleans on both sides of the ocean, either jointly 
or separately, that they have only recently begun to develop a strong lobby to 
target precisely the subject that unites them literally and figuratively: the 
successful struggle, so far, against restrictions on the right to abode in the 
Netherlands and, hence, against any other infringement of their right to 
equal citizenship within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Since the late 
1990s, time and again, and supported by a majority in the Dutch parliament, 
legislation was prepared that would limit access to the Netherlands and 
make it possible to repatriate (potentially) criminal Antilleans and, in a 
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youths. A long and hard struggle has been waged on the islands by politi-
cians and in the Netherlands, led by OCaN and the organization Movimentu 
Antiano i Arubano pa Promové Partisipashon (maapp 2000. Antillean and 
Aruban Movemement to Stimulate Participation). This has culminated in 
The Hague not introducing restrictions or registration – as yet, one should 
probably add.
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This brief overview reveals a strong culture of societies and associations 
that varies from group to group. But what significance did these organiza-
tions ultimately have for the integration process? The Blok parliamentary 
commission in the Netherlands was not positive about the role of the mi-
grant organizations, which it found were too preoccupied with identity 
politics and consequently promoted isolation rather than integration. Re-
searchers have arrived at different views on the subject, just as they have on 
the question of whether the considerable amount of government funding 
for ethnic organizations played a significant part in this.
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Bosma and Alferink arrive at different conclusions in relation to postco-
lonial migrant organizations.
31 Based on their database, which contains 
2,600 organizations, they counter the view of a direct and proportional link 
between government funding and the foundation of ethnic organizations. 
This link is weak in the case of Indisch organizations; for other groups of 
postcolonial migrants the link is stronger, but not decisive. Moreover, they 
make clear that a significant number of Surinamese organizations were re-
ligious in nature, namely Hindu; there are no indications that this hindered 
socio-economic integration or the level of identification with Dutch society. 
They are ambiguous about the extent to which the exceptionally closed and 
highly, explicitly ideological Moluccan organizations formed an obstacle to 
integration. There is good reason to be sceptical about this.
One feature of these organizations remained implicit. Over the past 65 
years no organizations were founded jointly by all postcolonial groups. 
Fragmentation along colonial and ethnic lines was the norm. This was also 
true of the media. Leafing through Indisch magazines like Tong Tong or 
Moesson the complete lack of interest in Caribbean or even Moluccan affairs 
simply flies off the pages; Indian magazines like Lalla Rookh and Aisa Sam­
achar are primarily aimed at their own group and general Surinamese news, 
as are the Afro-Surinamese magazines Jere or Famiri. This is once again evi-
dence that a single postcolonial community never existed in the minds of 
the migrants and their offspring. ‘The postcolonial migrant(s)’ is an ana-
lytical abstraction without street value, as spokespeople explicitly state.
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Postcolonial Netherlands revolves around the way postcolonial migrants 
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and what it means to be Dutch. Migrant organizations played an important 
part in this. After all, they lobbied on behalf of a community and in doing so 
determined the image of the group and its identity. Government funding 
did not create this process, but it did sustain it, especially over the last two 
decades. The paradox is that funding only got underway quite late in the 
story, just at the point when minorities policies, with all the rhetorical room 
for diversity, was particularly aimed at the ‘harder’ aspects of integration 
and when socio-economic integration for most postcolonial migrants and 
their children was, if not quite complete, at least well on the road to being so. 
The background to the support for this postcolonial identity politics was 
the belief that the scope given to the call for recognition of the colonial past 
would foster redemption and inclusion and, consequently, advance integra-
tion. This is an appealing vision, but one that is difficult to validate empiri-
cally.
polITICal parTICIpaTIon
Apart from providing fulfilment or careers for professional representatives, 
minority organizations served to bring to the fore the interests, concerns 
and desires of their grassroots. However, their political influence was lim-
ited, with the exception of a small number of large Indisch organizations 
such as nibeg. The weight of these Indisch organizations was partly ex-
plained by the massiveness of their organized grassroots and the popularity 
of their standpoints in a land where solidarity with the ‘victims’ of Indone-
sian nationalism was still strong. No less pivotal were the excellent connec-
tions these organizations had with The Hague politicians and, indeed, the 
royal family. This was a lesson in political mobilization. However, that fa-
vourable conjunction would not be repeated.
With the exception of the Moluccans, postcolonial migrants were, on the 
whole, already Dutch citizens when they arrived in the Netherlands, with 
either an active or passive right to vote. Access to the Dutch political system, 
with a view to representing potentially specific interests, could be achieved 
by seeking out kindred spirits in the political parties, by playing an active 
part in one of these parties, or by founding specific political parties. Con-
stant efforts were made to achieve the first option, also by using their own 
organizations to this end. The second strategy seems to have been success-
ful over the last few decades, although the elected politicians rarely operate 
primarily on the grounds of their postcolonial backgrounds. The third 
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was never seriously taken up by postcolonial migrants.
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Up until the early 1990s, established political parties had few postcolo-
nial migrants on their election lists.
34 Since then they have caught up at a 
remarkable rate. Even if the number of parliamentarians went down after 
the 2010 elections (to 13 out of 150), we may still conclude that over the past 
decade or so the Lower House of the Dutch parliament reasonably represent-
ed the diversity of the population – far more, for example, than the ‘colour 
blind’ republic of France.
35 The first member of parliament with a Moluccan 
background was John Lilipaly (social democratic party PvdA, 1986), the sec-
ond was Usman Santi (PvdA, 1998). Twelve postcolonial politicians from 
various parties were of Surinamese descent, starting with Dowlatram 
Ramlal (Christian democratic party, cda, 1992). Only three members of par-
liament, again from different parties, were from Antillean backgrounds; 
the first was Hubert-Geronimo Fermina (the liberal democratic party D66, 
1994).
36 Over the last decade, the overall representation of migrant commu-
nities in the Lower House went up, but the earlier postcolonial domination 
receded – to only three out of a dozen parliamentarians with a ‘non-Western’ 
background today.
Politicians with an Indisch background have been left out of this brief 
overview. Yet, in the years immediately following the Second World War 
there were many politicians from Indisch backgrounds or experience of the 
Dutch East Indies. They helped to give a political voice to the interests of the 
repatriates and, in vain, opposed Indonesian independence and the later 
transfer of Dutch New Guinea to Indonesia. Most of these politicians were 
right of centre – as were the repatriates, many of whom blamed the social 
democratic PvdA for the loss of the East Indies in the first place.
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These members of parliament represented an Indisch world that was po-
litically finished. In later decades there were politicians in the Lower House 
who had some kind of Indisch background, but this rarely impacted notice-
ably on their election or performance, though they sometimes popped up 
later on the boards of Indisch organizations. This was also true of promi-
nent politicians whose Indisch past was already a generation behind them, 
such as Jan Kees Wiebenga (of the conservative-liberal party vvd), chair of 
the Indisch Gebaar, or Winnie Sorgdrager (of the liberal democratic party 
d66), board member of the Indisch Herinneringscentrum (Indisch Memo-
rial Centre) in Bronbeek. The association of the political right with the In-
disch community would remain intact for some time, with a particularly 
strong position in the conservative-liberal vvd party. The barely visible ‘In-
disch’ representation in the current parliament reflects a broader picture of 
completed emancipation, in which ethnicity no longer plays a noticeable 
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The First Chamber of the Dutch parliament has remained, to this day, an 
overwhelmingly white bastion of power. Since the war, there have been 
fourteen senators who were born in the Dutch East Indies, but only one of 
them was Moluccan (Samuel Portes, the green party Groen Links, 2001) and 
one of Surinamese descent (Joyce Sylvester, PvdA, 2003). Something similar 
applies to the government. There have been no ministers from non-Western 
backgrounds since the war, though there have been four state secretaries. 
The first, the Surinamese Philomena Bijlhout (Pim Fortuyn’s populist-right 
party, lpf, 2002), had to step down after a few hours because she had given 
false information about her role in the Bouterse military regime in Surina-
me. Bijlhout was succeeded for just a few months by Chinese-Dutch Khee 
Liang Phoa (lpf, 2002). The two people from non-Western backgrounds ap-
pointed state secretaries were Ahmed Aboutaleb (PvdA, 2006), originally 
from Morocco, and Nebahat Albayrak (PvdA, 2006), originally from Turkey. 
The right-wing cabinet-Rutte inaugurated in 2010 has no members with a 
non-Western background whatsoever.
The postcolonial minorities have been prominent for much longer at a 
local level, logically mainly in the big cities. Initially they were to be found 
in parties associated with left-wing, anti-racist views, though now they are 
found across the political spectrum.
38 Tara Oedayraj Singh Varma was the 
first city councillor of Surinamese descent (Amsterdam, Groen Links, 1983). 
Many migrants followed from an array of countries, with representative-
ness being achieved in the larger cities in 2000. The postcolonial domina-
tion among these migrant politicians was, once again, short lived.
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This applies particularly to the number of city councillors. In 1994 there 
were more than 70 migrant chairmen and -women on council executive 
committees, in 2006 there were more than 300. The number of Surinamese 
chairpersons of these committees rose from 21 to 38, which is relatively 
speaking a sharp fall. The number of Antillean chairpersons grew from one 
to six, remaining, therefore, minimal.
40 There were almost no Moluccan 
chairmen or -women, and those of Indisch descent were not registered. Am-
sterdam has had two chairwomen of executive committees from Surinam-
ese backgrounds, Hannah Belliot (PvdA, 2002) and Hannah Buyne (PvdA, 
2006). Belliot (1998) and then Elvira Sweet (PvdA, 2002) first served as chair-
women (‘mayors’) of the Amsterdam district Zuid-Oost. However, since 
then, other Amsterdam districts have been led by chairpersons from Mo-
roccan backgrounds.
To date, there has only been a small number of immigrant mayors. The 
first, on government instruction, was Surinamese, Roy Ho Ten Soeng (Ven-
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out that Indisch Dutch Jos Verdier was made mayor long before this (Huizen, 
1995).
41 Considering these small numbers, if there had ever been a point to 
speaking about a postcolonial dominance, this vanished completely with 
the appointment of Moroccan-Dutch Ahmed Aboutaleb in 2008 as Mayor of 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands’ second city. He promptly clashed with Antil-
lean organizations because, having earlier used strong terms to address Mo-
roccan troublemakers, he was now outspoken about their Antillean peers.
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The voting patterns of postcolonial minorities can only to a certain ex-
tent be charted. Little is known about migrants with Indisch roots. Howev-
er, it can be established that they were more likely to find support for their 
standpoints and desires on the right than on the left.
43 The turn out of Suri-
namese and Antilleans at the ballot box has been strikingly low for decades, 
also compared with other migrant groups. Among these voters there was a 
general preference for the social democratic PvdA. The spectrum has broad-
ened over the last decade, but it is still dominated by the left. The PvdA has 
remained by far the most popular party among this group, at least until re-
cently and certainly more so than for other migrant groups. It is doubtful 
whether politicians of Surinamese and Antillean backgrounds are repre-
sentative of their fragmented, largely non-voting, ethnic grassroots.
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The access of migrants to national and local political parties gradually 
improved, with a strong improvement over the last decade, due in part to 
migrants without Dutch citizenship being allowed to vote in local elections 
since 1985. A number of factors explain this: better integration and conse-
quently better qualified candidates, electoral considerations, and more 
openness on behalf of the established parties. The initial advantage postco-
lonial migrants had over other minorities, which was linked to citizenship 
and a socio-cultural lead, has now disappeared. Their advantage has evapo-
rated.
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There is nothing to say that politicians with a migrant past set different 
priorities to other Dutch politicians. When Lilipaly was installed in the 
Lower House of the Dutch parliament in 1986, he wore a Moluccan smock, 
which, he said, was a signal to Moluccans in the Netherlands: ‘I am a mem-
ber of parliament, but also one of you.’ 
46 However, no single party gives 
much room to identity politics and parliamentarians from migrant groups 
largely avoid being identified specifically with minority questions or trans-
national loyalties. Such a position is harder to achieve at a local level. Con-
sidering the proximity of the grassroots, it is electorally far riskier for the 
party and, above all, the politician concerned, who is often elected by prefer-
ential votes from their own grassroots supporters.
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The rapid rise of politicians from ethnic minorities in districts and mu-70 postcolonial netherlands
nicipalities was accompanied by a surge in disaffection regarding these 
politicians’ qualifications and weak ties to the party line. The same applied 
to postcolonial politicians and was fed in part by ‘scandals’ surrounding Oe-
dayraj Singh Varma, Bijlhout, and Pormes.
48 Such disaffection provoked 
predictable reactions. Politicians with postcolonial roots are consistently 
reminded of this tension, more than leaders of postcolonial organizations.
ambIvalenT IdenTITIes
How open was the postcolonial Netherlands to the longing for full citizen-
ship, which was articulated in demands for the acknowledgement of and 
possible concessions for the colonial past and the (alleged) contemporary 
legacy? The Dutch decolonization debate is often presented in terms of a se-
ries of traumas. With regard to Indonesia, so the cliché goes, everything 
went wrong. This trauma is supposed to have led to financial and migratory 
concessions during the transfer of sovereignty in Suriname. When this pre-
sumed ‘model decolonization’ again gave rise to a number of disappoint-
ments, the next trauma came, in response to which The Hague adopted a 
pampering attitude towards the Antilles.
Much of this cliché can be dismissed. The decolonization of the Dutch 
East Indies may well have been traumatic in the beginning, but this does not 
mean it influenced politics in The Hague decades on – and even less so that 
this ‘trauma’ has found its way into the collective memory of Dutch society. 
As far as political memory is concerned, the decolonization of Suriname 
rested more on self-interest than the conviction that the country was much 
better off without the Netherlands. A degree of guilty conscience about the 
problems caused by the over-hasty transfer of sovereignty to Suriname may 
have contributed to a more supportive approach to the Antilles. Yet, the ac-
ceptance that the islands would remain part of the kingdom stemmed 
mainly from the insight that The Hague lacked the judicial and political 
means to complete decolonization with a final transfer of sovereignty.
The argument that the political trauma surrounding decolonization led 
to a policy founded on a guilty conscience sooner reflects the way postcolo-
nial migration was handled. Despite the degree of doubt and dissent, the fi-
nal immigration policy was far broader than legally necessary and was pub-
licly defended by appealing to the rights of postcolonial migrants. The 
Hague’s policy was without a doubt more lenient than that of the British. 
France initially exercised a more open policy, but with a labour shortage in 
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Did a sense of contrition affect the treatment of postcolonial migrants, 
or minority policy as a whole? It is hard to say. It was pretty soon accepted 
that migrants from the Dutch East Indies were unable return to Indonesia. 
Their ties with the colonial regime and the fiasco of decolonization, so it was 
acknowledged, bore obligations for the Dutch. Surinamese and Antillean 
migrants were able to return, but did not want to. It took longer for this fact 
to be reluctantly accepted. Insofar as a Dutch sense of guilt has played any 
part since then, it has done so mainly in relation to earlier chapters in the 
colonial past.
Postcolonial migrants brought colonial history back to the Netherlands. 
It is clear that over the course of time there was a growing willingness on the 
part of the Netherlands to take a critical look at its own colonial history. This 
did not necessarily mean that postcolonial minorities were treated any bet-
ter than other newcomers. One may draw a parallel here with the thesis ad-
vanced by Herman Vuijsje, who claimed that the shame of the wartime de-
struction of Dutch Jewry determined post-war minority policies.
49 One may 
well believe that this sense of shame existed, but did it really lead to a funda-
mentally different policy, except at a rhetorical level? This is hard to estab-
lish.
What can be established is that, whatever was said behind closed doors, 
openly xenophobic or racist statements were avoided in Dutch politics until 
about a decade ago. Even though this discourse has, to a distressing degree, 
become more acceptable these days, it is rarely directed at postcolonial 
groups, except occasionally the Afro-Caribbean Dutch. All the preceding 
debates about restricting the entrance of migrants from the colonies into 
the Netherlands (based on their capacity and willingness to adapt) were 
couched in guarded terms or with reference to the financial costs for the 
Netherlands or the interests of the sending countries. These debates rarely 
led to practical consequences. Moreover, this discourse did feed a feeling 
among postcolonial migrants that they were not welcome, as was articulat-
ed from time to time by Indisch Dutch in the 1950s and ever since by all post-
colonial migrants.
50 This, again, is why many felt aggrieved and frequently 
express their rancour and, at best, their ambivalent identification with the 
Netherlands.
Meanwhile, the struggle for full citizenship has shifted from entry into 
the country to support for integration and, subsequently, to the more im-
material realm of acknowledgement: recognition of the colonial history, of 
the contribution to Dutch culture, and of the specific place of each of the – 
increasingly diffuse – postcolonial ‘communities’ within the multicultural 
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linked to the assurance that postcolonial identity fits excellently within 
Dutch culture. This is correct, but also implies that playing a postcolonial 
card tends to lose its effect – even in the ‘contrite’ Netherlands, which, after 
all, is primarily concerned about other migrants who, it is angrily claimed, 
cannot or do not want to integrate.73
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The sTruggle for reCognITIon: 
war and The sIlenT mIgraTIon
Using a variation of the French warning at level crossings, Un train peut en 
cacher un autre, the French-Algerian historian Benjamin Stora once de-
scribed how one memory (of the Algerian war of independence) may ob-
scure another (of French colonial rule in Algeria): Quand une mémoire (de 
guerre) peut en cacher une autre (coloniale). The emotions around the final 
bloody phase of French colonial rule in Algeria are still so fresh and power-
ful, that to this day France is barely able to view this period with any detach-
ment – and is, therefore, a long way from being able to explore the preceding 
colonial history seriously.
1
The memory wars regarding the Netherlands East Indies are not nearly as 
extreme. Unlike France, the Netherlands is no longer fiercely divided on the 
subject of the final years of colonialism in the East Indies. The Japanese oc-
cupation is regarded primarily in terms of suppression by an alien power 
and the suffering of the Europeans. It has been established that Indonesian 
gangs perpetrated terrible violence during the so-called bersiap period of 
the revolution. At the same time, it has become more broadly and gradually 
less controversially accepted that during euphemistically termed ‘police ac-
tions’ in the first few years after the war – as if the problem were a case of 
temporarily maintaining order in a colony – Dutch troops were involved in 
war crimes and the Netherlands had ‘stood on the wrong side of history’. But 
what about before the arrival of the Japanese? There was colonialism. First 
there was the voc, then the East Indies. The idea that ‘something magnifi-
cent’ was done in that part of the world is rarely bragged about, but there is 
no reason not to think it sometimes, quietly, and occasionally to celebrate it 
in style. The colonial period is neither a taboo nor a black hole.
The fact is that the final stages of the colonial period still attract more 
attention in the Netherlands than the 350 years that preceded them. This 
chapter is, above all, about the memory of that final phase, which continues 
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France. Why is this? The decolonization process in Algeria was more bloody 
and is still more strongly marked by cruelty on all sides. It was also more re-
cent. It is important to note that all the parties who contended in the past are 
strongly represented in France today. Stora has done the calculations. At the 
end of the final phase of the war, more than a million French soldiers, a mil-
lion pieds noirs, 400,000 ‘ordinary’ Algerians and 100,000 harkis who had 
fought in the colonial army, were repatriated. They brought their memories 
with them and passed them on to their children. This amounted to six or 
seven million people by the beginning of the twenty-first century. One in 
ten French people had either direct or indirect experience of the war.
2
There are all kinds of other parallels between the pieds noirs and the In-
disch Dutch, between the harkis and the Moluccans, between the French and 
Dutch soldiers who fought in a final colonial war. The Dutch lost, the French 
lost. But where the struggle for independence remained at a remove from the 
Netherlands, the Algerian war spread onto French soil, carried by terrorist 
attacks and state repression. And where only the losers were repatriated to 
the Netherlands, hundreds of thousands of Algerians took up residence in 
France both during and after the war. This meant the repatriated were con-
stantly reminded of the defeat and of the victors, whose Islamic faith be-
came increasingly seen as an obstacle. All in all, not ideal circumstances for 
achieving a balanced acceptance of the recent past.
Things passed off more peacefully in the Netherlands. Indonesia was 
further away, both in time and space. The migration had been more selective 
and Indonesian views were initially not taken seriously. Even so, Indisch 
and Moluccan memories of the war, the bersiap, the journey and their recep-
tion in the Netherlands are still marked by bitter discontent. ‘Keeping silent 
with a visible exclamation mark’, is how acclaimed author Adriaan van Dis, 
himself a son of repatriates, characterized this initial attitude – coercion 
into silent assimilation. It was not until later that the discontent about 
growing up in what Pamela Pattynama, a specialist in Indisch literature, 
called an ‘atmosphere of concealed memories’ came to be articulated more 
openly.
3 This chapter focuses primarily on the so-called repatriates’ strug-
gle for acknowledgement by the Dutch state. Recognition of their suffering 
in the East Indies, of their right to full Dutch citizenship, recognition that 
their immigration had been unavoidable and that their reception in the 
Netherlands had been unduly chilly. This struggle helped them to forge a 
sense of ‘community’.
Two counterpoints conclude this chapter. First of all a comparison with 
the exodus from the West Indies, which was hardly unavoidable and which, 
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other issue is the late ‘discovery’ of the Second World War in Suriname and 
the Netherlands Antilles and the way Second World War commemorations 
in the Netherlands today are employed as an instrument of integration pol-
icy. This policy could quite easily, and understandably, provoke new resent-
ment among the Indisch Dutch.
from war To exodus
At the end of the 1950s, in De repatriëring uit Indonesië, Kraak, Ellemers and 
Wittermans remembered that immediately after the war, Dutch relief work-
ers in the Netherlands had been irritated by the ‘haughtiness and preten-
sions of the evacuees, their emphasis of their own suffering and their lim-
ited interest in the Netherlands’ experience of the war’. A few pages later 
they describe precisely the repatriates’ indignation that their suffering was 
not acknowledged and their forced migration not understood, their resent-
ment that the Netherlands felt no ‘moral’ obligation to help them. Mutual 
irritation therefore, based on a lack of understanding of each others’ war-
time suffering.
4 While the earlier irritations felt by the Dutch are now en-
tirely past history, Indisch Dutch resentment is not.
It is now a good sixty-five years since the disembarkation of the first repa-
triates and four decades since the arrival of the first spijtoptanten, or ‘regret-
ters’. This lengthy period cannot simply be summed up in the worn-out 
motto of ‘quiet assimilation’ and neither should Indisch Dutch life in the 
Netherlands be reduced to a resentful narrative of being misunderstood and 
unappreciated. Yet the demand for recognition was indeed the most impor-
tant theme behind almost all the initiatives to mobilize the East Indian 
community: recognition that they had their own identity, recognition of 
the hardships they had endured, recognition of their right to restitution. 
The question of what an Indisch Dutch (or Moluccan, or totok, or Dutch) 
identity might actually be will be addressed later in the book. Here I am 
looking at the struggle for an acknowledgement of the hardships they un-
derwent within the trilogy of war, decolonization and migration, and ar-
rival in the Netherlands.
To briefly sketch this history, in March 1942 the East Indian government 
capitulated and almost all totoks were interned in Japanese camps or taken 
into forced labour elsewhere; around 150,000 people were interned. A mi-
nority of the Indo-Europeans were interned; most, known as buitenkampers, 
remained outside the camps, often in extremely grim circumstances. Con-
ditions in the Japanese camps were brutal; almost a tenth of those interned 76 postcolonial netherlands
did not survive the war.
5 Yet, there were even more horrendous circum-
stances. The Japanese used the Javanese for forced labour. On Sumatra, a ma-
jority of these romushas, around 200,000 of them, died. This story is sup-
pressed in Indonesia, because it points to Sukarno’s role in recruiting 
Javanese labourers, and in the Netherlands because the repatriates, under-
standably, only drew attention to their own suffering.
The Japanese surrendered on 15 August 1945; Sukarno and Mohammad 
Hatta proclaimed independence two days later. In the power vacuum that 
arose, which lasted until the beginning of 1946, thousands of totoks, Indo-
Europeans and Chinese were murdered locally by radical nationalists and 
criminals. The anarchic terror of this bersiap period was a traumatic conse-
quence of the dream of ‘liberation’. The irony was that the totok internees 
were now in a better position than the Eurasians outside the camps. The for-
mer Japanese camps provided protection against rampaging Indonesian 
mobs who loathed the ‘Indisch parasites’.
6
Dutch authority was temporarily and incompletely restored. Between 
1945 and 1949, around 120,000 Dutch troops served in Indonesia. Around 
5,000 of them died, a fraction of the number of Indonesian casualties. Most 
returned safely and would carry the memories of maintaining order and 
‘police actions’ with them for many years to come. It is clear that they had 
Indisch experiences; the question became whether, back in the Netherlands, 
they could and would join in the Indisch fanfare. In other words, would they 
become part of what sociologist and military veteran J.A.A. van Doorn char-
acterized as the ‘community in adversity’ of the ‘Indisch generation’.
Sovereignty was transferred on 27 December, 1949. The exodus of totoks 
had already begun, followed by the Indisch Dutch and troops. Then, in 1951, 
another chapter unexpectedly opened: the arrival, under unclear and what 
turned out to be misleading conditions, of Moluccan knil soldiers and 
their families. Almost none of the ‘repatriates’ were sent back, their recep-
tion was frugal but, on the whole, formally correct – it would ultimately be 
canonized ‘cold’. This was very different from the ‘open arms of Dutch hos-
pitality’ Queen Wilhelmina and Crown Princess Juliana had promised on 
the arrival of the first ship carrying repatriates from the East Indies.
7
war and BERSIAP
The Japanese occupation had been hard and, for numerous Europeans, trau-
matic. The repatriates brought different versions of wartime memories 
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memoirs and, on a far more modest scale, memoirs of Indisch buitenkampers 
– those who lived though the period outside of the camps and survived. In 
Achter het kawat was Nederland, historian Esther Captain analyzes the mem-
ories of the internees. Recurring themes are fear, humiliation, anger, grief 
and the instinct for survival – emotions the victims found hard to leave be-
hind. The scope available for reconciliation with the ‘Japs’ is to this day lim-
ited, as Jet Bussemaker, daughter of an interned totok and a former cabinet 
member responsible for Indisch affairs recently experienced.
8
Comparisons with the German occupation are drawn all the time, in the 
most extreme form in polemics – including between such ‘first-hand ex-
perts’ as writers Jeroen Brouwers and Rudy Kousbroek – around whether the 
Japanese camps fall into the same category as the Nazi death camps.
9 When 
the question is narrowed down to this degree the answer, based on survival 
figures, can only be that they do not. However, this is not the whole story. 
Former internees in the East Indies either told their story, or kept silent, in a 
country in which most of the population had been spared any personal ex-
perience of violence during the German occupation, had never been sepa-
rated from their spouse and children, and had never even had to leave their 
own home; in contrast to the Jewish population, which was almost entirely 
annihilated, only a small number of the population did not survive the war. 
Viewed in this light, the average totok or Indisch-Dutch person had certainly 
had a much harder time.
10
The next nightmare was the bersiap, a period that mainly affected the 
buitenkampers. In many recollections, the war and this aftermath flow into 
one another. And yet this period seems to play a far smaller part in the col-
lective memory. This may be because it is more strongly associated with the 
difficult story of decolonization than it is with the clear-cut and morally un-
burdened story of the Second World War. But it is probably also because the 
totoks were far less affected by these reprisals. In post-war debates, the totoks 
frequently drowned out the Indos.
11
The material damage resulting from this period was considerable for all 
involved. What for most of those involved was an unsatisfactory winding up 
after the war has recently been exhaustively investigated in government-
commissioned historical research – a late gesture of acknowledgement to 
the Indisch community. Peter Keppy wrote about the war damage and reha-
bilitation in Sporen van vernieling, Hans Meijer about ‘back pay’ for govern-
ment employees in Indische rekening.
12 The cost of damages caused by the 
Japanese occupation up to the transfer of sovereignty ran into tens of thou-
sands of guilders, far more than the back pay. The precise extent was as hard 
to establish as the degree to which any party bore liability for the debt.
13 It 78 postcolonial netherlands
soon became clear that of the four governments involved, three – the Dutch, 
the Dutch-East Indian, and the Indonesian – never seriously considered pay-
ing damages. In 1956 Japan, which unlike Germany paid almost no damages 
after the war, got away with paying very modest compensation of less than 
40 million guilders for the internees of the East Indies – no more was ever 
paid, despite the efforts of the Stichting Japanse Ereschulden (Foundation for 
the Japanese Debt of Honour) founded in 1990.
14
Few in Indonesia had any illusions about gaining compensation, so this 
demand soon turned into a final colonial project. No one spoke of Indone-
sian war victims anymore, Keppy observes, wryly.
15 Repatriates in the Neth-
erlands initially cherished some hope, but were soon confronted with the 
fact that there were no liable debtors, which made the whole issue ‘intangi-
ble’.
16 Consequently, all attention shifted to the issue of back pay, which was 
to become a long, drawn out legal battle. During the Japanese occupation, 
the East Indian government had not paid any salaries or pensions to East 
Indian civil servants and knil soldiers or East Indian navy personnel. Im-
mediately after the end of the war, these victims demanded payment for 
their loss of earnings. They regarded this as a right, not a favour, a stand-
point they would maintain for over sixty years.
The Netherlands’ response was non-committal from the beginning, but 
the state was forced to change this position. Payments were made in succes-
sive rounds, although this never amounted to full compensation. Conces-
sions were viewed as gestures stemming from a moral understanding of the 
situation, not as the repayment of a government debt. And so the victims’ 
dogged battle took on a tragic air. Although they gradually won more sym-
pathy, their wishes were only met in part, even once their claims had been 
more or less accepted as legitimate.
A number of different elements stand out in the long history of the battle 
for back pay, in Meijer’s words the ‘pièce de résistance of all Indisch grievances 
against the Dutch State’.
17 First, there was broad support in their own ranks 
for the organizations that took the lead on the matter. Bosma remarked that 
Indisch organizations, unlike Surinamese ones, had (many) paying mem-
bers. Organizations such as nibeg (Dutch-Indisch Alliance for Former 
pows and Wartime Internees), the Indische Pensioenbond (Indisch Pension 
Union) or the association of former military personnel Madjoe and their suc-
cessors could all count on the support of thousands of paying members, be-
cause they did not set themselves abstract targets in the realms of identity, 
solidarity or conviviality, but actively represented the interests of their 
members. As long as the prospects for recognition, and therefore financial 
compensation, were good, the level of syndication remained high, to the de-the struggle for recognition: war and the silent migration 79
gree that the emergence of any new, favourable perspectives immediately 
led to an increase in membership and the foundation of new organizations. 
This pattern became evident early on.
18
It is possible to identify a shift in the government’s approach from rejec-
tion to half-hearted acknowledgement. The initial starting point, prompted 
by empty national coffers in The Hague and Batavia (today’s Jakarta), was 
firmly to discourage. Only a very modest concession could possibly be of-
fered, which would, moreover, be charged to the Indisch government; The 
Hague rejected all responsibility. The Dutch business community that had 
been active in the pre-war Netherlands Indies was far more generous, but it 
was put under enormous and effective pressure to reduce the more advanta-
geous arrangements it had proposed. This first round was concluded in 1947 
with the resolution to pay a paltry ‘rehabilitation’ payment equivalent to 
three to five months salary, an offer that was dismissed in the official organ 
of the Indo-European Alliance (iev) Onze Stem as an ‘ice-cold shower’.
19
The transfer of sovereignty implied that outstanding claims would be 
transferred from the Indisch government to the Indonesian government, 
including rehabilitation payments, few of which had been paid and which 
inflation had also considerably diminished. As the victims immediately 
pointed out, for them the road had reached a dead-end. The republic had few 
means and other priorities and, in the end, would never cover the rehabilita-
tion payments, let alone consider paying all back pay in full. The only pos-
sible Indisch strategy was to present their demands directly to The Hague; 
in the meantime a majority of the claimants had been repatriated.
What helped was the relatively widely-held sympathetic attitude of the 
political parties, particularly those on the right. However, successive cabi-
nets remained reluctant. The first cabinet of Prime Minister Drees (PvdA) 
decided, after a great deal of hesitation, to make 250 million guilders avail-
able for compensation, in contrast with the several billion guilders of com-
pensation for war victims. The nibeg, which incidentally had far more totok 
members than Indos, described this as a ‘distressing disparity’.
20 The victims 
regarded the payments as pittances which marked only the beginning of 
recognition. However, new rhetorical opportunities arose: in 1951, through 
the Minister of Union Affairs and Overseas Territories, L.A.H Peters, the 
Dutch government, more or less by mistake, made mention of a ‘moral re-
sponsibility’.
21
The theme of a debt of honour was deployed more and more forcibly by 
Indisch organizations and became broadly accepted in the 1970s. Existing 
organizations, with a collective grassroots of tens of thousands of mem-
bers, were reactivated. New interest groups, such as the Stichting Nederland­80 postcolonial netherlands
se Ereschulden (Foundation for Dutch Debts of Honour, sne, 1976) attracted 
thousands of members.
22
The Netherlands became more receptive to the appeal of moral obliga-
tion; a consequence of the changing zeitgeist, but also evidence of the shock 
caused by the violent actions of radical Moluccans in the 1970s. Ignoring old 
colonial rage, read the lesson, not only translated into psychic suffering, but 
also gave rise to violence. By now, the Netherlands had become wealthier 
and the empty-coffers argument no longer washed. Hence, support for rec-
ognition and, ultimately, more generous treatment grew. First, Indisch in-
ternees became entitled to consideration under general measures such as 
the broad legislation that provided financial support for victims of the Sec-
ond World War (1972). This was followed in 1981, at parliament’s instigation, 
by benefits for those who had been interned in the East Indies in the form of 
a one-off, tax-free payment of 7,500 guilders, which was paid to breadwin-
ners who were victims, or to their widows. The parliamentary bill, uig, now 
spoke explicitly of a ‘moral responsibility’.
23
Once again the government hoped this would be the end of the matter, 
and once again it proved an illusion. The commercial arguments of the 
claimants had remained unchanged. It was not, in their view, a question of 
favours, but of rights, which had also been recognized by other colonial 
powers – a solid argument that historian Meijer supports in Indische reken­
ing.
24 Only full compensation, many claimants argued, would demonstrate 
the full acknowledgement of the wrongs that had been done to those who, in 
the East Indies, had been full Dutch citizens. The amount of money offered 
by the uig did not meet this demand. It was far less than many felt was rea-
sonable, even though there was no consensus in this regard among the dif-
ferent Indisch organizations. What was even more crippling was the limited 
scope of the benefits. The uig set the criterion of internment in Japanese 
camps. This excluded the buitenkampers and, hence, the majority of mixed-
race Indisch Dutch. What in the government’s view had simply been a prag-
matic criterion – but a useful way of limiting the number of expected claims 
– inevitably came to be interpreted as evidence of discrimination. Almost 
all the tokoks who were still alive were eligible for this benefit, but only a 
minority of Indos. We may reasonably accept that the intention here was not 
deliberately discriminatory, but the outcome was, leading to predictable re-
sponses. Meijer has transcribed a range of indignant descriptions in the ar-
chives: ‘pittance’, ‘dishonourable’, ‘sickening’, ‘scandalous’, ‘unscrupulous’, 
‘humiliating’.
25
The fight continued, even though the first generation had begun to die 
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Yet, in 1992, nineteen organizations joined together – remarkably, at the gov-
ernment’s insistence – as the Indisch Platform, determined not to let up the 
pressure on the government. Supplementary measures were formulated, 
which now, finally, directly benefited the buitenkampers.
26 What was expect-
ed to be the final chapter was Het Gebaar, ‘The Gesture’, which was presented 
in 2000 by Prime Minister Wim Kok’s second cabinet and which explicitly 
apologized for the ‘identified shortcomings of the rehabilitation process’. 
Het Gebaar, among other things, provided compensation of 3,000 guilders 
for all ‘Indisch war victims’, that is, every Dutch citizen who had been 
through the war in the East Indies. The government made 350 million guil-
ders available for this, with another 35 million for cultural, social and aca-
demic projects.
27
It is striking that the government that marked this chapter as closed was 
the very same one that financed research into the question of back pay. The 
outcome was paradoxical. The conclusions reached in Indisch rekening – nei-
ther disputed nor confirmed by the Dutch government – that it had respond-
ed too late and inadequately to the demands of the victims, did not lead to 
any new gestures. The government, therefore, financed criticism of its own 
performance without feeling obliged in any way to rectify its failings. It is 
unlikely that any effective support will be found to reopen the issue of back 
pay, even though the Indisch platform is attempting to do so. For the time 
being it would seem that Het Gebaar and the Indisch Memorial Centre com-
prise the final settlement in this long and highly emotional battle.
28
The ‘Cold’ reCepTIon
World War ii gave birth to decolonization, decolonization to the exodus, 
and the exodus to the postcolonial Netherlands. There was talk of repatria-
tion, but most so-called repatriates had never set foot in the Netherlands 
before. The majority would have preferred to stay in Indonesia and experi-
enced the move as displacement. Initially many may have dreamt of return-
ing, but this was to remain an illusion – the illusion of the ‘orphans’ of de-
colonization.
29
Would it really have been impossible for them to remain in Indonesia? 
The Hague had long claimed that this would have been best, at least for those 
who were ‘rooted in the East Indies’. This group may indeed have wanted to 
return, but the situation was already difficult and would only get worse. 
‘The past had gone and there was no future, no structure to build on’, is how 
the ‘Indo’ Rudy Verheem described his feelings, ‘it was a no man’s land; no 82 postcolonial netherlands
way back, no way forward’.
30 The more Dutch-Indonesian relations deterio-
rated, the harder it became for Eurasians to survive in the young republic. 
This did not primarily come down to physical threat or deportation, but 
there was increasing marginalization, which gave rise to fears of worse to 
come. Indonesia had little patience with what it regarded as the old colonial 
community. The politics of Indonesianisasi meant the dismissal or demotion 
of Indos who worked for the government or for former Dutch companies that 
had been nationalized. The Netherlands acknowledged this and accepted 
that they ultimately had little choice other than to leave.
In the end, almost all Indo-Europeans were ‘repatriated’. Since then, nu-
merous biographical chronicles, studies and novels have been published 
about the journey to the Netherlands, sometimes frightening, sometimes 
full of expectation, the first impressions of the Netherlands, the reception, 
which has been canonized as ‘cold’, and the ‘mildly terrorizing’ paternalistic 
metropolitan guidance they were subjected to.
31 The fact that integration it-
self had been a remarkably successful process was played down, suppressed 
beneath old Indisch anger and somewhat anachronistic apologies from the 
Kok cabinet.
32
Historian Martin Bossenbroek, charged with researching the post-war 
return to and reception of the displaced in the Netherlands, compared 
grounds for resentment. Were the Indisch Dutch really so badly received? 
Relatively speaking, not that badly, he concluded, to the surprise and out-
rage of many. In De meelstreep (2001), Bossenbroek compares the reception of 
all the groups who returned to the Netherlands at the end of the Second 
World War: the few Jewish survivors, the resistance fighters and prisoners of 
war, the forced and volunteer labourers, and the repatriates from the East 
Indies. The latter, in Bossenbroek’s view, were the best received. His explana-
tion is based on the moment at which they returned. By that time the Neth-
erlands was already beginning to claw its way up again, logistically things 
were working better, and there were once again provisions to distribute – 
the situation had been very different in the first few months after the war, 
when the repatriates from other parts of Europe were brought back. He ex-
plains the disappointment of the repatriates from the East Indies partly in 
terms of their high expectations.
33 Bossenbroek agrees that the repatriates 
indeed received little sympathy for their camp experiences. However, he 
puts this in perspective by pointing out that even the survivors of the Nazi 
death camps found that their dreadful experiences frequently fell on deaf 
ears, if they ever felt able to speak of these at all. It was not until the 1960s that 
the destruction of Dutch Jewry was truly addressed and given a place within 
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‘cold’ reception in this literally cold country does not become warmer, but it 
does become more understandable.
The fact that the exodus from Indonesia ultimately became inevitable 
was in part a consequence of an uncontrolled decolonization process. The 
acknowledgement that there had not been a consistent and visionary Dutch 
policy placed the responsibility for the repatriates’ problems with the Neth-
erlands. For the Indisch community, this was self-evident, but The Hague 
was slow and reluctant to acknowledge – and only partially remunerated – 
the Indisch victims of the process.
34 The definitive closure of this long chap-
ter was to be provided by Het Gebaar. In separate moves, the two ‘purple’ (so-
cial-democrat and liberal) coalition cabinets under Prime Minister Kok 
invested several millions in research projects such as ‘De geschiedenis van In­
dische Nederlanders’, ‘Van Indië tot Indonesië’, a separate history of the Moluc-
cans, and research carried out by the soto foundation, which researched 
the return and care of war victims and which contained a sizeable East In-
dian section.
35
A combination of factors explains why, around the turn of the millenni-
um, the Dutch government decided to make one ‘final’ gesture of reconcili-
ation, when previous governments, immediately after the war and again 
around 1980, had thought they had already finalized this history. Much had 
changed in the Netherlands by this time. In the 1960s, the Second World War 
was ‘rediscovered’ in a far more critical light and has provided the moral 
touchstone ever since. Owing to the strong Indisch lobby, the Indisch di-
mension of the war had by now become an integral element in this narrative. 
‘Acknowledgement of past suffering’ gradually became a right for any group 
that could convincingly present itself as victims and, conversely, it became 
a duty of society to honour this claim.
36 The Netherlands was also becoming 
ever more prosperous and could therefore permit itself to make gestures 
that had previously been unthinkable.
Within this context of reappraising the war and its aftermath, arrange-
ments were put in place for all groups that had been affected by the war, be-
ginning with Jewish survivors. This provided a model which the Indisch 
community then emulated. There was also another comparison which, al-
though not often spoken of, must have played a role. From the end of the 
1970s, increasing amounts of government money were spent on ethnic mi-
norities policy, running into several tens of millions of guilders annually, 
reaching more than a billion euros in the new millennium.
37 The Indisch 
community was recorded as being outstandingly integrated and did not 
qualify for any of this money. So, viewed in this light, a more generous con-
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If the Indisch community had not forced its way into public opinion and 
The Hague’s political circles, it would have achieved far less than it did. As 
discussed above, a series of strong organizations had kept the issue of repa-
rations alive ever since 1945. From the 1970s a more immaterial offensive was 
launched, aimed at gaining recognition within the realm of Dutch memo-
rial culture. More ground was gradually won, always involving an appeal to 
old alliances and the ensuing debts of honour.
And so, bit by bit, 15 August became transformed from an East Indian 
commemoration to an official Dutch commemoration, culminating in the 
unveiling of the national Indisch monument in The Hague (1988). Hence, 
the fury surrounding what was felt to be an unfair treatment of Indisch his-
tory by Lou de Jong in the East Indian volumes of his book, Het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (The Kingdom of the Netherlands dur-
ing the Second World War), was effectively translated into a demand for a 
new history of the East Indies.
38 The anger provoked by amiable relations 
with Japan – the visit by Emperor Hirohito in 1971, wreath-laying by Prime 
Minister Kaifu at the Indisch monument in 1991, the celebration of the 400 
years of Dutch-Japanese relations in 1999 – led to furious demonstrations in 
The Hague which again prompted gestures of reconciliation, including the 
financing of memorial centres.
39 In the background of this process was the 
intrigue surrounding the Moluccan community and Dutch soldiers. In ma-
ny respects these were completely different histories, as will be discussed 
below. However, the public attention these groups attracted each time 
helped to keep the aftermath of the East Indies in the news.
The run up to Het Gebaar was relatively short compared with the preced-
ing history and was marked by the need of Wim Kok’s ‘purple’ coalition’s 
desire to draw a conclusive line under a series of colonial and World War ii 
issues. In the context of a broader enquiry into remuneration and redress for 
war victims, which was begun in 1997, the Kok cabinet held discussions in 
2000 with the Indisch Platform on the subject of financial reparations, led 
by Rudy Boekholt. The cabinet responded a month later, ‘that this particular 
history book must never be closed,’ and expressed ‘sincere regrets and apolo-
gies’ for the ‘excessively formal, bureaucratic and above all cold nature of the 
redress’. A year later the generously endowed Gebaar was launched.
40 Het Ge­
baar was intended to be the tailpiece of more than half a century of compro-
mise; a generous financial and moral settling of the accounts for wartime 
suffering and a cold reception. However, whether this really is the end of the 
matter is unclear. It is an illusion to think that everyone – the first genera-
tion, the children, the grandchildren – will ever be satisfied. There was im-
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reference to the Dutch post-war normative model: ‘A Jew wouldn’t allow 
himself to be palmed off with a “Jewish tip”. Only an Indo would!’ 
41 There 
was certainly not unanimous enthusiasm. The minister responsible, Els 
Borst-Eilers from the Ministry for Health, Welfare and Sports, later reported 
that ‘Het Gebaar had been unable to remove the sting’. Meijer also believes 
that the ‘damages’ paid by Het Gebaar were unable to dispel the ‘bitter emo-
tions’. The question of generation undoubtedly played a role in this. Publi-
cist Amanda Kluveld rejected ‘nurturing the same resentments as my par-
ents and grandparents’, declaring ‘you can count this Indisch daughter 
out’.
42
By way of closure, Stichting Het Gebaar (The Gesture Foundation) pub-
lished a beautiful book containing a report on the payments and projects 
under the title Eindelijk erkenning? (Recognition, finally?), so, with a large 
question mark which was emphatically highlighted throughout by the wide 
variety of fragments of letters. Even at the festive closing event reference was 
again made to the ‘cold’ reception, the suffering that did not go away and the 
ignorance of people in the Netherlands about anything Indisch. All speech-
es were pervaded by the spirit of rights, not gratitude, and of the need to re-
main organized to ‘keep the past alive’. A recent statement by Hella Haasse, 
‘We are not finished with the East Indies by a long chalk’, was quoted many 
times, including by the chairman of the board, Jan Kees Wiebenga.
43 The 
question is how wide the ‘we’ community is today and how many will feel 
affiliated to it in the future.
The uprooTIng of The moluCCans
For Moluccan migrants, the prelude that took place in Indonesia was differ-
ent, but the end result – permanent residence in the Netherlands – would 
turn out to be the same. The departure of 12,500 Moluccans (knil soldiers 
and their families) in 1951 had become inevitable, because they did not want 
to be demobbed in the republic while Indonesia was demanding they dis-
tance themselves from the ideal of an independent Moluccan republic 
(rms). A military command from the Netherlands was decisive in the end. 
Moluccan knil soldiers were given the choice between army discharge on 
Java or being shipped out with their immediate families to the Netherlands. 
They chose the second option. When they arrived in the Netherlands they 
were outraged to find themselves instantly discharged from the army. The 
helpless rage this aroused was to hold the Moluccan community firmly in its 
grasp for many decades.Event commemorating the 35th anniversary of the Moluccan community in the Nether-
lands; Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers handing Rev. S. Metiarij the ‘Rietkerk resolution’, 
named after the Minister for Domestic Affairs, Koos Rietkerk, who was also responsible 
for minorities policy. The resolution provided for an annual payment of 2,000 guilders 
to former knil soldiers and others who, in 1951 and 1952, had been brought to the 
Netherlands ‘under the care of the Dutch state’ and which counted as (the beginning of) 
reparations. Queen Beatrix also attended this ceremony. The Hague, Ridderzaal, 25 
November 1986. (collection national archive)
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The ‘cold reception’ is a cherished cliché throughout the Indisch com-
munity. But the resentment among Moluccan Dutch lies less with the recep-
tion and care they received than with the evacuation itself and the impossi-
bility of going back. This is a precarious story. There is good reason to accept 
that the military commanders and the Dutch government in The Hague 
deliberately issued mixed messages about the ‘temporary nature’ of the Mo-
luccan soldiers’ stay in the Netherlands.
44 However, the protracted integra-
tion into the Netherlands cannot solely be blamed on The Hague’s policy. 
Long after it had become clear that Indonesia would not contemplate Moluc-
can independence and that the Dutch government had no influence in Ja-
karta, the Moluccan leaders in the Netherlands continued to propagate the 
old ideals and, thereby, the view that integration was undesirable, or at least 
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Moluccan integration was consequently ill-starred from the start, as re-
searchers Smeets and Steijlen make clear in their (state-commissioned) 
book In Nederland gebleven (Lingering in the Netherlands, 2006). The Moluc-
cans’ social capital was relatively weak. Of course, they were fiercely loyal to 
the Dutch Royal family and were overwhelmingly Christian, but their aver-
age level of education was low and their command of the Dutch language 
poor. Their accommodation at separate locations – ‘islands of embitter-
ment’ (Bossenbroek), such as the former Nazi camp Westerbork
45 and later in 
separate residential neighbourhoods – reflected the hope of an early return 
to the Moluccas. This illusion, which was sniggeringly contradicted by the 
Dutch, formed a tremendous obstacle to integration, which indeed stagnat-
ed in all areas, starting with work and education. Two decades after their 
arrival in the Netherlands, the Moluccans’ situation was quite simply de-
pressing. The deep frustration felt by the young was partly directed at the 
older generation, but above all at the Dutch state. The consequences were 
serious. Violent occupations (the Indonesian ambassador’s residence 1970, 
the Indonesian consulate 1975, a primary school 1977, the Provincial Govern-
ment Building in the eastern Dutch province of Drenthe 1978) and train hi-
jackings (Wijster 1975, De Punt 1977), to this day unique events in Dutch his-
tory, transformed Moluccan anger into a national concern. Whatever the 
demands, The Hague saw no way to support the republican ideals and only 
now made this patently clear.
46
Integration and pacifying agreements were at the heart of the Dutch gov-
ernment’s new Moluccan policy, an approach that would provide a model for 
minorities policy in a broader sense.
47 It brought the Moluccan community 
recognition – in the sense of ‘redress’ – its own ‘pillar’ or compartment in 
minorities-land and, a bit later, a unique Moluccan historical museum in 
Utrecht (Museum Maluku, Utrecht, 1990) as well as a government-financed 
written history. Moluccan integration improved, by fits and starts, in part 
thanks to a focused government policy and a broader acceptance that return 
to the Moluccas had become an illusion. No less important is the demo-
graphic integration: increasing numbers of Moluccans have found life part-
ners outside the Moluccan community.
48
In the battle for recognition, the political, transnational element of the 
rms has faded into the background somewhat since the end of the 1980s, 
while the first generation’s argument regarding the Dutch ‘betrayal’ has re-
mained prominent. This appears to contain a certain inconsistency – if one 
accepts that the rms had never been a realistic ideal, what could have been 
an alternative for ‘repatriations’, other than giving up the ideal? This is a 
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meantime, the rms changed from being a concrete ideal into a more ab-
stract identity symbol, as anthropologist Steijlen has put it, including for 
the Moluccan youth; a turn towards a less binding engagement with the Mo-
luccas.
49
The Moluccan community, therefore, remained separate from the In-
disch community, just as it had been in the East Indies. The extension of Het 
Gebaar to the Moluccan Dutch was therefore not a self-evident outcome. But 
it did correspond with the gradual integration of Moluccans into the postco-
lonial Netherlands. Consequently, in the late 1970s, it was possible for the 
Dutch parliament to offer its apologies to the Moluccan community, em-
ploying such notions as ‘dishonourable treatment’, ‘cold and impersonal at-
titude’ and ‘debt of honour’. No reference was made to the familiar Indisch 
theme of the sloppy processing of knil pensions and reparations.
50
veTerans and The IndIsCh CommunITy
For the Indisch community, the Japanese occupation, the bersiap, decoloni-
zation, the forced exodus from the East Indies, and the cold reception in the 
Netherlands were an ongoing story. During the 1945-49 conflict – the middle 
part of the story – 120,000 Dutch armed forces entered a colonial history in 
which they had previously, at most, played an indirect role. They arrived as 
defenders of the colonial order and, hence, of the totoks and Indisch Dutch. 
Back in the Netherlands, following a futile struggle, they would go on to 
play their own part in the way the Dutch processed the war and decoloniza-
tion. Their role was ambivalent, as was the relationship between the Indisch 
community and these former soldiers.
The army comprised not only professional soldiers and national service 
conscripts, but also knil fighters. Their joint task was to restore a colonial 
order that was still undisputed back in the Netherlands. The number of con-
scientious objectors was therefore small. The general feeling was that the 
East Indies were of crucial importance to the Netherlands, economically 
and geopolitically, but also that the Dutch had a developmental and ethical 
mission to complete. Because the republic was associated with Sukarno, Su-
karno with Japan, and Japan with Germany, the conflict also had an idealis-
tic and revanchist character. For four years, parley and combat alternated, 
or sometimes ran simultaneously. From a Dutch perspective, the conflict 
was an inglorious defeat. The war turned out to be much more violent than 
expected and, moreover, futile, because the Netherlands found itself in-
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tion of the East Indies and, later, of a special relationship with Indonesia had 
to be abandoned.
The soldiers came back to a country that found it hard to live with the 
defeat, right into the highest echelons of society. But soon, since nothing 
else could be done, the rancorous noises subsided and the Netherlands 
turned its attention to the order of the day – the post-war rebuilding of the 
country. This is also how the German occupation had initially been ‘pro-
cessed’ – by avoiding any self-examination. The critical re-examination of 
the war on Dutch soil gained momentum in the 1960s, followed a little later 
by re-appraisals of the last war in Indonesia.
This moment can be very precisely dated: 17 January, 1969. In a current af-
fairs programme by the TV broadcasting company vara, Achter het Nieuws 
(Behind the News), the veteran J.E. Hueting spoke frankly of atrocities com-
mitted by Dutch troops.
51 His testimony struck like a thunderbolt, leading 
to vehement discussions and the setting up of an enquiry committee. Its 
‘Excesses Report’ – a pregnant title – concluded that the army was not guilty 
of ‘systematic atrocities’; insofar as any evidence of torture and worse was 
found, it related to isolated incidents. This conclusion was met with divided 
opinions. A year later, war veterans J.A.A. van Doorn (the sociologist cited 
several times above) and W.J. Hendrix described this report in Ontsporing 
van geweld (Tracking violence) as a ‘shameful document’ that played down 
the systematic terror. The assessment remained controversial, concluded 
historian Stef Scagliola in Last van de oorlog (Troubled by the war), as did the 
government’s stance and the question of whether the successive govern-
ments that had protected the veterans might also have had something to 
hide themselves.
52
This episode bore contradictory consequences. First, there was a deep 
division among the former military themselves. The majority thought more 
in terms of having carried out their duties to the best of their abilities and   
in an orderly fashion, rather than of excesses or an immoral war, but their 
recollections were extremely diverse. The perspective that justified the war 
corresponded largely with the Indisch view, in which the only conceivable 
answer to the post-war anarchy and the nationalists had been firm, but righ-
teous intervention. However, in retrospect, the broad publicity attracted by 
conscientious objector veterans and the few, like Poncke Princen, who de-
fected for their principles, casts the post-war years and, hence, the colonial 
order that was being defended, in another light. Thereafter it was impossi-
ble to commemorate the 5,000 Dutch soldiers who died in Indonesia with-
out mentioning the multitudes of Indonesian victims, or to speak of the loss 
of the East Indies without putting the legitimacy and justifiability of the 
colonial order up for discussion.
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The Indisch community had complained for a long time about a lack of 
interest and recognition. Now that more was finally being said about the last 
years of the colony, the mood was mixed and the tone often strident. Along-
side sympathy for the repatriates’ departure from Indonesia, their home-
sickness and the resentment they felt, an image of the Indisch Dutch now 
emerged as a pre-eminently privileged class of the ‘wrong’ colonial kind. 
The Indisch community might at this point have turned, sulkingly, in on 
itself. But the opposite occurred. It was precisely after this episode that the 
battle for acknowledgement really got underway. And even though com-
plete redress was their most concrete aim, the focus was increasingly on de-
fending the old order and the Indisch role in it against allegations of self-
serving, unjust, violent colonialism.
Consequently, an uncomfortable split arose, which generated striking 
silences. Where there was talk of discrimination, it was the Indisch Dutch 
who were the victims of Dutch racism with little being said about their own 
pre-war attitudes to the ‘natives’. Where post-war violence was discussed, 
the Indisch community spoke of the bersiap period, not of Dutch war crimes. 
Distressingly, in the memories of veterans, it is often precisely the Indisch 
and Moluccan troops who are deemed to have been violent. This, naturally, 
never became a popular theme in Indisch and Moluccan circles.
54
The East Indian veterans were given their own monument in 1988 in 
Roer mond. It was unveiled by Prince Bernhard, prince consort to the former 
Queen Juliana. This was a remarkable delegation of duties considering 
Queen Beatrix had unveiled the Indisch monument in The Hague a couple of 
weeks earlier. A Veterans’ Platform was established and the government set 
about developing a veterans policy. In 1990, the Dutch government, through 
the Minister of Defence, Relus ter Beek, offered the East Indian veterans the 
government’s apologies for showing them insufficient understanding and 
guidance on their return to the Netherlands. An apolitical acknowledge-
ment which did not raise the justification for and the point of the war.
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Van Doorn included the veterans in what he described as ‘the Indisch 
generation’. There is much to support this stance in the sense that they con-
tributed to keeping the East Indies alive in the Netherlands and, like the In-
disch community, continued to influence Dutch government policy on In-
donesia for a long time and were deeply offended about what they felt to be a 
lack of recognition and appreciation. But were they really Indisch in a socio-
logical sense, a community with a shared fate? This is doubtful. Ultimately, 
the veterans were too transient and had no ties to the pre-war East Indies. 
Partly because of this, decades later many of them were to become more crit-
ical of the old colonial order and the attempt to restore it. The public case of the struggle for recognition: war and the silent migration 91
the veterans was, above all, whether their devotion to duty as soldiers was 




The call for recognition reflects a desire to be accepted completely and to 
belong – in the case of the ‘Indisch generation’, to belong to the imagined 
community of the Dutch nation. Soldiers and totoks could assume they were 
accepted as Dutch; for them it was quite simply a question of whether their 
experiences were taken seriously. The Indisch Dutch doubted, correctly, 
whether their citizenship was taken seriously. They had always viewed their 
ties with the metropole as family relations, as Ellen Derksen, the driving 
force behind the enormous annual fair in The Hague, the Pasar Malam Besar, 
put it. It is striking how soon and how bitterly the metaphor of second- or 
third-class citizens – or ‘pseudo-Dutch’ (Tjalie Robinson) – took root in In-
disch circles and how often complaints were made about ‘disloyalty’ and a 
lack of solidarity in the Netherlands.
57
The Hague’s reactions evolved from dismissive through non-committal 
to accommodating, but the ambition to finally draw a line under the period 
1942-1949 remained intact. In 1965, Pelita – the foundation charged with pay-
ments to war victims, which had been founded in the East Indies – was al-
most dissolved, ‘because people cannot remain war victims forever’.
58 How-
ever, Pelita continued, more payments were made, but many continued to 
be resentful. Fifteen years later, vvd senator Wiebenga called upon the In-
disch community to close the issue of back pay, ‘also for their own spiritual 
welfare’. The same Wiebenga later became chairman of Het Gebaar, the dis-
continuation of which he oversaw in 2009, while at the same time describing 
the government’s gesture as ‘late and limited’. It remained difficult for all 
parties to find a middle way between acknowledgement and closure. Histo-
rian Cees Fasseur established in 1985 that the war never ended for many of 
the Indisch generation; a quarter of a century later the generation is greatly 
diluted, but the emotions remain.
59
The struggle for acknowledgement also had an immaterial aspect – and 
again it was a long time before a space was forced open to allow for an Indisch 
perspective. The national World War ii monument in the central Dam 
Square in Amsterdam was initially only intended as a European memorial. 
However, at the insistence of prominent Dutch from the East Indies it was 
decided that an East Indian urn should be added to the design. The urn, The first major commemoration of the war in the East Indies took place in The Hague  
on 15 August 1970, twenty-five years after the Japanese surrender. More than 10,000 
people attended, including Queen Juliana; the Minister of Culture, Recreation and 
Welfare, Marga A.M. Klompé; the Minister of Finance, H.J. Witteveen; and the last 
Governor General of the East Indies, A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer. This 
photograph of the entry of Tjarda and his wife evokes an image of colonial nostalgia.
(collection netherlands institute for war documentation)
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which was added in 1950, brought a layer of symbolism to this national mon-
ument which, above all, reflected the experience of the totoks – Dutch who 
had just happened to be somewhere else. There was nothing to show that the 
knil had largely consisted of indigenous soldiers or that the Indisch Dutch 
had also suffered during the war. Thus, the ‘monument on the Dam’ also 
symbolized Dutch ignorance of the Indisch world and its wartime experi-
ences.
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The memorial culture around the Second World War became more criti-
cal from the 1960s onwards, substituting concern about Jewish and other 
victims, collaboration, traumas and ethical dilemmas for a previous insis-
tence on national heroism.
61 And, gradually, as the Indisch community be-
came more organized and expressed its grievances and desires more openly, 
more space was demanded for the Indisch wartime experience. Invariably, it 
was the repatriated Dutch who took the initiative for monuments, but along 
the way it also became clear that the war in the East Indies was not only an 
issue for the totoks. It took a long time, but in the end 15 August, the day of the 
Japanese capitulation, became a national day of commemoration. Once 
again Indisch organizations took the lead, led by G.S. Vrijburg, the man who 
was later behind the Stichting Nederlandse Ereschulden (Foundation for the 
Dutch Debt of Honour).
In 1970, a memorial ceremony was held at The Hague Congress Building 
attended by around 10,000 people; guests of honour included Queen Juli-
ana, Princess Beatrix and the last Governor General of the East Indies, A.W.L. 
Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer. The day was felt to be a great success. 
Tjalie Robinson wrote in Tong Tong of an ‘atmosphere of pride in the Com-
memoration’, but also that it was to be ‘the first and last’ such ceremony.
62 
This turned out not to be the case. The first Indisch monuments were un-
veiled in Apeldoorn (1971) and Bronbeek (1975). Many books were published 
and exhibitions held. In 1980, the new 15 August 1945 Foundation organized 
a national memorial ceremony in Utrecht, attended by 11,000 visitors in-
cluding Queen Beatrix, members of cabinet and the Indonesian ambassa-
dor. The crowning moment of the foundation’s work was the unveiling of 
the Indisch monument in The Hague, once again in the presence of the 
Queen and members of the cabinet (1988). Ever since, 15 August has been a 
national day of remembrance, a day that is marked not only in The Hague, 
but throughout the land at relatively recently constructed monuments.
The tenor of all this remembering does not seem to have undergone any 
great development: starting with the Japanese, ending with the cold recep-
tion, and including the long and never truly won battle for acknowledge-
ment. The scope of the attention paid to victims has broadened along the 
way to include totoks – who, remarks Captain, became more Indisch through 
the process of remembering – Indisch Dutch and Moluccans.
63 The impact of 
the war on the vast majority of the ‘native’ population of Indonesia has never 
been a central issue. The memory remained Indisch.
That the war in the East Indies would not simply go away had become 
quite clear. But the acknowledgement that was being demanded raised new 
questions, which were posed more and more forcefully, about the way the The Hague, 15 August, 1999. Prime Minister Wim Kok and Minister for Health, Welfare 
and Sport, Els Borst-Eijers, head the procession at the Indisch monument. 15 August 
became a national day of remembrance in 1988, forty-three years after the Japanese 
surrender. Both politicians were closely involved in establishing Het Gebaar for the 
Indisch and Moluccan communities in 2000. (collection anp)
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war was commemorated in the Netherlands: why continue to remember 
and, now that the generations who lived through the war are fading away, 
how should it be done? The answers to these questions recall the German 
occupation and revolve largely around the dual themes of ‘Auschwitz never 
again’ and respect for minorities; in this sense they are forward looking.
The memory of the Japanese occupation is less easy to bring up to date. 
The annual commemoration at the Indisch monument in The Hague on 15 
August has attracted on average 2,000 people over the last few years. Dutch 
television dedicates considerable airtime to the ceremony, which is very dif-
ferent from what tends to happen with, for example, the national commem-
oration of the slave trade and slavery on 1 July.
64 There is no longer a lack of 
recognition surrounding Indisch war-related suffering. However, this has 
not meant that ceremonial commemoration has become truly national, nor 
that ceremonial commemoration will long outlive the Indisch generation. 
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tend to become anachronisms once the generations who shared the experi-
ences being commemorated have died out. Those who attend the Indisch 
monument in The Hague still form an impressive gathering, but their num-
ber is nothing compared with the numbers that attended in 1970 and 1980.
To prevent forgetting, and after the inglorious demise of the earlier In-
disch House in The Hague, the government decided in 2007 to set up the In-
disch Memorial Centre (ihc, Indisch Herinneringscentrum) on the country 
estate of Bronbeek in the east of the Netherlands. This is a home for veterans 
of the East Indies and a museum primarily about military colonial history. 
The museum, which after many delays finally opened its doors on 16 Au-
gust, 2010, focuses on the modern history of the Indisch community, with 
particular emphasis on the war and its aftermath, including the exodus and 
integration in the Netherlands and elsewhere. The target group, the Indisch 
community, is very broadly described as ‘anyone who has links with or feels 
connected to the Dutch East Indies or Indonesia’ – this broadening of the 
scope, like the set up of the ihc itself, is evidence of the realization that the 
existence of such a community and an Indisch identity is less and less a mat-
ter of course. The complaints about Dutch forgetfulness and frugality re-
main, but it is the duty to remember that is increasingly being hammered 
home. Erry Stoové, chair of the ihc and, among other things, former chair 
of Pelita, speaks of a history that ‘must continue to be narrated and repre-
sented. For ourselves, by way of solace, and for our children and grandchil-
dren, to provide them with something to hold on to’. The current chair of the 
Indisch Platform, Herman Bussemaker, has frequently used similar expres-
sions.
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How long will this incantation continue to work and what can such a me-
morial centre mean today, now that a fourth generation is growing up? For 
how long will the scores of memorials that have been built continue to be 
visited and understood? Like monuments to the Holocaust, in their appeal 
to remember, not to forget, they attest to the fearful realization that more 
and more is forgotten forever and that not only the memory, but also the re-
membering community, eventually vanishes.
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What in any case will remain, besides individual memories passing 
down and changing from generation to generation, is the collective histori-
ography. Piles of books have been written over the last few years, paid for by 
public money, aimed at presenting a balanced Indisch history. This written 
memorial would not have come about without a strong Indisch lobby, which 
initially crystallized around the anger about what was felt to be a one-sided 
account in the Indies’ sections of Lou de Jong’s semi-official history of the 
war.
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cial history of the Dutch East Indies that has come about in this way was 
written by (male) historians with no previous personal ties with the colo-
ny.
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Examining the history of the struggle for recognition, several things 
stand out. First of all, that Van Doorn’s ‘Indisch generation’ never became 
united. The parameters, of course, became more inclusive – totok domina-
tion disappeared and the Indisch voice became stronger – but the Moluccan 
community remained relatively isolated, also in terms of organizations. 
This was even more the case with the Dutch soldiers.
A sense of incompatibility also forces its way to the surface. The bitter-
ness of the first Indisch generation remained, regardless of how often the 
government exhibited regret or how many more ‘gestures’ it made than it 
was initially inclined to. These concessions were not won without a battle, 
nor indeed without a strong lobby of organizations and spokesmen (and 
they were predominantly men). The Indisch organizations were in part as 
strong as they were, because they were able to mobilize their grassroots for 
concrete and, to a degree, legally underpinned aims: it was not a matter of 
simple acknowledgement or appreciation, but financial demands with real 
value. Their ambit within Dutch administrative circles was considerable be-
cause prominent members of Indisch organizations often occupied promi-
nent positions in Dutch society and came into contact with high-ranking 
administrators who could boast of East Indian experience. This made it 
easier for them to identify with each other within a notion of shared citizen-
ship and all the duties this entailed, particularly duties they ascribed to the 
Netherlands.
Of course, the Dutch government never fully met the demands. There is 
still disagreement surrounding the legitimacy or fairness of The Hague’s 
position. A cynical view would be that Indisch representations revolved 
around self-interest, with little concern for the destitute conditions of the 
indigenous population of Indonesia in 1945 (or later). That, in other words, 
harping on about their own citizenship was a continuation of a colonial dis-
course of inequity and racism. The Indisch perspective was very different. It 
saw the Netherlands as always holding the purse strings, as highly cautious 
about stripping colonial citizenship of its predicate ‘colonial’, which would 
lead to it being confronted with financial consequences. Many Indos experi-
enced this as racial discrimination, an accusation that hits home harder in 
the postcolonial Netherlands than it once did in the East Indies.
At the same time, it will not have escaped the attention of many Indisch 
Dutch that The Hague not only began to spend serious money on develop-
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sums of money to the Caribbean territories, starting with a few hundred 
guilders per capita in the early 1960s to several times this amount in later 
decades – expenditures that would far exceed all the compensation that was 
ever paid to repatriates.
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wesT IndIan and duTCh sTorIes and  
sIlenCes around war and exodus
History is told through ordering; through remembering and commemorat-
ing, but no less through forgetting and suppressing. Conscious and uncon-
scious choices by diverse groups and individuals lead to very different sto-
ries about the past. If we compare the wars in the Dutch East Indies, the 
Netherlands and the West Indies, the factual differences are enormous. And 
these differences are reflected in collective memory. If we look further, in 
this case into West Indian memory, characteristic silences emerge. Surina-
me and the Antilles were the only ‘free’ (although, of course, still colonized) 
parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands during the war. Allied troops en-
sured this status and enabled the Surinamese bauxite industry and the oil 
refineries on Aruba and Curaçao to make an important contribution to the 
allies’ war industry. The colonies supplied volunteers and mariners, many 
of whom were killed. Several dozen West Indians, who were living in the 
Netherlands at the time, joined the resistance; a number of them were shot 
by the Germans or died in concentration camps, like Surinamese Anton de 
Kom, Aruban Boy Ecury and Curaçaoan George Maduro. This is a footnote in 
the grand narrative of the Second World War, but a source of Caribbean pride 
and, therefore, a story that took on a new strategic value, alongside the in-
herent emotional one.
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Shortly after the war, George Maduro’s parents put up the starting capi-
tal to build the permanent exhibition in The Hague of the Netherlands in 
miniature, Madurodam (1952). It was not until 2006 that Anton de Kom came 
to be remembered in stone, in controversial exotic nudity in Amsterdam 
Zuid-Oost. By now, the Caribbean community in the Netherlands had grown 
enormously and the willingness to accommodate Suriname and the Antil-
les in World War ii commemorations had correspondingly increased. A war 
pension was finally paid to West Indian veterans in 2003. The first exhibition 
and publication on the theme, Wereldoorlog in de West (World War in the 
West) dates from 2004. The civilians and military personnel who were inter-
viewed delivered the message that West-Indian solidarity during the war led 
to Dutch obligations today.
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In Indisch history, repatriation is directly linked to the war and decolo-98 postcolonial netherlands
nization, something that was inevitable and which therefore generated 
rights – the right to find refuge in the Netherlands and, above all, the right to 
expect more than a chilly reception. A similar story cannot be told of the 
colonies in the West. The war did not bring collective suffering, but rather 
some prosperity and an opening to democratization and controlled decolo-
nization. As Elfriede Ferrol-Macintosh, from Suriname, powerfully 
summed it up: ‘We celebrated the war.’ 
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The exodus from the former West Indian colonies began much later, had 
nothing to do with the war and can hardly be described as unavoidable. More 
than a third of all Surinamese voted against independence with their feet, 
out of free will, unimpeded by the Netherlands. Antilleans – voters and pol-
iticians alike – have rejected independence for decades. Despite, from a re-
gional perspective, enjoying a materially privileged existence, more than a 
third of Antilleans have decided to settle in the not-much loved, but much 
more prosperous and freely accessible metropole.
There are no heroic tales to tell about this either and so the dominant 
West Indian explanation for the migration revolves around rights linked to 
citizenship: the right to unhindered access; the right to work and enjoy the 
collective rights awarded every Dutch citizen; and the right, in all respects, 
to belong. But in stark contrast to the Indisch narrative, the exodus itself is 
not a popular theme. It is painful, not because things were so bad for the 
Caribbean community, but because the migration is marked by choice, not 
the absence of the alternative: to remain at ‘home’.
The Netherlands learned to live with the Caribbean exodus. This is less 
relevant for the second generation of Surinamese and Antilleans, but what 
was the situation for the first generation? Constructing a narrative re-
mained a delicate affair. The easiest option was the construction of forces 
beyond one’s control, a strategy employed by Asian Surinamese: migration 
as flight from independence, which was dismissed as ‘that Creole thing’. It 
was only a small step to the dramatic words spoken by Hindustani Surinam-
ese politicians in the Dutch parliament on the eve of independence: ‘Hail 
[Dutch prime minister] Den Uyl, masters, we who are about to die greet   
thee!’ 
73 But in the end, Surinamese Dutch of Asian descent retained just one 
story to tell their family and friends who stayed behind in Suriname. Not a 
political story of forced exile, but a story of greater opportunity and pros-
perity.
Early Afro-Surinamese nationalists had the most difficult narrative 
challenge. How can you celebrate independence when you have chosen to 
live in the Netherlands, how can you continue to propagate nationalism 
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tempt Surinamese Dutch back to Suriname? The rhetorical way out lay in 
denial. Organizations like the Landelijke Federatie van Welzijnsstichtingen 
(National Federation for Welfare Foundations) initially talked a lot about a 
temporary stay and imminent remigration, an attitude that the Dutch gov-
ernment soon criticized as naive and counterproductive to integration in 
the Netherlands.
74 The horizon yielded. In the end, most Surinamese of the 
first generation – with children and grandchildren who were rooted in the 
Netherlands – began to think about return as a possibility for their retire-
ment. The most popular rhetorical solution, even among Surinamese na-
tionalists, was simply to snuggle down. The Surinamese exodus became 
something that, silently, went without saying. But within that silence lay a 
bias that verged on hypocrisy. While much has been said over the last few 
years about colonial trauma, especially around slavery, the exodus from the 
distant republic of Suriname was rarely spoken of in such terms. As if that 
exodus were not really a deep trauma, on both sides of the ocean. The theme 
was – and perhaps still is – apparently too close, too painful, too confronta-
tional. It was easier to blame the Netherlands for the abrupt farewell to Suri-
name and for everything that preceded it than to judge one’s own commu-
nity and oneself.
A similar avoidance of the exodus as a subject for debate can also be found 
in the Antilles community. Unavoidability and coercion are not the issues, 
but choice and rights. And here the narrative goes one step further. Antille-
ans on both sides of the Atlantic were strongly opposed to independence, 
because one consequence would be the closure of the path to the Nether-
lands. This is as clear and understandable as it is problematic, from a nation-
alist viewpoint, and is the reason it is not much spoken of except in vague 
allusions to the role the ‘seventh island’ (the Antilleans living in the Nether-
lands) might play for the islands in the Caribbean.
Surinamese and Antilleans were able to relate more easily to new Dutch 
attitudes to the Second World War. The war and its memory have been con-
stantly reinvented since 1945, by degrees less nationalistically, more self-
critically and with more room for the colonies. Strikingly, a recent pro-
gramme from the Ministry for Health, Welfare and Sport, Erfgoed van de 
Oorlog (Heritage of the War), was immediately and unprecedentedly direct-
ed at all parts of the wartime Kingdom. This kind of initiative, generously 
supported by the government, further shapes the memory of the war as a 
signal of recognition and inclusion for the postcolonial migrant. This ac-
knowledgement is appreciated, though the absence of collective West Indi-
an wartime suffering will not have passed unnoticed in the Indisch com-
munity. Sceptical Indisch views have, however, seldom been expressed in 
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The institutionalized commemoration of World War Two has acquired 
an increasingly explicit contemporary significance over the last few de-
cades. The dictum of ‘Auschwitz, never again’ has become a warning against 
xenophobia and racism at home. Incidents during remembrance ceremo-
nies and wider concerns about, primarily, Moroccan-Dutch youths have led 
to another broadening of war commemorations. Increasingly, the global 
nature of the war is emphasized as a way to draw a range of ethnic minorities 
into our war, our history, our commemorations. The Netherlands Institute 
for War Documentation (niod) has been actively involved in the publication 
of such books as Allochtonen van nu & de oorlog van toen (Contemporary im-
migrants & past war, 2004) and Oorlog op vijf continenten (War on five conti-
nents, 2008).
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Such projects developed from the best of intentions, but raise many 
questions, firstly about their effectiveness, but above all about the contrived 
use of history for contemporary ends. Over the last few years a lot of atten-
tion has been paid to the tens of thousands of Moroccans who fought with 
the Allies to free Europe and of the several dozen Moroccan soldiers who 
died in or near the southern Dutch province of Zealand and who lie buried 
there. This a story that might serve inclusionary purposes, but it is a one-
sided story. The number of Allied troops of other nationalities who are bur-
ied in the Netherlands is incomparably higher – thinking in terms of con-
temporary migration, we might mention the 500 or so Poles who lost their 
lives here. But it is not just about numbers. In the lead up to the Second World 
War, 30,000 Moroccan troops helped the Fascist General Francisco Franco to 
overthrow the Spanish Republic, Moroccan cavalrymen fighting for the Al-
lies were guilty of raping and plundering, and anti-Semitism was rampant 
in Morocco. Only telling half the story is not a serious option.
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A broad, explicitly non-nationalistic approach to the commemoration of 
war can raise very different concerns among postcolonial migrants. Their 
struggle was to get their own history accepted as part of national remem-
brance. Their war has a strategic value – right from the start for the Indisch 
community and more recently for Surinamese and Antillean Dutch. Yet, the 
wider the bounds are set around an historically linked community in the 
Netherlands, the less particular the colonial ties become and the more the 
postcolonial communities may be seen as just another group among so ma-
ny ‘immigrant’ minorities. Again, this leads to the loss of the postcolonial 
bonus.101
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The IndIvIdualIzaTIon of IdenTITy
Repatriates from the Netherlands East Indies arrived in a country that had 
almost no experience of ethnic diversity within its own borders and where 
anyone who was not white was regarded peculiar and labelled as such. There 
was little patience for difference and the pressure to assimilate was great. No 
wonder Tjalie Robinson, in his constant struggle against that pressure to 
adapt, rendered Indisch identity through crass expressions: ‘Nations are 
made, ethnic groups are born: the Indo character is inherited and has little to 
do with logic or the thinking of “an orderly state”.’ 
1
Fifty years later, while such a characterization is considered scientifi-
cally unsustainable, it also resonates little with later generations of Indisch 
Dutch. For them, Indisch is more a vague feeling than the fixed ‘ethnic char-
acter’ portrayed by Tjalie Robinson. This relaxed approach to putting things 
in perspective reflects both generational change and the transformations 
the Netherlands as a whole has meanwhile undergone. In a multicultural 
society, the scope to define oneself as different on grounds of ethnicity or 
culture has become more a matter of individual choice than it used to be, a 
choice that no longer needs to be defended in the essentialist terms ‘Tjalie’ 
needed to employ in the 1950s. ‘Indisch identity’ has become more accept-
able, but less clear-cut; the same goes for Moluccan, Surinamese or Antille-
an identity.
The space that is openly available for the commemoration and experi-
ence of postcolonial identities has become tangibly greater over the past few 
decades. This has also meant that previously ‘alien’ elements now form part 
of the nation’s self image. Since the opening of the Moluccan Historical Mu-
seum in 1990, the government has supported various other institutions for 
the history, culture, and identity of postcolonial communities.
2 This is re-
markable, considering that by the 1980s there was no longer a policy of sub-
sidizing minority languages and cultures. But because of the centuries of 
historical bonds, postcolonial minorities were allowed some leeway over 
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The Netherlands East Indies, in particular, became part of the national 
memorial culture. In 1996 the decision was taken to found an Indisch Memo-
rial Centre (Indisch Herinneringscentrum); in 2001 this turned out to have 
been a failure marked by internal conflict, accusations of nepotism, and 
mismanagement. Nonetheless, an Indisch House (Indisch Huis) was opened, 
once more in The Hague, but this institution suffered an equally inglorious 
demise, primarily due to mismanagement.
3 Yet again the decision was tak-
en to start up a new centre. After many delays another Indisch Herinnerings­
centrum opened its doors at the former home for veterans of the colonial ar-
my at Bronbeek on 16 August, 2010. A National Institute for the Study of 
Dutch Slavery and its Legacy (NiNsee) opened in 2003. While focusing on the 
Afro-Caribbean population, NiNsee also seeks to build bridges to wider so-
ciety. Only the Asian Surinamese and smaller minorities, such as the In-
disch Chinese, have not been given a national, publicly funded, ‘identity 
house’; but neither have they fought hard to get one.
4
IdenTITy: IndIvIdual perCepTIon, publIC sIgnIfICanCe
Bridging and bonding have become interchangeable in all these memorial 
institutions. Anyone following the ins and outs of these publicly funded es-
tablishments – and certainly the numerous, largely self-generated and self-
financed cultural festivals, gatherings, artistic expressions, publications 
and web sites that celebrate a specific ethnic and/or historical identity – will 
find that the perception of bonding carries a lot of weight. There is a deeply 
held sense of a shared, unique identity, often accompanied by the realiza-
tion that this identity and therefore also the cohesion, sense of security and 
continued existence of the community is under pressure. The celebration of 
a specific character begins to take on a defiant air, not because it is actively 
threatened from outside, but because its significance quietly evaporates.
‘Identity’ is a vague concept. Like the earlier notion of ‘race’, it has evident 
street value in everyday language usage, but it lacks scientific clarity. The 
concept is such an ambiguous mixture of ‘hard’ (essentialist) and ‘soft’ (con-
structivist) meanings that it now barely functions as an analytical concept.
5 
Amidst the stream of publications over the last few decades on the subject of 
identity and identity politics, a consensus has emerged that collective iden-
tity can better be understood as a process, in constant motion, rather than as 
a fixed result.
Academic consensus on the constructed nature of a specific form of col-
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endorsed. This was made particularly apparent by fierce response to a com-
ment made by Princess Maxima, the Argentinian-born wife of the heir to 
the Dutch throne, when she said that ‘the Dutch person does not exist’. We, 
so it appeared from many critical reactions, quite simply like to feel some 
certainty around the question of who we are.
That ‘we’ presumes a sense of solidarity, of belonging to a national com-
munity. And part of this is an ‘identity’, frequently defined in cultural terms, 
that should be expressed in ‘cultural heritage’. Wherever ethnic communi-
ties stress their own identity, the question immediately arises of how they 
want to relate to the broader society, to what extent there is also room for 
communality. Political and academic debates resonate with a need to com-
plement the sharp outlines of the state with a social, cultural, and ideologi-
cal dimension – to use Benedict Anderson’s influential expression, to con-
struct an ‘imagined community’, through which individual citizens may 
feel part of an entire nation, even if they regard themselves as belonging to a 
separate group.
6
Homogenous nation states do not exist, even if only because there is such 
a thing as class differentiation. Yet it is easier for countries with limited eth-
nic and cultural diversity to conceive of ‘the nation’ as being more or less 
uniform. Migration made the post-war states of Western Europe more het-
erogeneous, a process which, far from passing off soundlessly, was the 
source of heated debates on the subject of the nation – Maxima’s contested 
statement was made at the presentation of a report by the Scientific Council 
for Government Policy (wrr), which introduced profound subtleties to the 
idea of Dutch national identity.
7
No sensible person could possibly claim that national identity does not 
(or should not) change. Many of the debates revolve particularly around 
what the fundamental principles of such an identity might be, how many 
and what changes are acceptable, and who should be allowed to have the fi-
nal say. The state does not have a monopoly as such, but in a formal sense it 
does have the last word, whether in terms of establishing and monitoring 
national symbols and canons, or defining the space for cultural difference 
within the nation. Debates about multiculturalism revolve around the 
question of how much freedom should be granted to different views and 
customs, especially with respect to migrant communities, and whether 
characteristics specific to those newcomers can be sufficiently accommo-
dated within what up to that point had counted as the national identity – 
and, indeed, whether they might be able to contribute anything worthwhile 
to this identity.
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political clout, they begin to play an active part in the game of identity poli-
tics. The more minority groups there are that articulate such claims, often 
in strongly essentialist terms, the more complicated is the situation that 
arises, with desires that may be partly at odds with earlier views of the na-
tional identity and which, moreover, may also be mutually exclusive. No 
wonder then that in France, a country with a strong, state-centered nation-
alist tradition, there is much grumbling about the threat of a ‘Balkanization’ 
of the national identity and an undermining of the values of the French Re-
public.
8
The Netherlands has a less assertive tradition of nationalism and a great-
er tolerance of diversity, which in part is attributable to the phenomenon of 
verzuiling discussed above. Post-war migrants, therefore, landed in a society 
that was used to diversity within its own borders, but where cultural differ-
ence related mainly to differences between different Christian traditions 
and between Christian and secular citizens. Two contradictory develop-
ments began to emerge from the 1960s. Increased secularization reduced the 
importance of verzuiling. On the other hand, non-Western migrants brought 
new religions, Islam in particular, which marked a return of religion into 
the public domain. This question has come to dominate the Dutch debate on 
migrants and multiculturalism and has also fed a political penchant for 
‘culturalizing’ citizenship, requiring migrants not only to integrate at a 
functional level, but also to adopt ‘our’ norms on immaterial issues. ‘Islam’ 
has become a hot potato in this area.
The question at the heart of this chapter is how postcolonial migrants 
experienced and performed their own identity and what role they played in 
the national game of identity politics. On their arrival in the Netherlands, 
their colonial backgrounds distinguished them from other Dutch people 
and, as it would turn out, from other (later) migrants. This gave postcolonial 
migrants cause to emphasize their own character without it interfering 
strongly with their identification with wider Dutch society. Their call for 
their own identity to be acknowledged did not fade away, but gradually be-
gan to rub up against the practical process of integration, which eroded the 
significance of their colonial baggage.
What remained was ambiguous. On the one hand, as an extension of the 
experience of being different and the need to hold on to what was one’s own, 
protagonists in postcolonial migrant communities pushed more explicitly 
to the fore the discourse on the enrichment of post-war culture by postcolo-
nial cultures, which had already been employed by Tjalie Robinson. On the 
other hand, there remained an awareness, which was less enthusiastically 
voiced, of endemic ‘ethnic’ problems which were often related to class dis-
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Migrants from the former colonies had the advantage of the ‘postcolo-
nial bonus’ over other migrants from non-Western countries. This bonus 
ranged from full citizenship to a familiarity with Dutch language and cul-
ture. The weight of the European component in their colonial culture varied 
greatly, however, and was divided along partially overlapping lines of eth-
nicity and class. East Indian culture was a perfect example of a mixed cul-
ture; it is no wonder that Tjalie Robinson liked to compare this Eurasian 
culture with the mestizo cultures of Latin America.
9 The cultures of Suri-
name and the Antilles too are perfect examples of centuries of creolization; 
yet when they arrived in the Netherlands, most Caribbean migrants were 
not regarded as ‘Dutch’ – probably less so even than the Indos – and probably 
also felt themselves not to be.
The appreciation of ‘mixed’ cultures and creolization has undergone a 
remarkable change over time. Such cultures were long considered a corrup-
tion of the European norm. It was not until the twentieth century that the 
ideological re-evaluation that had made such an impression on Robinson, 
and which in Latin America was strongly nationalist, became dominant. In 
the postmodern world, where there was no longer a place for ‘race’, the no-
tion of a ‘mixed culture’ lost all of its stigma and the ‘hybrid cultures’ of co-
lonial history even came to be extolled as the predecessors of a globalizing 
‘creolizing world’.
10
Often missing from this praise of creolization is an understanding of the 
enduring significance of class. The continuum (African-European, Asian-
European), along which new, mixed cultures developed in the colonies, was 
never neutral. They remained hierarchies in which the European pole cor-
responded with respectability and progress. In this sense, these mixed cul-
tures indeed served as functional corruptions: the farther away from the 
European ‘norm’, the more ‘bastardized’ they were considered and, hence, 
less reputable. Respectable social advancement was and continued to be 
largely dependent on the extent to which the colonial citizens adopted Euro-
pean norms. Colour could be manipulated only to a limited degree and, in a 
direct sense, only over time through hypergamy, by ‘improving your colour’ 
– a widespread and, to this day, recognizable alienating strategy. Conduct 
and habits were somewhat easier to steer at an individual level. Social ad-
vancement was linked to internalizing and practising European norms. For 
ambitious individuals and families in colonial societies this opened the 
path to respectability and prosperity, followed by status: ‘money whitens’.
Whenever cultural dynamism is praised in migrant societies, it is often 
in relation to culture in the narrowest sense of the word – art forms such as 
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richment.
11 Reference is also made to physical characteristics and aesthet-
ics; while for centuries the derogatory term ‘half-blood’ was used, nowadays 
there is also praise for the postmodern biracial, or ‘double-blooded’ citizen, 
to use a term common in the Netherlands today – a rhetorical strategy that 
does not necessarily penetrate very deeply and which, in any case, continues 
to clash with the legacy of centuries of racism.
Less is said in this context, and certainly less jubilantly, on the signifi-
cance of class. Considering the unmistakable continuity between the colo-
nial context and the progress of integration, this is problematic. The closer 
to the European norm, the greater the chance of satisfactory integration in-
to the receiving country, and vice versa. Concretely, a poor knowledge of the 
language – Dutch in the Netherlands – low levels of education and employ-
ment qualifications, often combined with strongly authoritarian or unsta-
ble family relations, was part of the colonial heritage that postcolonial mi-
grants from the lower classes brought with them. Such dysfunctional 
characteristics also belong to cultural heritage.
IndIsCh IdenTITy, from TjalIe To Indo4lIfe
The feeling of being misunderstood and unappreciated by a cold and deni-
grating Dutch society is a leitmotif that runs through Indisch history – this 
shared understanding was to become fundamental to the sense of being 
part of a permanently distinct community. Responses to this sense of being 
misunderstood and undervalued varied enormously. For Tjalie Robinson, 
as his biographer Wim Willems makes clear, a refusal to resign himself to 
the situation led to an impressive struggle to defend individuality – against 
misjudgement, forced assimilation, loss and, thereby, not only against 
Dutch society, but also against those in his own circle who adapted in si-
lence. His ambition was great: he wanted his own people, including the In­
dos to ‘learn that the urge to live more freely is stronger than the pressure to 
live a confined existence’.
12
It had initially been in the interests of the Indisch Dutch to stress how 
Dutch they had always been, even in the East Indies, where they were said to 
form the ‘backbone of the colonial society’.
13 This was, after all, the premise 
of the argument for unrestricted access and the strategy for rapid integra-
tion into a society that had little regard for other cultures. The feeling of be-
ing different and the resentment at the lack of understanding and apprecia-
tion in this respect was mainly expressed in private. Tjalie Robinson was 
therefore relatively isolated in the 1950s with his emphasis on cultural spec-Tjalie Robinson at a fairground catapult stand, The Hague, Pasar Malam Besar, 1959.  
Play and posturing fitted perfectly with ‘Tjalie’s’ predilection for Indisch branie, or 
bluster. The catapult was removed from the Pasar Malam in 1984, as the police regarded 
it as an offensive weapon – a striking sample of the domestication of Indisch culture 
that Robinson so loathed. (collection tong tong foundation, the hague)
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ificity. Assimilated Indos retaliated by saying that clinging onto the Indisch 
identity was a ‘dead end’ that would only hinder integration – his popularity 
could not be compared with that of a crossover artist like the popular In-
disch singer Anneke Grönloh.
14
But this did not deter the indefatigable Jan Boon, alias Tjalie Robinson, 
alias Vincent Mahieu, from continuing his battle, supported by his wife Lil-
ian Ducelle (pseudonym for Lilian van Zele) and a gradually expanding net-
work of supporters, some recruited from his own family. In the end their 
struggle would help to make Indisch culture appreciated socially. But what 
was this culture? To begin with Robinson had hoped that the Indisch popu-
lation would manage to survive in Indonesia as a distinct people with its 
‘own language, customs and traditions’. Later he came to regard the Indisch 
community that had moved to the Netherlands as the bearer, in Willems’ 
words, of a ‘transnational identity [...] before this term had been coined’.
15
But what Robinson defined as ‘Indisch’ remains a mystery, at least for the 
– by him almost routinely detested, uncomprehending – outsider. At times 
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character is hereditary.’ 
16 He was more cautious elsewhere, but no more con-
crete. His Indisch was a mixture of pride and security, full of nostalgic refer-
ences to a bygone colonial era, a hymn of praise to the fruits of a mixed Eur-
asian culture, a deep understanding of the internal contradictions (‘that so 
subtly and sentimentally bedevil the Indisch’) and of his own weaknesses 
(lack of ambition and enterprising spirit). The Indo mindset, he wrote short-
ly before his death, is ‘typically universalist’ – but this, of course, raises 
questions about what was ultimately so unique about Indisch identity.
17
Tjalie Robinson’s struggle for the recognition of the Indisch identity was 
primarily a struggle for the Eurasian Indo, but it did not exclude the totok. 
Even if only for strategic reasons, he wanted to erase the divisions between 
the partially overlapping categories of class and colour. When it came to 
forging a single Indisch generation he revealed himself to be an optimist. He 
observed totoks in the Netherlands becoming more Indisch, while the so-
called assimilated Indo ‘didn’t become a jot more Dutch’. He regarded the 
rapid increase in exogamy as even less of an impediment to the continued 
existence of the Indisch identity, which, after all, was a mixed culture. For 
him it was evident that Indisch culture was and would remain unique, even 
if outsiders, on the whole, were unable to understand this.
18 As was written 
in a brochure published by the Indische Kunst Kring (Indisch Fine Art Soci-
ety), in the spirit or, perhaps, even by the pen of ‘Tjalie’: ‘whoever grew up – 
or worked [in the East Indies], can never forget it. He has been stamped with 
a mark that is fixed in his blood, anchored in his heart’. This applied to both 
totoks and Indos.
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It was incontrovertible to Robinson and his supporters that maintaining 
an individual identity posed no obstacle to integration in the Netherlands.
20 
This conviction was not only a prelude to the later ideology of multicultural-
ism, but also advanced a thesis that was to be born out in the decades that 
followed. Meanwhile, these early struggles generated a small, but literarily 
and journalistically fine oeuvre by Boon himself, written under the pseud-
onyms Tjalie Robinson and Vincent Mahieu, but also in the Indisch Kunst 
Kring, the annual Pasar Malam Besar fair and ‘The only Indisch paper in the 
world’, the Tong Tong (previously De Brug, later Moesson) which was confi-
dently extolled as ‘Trouw­Branie­Ondernemend’ (Loyal-Plucky-Adventur-
ous).
Tjalie Robinson died in 1974, but his work was continued by his third 
wife, Lilian Ducelle, his son Rogier Boon, his daughter-in-law Ellen Derk-
sen, and his granddaughter Siem Boon. From the 1970s on, scope for the pub-
lic expression of Indisch identity increased dramatically, as did the appar-
ent need to disseminate it more widely. This was initially organized using the individualization of identity 109
private means and personal energy. When in the 1990s the celebration of In-
disch identity became more closely linked to the struggle for compensation 
for wartime suffering, the government became more of a generous funder. 
And so the financing of Indisch heritage became a political issue, but, at the 
same time, this heritage was gradually stripped of its sharper edges.
21
Where the Indisch sociologist Guus Cleintuar wrote in about 1960 that it 
was ‘at least doubtful as to whether the so-called Indisch Dutch are Dutch, 
feel Dutch and are felt to be Dutch’, a few decades later an ostentatious em-
brace of Indisch culture confirmed their complete inclusion.
22 What Lizzy 
van Leeuwen in Ons Indisch erfgoed defines as the ‘struggle for culture and 
identity’ becomes something of a symbolic catch-up manoeuvre. The em-
phasis on an Indisch identity, which had been so natural in the East Indies 
that there were no words needed to describe it, helped to bond the commu-
nity, provide security and pleasure, but was also fed by rancour.
This rancour was a response to the incomprehension and delayed ac-
knowledgement that met them – Ralph Boekholt wrote furiously of the lack 
of recognition for Indisch ‘roots without which we could not exist’. Resent-
ment was often also felt later towards more assertive and sometimes prob-
lematic migrants. Resentment that they were thought to have been given so 
much more scope, sometimes jealousy that they seemed able to disseminate 
their culture so much more easily. And, of course, frustration that the Dutch 
continued to confuse ‘Indisch’ and ‘Indonesian’. Edy Seriese, director of the 
Indisch Wetenschappelijk Instituut (Indisch Academy) in The Hague sighed: 
‘Colonial history, no one knows anything about it! If “Indisch” gets mixed 
up with “Indonesian”, it just shows that the Dutch know nothing of their 
own history!’ 
23
Meanwhile, an understanding of the differences of colour and status re-
mained alive within the Indisch community. Migrants from the East Indies 
brought with them a legacy of at times undisguised racism against the ‘in-
digenous’ population, but equally in relation to colour distinctions among 
themselves. This was carried over into the Netherlands. While the postcolo-
nial label ‘Indisch Dutch’ may have come to be used more freely over time, 
the colonial distinctions between origin and colour were not forgotten 
within the community and only began to ebb away somewhat in later gen-
erations.
24
The resentment at the lack of appreciation for the suffering they endured 
under the Japanese occupation and upon their settlement in the Nether-
lands was not expressed in terms of a distinct culture. But where frustration 
regarding politicians’ lack of willingness was expressed, references to the 
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totoks were also privileged above the Indos. Class and colour were on the ta-
ble, but it rarely went further than mutual grousing. The strategic unity 
among repatriates took priority; the struggle for recognition and compen-
sation for the hardships they had endured fuelled the desire to form a com-
munity, despite everything else.
Integration itself only strengthened this. The much discussed process of 
‘silent assimilation’ consisted in part of a pragmatic reinforcement of the 
Dutch component in Indisch culture. The world of the totoks in the East In-
dies was compared with ‘Hilversum [an affluent village in the centre of the 
Netherlands] in a heat wave’.
25 The life of the Indo community was far more 
varied; Hilversum was one extreme, the kampong (village), the other. The 
kampong had to be erased in the Netherlands. Malay, or the Malay- and 
Dutch-based mixed language Petjo, slipped further into the background, 
the religion was and remained Christian, and Indisch attire became purely 
folk costume, from high to low. With no way back, adaptation was by far the 
best strategy; this is why the repatriates, despite all their irritations regard-
ing Dutch ignorance and paternalism, proved themselves willing to become 
‘potato guzzlers’.
26
The more Dutch an Indo became, the more the culture of the lower In-
disch class began to lose significance. Of course, there remained a class dis-
tinction among the Indisch Dutch, but it gradually came to resemble more 
closely the hierarchy that existed in the society as a whole. What was left of 
an internal struggle took place largely in private. Meanwhile, from the 1950s 
on, the Indisch Dutch began to assert themselves in mainstream Dutch pop-
ular culture, starting with singers like Anneke Grönloh, followed later by 
Indo rockers like the Tielman Brothers and the Blue Diamonds, who broke 
through with a largely Western repertoire. The praise expressed at the time 
– ‘rock ’n roll is in the Indo blood’, Indisch Dutch have the gift of dance ‘that 
can never be forgotten’ – sounds awkward today, now the metaphor of he-
reditary culture is no longer appreciated.
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In the decades that followed, the East Indies would continue to penetrate 
further into Dutch culture, starting with literary awards for Tjalie Robin-
son/Vincent Mahieu and ending with what Lizzy van Leeuwen describes as 
the ‘Indisch Rococo’ around 2000: besides the annual mega-festival of Pasar 
Malam Besar, numerous incidental and commercially successful initiatives 
sprung up, like Indisch Zomer in The Hague (2005) and a long series of nos-
talgic television and feature films about the Tempo Doeloe period of around 
1870 to 1914 (De stille kracht, Max Havelaar), about the war and decolonization 
(Oeroeg, Gordel van Smaragd), homesickness and integration (De stille intocht, 
Het land van mijn ouders). Indisch heritage has become a leading cultural the individualization of identity 111
brand. In the end the government also provided funding for an Indisch Me-
morial Centre, thus fulfilling a long-held desire. However, results so far 
have been mixed at best; the first two centres were closed down due to an 
ignominious history of mismanagement.
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‘Indisch people’, even the second generation, remained sceptical about 
the acceptance of their community, of their own identity. This is revealed by 
the genre of witness literature, full of depictions – ranging from ironic to 
bitter – of the defensive way the repatriates were treated and the resulting 
parental resentment.
29 Such Indisch authors as Alfred Birney, Reggie Baay 
and, above all, Marion Bloem (Geen gewoon Indisch meisje) have been repre-
sentative of this new, postcolonial genre since the early 1980s. The renowned 
Dutch author and media personality Adriaan van Dis (Nathan Sid, Indische 
duinen), born in the Netherlands of Indisch parents, but white in contrast to 
his Indo half-sisters, was trickier to place and even became the subject of 
debate: was he Indisch enough? And was the Indisch ‘character’ acceptable 
as portrayed in a popular television show by the repatriate Wieteke van Dort 
using a thick Indo accent? There were many of these, often vehement de-
bates: about how harsh the occupation and bersiap had really been; about 
how deep colour consciousness and mutual racism had been and still were 
(publicist Rudy Kousbroek versus Tjalie’s granddaughter Siem Boon); and 
on the changing meaning of the Indisch identity for later generations.
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These debates revealed growing differentiation in Indisch circles and 
raised the question of whether there was still any point to speaking of a sin-
gle community with a single identity. Spokespersons of the second genera-
tion accused their parents of clinging onto the war and tempo doeloe, they 
also wanted to rebuild ties with contemporary Indonesia; but how deep this 
all went is unclear.
31 These were also debates that largely passed wider soci-
ety by – which inevitably brings Tjalie Robinson to mind, venting his spleen 
on Dutch ignorance and disinterest. And so it was precisely the ‘taste and 
smell of Indisch cuisine’ that was recently praised by the Dutch National 
unesco Commission for being a textbook example of immaterial cultural 
heritage and striking proof of the degree to which migration has enriched 
Dutch culture. With such well-intentioned constrictions, writes Van Leeu-
wen, Indisch culture becomes not only ‘impoverished’ and depoliticized, 
but also almost entirely stripped of the dimensions of class and colour.
32
Nonetheless, it is clear that over the past few decades the Indisch com-
munity has played a crucial role in the broadening of the notions of what 
comprises Dutch culture. The Indisch struggle for the recognition of an 
own identity formed a prelude to the arduous process of multiculturaliza-
tion. A symbol of its success is the Pasar Malam Besar. Recently renamed the With a strike on the tong tong, Queen Beatrix opens the 50th Pasar Malam Besar,  
The Hague, 21 May, 2008. On this occasion, Ellen Derksen announced the name change 
from Pasar Malam Besar to the Tong Tong Fair. (collection anp)
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Tong Tong Fair, this Indisch festival has grown into the largest ‘multicul-
tural’ festival in the Netherlands and the largest Eurasian event in the world, 
attracting around 135,000 paying visitors to the 50th edition in 2008. Florine 
Koning subtitled her history of the Pasar Malam ‘een Indische onderneming’, 
an Indisch enterprise. This underlines the extent to which the organizers – 
originally the Indisch culinary author, Mary Brückel-Beiten, and Tjalie Rob-
inson, quickly joined by volunteers from Robinson’s own family, in particu-
lar Ellen Derksen and Siem Boon – deliberately ran this event as a commercial 
enterprise, without receiving any external funding worth mentioning until 
recently. The Pasar Malam was a gift not from, but to The Hague. This estab-
lished ‘the Indisch’ – as their advocates had been declaring for decades – as 
self-confident, enterprising, enriching, a testimony to the ‘uncompromis-
ing ambition’ of (dixit ‘Tjalie’) ‘free, enterprising Indos’.
33
Nevertheless, considering the changing of the generations and the high lev-
els of exogamy that occurred from the beginning, the existence of a single 
community with a shared identity cannot be taken for granted – in fact, less 
so by the day. Esther Captain writes that within the Indisch community, 
identity is linked to the war, (pre-war) Indisch background, or a combina-the individualization of identity 113
tion of both. She believes ‘that “Indisch” culture and identity will probably, 
in the end, outlive manifestations as war victims.’ 
34 This is convincing; but 
the biggest question remains how long ‘Indisch’ will continue to be a deter-
mining factor in the lives of descendants at all.
Recent research into the second and third generation – funded again by 
the government as part of The Gesture – documents a ‘community’ that is 
highly aware of its own ‘dilution’ and, moreover, speaks of it in very matter-
of-fact terms.
35 What is summed up as typical of the Indisch identity is gen-
erally positive (good manners, hospitality, warmth, politeness, respect for 
elders, family values); there is naturally less scope for negative, colonial ste-
reotypes (indolence, culture of gossip, inferiority complex). But what is ex-
pressed is staggeringly unspecific: ‘Indisch is a feeling’, just as The Hague 
Pasar Malam is celebrated because ‘once a year you can be yourself in your 
own niche’. What remains is nostalgic-sounding criticism of the cold Dutch 
culture, which varies little from the views of other migrants from other non-
Western countries, while at the same time the understanding that the In-
disch identity has become increasingly a matter of individual choice.
36
One may assume that Indisch history will end with the fading away of 
the generation that experienced the East Indies first hand, or via their par-
ents, or perhaps even their grandparents. As Indisch spokesman Huub 
Deetman once put it, ‘Indisch was there and then, not here and now’. Such a 
decisive rejection of postcolonial continuity passes over the way in which, 
precisely in the Netherlands, the need to distinguish oneself as Indisch 
grew in response to what was experienced as a cold reception – and how it 
was later felt to be imperative to emphasize ethnic uniqueness in a society 
that gradually became more accepting of diversity. This is still not past his-
tory. Captain has demonstrated that among (grand)children of the first re-
patriates the need to identify with the Indisch remains strong; Deetman’s 
dismissal was perhaps somewhat premature. On the other hand, the identi-
fication Captain describes is so broad – aimed at the past or the present, at 
Indos in the Netherlands, Indonesia or Asia, or a dash of all them mixed to-
gether – that the question arises how distinct and communal that Indisch 
feeling still is. ‘The main tendency,’ writes sociologist Marlene de Vries in 
Indisch is een gevoel, ‘seems primarily to be assimilation.’ In which case, the 
notion ‘Indisch community’ is gradually, quietly losing relevance, despite 
Tjalie Robinson and his unremitting polemic against assimilation.
37
There is something paradoxical about this. The Indisch community en-
tered into ultimately successful confrontations with a society that showed 
little tolerance for diversity. It wrested more room for the recognition and 
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‘strange and familiar’, and thus fended off the pressure to assimilate with 
increasing success. Later migrants profited from the battle the Indisch pio-
neers had fought for multiculturalism, long before this word existed. In-
disch Dutch still state their pride in their identity.
38 But this identity has 
become gradually more diffuse, particularly since the Dutch elements of 
the Indisch identity, which were already prominent, have simply become 
stronger in the subsequent, ‘diluted’ generations. Contemporary web sites 
reveal how the younger generations present themselves as ‘Indo4Life’ or 
‘Proud to be Indo’, demonstrating a continuity, the transfer of an older, 
mixed culture. But even the Indisch Netwerk, founded by highly educated 
youngsters of the third or fourth generations, has observed that ‘there is 
now a large group of Indos of our generation that is completely uninterested 
in what we are doing.’ 
39 To which one may add that the free, noncommittal, 
individual choice to join Indo4Life is a far cry from the ‘hardcore’ version of 
Indisch identity that Tjalie Robinson once brought out into the open.
moluCCan IdenTITy around and afTer The rms
Among the small group of Moluccans who took up residence in the Nether-
lands after decolonization, the majority had previously no strong ties with 
Europeans in the East Indies – neither totoks nor Indos – beyond the realm of 
work, particularly the colonial army (knil). It is therefore not surprising 
that this lack of mutual involvement continued to play a significant role in 
the Netherlands, regardless of how much communality is celebrated (Pasar 
Malam Besar), commemorated (vj day on 15 August) or how much recogni-
tion is enjoyed today (The Gesture). This recent ‘communality’ is largely the 
result of government policy – whether there is rapprochement at an emo-
tional level as well is less clear.
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As will have become clear, the meaning of Indisch identity is disputed. 
The Indisch community that took shape in the Netherlands after the war 
remained divided along lines of class, status and colour. In subsequent gen-
erations the meaning of both ‘the community’ and its ‘identity’ became 
more diffuse. It produced fascinating and often exceptionally sophisticated 
debates within Indisch circles, but provided no foregone and certainly no 
uncontested conclusions.
Compared with this, the story of the Moluccans in the Netherlands is 
easier to survey. The identity of this small and more homogeneous commu-
nity was better defined. Apart from a small, well-educated Moluccan elite in 
the colonial service, the majority of the male heads of households had served the individualization of identity 115
in the knil, usually in the lower ranks. However much was made in the East 
Indies of their Oranjeliefde (love of the ‘Orange’ monarchy and the Nether-
lands) and the eternal loyalty of these soldiers to the colonial authority, the 
culture of these knil personnel and their families was not so much a mixed 
culture as a primarily Moluccan military, ‘indigenous’ culture which, apart 
from the Christian faith of the vast majority, only contained superficial 
Dutch elements.
The refusal to give up what had rapidly become an illusory ideal to return 
to an independent (South) Moluccan republic (Republik Maluku Selatan, 
rms) held integration back by at least a generation. Clinging to their own, 
politically defined identity made it hard to break with their own culture, 
even where certain elements proved dysfunctional in the Netherlands, for 
instance, using their own language, Moluccan Malay. Political radicaliza-
tion reinforced the feeling that they were fighting for their own, clearly de-
fined aim. Group pressure, which had been a crucial factor since settling in 
the Netherlands, as well as the need for security, helped to keep the commu-
nity together, as did the lack of understanding and above all support from 
the Dutch political establishment. Following the violent actions of the 
1970s, hostile reactions from the wider society may have underscored this 
sense of community.
The abandonment in the 1980s of the ideal of the rms, or at least the 
dream of ever being able to settle in an independent rms, created room for a 
less imperative and politically more symbolic interpretation of identity.
41 
The orientation towards the islands, however, remained strong, far more so 
than for the Indisch Dutch. The Moluccan identity thereby preserved a 
strongly transnational dimension. But later and, as yet, incomplete im-
provements in the social position of the Moluccans are linked to a stepping 
away from the original colonial baggage – from the Malay language, from 
the dream of remigration, and from strict familial and communal disci-
pline.
The route to integration and social improvement thus took on some-
thing of the character of an escape from the (grand)parents’ small commu-
nity. Demographically, this took shape through many mixed relationships; 
geographically, through leaving segregated housing and neighbourhoods; 
and culturally, through participating in Dutch youth culture, among other 
things. From the mid-1970s, the Moluccan band Massada scored hits with 
music that tied in with American, Latin-influenced pop music. In the early 
1980s Amsterdam’s pop temple Paradiso put on monthly concerts under the 
title Moluccan Moods; the musicians and a large section of the audience were 
Moluccan, but the music was predominantly international pop.
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As in the Indisch community, the reorientation of the younger genera-
tions did not require them to completely distance themselves from the iden-
tity of their (grand)parents. Moluccans often claim pride in their identity, 
which is different from simply being Dutch or Asian, let alone Indisch.
43 On 
a more symbolic level, the ideals surrounding the rms, and certainly en-
gagement with the Moluccas, remained alive. In the 1980s there was even 
mention of a counter reaction among some youths, a tendency to define Mo-
luccan identity more stringently around such issues as a command of the 
Moluccan-Malay language and knowledge of the traditional adat (customs, 
traditions). In addition, older differences within the community resur-
faced, such as ties with particular islands and communities and the sepa-
rate existence of a Muslim minority.
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Over the last two decades the Moluccan community has nonetheless be-
come more Dutch, out of necessity, but also through exogamy and choice. 
Giovanni Mataheru, grandson of a knil soldier and himself in the Dutch 
army, observed matter-of-factly that the third generation is ‘completely in-
tegrated. Most of my peers are not even aware of this history. So, you should 
just let it be.’ This last sentence poignantly expresses how identity is nowa-
days less and less experienced as an exclusive choice, an observation that is 
highlighted by Smeets and Steijlen, even though they also stress that a sense 
of difference still remains.
45 This feeling of distinctness, of an own identity 
and associated obligations may explain why the involvement of the Moluc-
can community with their islands of origin remains so strikingly strong to 
this day. And this bond is no longer seen as incompatible with integration – 
neither by the Moluccan community, nor by society at large.
It is over sixty years since the arrival of the first Moluccan knil person-
nel and their families in the Netherlands and there has been much reflection 
on the arduous process of integration. Every year around the commemora-
tion of the founding of the rms it becomes repeatedly apparent how strong-
ly Moluccans feel about ‘preserving’ their identity. The former director of 
the Moluks Museum, Wim Manuhutu, recently remarked that a once ‘close-
ly structured society, a community that was relatively ordered from the top’, 
had become ‘considerably more individualistic’.
46 The debate around this 
tension has never abated in Moluccan circles. Meanwhile, almost all studies 
of Moluccan culture and identity have been written by ‘outsiders’ – certainly 
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dIversITy wIThouT unITy: CarIbbean IdenTITy
Leading post-war Surinamese politicians presented an ideal of national uni-
ty to their strongly ethnically divided country under the motto ‘unity in di-
versity’. This motto, based on the so-called verbroederingspolitiek (‘fraterni-
zation politics’) was limited in its success, but it did help to prevent serious 
ethnic tensions from building up – no minor achievement in a country that 
was so strongly segregated along ethnic lines. No one has ever remotely 
claimed that there is such a thing as an homogeneous Surinamese identity, 
nor is there an homogeneous Antillean identity, as identities are primarily 
experienced as island-related. Neither can one speak of a strong sense of a 
shared Afro-Caribbean identity among the descendants of enslaved Afri-
cans in the former Netherlands colonies.
47
It was many years before these contrasts began to dawn on the Dutch – a 
logical consequence of a long history of neglect. The fact that all inhabitants 
in the Western colonies were granted Dutch citizenship in 1892, a privilege 
that was only granted to a fraction of the population of the Netherlands East 
Indies, did not reflect any special appreciation for West Indian culture or 
subjects. The Netherlands simply saw no local alternative in the Western 
colonies – the elite regarded themselves as Dutch – and was unimpeded by 
worries about population size, which was small, or the existence of radical 
anti-colonial movements.
The label ‘West Indian’ concealed the heterogeneity of the inhabitants of 
these colonies, the extent of which only became really clear with postcolo-
nial migration. Prior to this, people in the Netherlands were not generally 
aware that Suriname was ethnically and culturally extremely diverse; that 
the Antilles were made up of different, fairly dissonant islands; that rela-
tions between Antilleans and the Surinamese were not necessarily easy; or 
even that they spoke different languages. Their Dutch citizenship made 
them a little more similar to each other, but to all other Dutch citizens as 
well.
It soon became apparent that West Indians continued to organize them-
selves along regional and ethnic lines, and certainly not because the Dutch 
authorities stimulated this. However, it also became clear that class was at 
least as pivotal to social integration and that culture and class were closely 
related, at least in the case of Afro-Caribbean migrants. This generated all 
kinds of dilemmas. What precisely were ‘our own things’, to use the expres-
sion of the Surinamese nationalist movement Wie Eegie Sanie, and how 
could they help the Surinamese to secure a place in Dutch society? Inevita-
bly questions arose as to how widely that ‘own’ could be shared; how useful, 
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how useful was it going to be in the Netherlands – for the first generation, 
but even more so for later generations?
The history of slavery is a pillar of Afro-Caribbean identity; that under-
standing, the commemoration and the struggle for the recognition of that 
history help to strengthen a sense of community. But where slavery gener-
ates images of a black and white dichotomy, Caribbean history has been 
marked by creolization and the emergence, also in the Dutch West Indies, of 
mixed cultures. Here too, creolization was transected by class distinctions. 
Internalizing Dutch culture and mastering the Dutch language were condi-
tions for upwards social mobility in the colonies. Meeting such Dutch stan-
dards became even more important upon arrival in the Netherlands, where 
it soon became painfully clear how unequally the postcolonial bonus was 
distributed.
Afro-Surinamese culture, in a narrow sense, initially reached the Neth-
erlands as a black, Dutch-speaking culture with a funny accent – in the 1950s 
the musician Max Woiski made it to the charts with his song ‘Oh Nederland, 
geef mij rijst met kouseband’ (Oh Netherlands, give me rice with [typically Su-
rinamese] yard-long beans). The exodus also brought the ‘working class’, 
who peppered Dutch with more Sranan and thick accents, who assimilated 
less silently than the Indisch Dutch or the earlier middle-class Surinamese 
immigrants, and who were often more challenging. The Surinamese band 
Trefassi came with a provocative variation of the Woiski song by demanding 
‘O Nederland, geef mij WW [werkloosheidswet] à contant’ (Oh Netherlands, give 
me my dole in cash).
In the 1970s, Afro-Surinamese culture came into ill repute through re-
ports about broken families, absenteeism from school, an inadequate work 
ethic, and drug abuse. The concerns were, it seems in retrospect, one-sided 
and exaggerated. However, there are indications – though remarkably little 
solid research – that integration was not successful across the board for the 
Surinamese Dutch and, specifically, that persistent problems have contin-
ued to mark the lower echelons of Afro-Surinamese communities. Anthro-
pological research has revealed striking continuities between a self-perpet-
uating Creole culture of poverty in Suriname that has carried over to the 
Netherlands.
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In wider Dutch society, Afro-Surinamese culture has at best indirectly 
claimed a space for itself. In the 1970s, Edgar Cairo wrote hilarious, often 
tragicomic columns in the national daily de Volkskrant in which he helped 
himself in abundance to Sranantongo and Surinamese-Dutch; writers like 
Astrid Roemer (Neem mij terug Suriname, Take me back Suriname, 1974) and 
Bea Vianen (Het paradijs van Oranje, The Paradise of Orange [orange being the individualization of identity 119
the colour of the Dutch monarchy], 1973) turned the exodus into a literary 
theme.
49 They painted a picture of a world of huge cultural differences, enor-
mous mutual incomprehension, of alienation and a ‘life between two 
worlds’. Since then, the Netherlands and Suriname have come closer togeth-
er, a growing number in the ‘Surinamese’ community has been born in the 
Netherlands and the Netherlands has become multicultural. Publications 
by contemporary authors of (part) Surinamese origins reflect this. They are 
more (multicultural) Dutch in theme, tone and vocabulary.
And what else? Today’s urban youth culture borrows some phrases from 
Sranan, the annual Kwakoe Festival attracts tens of thousands of visitors 
every summer to the Bijlmer district of Amsterdam, popular TV personali-
ties like Jörgen Raymann bring a touch of Surinamese flair to Dutch living 
rooms. Yet is is striking how limited the visibility of Afro-Surinamese cul-
ture is in popular culture. The youth in Britain embraced ska and reggae 
many decades ago, as French youth did zouk, but Suriname’s kaseko music 
has never broken through to the Dutch mainstream. The fame of many suc-
cessful musicians of Surinamese origin rarely rests solely on specifically 
Surinamese work. What they and other Creole performers and their fans 
mainly excel in is their participation in an international, North American 
and British dominated black culture.
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It is hard to say which image of Afro-Surinamese identity now domi-
nates in wider society. It is clear that within ‘the community’, besides pride 
in their origins, many still feel hugely frustrated about certain negative cli-
chés and racism that prevail, for instance, the raw nerve of what many feel is 
the racist tradition of Zwarte Piet (Black Pete).
51 This was recently graphically 
expressed by the anger that arose in response to the statue of the radical Su-
rinamese nationalist and writer, Anton de Kom. At long last a monument 
was being erected to celebrate this Surinamese hero and was to be sited in 
the Amsterdam-Bijlmer square which had been renamed after him. It then 
transpired that the Dutch sculptor had rendered him for posterity as a half-
naked noble savage, an ‘honour’ that would never befall a white politician or 
writer. The reactions in the Dutch press ranged from understanding to irri-
tation and pity for such over-sensitivity, just as they had a few years earlier 
around the tumultuous unveiling of the Slavery Monument in Amsterdam. 
However, now there was no longer a Dutch ‘us’ opposing a Surinamese 
‘them’. No less striking was how broad the range of reactions from black 
Dutch people was.
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What may be regarded as typically Surinamese has never been very clear; 
ethnic pluralism and respect for diversity remain as common as they are 
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has broadened to become the theme of transnationalism. The label of ‘Suri-
namese’ has continued to be primarily bound to Afro-Surinamese, a point 
that is not lamented by the Asian, and certainly not the Indian (Hindustani) 
Surinamese.
53 Successful Afro-Surinamese usually simply present them-
selves as Dutch with a different skin colour, a few different habits and some-
what stronger (read: richer) emotions, in which Christianity stills occupies 
a significant position. None of this refers to large, let alone insurmountable 
cultural differences.
Where discourse around a unique identity tends to speak of quintessen-
tial difference, the Afro-Surinamese, like the Indisch identity, continues to 
be more diffuse and more strongly linked to the Dutch colonial past, cer-
tainly more so than the (British) Indian a.k.a. Hindustani Surinamese iden-
tity. This soon marked the disintegration of the notion ‘Surinamese’. Wher-
ever the Indian Surinamese community speaks of identity and heritage, it 
always refers to its own group and links identity directly to ethnicity, reli-
gion and tribal land: relatively firm and far stronger criteria for a definition 
of self. This view of identity provided ideal foundations for self-organiza-
tion and was not felt to be problematic by the wider society; it was even fa-
cilitated in the Netherlands, which had meanwhile begun to lean towards a 
moderate multiculturalism.
The way the Indian-Surinamese community experiences and dissemi-
nates its own identity through the celebration of religious festivals and the 
annual Milan Festival in The Hague (around 70,000 visitors), in part under 
the auspices of the umbrella organization Lalla Rookh, outlined a paradox. 
On the one hand it situated Indian-Surinamese identity outside Dutch colo-
nial history and culture. The religion and bond it shared with India was the 
determining factor, Suriname was merely an intermezzo; the move to the 
Netherlands, therefore, an historical accident. On the other hand, its own 
culture, with its Calvinistic-like respect for family, discipline, learning and 
work, were presented as perfectly suited to Dutch society. Hence, so the ar-
gument goes, the remarkable success of the Indian Surinamese: spiritually 
different, but also successful because of their particular culture. This per-
petuated an implicit discourse of difference and often superiority with   
regard to Afro-Surinamese culture. And, just as in Suriname, this was   
expressed out loud in private, but at most sniggered in the public arena –   
although such authors as Kanta Adhin, Chan Choenni, Ruben Gowricharn 
and Anil Ramdas have become increasingly less restrained in this respect.
54
While any discussion about Afro-Surinamese culture cannot ignore the 
dysfunctional elements of the culture of the lower classes, the discourse 
around Indian culture harps on about the glorious nature of their roots cul-the individualization of identity 121
ture, for all classes. The fact that less positive elements – authoritarian fa-
thers and spouses, sexual and alcohol abuse, homophobia, high suicide 
rates – are only spoken of reticently, should not come as a surprise; as had 
earlier been the case with the Indisch Dutch, the motto was ‘don’t air your 
dirty laundry in public’.
55 Politically oriented Hinduism is not an issue, even 
less so than in the United Kingdom.
56
The latter is, in itself, an interesting fact in a society that, bearing Islam 
in mind, has begun to judge religious difference largely in a negative light. 
A minority of Indian-Surinamese is Muslim, as is the majority of Javanese 
Surinamese. As the Dutch integration debate has become increasingly 
bound to concerns about Islam, the fact merits attention that there are no 
indications that Surinamese Muslims had problems integrating. Neither 
group has a distinct, individual voice, neither in the Surinamese commu-
nity, nor in the world of Dutch Muslims. Indian Surinamese identify pri-
marily with fellow Muslims who share a similar migration history from 
‘Hindustan’ (in what was then British India), rather than with Muslims from 
the Arab world or Turkey. However, the current, intensely anti-Islamic ten-
dency in the Netherlands may yet serve to shape Surinamese Muslim iden-
tity.
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Thus there is no such thing as ‘the’ Surinamese identity or community 
beyond this diversity and the relationship with colonial history and the 
metropole. Rather, the question is whether and how the different ethnic 
communities, which are easy to distinguish in Suriname, will each be will-
ing and/or able to ensure their continued existence. The picture that begins 
to emerge here is at first a demographic one. Exogamy is traditionally strong 
among Afro-Surinamese, which at least at the moment contrasts starkly 
with the Asian Surinamese – a pattern that can be observed elsewhere in 
Europe.
58 In the realm of religion and, by implication, choice of life partner, 
the latter have continued to cherish their non-Western traditions in the 
Netherlands and there are few indications that this is changing.
This would suggest that the Afro-Surinamese community is becoming 
less separate, both demographically and culturally – a logical consequence 
of Western-oriented creolization stemming from the colonial era. From the 
perspective of integration, problems continue to centre on lower-class cul-
ture. The colonial view that this was a dysfunctional variant of Western cul-
ture was internalized more completely by the Creolized middle class. Class 
rather than ethnicity per se was seen as the problem, and not without justi-
fication. This problem seems to remain unabated within the urban minori-
ties’ culture of the big cities. However, the majority of Dutch people with 
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about identity and community will presumably come to link them less and 
less to those who stayed behind. Identity is increasingly experienced as an 
individual choice and this choice is becoming freer. Consequently, the space 
and motivation to bind an ever more diffuse community together around 
themes of a colonial past, cultural (slavery) trauma or a separate kulturu is 
declining.
That the cultural-political history of the Asian Surinamese in the Neth-
erlands took such a different course reflects the more exclusive and rigorous 
definition of what is considered a distinct identity, which in turn implies 
serious objections to exogamy. There is no reason to postulate that this will 
remain the case in future, but for the time being the various Asian-Suri-
namese groups continue to operate more as separate (but not oppositional) 
communities. This does not preclude an appreciation of the fact that a ‘Hin-
dustani’ may have multiple identities, nor does it preclude criticism from 
within – there are signs that the second generation is distancing itself from 
the rather authoritarian, patriarchal culture of the first.
59 It is striking, but 
not surprising, that in contrast to the Afro-Surinamese the Surinamese of 
Asian descent associate their identity so little with colonial history and re-
sistance: their cultural singularity is simply older and more defined as it is.
Neither is there much point in using such terms as ‘identity’ and ‘com-
munity’ to define Surinamese and Antilleans of African descent as a single 
community. What they do share is the history of Dutch colonialism and 
slavery, the legacies of which some believe continue to disadvantage the de-
scendants today, both in their emotional lives and in their social participa-
tion. Institutions such as the NiNsee attempt to unite them along these 
lines, but the continuing relevance of that past for the present is probably 
the most contentious issue discussed by leading members of the Afro-Ca-
ribbean population.
60
The features that divide the Surinamese and Antilleans from one anoth-
er are stronger: divergent local histories, a different relationship to the 
country of origin, and, above all, language. Where Dutch has become the 
dominant language for all Surinamese on both sides of the Atlantic, Papia-
mentu defines the Antillean identity to the extent that it even surpasses 
concerns of colour difference.
61 And this is the greatest dilemma facing the 
Antillean community. The language keeps the community together – far 
more so than, for example, the fact that most Leeward Islanders are Roman 
Catholic – but at the same time the dominance of this unique Creole lan-
guage seriously impedes educational performance and the overall integra-
tion of lower-class Antilleans.
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was rejected on sound, pragmatic grounds. However, the affinity with 
Dutch culture and politics has not grown any stronger, especially not now 
there is a feeling that the Netherlands is recolonizing the islands, while at 
the same time secretly hoping to be rid of the Antilleans who live in the 
Netherlands. This exacerbates the need of Antilleans on both sides of the 
Atlantic to defend what they see as their own identity. Papiamentu is the 
defining trait here; but the absence or rejection of a postcolonial language 
advantage has turned out to be disastrous for a large group of disadvantaged 
Antilleans. This dilemma was sketched many times and many years ago, but 
the issue was tackled badly and only exacerbated the problem. Antillean 
youths in the Netherlands now have a very poor reputation. Where in the 
case of other problematic minorities reference is made to a culture shock 
and an insurmountable generation gulf, here the opposite is true. Poor lan-
guage skills and school results, low employment levels, teenage pregnan-
cies and matrifocality, and crime: these serious social issues did not arise in 
the Netherlands, they were simply transplanted from a lower-class culture 
of poverty, primarily from Curaçao.
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An Antillean identity can, therefore, only be celebrated eclectically and 
sometimes blinkered. The Antillean culture of the higher classes has gener-
ated unique music and literature. Discovered by the Netherlands and re-
garded there as exceptionally rich, it has also become part of Dutch heritage. 
Curaçaoan waltzes and mazurkas and the work of Antillean authors such as 
Boeli van Leeuwen, Tip Marugg and Frank Martinus Arion were met with 
widespread appreciation. On the other hand, the reach of Afro-Curaçaoan 
folk culture in the Netherlands has remained very limited – Papiamentu-
language music plays virtually no part in Dutch music culture and the an-
nual summer carnival in Rotterdam, which attracts more than a million 
visitors, is beginning to lose its exclusively Antillean character.
63 For out-
siders, Antillean culture remains primarily linked to an unintelligible lan-
guage and the problems surrounding migrants with no prospects – some-
thing that is, of course, not taken lightly by Antilleans who actively cherish 
their origins.
64
A community is held together through emphasizing its own identity 
and through endogamy. The latter is no longer the norm for either Antille-
ans or Afro-Surinamese, but even the former is now under pressure. A divi-
sion is clearly discernible between well-integrated Antilleans – who by defi-
nition speak good Dutch as well as Papiamentu – and the lower and 
underclasses. This perpetuates the divide characteristic of Curaçao. For 
successful Antilleans in the Netherlands, identity will increasingly become 
a matter of choice, perhaps a choice of distancing, with the better integrated Antillean Summer Carnival to mark the close of the Kunstmarkt (Art Market) in Rotter-
dam, 24 August, 1986. The Rotterdam Carnival began in 1983 and has become ever larger 
and more commercial. In 1988 ‘Antillean’ was dropped from the title, allowing room for 
other Caribbean, Latin American and Cape Verdean participants. Recent Carnivals have 
consistently attracted almost a million visitors.  (collection anp)
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Antilleans simply enjoying greater freedom of choice. Whether they will 
continue to teach their children – often the products of mixed relationships 
– Papiamentu remains to be seen.
The parallels between Antillean and early Moluccan history are striking 
and might offer the Antillean community food for thought. When they ar-
rived in the Netherlands, the Moluccans scored poorly in terms of the post-
colonial bonus of the Dutch language. Moreover, they clung onto the illu-
sion of remigration, which led them to postpone adopting Dutch as their 
official language. This served to bind the community together, while at the 
same time seriously delaying its integration into the Netherlands, with con-
sequences for social mobility that are still discernible today. It is difficult 
not to read this as a warning for the Antillean community.
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reCognITIon and erosIon
Historian Hans Blom appositely characterized the Netherlands of the early 
post-war years as a country of ‘discipline and asceticism’ – today we may add 
that it was a time of almost inconceivable provincialism.
66 Yet, the country 
regained its international orientation, its population became more diverse 
and more space was created for the expression of ethnic identities. This was 
not a linear process. The last decade has seen a hardening of the integration 
debate and a tendency towards the culturalization of citizenship. However, 
because this reaction has primarily been directed against Islam, it has been 
less significant for the postcolonial communities, who instead were treated 
to a series of official, inclusive gestures.
In recent Dutch minorities discourse there is endless talk of cultural dif-
ferences, frequently narrowed down to issues around Islam, rather than 
class. A multicultural culture of extreme tolerance is denounced as having 
undermined the fundamental values of Dutch society. Postcolonial mi-
grants play a peripheral role in these debates. They are seen to be generally 
well integrated and, above all, are not viewed as presenting a threat to the 
social order. The first conclusion too easily steps over the existing problems 
associated with class and discrimination that have by no means been re-
solved. The second conclusion is correct; over the last 65 years, apart from 
the now concluded, moderate Indisch lobby against the Republic of Indone-
sia and the short period of violent Moluccan actions, there has been no radi-
cal political mobilization by postcolonial migrants.
From this perspective it might seem remarkable that it is precisely in the 
last few decades that Dutch politics has acknowledged and provided sup-
port for all kinds of demands in the realms of postcolonial identity, memo-
rial culture, museums and cultural institutions and the canonization of 
(colonial) history. Furthermore, repatriates from the East Indies, unlike mi-
grants from the Caribbean, were able to appeal for financial compensation 
for the war, bersiap and the ‘cold reception’.
67 The background to these ges-
tures was an understanding of the reasonableness of such demands, but also 
the view that acknowledging the postcolonial communities would make it 
easier for them to positively identify with Dutch society. A slogan such as 
‘Bound in Freedom’ – the motto promoted by the government for the com-
memoration of slavery – evocatively expresses this aim.
In this sense, the widespread attention for (post)colonial culture and 
history, spurred on by well-integrated postcolonial lobbies, can also be un-
derstood as the conclusion to a process of facing up to the colonial past. Once 
again the critical issue is the extent to which the postcolonial communities 
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the recognition of an own identity has more or less been won, the question of 
how ‘separate’ one really is becomes all the more pressing. Emphasizing 
postcolonial identity thus increasingly becomes a matter of choice – assum-
ing society at large respects that freedom of choice. Yet there is little here 
that can be taken for granted. Societies are not colour blind and are almost 
always sceptical about newcomers and their descendants. The freedom they 
are granted, both individually and collectively, to preserve aspects of their 
own identity and to express it publicly varies greatly. The same applies to the 
domestic willingness to loosen the definitions of national identity and to 
allow room for multiculturalism.
The Netherlands has changed a great deal in this respect. In the early 
post-war decades, the Indisch pioneer Tjalie Robinson experienced the ‘pil-
larized’, but ethnically fairly homogeneous society as suffocating. The atti-
tude to ‘coloureds’ was at best uncomfortable. Much post-war literature re-
volves around the confrontation with a culture that was regarded as 
homogeneous, petty, parochial, and often harbouring an aversion to being 
tainted by outside influences. The sense of alienation and frustration that 
resulted from feeling misunderstood and rejected would continue to form 
part of the collective postcolonial memory.
In the decades that followed, the Netherlands became less provincial, 
even though the codes for the national identity only changed slowly. Much 
about national identity remained unexpressed, a vagueness which for a long 
time was actually considered to be a wise approach. In the mid 1990s, prom-
inent historian E.H. Kossman qualified the notion of national identity as ‘an 
enormous jelly fish on the beach’, best avoided: ‘too complicated, too multi-
faceted and too fickle’.
68 With this Kossman positioned himself in opposi-
tion to essentialism, but perhaps he also disregarded the codes that con-
fronted migrants in Dutch society. In the meantime, a shift towards being 
more explicit had begun to emerge. In the edited volume Het nut van Neder­
land (The use of the Netherlands, 1996), the influential intellectual Paul 
Scheffer rejected the ‘boundless taking for granted’ of the national identity 
and the negligent treatment of national history and symbols. ‘What perhaps 
best typifies the Netherlands’, he wrote, ‘is a self-importance that is believed 
to have no need of words’. He added, programmatically in view of his later 
interventions in the multiculturalism debate, ‘Perhaps those words are 
needed now’.
69 With his own work, starting with an essay in the leading 
Dutch national broadsheet NRC Handelsblad, ‘Het multiculturele drama’ 
(The multicultural drama, 2000) and culminating in Het land van aankomst 
(The country of arrival, 2007), Scheffer has exercised an enormous influence 
over the Dutch debate on national identity that has flourished over the last 
decade.the individualization of identity 127
The identity issue has meanwhile become crucial. The evolution of colo-
nial history stands out. Typical for the time, Het nut van Nederland did not 
reflect on the impact of this history or postcolonial migrations on Dutch 
identity at all.
70 Since then there has been continual rediscovery and recog-
nition, in a gradually more relaxed, inclusive atmosphere, often accompa-
nied by paradoxical self-congratulations regarding an apparent absence of 
pride in a national history. Critiques of colonialism there and parochialism 
here were contritely endorsed. If the national identity was being under-
mined at all, it was certainly not by postcolonial migration, as Scheffer also 
suggests in Het land van aankomst.
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Recognition will advance identification and hence integration, the new 
adage had it. Working from this philosophy, more concessions were made to 
the identity politics of postcolonial migrants. A number of memorial insti-
tutions were granted, from the Moluccan Historical Museum to the NiNsee 
and the Indisch House: from apologetic gestures (‘we were in the wrong’) to 
conciliatory ones (‘now you really belong’). Consequently, it has become less 
acceptable over the last few decades to exclude (post)colonial literature from 
the official canon; museums, theatres and the media have hesitatingly paid 
more attention to colonial history and culture and to postcolonial artists; 
and accordingly more space is dedicated to the colonial past and its legacies 
in the new official canon of Dutch history.
Viewed from the perspective of 1950 or 1975, these changes were radical. 
They answered the demands of postcolonial migrants which were articu-
lated by their own leaders and organizations or representatives. The ‘strug-
gle’ for recognition was almost always moderate and – with the exception of 
the Moluccan actions – largely took the orderly route of demonstrations, 
media appearances and political lobbying. The mobilization of the grass-
roots for the struggle also served to bind communities together, to reunite 
them. There was broad political support; only right-wing populist political 
leaders Pim Fortuyn, Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders explicitly opposed 
radical Afro-Caribbean claims – what is striking is that Verdonk and 
Wilders, champions of an extreme assimilation policy, both have links to 
the Dutch East Indies through their parents. Perhaps for this reason they 
feel an affinity with the normative tradition of ‘silent assimilation’.
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However, we cannot attribute the apparent end of the cycle of recogni-
tion to this political headwind. With the passing of the generations, high 
degrees of exogamy, in short, with the decline in the uniqueness of postco-
lonial communities, the experience and above all expression of a postcolo-
nial identity becomes increasingly a matter of choice. This also applies to 
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gration and rejection of the cultural identity of Indisch migrants uninten-
tionally served precisely to strengthen the sense of community. Where post-
colonial identities later became more vague, less exclusive and more 
accepted, identity politics could no longer be taken for granted. Hammer-
ing away at the anvil of a distinct identity increasingly served to camouflage 
its loss or embodied the effort to compensate for this loss.
73
The challenge for wider society has become far greater. Is it possible to 
formulate a view of Dutch identity which accommodates all migrants, with-
out jettisoning traditions and visions that are still considered important, 
and which resolves more recent contradictions that no longer revolve around 
the colonial past? This debate has become highly polemical around the is-
sue of Islam over the last decade. Where Moroccans and, to a lesser degree, 
Turks are being stimulated by a harshening of the social climate to see 
themselves more as faith communities and perhaps also national commu-
nities, this particular challenge passes the postcolonial migrant by.
74 Over-
simplified criticism of Hinduism does not occur, while harsh words about 
the problems within the Afro-Caribbean population sooner lead to divi-
sions within this group. This is partly because these issues are strongly class 
related; better integrated Antilleans and Surinamese have sufficient room 
to be able to distance themselves from the problems. Unlike the United 
States, or even the United Kingdom, ‘black politics’ – mobilization based on 
race – does not exist in the Netherlands.
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A broadening of Dutch self-identification has been underway for quite 
some years now. Where this relates to history, the postcolonial migrants are 
a step ahead; the rediscovery of a shared past is still fresh and based, more-
over, on obvious grounds. That cultural advantage has disappeared in most 
other areas. Indisch, Moluccan Surinamese or Antillean authors no longer 
have a monopoly on the theme of nostalgia and the ‘life between two worlds’; 
the enrichment of the language is no longer restricted to words lifted from 
Malay, Sranan or Papiamentu; government policy for the ‘preservation’ of 
cultural heritage is now aimed at all minorities. Just as in politics, migrants 
from Islamic countries form an increasingly distinct presence in the world 
of literature, theatre, the visual arts and the media, because that is where 
there is talent, but also because the same inclusive governmental reflex is 
now aimed at newcomers from the Islamic world – because cultural policy 
in the broadest sense is simply also political and because the better-integrat-
ed postcolonial minorities are no longer a priority.
Being a priority in a minorities policy is, by definition, bad news. But 
even so, this offers scant comfort. Many Dutch from a postcolonial back-
ground are unhappy about what has been achieved to date and continue to the individualization of identity 129
demand more appreciation of their own histories and cultures. The mobili-
zation of partners in the face of adversity is the most obvious way to bind a 
community together. That solidarity still exists and is preserved in memo-
ries – less now of the country of origin and more of arrival and integration in 
the Netherlands – and identifications with an own heritage. These emotions 
will remain, but will become increasingly less noticeable in a multicultural 
society. Bonding can create space for bridging.
76 Where identification be-
comes increasingly a matter of choice, where all citizens are increasingly 
able to reinvent themselves within multiple identities, the scope for postco-
lonial migrants to organize collective struggle diminishes. The need for a 
political translation of postcolonial desires ebbs away and, following the 
same logic, the notion of the ‘postcolonial community’ evaporates.
This sobering conclusion might be contradicted with reference to the 
numerous expressions of postcolonial identity among the young, to the se-
ries of recent studies of which grateful use has been made in the above, to the 
memorial institutions which will combat precisely that forgetting. But ap-
pearances can be deceptive. The players in the game of identity politics 
(claim to) speak for a grassroots that is losing its cohesion; academics ana-
lyze their expositions, but grope around in the dark trying to find out how 
representative they are. Where the struggle against erosion is chronicled, 
the process of erosion itself can be overlooked. However legitimate or re-
freshing it may be, a biased focus on community and identity politics con-
ceals more fundamental processes of integration and loss of exclusive sig-
nificance for (postcolonial) identities.130 postcolonial netherlands
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ImagInIng ColonIalIsm
A few years ago, in an unguarded moment of visible irritation, the then 
Dutch Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, allowed himself to be drawn 
into appealing to the country to follow the positive example of the Verenigde 
Oost­Indische Compagnie – the Dutch East India Company (voc). The footage 
of these words being spoken in the Lower House of the Dutch parliament 
suggest that he too was somewhat shocked by his own bold comparison. 
‘Don’t you think?’, he added in slight hesitation. Mild embarrassment seems 
to have descended on the parliament, accompanied here and there by disbe-
lief and derision. The political and media reactions were predictable: there 
are so many painful questions surrounding the voc that the Prime Minis-
ter should never have referred to it so lightly. And that is where it ended. 
Parliament does not debate history, unless it really cannot be avoided.
1
What was more remarkable, however, was the almost complete absence 
of comment from Indisch Dutch and Moluccans. Praise of the voc, while 
not endorsed, was not experienced as insulting, it would seem. Perhaps the 
more critical minds were still too fatigued by the 2002 voc anniversary cel-
ebrations to regurgitate the familiar counterstory for the umpteenth time. 
Perhaps the fire had quite simply gone out.
2 On the other hand, Surinamese 
organizations protested in a demonstration and sent an indignant letter to 
Balkenende demanding ‘apologies, atonement and restitution for the voc 
era he so praised’, especially as this was also the era of the West Indian Com-
pany (wic) and its slave trade.
3 Thus, a couple of rhetorical turns trans-
formed an unfortunate remark about the voc into an unforgivable insult of 
the Afro-Surinamese. Antilleans were not mentioned at all.
This turn was typical, or at least characteristic of sensibilities in the 
Netherlands at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Things had been 
different in the past. Then we were expected to be proud of the voc and what 
succeeded it. Little was said or written about the wic or more broadly about 
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because that particular history was considered unimportant and not very 
interesting. As an overture to his book De laatste eeuw van Indië (The last cen-
tury of the Dutch East Indies, 1994), the acclaimed Dutch sociologist J.A.A. 
van Doorn, referring to the loss of Indonesia, dryly wrote, ‘The Netherlands 
reverted to being small country on the North Sea with a few, insignificant 
territories in the Americas.’ 
4 Regardless of how controversial van Doorn of-
ten was, here he articulated a broadly held and, in empirical terms, defensi-
ble view. Only his use of the word ‘insignificant’ can really be regarded as 
contentious, a vague echo, perhaps, of the designation islas inútiles, useless 
islands, with which the Spanish had disqualified the Antilles centuries be-
fore. But, above all, it was an implicit refusal to employ the jargon of ‘equal-
ity’ and ‘reciprocity’ that had dominated post-war relations between the 
Netherlands and the former Caribbean colonies. Employing that jargon 
and, moreover, avoiding such terms as ‘insignificant’ became more advis-
able as Surinamese and Antillean communities in the Netherlands grew. 
Van Doorn was, apparently, unconcerned about such sensitivities.
The CompanIes
The contemporary Dutch memory of colonialism reflects something of that 
distant past, but also, and perhaps more so, serves as a gesture towards the 
postcolonial communities that feel particularly involved with this history. 
Such gestures may easily come at the expense of historical consistency. The 
contrast between the 2002 celebration of the voc and the public atonement 
for slavery and, thereby, the wic is a striking illustration.
We can be brief about the wic (1621-1792). The company was economi-
cally far less successful than the voc (1602-1798), did not have a monopoly 
and focused on a part of the world where the Republic of the United Nether-
lands was only a modest player. Its early colonies appealed more to the imag-
ination – North-eastern Brazil and what is today New York and the surround-
ing area – but these were lost early on. The remaining prizes of Atlantic 
expansion, Suriname and the Antilles, by the late nineteenth century had 
become awkward properties it might have been better to jettison. This is il-
lustrated by the fact that a large part of the first wic’s archives was sold to a 
rag-and-bone man in 1821 – worthless papers from an insignificant past. The 
company’s feat of arms that most appeals to the imagination is the conquest 
by Piet Hein of the silver fleet in Cuba’s Bay of Matanzas in 1628.
5
Insofar as there was any memorial culture around the wic in the Nether-
lands, it continued to be completely overshadowed by the voc. Although 132 postcolonial netherlands
doughty Dutch heroes like Michiel de Ruyter, Maarten Tromp, Piet Hein or 
Witte de With conquered Atlantic waters, they also conquered other seas. 
Only Hein has been remembered down the centuries for his Caribbean ex-
ploits, though there are few today who know what the nineteenth-century 
song Hij heeft gewonnen de zilvervloot (He won the silver fleet) – so popular 
until recently in football stadiums – is about. The only recent statue of Hein, 
unveiled more then ten years ago in the Bay of Matanzas, simply reflects the 
hobby of a few Dutch business people and the Cuban state’s intention to de-
velop tourism on the island. Such an initiative would be unthinkable in the 
Netherlands, considering the association of Hein with the wic and, there-
fore, the Atlantic slave trade, which is the only thing the company is remem-
bered for today.
In the same spirit, a Dutch entrepreneur on Curaçao was promptly forced 
to retract his proposal to call his restaurant ‘The West Indian Company’ – in 
the end he called it ‘The Governor’. Around the same time, a Chinese busi-
nesswoman in the old port of Jakarta opened a restaurant using the name 
and the coat-of-arms of the voc without meeting any opposition. This is 
because few Indonesians have any idea what voc means. The situation is 
different in the Netherlands. Balkenende associated the company with 
‘commercial spirit, entrepreneurial drive and the courage to sail the seas’.
6 
This is the usual image of the company. The preceding government, a ‘pur-
ple’ coalition under Labour Prime Minister Wim Kok, had assessed it no dif-
ferently. The spirit of ‘Four hundred years of the voc’ was a festive and proud 
celebration, which was, of course, not entirely unfounded; the voc was in 
many respects spectacularly successful.
7
It is easy to be critical of the voc celebrations. Yet it would be as remark-
able to ignore such a milestone, as it is natural to investigate what the anni-
versary taught us about memorial culture in the Netherlands.
8 What strikes 
one immediately is the paradox that the celebrations to mark the ‘first mul-
tinational’, a company that transformed a small country into a major player 
on the burgeoning world stage, were extraordinarily provincial. However 
much the Netherlands attempted to disguise the element of celebration and 
to emphasize equal exchange, countries like South Africa, India and Indo-
nesia experienced the project as colonial, chauvinist and consequently in-
sulting. They did not take part in the celebrations. The Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs eventually instructed the embassies in those countries to steer clear 
of voc festivities. The embassy in Jakarta organized an event that allowed 
plenty of room for criticism of the voc and, thereby, the Netherlands. The 
question, in retrospect, is whether the business community was particu-
larly happy with this attempt to use the anniversary to help Dutch enter-
prise nestle deeper into Asian markets.
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The celebrations attracted negative attention in Indonesia, which al-
lowed little room for the subtle differences between the voc administration 
and the later colonial Dutch East Indies – following the example set by Su-
karno in 1931. Indonesian web sites published radical texts about the violent 
nature of Dutch colonialism and demanded apologies. At the eleventh hour, 
the Indonesian ambassador refused to attend ‘the celebration of our own 
colonization’ in the Ridderzaal (Knight’s Hall) in The Hague. His embassy 
published a book full of severe criticism of the Netherlands’ role in Indone-
sia since the arrival there of the voc. The Hague administration looked on in 
embarrassment.
10
However astonishing it may seem, that The Hague failed adequately to 
anticipate this predictable criticism, such lacks of stately empathy are not 
unusual. The Spanish made a spectacular blunder with their 1992 celebra-
tion of the 500th anniversary of Columbus’ arrival in the New World. The 
original plans for celebrating the descubrimiento (discovery) were so chau-
vinistic that the former colonies protested en masse. In the end, another 
more neutral notion, encuentro (meeting), was decided upon. But in reality 
the events held in Spain remained explicitly nostalgic and triumphant. 
Something similar happened a few years later with the Portuguese celebra-
tion of Vasco da Gama’s discovery of the sea route to India. The chauvinistic 
tone of the celebrations inflicted considerable diplomatic damage on Portu-
gal, in the view of Indian historian Sanjay Subrahmanyan.
11
The problem that confronted the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal is not 
unique. Every remembrance associated with colonialism provokes these 
kinds of issues and tensions. Every former colonial country is constantly 
being reminded of that past and accused of triumphalism and concealing 
the ‘dark pages’ of its history. Its former Caribbean colonies continued to 
remind France for years that the subject of slavery was completely ignored 
during the celebrations marking the bicentenary of the 1789 revolution. It is 
also difficult for Great Britain today to celebrate the fact that it once ruled 
the waves without admitting that this had sometimes dramatic conse-
quences for distant continents. Commemoration has become a perilous un-
dertaking and will doubtless remain so in the future, also as an element in 
international diplomacy.
Back in the Netherlands, the festivities were coordinated by the Stichting 
Viering 400 jaar VOC (Foundation Celebration 400 Years of the voc), chaired 
by the conservative-liberal member of parliament, Enrique Hessing. The 
foundation had a budget of 4.5 million euros, furnished mainly by the gov-
ernment, but also by donations from the business community. Many events 
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conferences, exhibitions, web sites, debates and a pile of new and reprinted 
books. Wherever a link of any kind could be found with what one of the pub-
lications described as the voc’s ‘illustrious past’, the jubilee was blithely 
celebrated with concerts, fairs, culinary arrangements and whatever else 
could be thought up. This merchandising would be inevitable, anywhere: 
culture and commemoration are, after all, dynamic branches of industry.
What was striking about the content of these celebrations, certainly 
compared with the concurrent discussions around the wic, was the light-
ness of tone. This was made easier by the decision to place most emphasis on 
the early period of the voc (1602-1620) and its maritime and commercial as-
pects, rather than its function as a violent protocolonial state. In doing so 
the Netherlands remembered a different voc from the one remembered by 
a country like Indonesia, where the kompeni is seen as the predecessor to the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial state of the Dutch East Indies. 
Admittedly, at a late stage the Foundation Celebration 400 Years of the voc 
decided to pay explicit attention to the ‘shadowy sides’ of the Company’s his-
tory such as violent suppression, the slave trade and slavery, in ways that 
included a public debate. However, it is clear that this critical reflection con-
tinued to play no more than a subordinate role within the celebrations as a 
whole, a ceremonial concession to ‘politically correct twaddle’.
12
What domestic sensitivities did the foundation have to consider? Re-
markably few. The dominant view of the voc in the Netherlands is a positive 
one, somewhat in the tone of the evergreen book for young readers by Johan 
Fabricius, De scheepsjongens van Bontekoe (The Ship’s Boys of Captain Bon-
tekoe) – and this appreciation had not diminished by 2002. Critical voices 
sounded from the academic world, but the Indisch Dutch and Moluccan 
communities remained remarkably silent. A few web sites vented anger and 
there were some critical meetings and small demonstrations opposing the 
celebrations.
13 However, all in all, the anniversary provoked little in the way 
of emotions and objections. A more striking illustration of the gulf separat-
ing the Indisch community in the Netherlands from Indonesia is hard to 
imagine.
On closer inspection, the gulf is all too understandable. The Indisch 
Dutch community was not angry about colonialism so much as about the 
way it came to such an abrupt end, leading to the exodus and the – at best – 
lukewarm reception in the Netherlands. This contrasts strongly with both 
the way Indonesia now regards colonial history, including the voc, and the 
feelings of the Caribbean community in the Netherlands. Among Caribbe-
an Dutch, the understanding of the colonial past that dominates is so ex-
plicitly critical that few can be left untouched by it. A ‘400 Hundred Years of imagining colonialism 135
wic’ celebration is virtually inconceivable today and this is likely still to be 
the case in the jubilee year 2021.
These contrasts in memory communities made it possible for the queen 
and the prime minister to express their regrets about the wic in 2002, while 
at the same time celebrating the voc. Socially understandable and perhaps 
also sensible, but from an historical perspective far from consistent. It is not 
about establishing that the voc was ‘good’ and the wic ‘bad’, or the other 
way around for that matter, nor is it a question of affected political correct-
ness. The point is that commemoration should also be about drawing in-
formed comparisons and should not be an exercise in the art of bending over 
backwards to give everyone what they want to hear.
‘someThIng magnIfICenT was done There!’
With the collapse of the Dutch Republic at the end of the eighteenth century, 
the companies also disappeared from the stage. Around 1815 the United 
Kingdom of the Netherlands took over the management of the colonies. It 
was not long before the East Indies became economically, politically, scien-
tifically and culturally crucial to the metropole. At the same time, hope 
evaporated of making profitable colonies of Suriname and the Antilles. 
They disappeared from view and did not return into focus until after the 
East Indies had been lost and particularly with the Caribbean exodus to the 
Netherlands.
If the colonial system had been unashamedly directed towards the inter-
ests of the metropole, at the end of the nineteenth century its course, in the-
ory, shifted. The Netherlands, in the words of C.T. van Deventer, had a ‘debt 
of honour’ to pay.
14 Put more positively, the new ‘ethical politics’ saw as its 
task the elevation of the natives and bringing economic development to the 
colony. The planned modernization process coincided with the – where nec-
essary – violent pacification of the archipelago, which was more or less com-
pleted by about 1910. More than a hundred years after first contact and settle-
ments, the Dutch finally controlled the entire archipelago, although this 
colonial hegemony was only to last three decades. The Dutch East Indies 
were in all respects heterogeneous, with arbitrary borders and a fragile con-
figuration that were direct consequences of a colonial history that might 
have turned out very differently.
Dutch interest in the East Indies is often reduced to the frequently in-
voked contemporary metaphors of the ‘cork’ that kept the Dutch economy 
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plunge to the ‘rank’ of smaller European countries such as Denmark. Cork 
and rank were constantly referred to in selfish arguments against relin-
quishing the colony. The first, in retrospect, was an unnecessary spectre; 
the second more relevant. However, there was a third, less self-interested 
argument, namely, that the Netherlands still had an enormous moderniza-
tion project to complete before it could leave the East Indies. Looking back in 
December 1949, cabinet member J.H. van Maarseveen said in parliament, 
‘The East Indies were our pride. We governed the Dutch East Indies in a way 
that provoked admiration everywhere.’ Hence, ‘We had a job to do in Indone-
sia and we are ethically bound not to abandon this task.’ This mission was a 
mixture of concrete infrastructural and social programmes and a paternal-
istic civilizing offensive – not that different, when scrutinized, from the 
pretensions of other late-colonial powers or post-war development aid. The 
Dutch East Indies had become a state project.
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This image of a grand mission was canonized in 1941 in Van Helsdingen’s 
Daar wèrd wat groots verricht… (Something magnificent was indeed done 
there...).
16 The title of this huge book, a variation on a statement by the pio-
neering (and brutal) governor Jan Pietersz Coen more than three centuries 
earlier, was intended to boost spirits in the Netherlands already occupied by 
the Germans and to offer something of a prelude to the changes in Asia. Af-
ter the war the slogan ‘Daar wèrd wat groots verricht!’ would become a superb 
cliché of Dutch arrogance. But the underlying question of the real signifi-
cance of the Dutch colonial project has remained the subject of serious aca-
demic and political debate in the Netherlands.
Initially the debate took place primarily among people who held quite 
similar views, people who had close ties with the Dutch East Indies before 
the war and repatriates. The dominant view was that a good mission had 
been abruptly interrupted in an unfortunate way. It was not until 1970 that a 
much more critical interpretation came into vogue, articulated for a broad 
public by the official historian of World War ii, Loe de Jong. In the draft ver-
sion of his volume on the war in the Indies, de Jong passed harsh judgement 
on Dutch post-war military actions (‘war crimes’), but he also painted an 
extraordinarily critical picture of pre-war colonialism, which he linked to 
exploitation and racism.
17 This was a harsh blow for the Indisch community 
and provoked a well-organized response led by the Comité Geschiedkundig 
Eer herstel Nederlands­Indië (geni, Committee for the Historical Rehabilita-
tion of the Netherlands East Indies). The deep resentment that splutters off 
every page of the book De staat, dr. L. de Jong en Indië (The State, Dr. L. de Jong 
and The Dutch East Indies), published by Ralph Boekholt soon after de Jong’s 
book came out, is articulated in biting sarcasm about de Jong’s work that was imagining colonialism 137
qualified as ‘deliberately incomplete, one-sided, negative, grievous and un-
scientific’. Since the transfer of sovereignty, wrote Boekholt, the Indisch 
community ‘had either been hushed up or distorted in books, articles, and 
television programmes into a world of white colonial suppressors who bled 
the population dry while Eurasians and others of mixed-race wandered 
around in between, looking up to the Dutch and down on the Indonesians 
and who otherwise had nothing better to do than talk about food in broken 
Dutch’. De Jong had now canonized this image and confirmed Dutch paro-
chialism. ‘Stupidity, which initially had been received with a smile, in the 
meantime had grown into a tumour of the soul. East Indians too have self-
respect.’ 
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The ‘courageous and honourable struggle’ (Boekholt’s own words) for a 
drastic revision of the representations of colonialism and the Indisch world, 
as canonized by de Jong, was fought and lost in a five-year long courtroom 
battle. It was, nevertheless, reasonably successful. In the definitive version 
of his book, de Jong was milder in his judgement of the military interven-
tion and there was no more mention of ‘war crimes’. More importantly, the 
plaintiffs broadened the platform on which their views could be publicized. 
All later government support for research into the Dutch in the East Indies 
was issued in answer to the unrelenting demand of the Indisch community 
to have their story told ‘properly’. This proper rendering was diametrically 
opposed to the view that the repatriates had been ‘on the wrong side’, as if, to 
quote Lillian Ducelle, ‘the war in Asia had been a kind of punishment for our 
sinful (colonial) life! Which the Netherlands, of course, had no stake in!’ 
Thus, not only the struggle for recognition and financial compensation, but 
equally the battle against imputations of morally wrong colonialism, unit-
ed totoks and Indos.
19
The battle for historical legitimacy turned on two main issues – pre-war 
colonial society on the one hand and, on the other, the Japanese occupation 
up until the move to the Netherlands and the alleged chilly reception found 
there – and was fought by a community built around the task of remember-
ing. We can be brief on the subject of the latter issue, which was discussed at 
length in the previous chapter. The government repeatedly conceded on 
symbolic acknowledgement and financial concessions. Although this may 
never have been enough for the plaintiffs, The Hague’s gestures went much 
further than could have been conceivable in 1950 or 1970. The beneficiaries, 
in the end, were the Indisch generation as a whole: totoks, Indisch Dutch, 
Moluccans and veterans. They found one another in a shared defence of their 
memories and truths and ended up being closer to another than had ever 
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even within the various categories of the Indisch generation: former intern-
ees on just how terrible the Japanese camps really had been, veterans on the 
justification and nature of the post-war military intervention, and so on.
From the 1970s, public and academic interest in pre-war colonial history 
resurfaced. Opinions continued to be divided over the question of the legiti-
macy of colonial society. The enormous historical value of the Dutch East 
Indies to the Netherlands was taken for granted, and with good reason. Inso-
far as this was at all a matter for dispute, disagreement was less about the 
facts than about their assessment: should all that profit give cause for 
shame?
The opposite question gave rise to far more debate: what good did the 
Netherlands do the colony (and by implication could have continued to do if 
the work had not been abruptly cut short)? This is a far more difficult ques-
tion. It is not only about good intentions, but also about what became of 
them; not only what the colonial authorities finally brought about, but 
whether this was impressive when looked at from a comparative perspec-
tive; not only about establishing what had been good work, but also drawing 
up the balance between what was give and what was take.
In academic research, the last word has not been spoken on any of these 
questions. For a brief moment among Dutch historians there was a kind of 
battle of directions, in which scholars from the University of Amsterdam 
supposedly adopted a more critical stance, while their Leiden colleagues 
were said to be more conservative, moderate or whatever. In retrospect, this 
is a rather ludicrous division, which says a lot about academic egos and the 
importance attached to scientific support for personal memories or politi-
cal standpoints. An uncritical, pro-colonial school of historians does not 
exist. While debates about colonialism outside academia are saturated by 
moral issues, the historiography of colonialism in the Dutch East Indies and 
Indonesia has taken a clear distance from moralizing.
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In wider society, colonialism is still an issue replete with questions of 
ethics and judgement. The pattern here has long been predictable. Older ex-
perts with experience of the Dutch East Indies defended the colonial order 
and, thereby, their own role. Complainants were politicians and historians 
like de Jong, who before the war had shown little interest in the Indies. And 
finally there was the baby-boom generation, discovering all kinds of paral-
lels between the decolonization of Indonesia and the Vietnam war. The ‘pro-
colonial’ Indisch generation would partially lose this battle with the gov-
ernment’s statement in 2005, expressed by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ben 
Bot, that the Netherlands ‘had stood on the wrong side of history’ in its deal-
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complex question of the character of pre-war colonial society has still not 
been settled and seems to attract ever less attention as the Indisch genera-
tion passes into oblivion.
This trend of depoliticization was appositely illustrated by the events 
surrounding the renovation of the Amsterdam Van Heutsz monument, one 
of the many monuments that have been carved in stone over the years in 
praise of colonialism.
21 J.C. van Heutsz’s brilliant military and administra-
tive career was crowned with the post of governor-general. He acquired con-
siderable fame as the ruthless ‘pacifier’ of Aceh; the young Queen Wilhelmi-
na admired him. Yet, his reputation was controversial, not least because the 
subjection of Aceh cost tens of thousands of Acehnese their lives. The post-
humous monument in his honour, unveiled by the queen in 1935 in Amster-
dam’s Olympia Square, not only glorified Van Heutsz, but was also a monu-
ment to the beneficial work carried out by the Dutch in the East Indies. By 
the 1960s, his reputation as an old war horse had become problematic for the 
monument, which from then on regularly became a site of actions and van-
dalism.
In 1998, the Comité Herdenking Gevallenen in Nederlands­Indié (Committee 
for the Remembrance of the Fallen in the Dutch East Indies) attempted to 
have the decayed monument restored with the intention of giving it a new 
purpose. The Amsterdam borough of Oud-Zuid voted in favour of this plan 
and work began on a thorough research and discussion process, which drew 
on opinions from a range of historians. Where other participants in the de-
bates frequently played on the emotions of ‘pride and shame’, most profes-
sional historians avoided them. The outcome of much nattering and pala-
vering would have been practically unthinkable thirty years earlier: the 
monument remained intact, but was renamed Monument Indië Nederland 
(Monument East Indies Netherlands), ‘representing the many memories of 
our colonial past, while pointing to the future, with respect for Indisch her-
itage’. A number of monumental elements were added that refer to the his-
tory of the Dutch East Indies between 1598 and 1949. What these additions 
share, above all, is that five of them are twentieth century, that they do not 
refer to Indonesia and that not one of them forms any provocation for the 
Dutch who had been involved. Hence, the Dutch Indies landed softly, almost 
meaninglessly, inoffensively in a renovated monument that was soundless-
ly unveiled at the end of 2007 – and with its back to Indonesia.
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Something similar continues to characterize the history syllabuses in 
Dutch schools. The history of the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia has been on 
the syllabus four times since 1976 – which incidentally means that this part 
of Dutch history has only reached a limited proportion of all pupils over the 140 postcolonial netherlands
past few decades. Consequently, pupils who opted out of history, but also 
the vast majority of those who did choose to study history, left school with 
only a cursory knowledge of any aspect of Dutch colonial history whatso-
ever.
The emphases of these four rounds of Dutch East Indies history varied 
and there was always room for critical reflection on the performance of the 
Dutch. However, what disturbed professional historians was the bias to-
wards the Indisch dimension of the history of colonialism in Indonesia – a 
gesture to the Indisch community in the Netherlands.
23 This rendering of 
Dutch East Indies history demonstrated, on good grounds, that Dutch na-
tional history is incomplete without its colonial chapters. Unintentionally, 
an uninformed pupil might easily get the impression that the majority of 
the ‘natives’ were mere onlookers in the story. This was once again the com-
plaint heard from specialist journals when colonial history was last on the 
school syllabus in 2007. Yet, one cannot say that there was a heated discus-
sion – perhaps because the Republic of Indonesia itself only rarely speaks 
out about the ways the Dutch deal with this ‘shared’ past.
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What is remarkable about these and similar representations and debates 
is not only what is said and the constant moralistic bickering, but also what 
remains unsaid. Thus, post-1942 history seems to be imprinted far more 
firmly on the retinas of repatriates and Moluccans than anything that went 
before. The first story is one in which injustices were done to them that need 
to be put right. The pre-war history seems to evoke nostalgia for a lost para-
dise and the old days, tempo doeloe, rather than critical reflection.
This nostalgic image belongs to a controversial repertoire in which the 
colonial system was ‘good’, but it would also appear to evoke an all too rosy 
image of the life of the Eurasian Indisch population. Recent studies have 
convincingly dismissed the image that all those in the colony who were le-
gally European were well off. They reveal the great heterogeneity of this 
population and the increasing threat the lower Indisch classes felt exposed 
to from the totoks above and the ‘natives’ below. Colour and ‘purity’ of lin-
eage were not the only factors at play here; as in almost all colonial societies 
the rule ‘money whitens’ applied here. It is nonetheless crystal clear that co-
lour indeed mattered and gave rise to enormous personal dramas and social 
contrasts. 
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In post-war Indisch memories, such social distinctions based on colour 
seem to have receded or been smoothed over. In the Japanese camps the 
totoks still looked down on Indos. But once in the Netherlands, in the battle 
for recognition of their Dutch citizenship and the accompanying rights, the 
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to serve as a great equalizer’, Wim Willems commented. But when it looked 
as if recognition and concessions were far more likely to benefit the totoks 
than the Indos, the latter once again complained loudly about discrimina-
tion. In so doing, they implicitly drew a parallel between the attitude of the 
totoks in the Dutch East Indies and the government in the Netherlands. But 
this did not bring about an organizational rupture, which from a strategic 
viewpoint would have been extremely injudicious for both groups. If they 
had not been easily identifiable as two strictly divided groups in the East 
Indies, once in the Netherlands history, integration and the struggle for rec-
ognition brought them even closer together, despite the lingering legacies 
of colonial colour casting.
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If racial discrimination was discussed openly at all, it usually related to 
the Dutch population and the Dutch government in particular. Complaints 
like these were constant and often justified.
27 However, it is at the very least 
ironic that a group that in the Dutch East Indies had held a privileged and 
colour-conscious position in a society divided along colour lines, should be 
so disturbed by discrimination in the Netherlands.
There are many such remarkable silences. The traditional narrative of 
the Moluccan community revolved around ‘centuries’ of loyalty to the colo-
nial regime and the post-war betrayal by the Netherlands. Although the 
story has some truth to it, one could ask whether after the war the Nether-
lands was in a position to set a different policy from the one it did and wheth-
er ‘betrayal’ is therefore the appropriate term. Either way, critical reflection 
about the Moluccans’ own role in the Royal Dutch East Indian Army (knil), 
as accomplices to an oppressive colonial regime, did not become a popular 
theme in the community. This became even more remarkable in retrospect, 
when the radical second generation began to identify itself with the wars in 
Vietnam and Angola and movements like the Black Panthers in the United 
States. Rhetorically this was resolved by characterizing the Suharto regime 
as a continuation of the violent colonial order. Yet this was precisely the or-
der their parents and grandparents had served and defended.
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The pattern of all this remembering is relatively straightforward. The 
various groups of the Indisch generation all made claims on Dutch memo-
rial culture and, therefore, had to lobby the Dutch government, both direct-
ly and through the media. It was a long time before Dutch society and poli-
tics were able to face up to this dimension of the nation’s history. The 
repatriates took it for granted that their history should be included in the 
narrative of the Dutch past, but this was experienced differently in the 
Netherlands. The veterans could be included, of course, but the futile post-
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whingeing. And it took decades of struggle before the Indisch Dutch and the 
Moluccans started to become part of the imagined community of the Dutch 
nation.
The main grievance of large sections of the Indisch generation was the 
lack of understanding they faced in Dutch society. The struggle for recogni-
tion was primarily directed at the government. This was logical. Even 
though the government is limited in the amount of scope it has for looking 
at its citizens through an alternative lens, the government does have the 
means to shape a memorial culture and to make material gestures. Conse-
quently, the entire post-war game of Indisch identity politics was directed at 
The Hague. Although the government did become more forthcoming over 
time, it saw itself up against limits the Indisch generation regarded as less 
important: governmental relations with Japan and Indonesia. The Hague’s 
policy strove to strike a balance between respect for the repatriated new 
Dutch, and maintaining good diplomatic relations with both of these for-
mer enemies – the occupiers and the nationalists.
In post-war relations with Japan the second consideration was decisive 
from the start, to the great frustration of the Indisch generation. The visit of 
Emperor Hirohito (1971), the laying of wreaths by President Kaifu at the In-
disch monument (1991), state visits back and forth, questions concerning a 
Japanese debt of honour and apologies, laborious attempts at collective re-
flection on the past – time and again emotions ran high. The main problem 
was that Japan was far less self-critical and conciliatory than Germany had 
been. The dismissive Japanese attitude continued to provoke incomprehen-
sion and irritation, not only in the Netherlands, but also in other Asian and 
European countries. Nevertheless, The Hague consistently put diplomatic 
interests above concessions for repatriates.
In relation to Indonesia, The Hague allowed itself to be led by Indisch 
sensibilities for far longer – and it helped that in the first decades after the 
war these meshed with its own frustrations. This gave rise to a constant bi-
lateral diplomatic friction. But for our present purposes, another question 
is of more interest, namely, whether and how Indonesian perspectives were 
accommodated at all within Dutch memorial culture. The answer to this 
question is short and final: hardly at all. Where Indonesian history was dis-
cussed in the Netherlands, it was almost always in relation to the colonial 
history, about an assessment of Dutch colonialism, and increasingly about 
the history of the repatriates and their exodus to the Netherlands. The grow-
ing acknowledgement of the importance of this last subject is evidence of 
the growing inclusion of the Indisch community as an inherent part of 
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has continued to dominate the Dutch perspective of the archipelago, not In-
donesia as it is today.
The contrast with state-sponsored history in Indonesia could not be 
greater. Of course, in historiography and education much time is given to 
the struggle for independence, but apart from that, the Dutch ‘intermezzo’ 
is only paid scant attention, even though it was crucial to the modernization 
and formation of the state. A lot of consideration is given to such topics as 
regional history, the relation of the regions to the central authority, social 
history (‘bottom up’) and the position of the archipelago within its Asian 
surroundings. Hero worship – though not of Dutch allies – dominates the 
treatment of these subjects and certainly the turbulent history of the repub-
lic. Many lacunae and distortions can be identified, so much so that some 
now declare it is time for a decolonization of Indonesian historiography.
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However, what is most striking compared with Dutch memorial culture 
is that in Indonesian representations of the past, the history of the (Indo-)
Europeans and Moluccans, including their exodus to the Netherlands, plays 
no role whatsoever, neither in research, nor in education.
30 From an Indone-
sian perspective, the minority who left was just a marginal group. This con-
trast highlights the ambivalent position of those Dutch who are ‘rooted’ in 
Indonesia: simultaneously claiming full Dutch citizenship and a separate 
identity, while being alienated from a country of birth that quickly erased 
them from its collective memory.
Dutch debates about the rights and wrongs of colonial times, about the 
years 1942-1949, or about the repatriates and their place in the Netherlands 
were, and are, above all significant for the local society. They mean little to 
Indonesia, so little in fact that Indonesia kept out of the Dutch debates en-
tirely. It is alert to what it regards as colonial demonstrations, such as the 
voc celebrations, but has never demanded apologies or reparations for the 
colonial period. This particular piece of decolonization was concluded at an 
earlier stage, no doubt made easier by the fact that the republic won the final 
and decisive battles.
This separation of memorial communities is also reflected in their read-
ing cultures. The Dutch language is almost forgotten in Indonesia, the num-
ber of historians that draw on Dutch-language sources and literature is 
small. English-language literature is only read to a limited degree. Indone-
sian historians publish primarily in Indonesian, are not translated into 
Dutch and rarely into English, and are only read outside their own country 
by a handful of specialists. Professional Dutch historians publish a lot in 
English, but translations into Indonesian are the exceptions – where this 
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Dutch professional historians who have a good knowledge of Indonesian is 
greater than the other way round. Mochtar Lubis’ Het land onder de regenboog 
(The land under the rainbow, 1979) is still the only Indonesian history writ-
ten for a broader Dutch reading audience.
This is no less succinctly expressed in belles-lettres and diaries, autobi-
ographies, memoirs, travel logs and so on. The production and success of the 
Indisch generation and its offspring within Dutch literature is consider-
able. The pre-war Indisch canon is beginning to wane, just like older Dutch 
literature on the Indies, but the nineteenth-century authors Louis Couper-
us and especially Multatuli – hardly ever read nowadays in Indonesia – still 
hold their own. In contrast, the work of the leading Indonesian author Pr-
amoedya Ananta Toer, with his anything but nostalgic view of the Dutch 
East Indies, enjoys only a small circle of readers. Modern Indonesian litera-
ture is rarely translated. For many years now, the number of students sign-
ing up to study Indonesian languages can be counted on two hands. The 
Dutch East Indies are far from forgotten and Indonesia is barely in the pic-
ture. The same is true from the other side: Indonesian interest in Dutch lit-
erature is non-existent.
The wesT IndIes: wIThouT prIde
Van Doorn once described the Dutch East Indies as ‘the way in which Euro-
peans, and in particular the Dutch, have given shape to the natural land-
scapes and native societies they encountered in the archipelago’.
31 It is im-
mediately clear that a history of the East Indies thus understood only 
comprises a small part of the history of Indonesia. Hence the exaggerated, 
but nonetheless now proverbial comparison coined by nineteenth-century 
author Willem Walraven, that Dutch cultural influence amounted to little 
more than ‘scratches on a rock’.
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A formulation of the Dutch West Indies has to cast the net more widely. 
With the arrival of the Europeans, Caribbean history in all respects began 
anew with the development of an immigration society. The Dutch colonies 
were not unique in this. The western colonies only had small ‘native societ-
ies’; the Amerindians in Suriname could be counted by the thousands and 
on the islands by the hundreds. In colonial times, everything revolved 
around the plantations and hence the import of labour: initially mainly 
slaves from Africa and, after abolition, Asian indentured labour. The is-
lands were unsuitable for plantations, but in the eighteenth century Cura-
çao and St Eustatius became trading centres and slave depots, populated by imagining colonialism 145
Africans. Only limited numbers of Europeans were drawn to the Dutch col-
onies in the West.
33
So, the history of the Caribbean that is relevant to most of the population 
there today – and to the Caribbean community in the Netherlands – only 
began in the second half of the seventeenth century with the activities of the 
wic, slave traders and so on. Dutch colonialism in the West soon lost its 
ambition. After 1800, Suriname and the Antilles never came out of the shad-
ows of the East Indies. By this time an unpleasant paradox had arisen. As far 
as the Netherlands was concerned, the East Indies grew steadily in signifi-
cance, while the mark made by the colonizer there remained limited. In the 
West, the Netherlands was responsible for the creation of completely new 
societies, which would bear a far stronger European identity. But the moth-
erland saw little economic or political use for these colonies, and showed 
equally little appreciation or consideration for the culture of these Dutch-
made colonies.
To a far greater degree than in the East Indies, the colonizer and colo-
nized shared a single history in the West. Everything that had happened 
since the seventeenth century was in some way or another linked to colo-
nialism. Where repatriates from the East Indies were carriers of a history 
that ended in Indonesia with their departure, Surinamese and Antilleans 
on both sides of the ocean represent the same history. The verbal battle that 
was fought over that past for years was about interpretation and often about 
moral assessment, but never about who the players were in that history. In 
the West Indies there was only one history, a colonial one.
Of course, from a colonial perspective, there were constantly reasons for 
concern, in part because the subjects did not conform as easily as the metro-
pole would have liked. However, from a Dutch perspective, the western colo-
nies were only of marginal importance, especially after 1800. Throughout 
the late colonial period, there was little interest in, and still less admiration 
for Caribbean culture or history. Consequently, little scholarly attention 
was paid to the West Indies and Dutch colonial institutions – from the Min-
istry for the Colonies to academic institutions – regarded Suriname and the 
Antilles as peripheral at best. Real interest and pride and a genuine sense of 
mission were reserved for the Indies, which in Dutch no longer required the 
prefix ‘East’ – ‘Indies’ now sufficed.
It therefore seemed that real colonial history came to an end with the loss 
of the East Indies. In the long, drawn-out run up to the 1954 Charter of the 
Kingdom consisting of the Netherlands, Suriname and the Netherlands An-
tilles, prominent administrators who had earned their spurs in the East In-
dies administration often found it hard to conceal their frustration about 146 postcolonial netherlands
the premises and great pretensions of this final accord with the western 
colonies. While old colonial institutions and education extended their 
range to ‘underdeveloped countries’, only a few institutions like the Royal 
Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies in Leiden (kitlv) kept 
to the former colonies and would gradually upgrade their interest in the 
West. A certain disdain continued to exist, even in academia, for what the 
acclaimed Dutch novelist W.F. Hermans had mockingly characterized as 
the ‘final remains of the tropical Netherlands’.
Indeed, from the second half of the nineteenth century on, there had 
been regular proposals to give up or sell the Caribbean colonies, although 
only Elmina was ultimately handed over to the British. Money was always 
having to be pumped into the Dutch West Indies and plans for development 
failed. Minister for the Colonies, Hendrik Colijn lamented in 1935 in the Sen-
ate that, ‘Everything that has been tried in Suriname has […] quite simply 
failed’.
34 Things began to improve for Aruba and Curaçao in the late 1920s 
with the construction of the oil refineries; however nothing truly ‘magnifi-
cent’ was done there. It is, therefore, no wonder that the mood changed in the 
Netherlands around 1970. It was time, so the metropolitan argument ran, for 
Suriname and the Antilles to become independent. Suriname did, but the 
hope that the Antilles would follow Suriname’s good example was ultimate-
ly, reluctantly abandoned. Dutch politicians abided with the Antillean re-
fusal to accept independence; Dutch popular opinion continued to regard a 
farewell as the best solution.
Few interests, few ex-pats and little traditional interest; consequently 
there was far less emotion invested in the West. This is why there was almost 
no desire for a post hoc defence of colonialism. There were no angry repatri-
ates to defend the honour of colonialism and, hence, their own pre-war lives. 
The growing number of Dutch West Indians settling in the Netherlands had 
little flattering to report about a colonial era dominated by slavery, inden-
tured labour and the like. Almost all the Dutch could honestly say was that 
they knew nothing of that history and had no personal involvement in it. 
This made humility a lot easier.
More books about the history of the Antilles and especially Suriname 
have been published over the last two or three decades than in the three cen-
turies before. It is Dutch, not Surinamese or Antilleans authors, who have 
dominated this catching up, and most of those authors who are from Carib-
bean descent live in the Netherlands. The rediscovery of the western colo-
nies is a particularly postcolonial phenomenon, directly related to the exo-
dus and the emergence of postcolonial identity politics. Only now did the 
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acceptance that this past too belonged to Dutch national history. And one 
topic would become the leading narrative of Dutch West Indian history: the 
African slave trade and slavery.
Yet, one single complaint continues to unite Surinamese and Antilleans 
on both sides of the Atlantic: ‘We always had to know everything about the 
Netherlands, while the Dutch knew, and know, almost nothing about our 
history.’ Those who live in the Netherlands can also add that, ‘we are here 
only because you were there’. This argument of historical ties helped Suri-
name and the Antilles to keep The Hague politically engaged. So while the 
Dutch had hoped, to no avail, that Indonesia would find the argument of a 
‘shared past’ enticing, the same ‘shared past’ argument helped West Indians 
to prevent the Dutch from disentangling themselves from the Caribbean.
It is not surprising that the slave trade and slavery are the subjects most 
discussed in Caribbean colonial history. Not only because it is, in the nega-
tive sense, the most conspicuous episode, but also because it spans more 
than two centuries and, thereby, the greater part of Dutch colonial history. 
Half of all Surinamese and the majority of Antilleans descend from Afri-
cans who were once imported as slaves. But there is more. No other theme in 
the shared history lends itself better to an appeal for Dutch gestures of repa-
ration and no other theme is linked to such powerful ideas of contemporary 
legacies for which one or another should pay.
And so slavery came to dominate the story of Caribbean history. This 
produced a remarkable distortion for the Antilleans, and more so for the Su-
rinamese. A story in which not only half of the population, but also the eth-
nic plurality of the society remains underexposed. This is not strange. In-
dian and Javanese Surinamese organizations do not need to look back on a 
painful past in slavery. They also did not articulate competing, accusatory 
claims of identity. This is not to suggest that they attach no importance to 
their own culture and history; quite the contrary, judging by the large num-
ber of organizations in these circles. However, the accent is on religion and 
culture, not on historical injustices and even less so on a battle for acknowl-
edgement or reparation. In Caribbean Indian discourse there is little room 
for victimhood or bitterness. Characteristically, initiatives from this com-
munity to create space for their history and culture were often self-financed. 
The smaller Javanese community barely speaks up at all.
A view of the history of Suriname therefore developed that was more 
clearly divided along ethnic lines than was the case in the country of ori-
gin.
35 The unsteady ideology of a single, undivided nation – articulated from 
Anton de Kom via the nationalist movement to the ‘revolutionary’ regime of 
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ebration of independence fell into oblivion and the celebration of ethnically 
defined holidays became more important. As a consequence, the Surinam-
ese community in the Netherlands became increasingly more divided in 
terms of its memorial culture. In Suriname, 1 July, Emancipation Day, is a 
national holiday; in the Netherlands, only Afro-Surinamese and a few white 
Dutch mark this day. The same thing applies to commemoration as to reli-
gious and family festivals: Surinamese in the diaspora have less to do with 
compatriots of other ethnicities than is the case in Suriname.
Looking back on recent (post)colonial history, there are two remarkable 
silences. In 1975, Suriname voted for independence by a narrow majority. 
The development of the republic was not a bed of roses and this, in part, is 
why the Antilles refused to take the same step. At the same time, the exodus 
was already underway, with serious political and economic consequences 
and no less drastic personal consequences: insofar as one can speak about 
Surinamese and Curaçaoan ‘communities’, they are divided by the Atlantic 
ocean and those on the European side are materially better off. This was a 
delicate episode and certainly a painful one for ardent nationalists – Suri-
namese voting with their feet against independence, Antilleans simply re-
jecting the option of independence. One cannot help but remark that this 
outcome is hardly ever discussed within the same moralizing repertoire 
that is applied to the preceding colonial era.
ColonIal slavery, posTColonIal seTTlemenT
The Netherlands has had a National Slavery Monument since 2002 and the 
abolition of slavery in Suriname and the Antilles in 1863 is commemorated 
on 1 July every year.
36 Surinamese Dutch have dominated the commemora-
tion of slavery, as was illustrated once again recently in the choice of Sranan-
tongo as the language for the motto: Keti koti, or broken chains. An unsus-
pecting newspaper reader could be forgiven for thinking that the whole of 
Surinamese history is about slavery and that all Surinamese descend from 
Africans who were once shipped to Suriname as slaves. This is not the case. 
Half of Suriname is Asian in origin, their forefathers arriving in Suriname 
after the abolition of slavery. A large number of the 300,000 descendants of 
slaves living in the Netherlands are from Antillean descent.
37 Moreover, 
slavery also played an important part in the history of the voc and the In-
disch Dutch. The fact that this is rarely depicted says less about colonial his-
tory than about the way in which postcolonial migrants have settled in the 
Netherlands.
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The Atlantic slave trade and slavery have never been forgotten. Memo-
ries, which gradually become stylized, distorted and canonized, are passed 
on from generation to generation by the descendants. However, it was not 
until the late twentieth century that this history became more widely recog-
nized in the western world through world leaders and heads of state who 
were rightly conscious of an historical guilt. Slavery and the slave trade have 
been addressed by Dutch historiography for a long time. One cannot speak 
of active silencing, but neither of a broad understanding. In the end it was 
not professional Dutch historians, but descendants who placed the subject 
on a broader and political agenda.
There was a build up to this history in which the Surinamese immigrant 
Anton de Kom played a crucial role. His seminal book, Wij slaven van Suri­
name (1934, We Slaves of Suriname) was simultaneously an anti-colonial his-
tory and a radical left-wing nationalist manifesto. Almost all the elements 
in the contemporary discourse around slavery – exploitation and repara-
tion, racism, dehumanization and trauma, self-liberation – were addressed 
in this remarkable book.
39 Wij slaven van Suriname put into words the deep 
emotions surrounding the legacies of Surinamese slavery, such as the ‘infe-
riority complex’ of his ‘race’, nurtured by a ‘history education in which only 
the sons of another people are named and praised’. It took a long time, de 
Kom wrote, ‘before I had freed myself of the obsession that a Negro was al-
ways and unconditionally the lesser beside any white person’. With his book 
he aimed ‘to awaken Surinamese self-respect’, because only then, ‘once the 
old slave mentality has been banished from our hearts will the Surinamese 
gain true human dignity’.
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De Kom was arrested as a member of the Dutch resistance during the war 
and died in a Nazi concentration camp. Wij Slaven van Suriname became a 
canonical text for young Surinamese nationalists after the war and the book 
took on political significance for the independence struggle. Later, long af-
ter 1975 and primarily in the Netherlands, it would once again be inspira-
tional in the battle for Dutch recognition of and atonement for the history of 
slavery. However, de Kom’s memory could not become the posthumous fig-
urehead of the struggle. He was born after slavery and, moreover, being Su-
rinamese, held little appeal for Antilleans.
Suriname and the Antilles developed very different commemoration 
traditions. On 1 July, 1863, the abolition of slavery in both colonies had been 
orchestrated as an exercise in thankfulness to God and King. The correct use 
of freedom was deemed to be piety, obedience, dutifulness, monogamy and 
a respectable family life. This was the civilizing meaning attached to the 
first of July. In Suriname, the celebration of emancipation developed into an Amsterdam, 1 July 1963. Surinamese Dutch celebrate the abolition of slavery exactly  
100 hundred years earlier. The banner slogans speak of freedom, but also of respect for 
one’s own people. 1 July has remained the day of commemoration under the motto keti 
koti (‘broken chains’) for Surinamese on both sides of the Atlantic. However, many 
Antilleans prefer to commemorate 17 August, the day of the great slave uprising on 
Curaçao in 1795.  (collection international institute for social history)
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ambiguous folk festival, a shifting mix of dedication to the faraway mon-
arch and racial awareness, an Afro-Surinamese festival which after the war 
was renamed a multicultural Day of Freedom for all groups in the popula-
tion, though it was later reduced to the celebration of the one freedom, a 
marker in interethnic relations.
41
Slavery lived on in private memory on the Antilles, but less so in the pub-
lic sphere. One explanation should probably be sought in the realm of eth-
nicity and politics. In Suriname commemoration of slavery was an element 
in Afro-Surinamese identity politics vis-à-vis compatriots of Asian descent. 
On the islands, where Dutch and Antilleans of European origin held the 
reins of power until well into the twentieth century, there was little enthu-
siasm on the part of the authorities to recall this past. So, the celebration of 
Emancipation was dropped from the calendar and it was not until more than imagining colonialism 151
a century later, on Curaçao, that an alternative celebration came in its place: 
17 August, the day in 1795 when Tula gave the sign to start the largest slave 
revolt in the history of the island.
42
It is unsurprising, therefore, that emancipation celebrations in the 
Netherlands were introduced by the Surinamese community. Following the 
call by the journal Sranan Krioro Suriname, around 1,000 people took part in 
the celebrations in 1962. A year later, in 1963, the centenary of the Emancipa-
tion was marked by a parade through Amsterdam.
43 Such celebrations 
would have had a strong element of bonding within the as yet small Suri-
namese community. This element of bonding through joint celebration has 
remained ever since; the Moravian Church in the Netherlands still organiz-
es an annual Emancipation celebration and the annual Kwakoe Festival in 
Amsterdam made room for 1 July celebrations.
In the 1990s a group of Surinamese activists took the lead in the politici-
zation of the celebrations. Not only has 1 July been celebrated in the Amster-
dam square Surinameplein since 1997, 30 June has also become an occasion 
for a solemn commemoration of the victims of slavery. The name ‘30 June 
and 1 July’ deliberately alludes to the Second World War dates 4 and 5 May, 
respectively Remembrance Day and Liberation Day – two central dates in 
Dutch commemorative culture. The Stichting Eer en Herstel Betalingen Slacht­
offers van Slavernij in Suriname (Foundation Honour and Reparations for the 
Victims of Slavery in Suriname, 1997) operated in the same spirit – the name 
referring to the persecution of the Jews in a strategic comparison which had 
begun to gain currency among Indisch Dutch too.
Within a short space of time the number of organizations with a similar 
aim grew appreciably. In 1998 the Afro-Surinamese women’s organization 
Sophiedela submitted a petition to the Lower House of the Dutch parliament 
requesting a national monument. Around that time, in the weekly paper De 
Groene Amsterdammer, the renowned Curaçaoan author, Frank Martinus 
Arion, argued the case for a gesture from the Dutch state. This provided the 
Prince Claus Funds with the impetus to publish the book Facing up to the 
past, an appeal for remembrance, reflection and the physical erection of a 
monument. Clearly, the time was ripe. Parliament and the Dutch govern-
ment, under Prime Minister Kok, responded positively and asked the parties 
to join as a single representative organization. Out of this came the Landelijk 
Platform Slavernijverleden (lps, National Platform Slavery Past), with Suri-
name-born activist Barryl Biekman, chair of Sophiedela, at the helm. In 2002, 
the National Slavery Monument was unveiled in Amsterdam’s Oosterpark.
44
All the organizations involved aimed at bridging gaps.
45 They wanted to 
commemorate slavery not only in their own circles, but also as a theme of On 1 July 2002, the National Slavery Monument was unveiled in Amsterdam’s Oosterpark 
in the presence of Queen Beatrix, Prime Minister Wim Kok and other politicians. An 
annual commemoration of slavery is now held at the monument, which was made by 
Surinamese sculptor Erwin de Vries. The date refers to the day, 1 July 1863, on which 
slavery was abolished on the Antilles and in Suriname. In 2008, Prime Minister Jan-Peter 
Balkenende attended the commemoration and celebration on behalf of the Dutch 
government. (collection anp)
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national importance. The fact that the national government, and subse-
quently local governments and various social and cultural institutions, 
were found willing to make a symbolic gesture underlined how much this 
lobby had already achieved. This success is therefore also indirectly evi-
dence of successful integration: there were enough people who themselves 
had authority or who were able to gain access to government and politicians. 
The result was a cautious mainstreaming of a theme which, until then, had 
always been regarded from the traditional centre as ‘your thing’.
46
It is some ten years since the decision was taken to erect a national monu-
ment. Through the Queen, Crown Prince and ministers, the Dutch govern-
ment on several occasions has expressed ‘deep regret’ for the suffering in-
flicted by the slave trade and slavery. Local gestures followed. In Middelburg, 
the logistical centre of the slave trade, a monument was unveiled in 2005. In 
2006, the then Mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, had a plaque attached to the imagining colonialism 153
facade of his official residence declaring that one of the first residents of the 
house had been the director of the slave trade for the wic. Subsidized TV 
documentaries followed, teaching aids, exhibitions in major museums, a 
pile of books, theatre projects and much more. A ‘dynamic’ monument fol-
lowed in 2003: the National Institute for the Study of Dutch Slavery and its 
Legacy (NiNsee).
The speed at which the theme of slavery became acknowledged as a dark 
page in the nation’s history is remarkable. A questionnaire carried out under 
the auspices of the monthly Historisch Nieuwsblad (History Newsletter) re-
vealed that between 2000 and 2008 increasing numbers of respondents 
pointed to slavery as the most shameful period in Dutch history. The inclu-
sion of the Atlantic slave trade and slavery as one out of fifty items in the 
historical canon commissioned by the Dutch government was, in this sense, 
the pinnacle of the battle for acknowledgement. Ten years earlier the theme 
had played no part at all in the debates around national identity and histo-
ry.
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This does not mean that the lobby to have this part of colonial history 
acknowledged as national history has been fully successful. That a space has 
been conquered for what until then had been a marginal theme is a remark-
able success for the activists and is evidence of the conciliatory attitude of 
the authorities. However, a tension remained between expectations held by 
the West Indian Dutch and the openings offered by the government. The au-
thorities reasoned in an atmosphere of acknowledgement and gestures, 
which were intended to close this chapter once and for all, hence the official 
mottos of inclusion and looking forward, such as ‘Bound in Freedom’. The 
parallel with the way in which the government dealt with the desires of the 
East Indian and Moluccan community is clear.
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There were great expectations among the descendants. The politiciza-
tion of the past was expressed in a radical discourse (‘Black Holocaust’, slav-
ery trauma) and in demands (reparations) which provoked incomprehen-
sion and resistance among the wider population. Within The Hague’s policy 
there was little room for radical movements and more moderate partners 
were selected with which to erect a national monument and to found NiN-
see.
49 Ultimately the NiNsee found itself caught in an uncomfortable dilem-
ma between demands from a radical grassroots and the task of connecting 
with society at large and building up respectability. A constant and hugely 
difficult balancing act between bonding and bridging.
What conflicting interpretations and expectations were at stake here? 
Did solemn words mean the same to all parties? Are spoken expressions of 
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ed? What is atonement in this context? How much public attention has to be 
organized to shine sufficient light on the subject? What is ‘sufficient’, both 
in terms of money and time, when judged according to the historical ‘accu-
racy’ of the information? Who determines what it accurate, can it be left to 
academics to decide or do descendants deserve a greater voice in this? Is it 
right to follow the American example and speak of a ‘Black Holocaust’? 
Should reparations be made? Are the wounds inflicted by slavery so deep 
that one can or should speak of a trauma that can be used to explain the prob-
lems of today? Is it at all possible to close this chapter?
It is not surprising that these questions provoke strongly conflicting 
  answers, in which the lines of division not only run between ‘descendants’ 
and ‘the rest’. How widely the call for acknowledgement is supported within 
the Caribbean community in the Netherlands is almost impossible to estab-
lish. It is equally difficult to know the extent of the support in this commu-
nity for those organizations – and their discourse and policies – that the gov-
ernment regards as its partners. The NiNsee has not researched this, neither 
have outsiders. One gauge is the active participation in particular moments 
of commemoration. A few, large manifestations that preceded the national 
commemoration, the consultation rounds to choose a monument, exhibi-
tions and the 1 July celebrations have consistently attracted a few thousand 
visitors in recent years. Lectures and debates at the NiNsee have generally 
attracted far fewer visitors. The same goes for the alternative commemora-
tion in Amsterdam’s Suriname Square or at the Zeeland monument.
If we compare attendance of the 1 July celebrations with the early 1960s, 
the proportion of active participants from the Caribbean community has 
declined dramatically. This is, of course, a thorny issue. When challenged to 
respond to this fact, the NiNsee chairman Eddy Campbell argued that there 
was no decline in the level of interest. ‘The remembrance event at the slavery 
monument will continue to exist as long as the one at the war memorial in 
Dam Square!’ Other Caribbean participants commented that 1 July should 
also become a national holiday. Some acknowledged that attendance might 
be lower than expected, but that the same applies to the ‘all-Dutch’ national 
commemoration of the Second World War on the 4 May.
50 This is, of course, 
true and also applies to the East Indies commemoration on 15 August. The 
generation that has experienced the war firsthand is dying out and it is prov-
ing a difficult task to attract later generations to take part in the commemo-
rations. Precisely for this reason, all those involved in commemorations 
know that support from the government and the media is vital to ensure 
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unfamIlIar dIsCourses and new sIlenCes
There is a pattern to the way postcolonial migrants attempted to elevate 
their displeasure about historical episodes to a national level. If Dutch soci-
ety were finally to understand what we have been through, so the argument 
ran, acknowledgement and gestures – symbolic and material – will follow. 
The frame of reference was explicitly ‘domestic’, in the sense that it was tied 
to the post-war moral discourse in the Netherlands around being ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ (read: resisting or collaborating) during the Second World War.
The Indisch struggle was about full citizenship; acknowledgement of 
the fact that they had always been Dutch; drawing the war in Indonesia out 
from under the shadow cast by the war in the Netherlands; compensation 
for lost income and possessions; an appreciation of their uprootedness; con-
firmation that their resentment and bitterness were not unfounded. The de-
mands were concrete and to a certain extent could be met. But for many it 
was too little too late and they remained aggrieved. Yet, this was a clear story 
about a recent injustice and targeted compensation for material losses was 
discussed.
Around the subject of slavery other, less familiar discourses were articu-
lated which provoked more resistance than Indisch desires had done. Slav-
ery was regarded as concerning distant ancestors, not first generation im-
migrants; the sympathy white Dutch people are able to muster for claims 
relating to the injustices of a distant past has remained limited. If the In-
disch Dutch were told in the 1960s that the subject of the war had to be closed 
once and for all, black Dutch were told even more frequently not to ‘keep fo-
cusing on the past’.
Many descendants of enslaved Africans experience slavery precisely as 
an unfinished history. The reasoning is that a traumatic history dating back 
centuries left lasting scars that still cry out for acknowledgement, atone-
ment, catharsis, liberation. Consequently, this debate has become no less 
sensitively charged than commemorations of the war. There was talk of the 
trauma of slavery that thwarted individual happiness and the ability to 
function within society; of the need to ‘de-traumatize’. Links were sought 
with international African-American movements and Dutch society was 
confronted with a call for recognition that was often felt to be excessive.
The discourse of trauma never really caught on beyond the realm of slave 
descendants and even there it remained highly controversial.
51 There are no 
scientific grounds – or refutations thereof – for the notion of a trans-genera-
tional transfer of slavery trauma. The problem with this discourse is not 
only conceptual and empirical, it also raises the simple question of how 
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is in a position to do anything about possible psychological legacies. It is 
clear in this respect that a line was drawn by government policy: there was 
room for symbolic acknowledgement, but scepticism concerning the trau-
ma discourse and no question of financial compensation.
The forthcoming attitude of the government in The Hague seems sooner 
to have provoked a counter position rather than a widely shared sense that a 
lot more still needed to be done. Populist right-wing politicians made force-
ful statements about what they called victimhood (Pim Fortuyn) and ridic-
ulous concessions to people who drag down Dutch honour (Rita Verdonk). 
Their own grassroots, they will have rightly thought, would gladly support 
this view. The discourse around the view that misdeeds perpetrated centu-
ries ago should be translated into far-reaching demands in the present – be-
yond symbolic acknowledgement – remained marginal in the Netherlands.
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Views on this varied greatly among the descendants, but once again it is 
difficult to establish which voices are representative. Only a small number 
of Afro-Caribbean Dutch were actively involved in the debates around slav-
ery. And even within this group opinions were greatly divided. There is a 
moderate group, which focuses on acknowledgement and closure and which 
is therefore barely distinguishable from the government line. At the other 
pole is a radical group for whom the past is far from over, which sees the 
slavery monument as just the beginning, which regards the NiNsee as too 
cautious and continues to demand substantial ‘reparations’ for the ‘Black 
holocaust’.
These contradictions often reflect views about how ‘bad’ the past really 
was, how ‘wrong’ the Netherlands was, how important the slave trade and 
slavery were to the countries involved and how far the shadow stretches. 
(White) historian and activist Alex van Stipriaan has spoken of a radical 
‘black’ versus a moderate ‘white’ discourse. Those who have been involved in 
the often heated debates of the last few years will recognize this division. 
However, it is almost impossible to explain outside this circle and there is 
little sympathy for the radical school of thought.
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This is unlikely to change. Slavery came home to the Netherlands with 
the arrival of Caribbean migrants and was then, finally, acknowledged. But 
as far as the well-meaning government is concerned, and probably most 
Dutch people, symbolic recognition is the end of the matter. Slavery has 
largely remained a topic for a minority of around 300,000 Dutch people, less 
than 2 per cent of the population. The black population on the Antilles, an-
other quarter of a million souls, barely feature in Dutch consciousness, even 
though they live in the same Kingdom of the Netherlands. It is therefore un-
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is not just a question of small numbers, but also the historicity of the na-
tional perception. The Jewish population in the Netherlands was almost 
200,000 before the Second World War; today it numbers around 45,000. Yet 
Dutch remembrance culture pays far more attention to the lot of the Jews. 
This reflects the enormity and historical proximity of the Holocaust, but 
also the fact that, as part of the story of the German occupation, Jewish his-
tory seems to be experienced far more as a national concern than the colo-
nial past is.
So, although the acknowledgement of slavery has become a national af-
fair, the experience of it has remained an emotional and politically charged 
issue mainly among the descendants. The way the press has reported on the 
commemorations and celebrations over the last few decades has been in-
dicative of this. It was not until the late 1990s that the media began to pay 
more attention to the history of slavery. The tone was sympathetic. The 
widespread reporting of the disastrous unveiling of the national monu-
ment on 1 July 2002 was typical. A series of mistaken logistical decisions, 
miscommunication and plain bad luck led to the unveiling act itself pre-
senting an image of major divisions. The immediate vicinity of the monu-
ment was cordoned off for a select group of invitees, black and white; this 
gathering departed to a party tent after the unveiling. The monument and 
the ceremony were largely obscured for the thousands of people who had 
come to take part and who began to protest ever more loudly. To make mat-
ters worse, it rained solidly throughout the whole ceremony. As a result, this 
first 1 July was far from being a feast of reconciliation, whatever the speakers 
said. The press presented a devastating picture of a partying establishment 
and frustrated descendants – with a great deal of sympathy for the latter.
The media has covered this annual commemoration ever since, but 1 July 
has never again been such big news. The reports today fit within a broader 
press policy which more or less obliges it to cover ethnic festivals. 1 July is 
not a national holiday. Conversely, the Indisch commemoration on 15 Au-
gust in The Hague is now covered extensively in the national media, in imi-
tation of Remembrance Day on 4 May and Liberation Day on 5 May; 1 July 
news reports are at best flashes. An arresting coincidence: at the exact mo-
ment of the slavery commemorations on 1 July, 2009, the national public 
broadcasting company broadcast a programme for schools that sang the 
praises of the voc.
Within the circles of those who are most actively engaged in commemo-
ration it has become common to speak of slavery in terms of an actively ‘si-
lenced’ history. A recently published inventory of the legacies of slavery, in 
part initiated by NiNsee, was given the programmatic title Op zoek naar de 158 postcolonial netherlands
stilte (In search of silence).
54 This view fits within a broader understanding 
that Dutch society has deliberately kept colonial and especially Dutch Ca-
ribbean history out of the picture, because it conflicts with the flattering 
self-image of a progressive, humane, tolerant society.
Slavery has indeed long been a neglected theme in Dutch memorial cul-
ture. However, this does not mean that the ‘forgetting’ was part of a deliber-
ate policy. There is nothing in the history of slavery to be proud of; even abo-
lition in the Netherlands and its territories came late and was imposed from 
outside. This could have led to active suppression. However, it is more prob-
able that slavery simply remained too far away in space and time, too mar-
ginal to need a policy. It was not until the descendants began to arrive in the 
Netherlands that Dutch society at large became confronted with its own 
slavery history. This was a shocking contrast with the rosy self-image, but 
the link with contemporary ‘whitewashing’ racism that is often suggested 
is, at best, speculative in this context.
In the meantime, the contemporary discourse on slavery has also pro-
duced its own silences. The slave trade and slavery in the voc’s trade zone 
have been forgotten, because no descendants have asked for recognition. 
Most attention paid to the ‘West’ goes to Suriname, simply because the Suri-
namese community in the Netherlands has been the most outspoken. The 
images of slavery that now appeal most to the imagination are, on the one 
hand, of extreme repression (‘Black Holocaust’) and, on the other, heroic re-
sistance – the more typical shades of grey remain underexposed.
Where descendants and their organizations ask for a ‘shattering of the 
silence’, they not only long for more attention, but also for room for other 
perspectives and conclusions. Such desires belong to all emancipatory 
movements. However, they carry the risk that new truths will be claimed, 
the assumptions and content of which are at odds with empirical fact. A 
heated debate has erupted in the Netherlands over the past few years around 
such questions as the defining power of scholarship and the question of 
whether there is such a thing as a distinct black perspective and if so, wheth-
er that should be privileged. Where is the middle ground between a radical 
black perspective that ‘you wouldn’t let a Nazi write the history of the Nazi 
concentration camps either’ and the positivist view that the background of 
a postcolonial researcher is completely irrelevant? In the almost entirely 
white world of Dutch historians the overwhelming conviction is that, with 
all the room there is for multivocality, there are still standards for scientific 
quality against which historical research can and should be tested and in 
which the background and emotions of the researcher may only play a sub-
ordinate role. In many respects this discussion recalls the laborious and al-imagining colonialism 159
most impossible closure of the moralizing in debates about resistance and 
collaboration in the Netherlands during the Second World War.
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As already mentioned, all of this presented NiNsee, which has educa-
tional, research and collecting tasks, with a huge dilemma. Radical groups 
from its own grassroots demanded room for their visions and truths, refer-
ring to their origins and the unpaid debt. Opposite them stood a circle of 
people who were involved, but who had little truck with a separate ‘black 
perspective’; administrators, because they linked acknowledgement to so-
cial cohesion; and researchers, because they seek out the nuances of the past 
and its legacies. NiNsee found itself more or less sentenced to following a 
middle course, which then prompted the question of what exactly made the 
institute individual and innovative.
From a government point of view this was not a pressing question. Com-
memoration, monument and institute existed within the framework of a 
moderate multiculturalism with mottos of solidarity and social cohesion. 
No different from the succession of gestures towards the East Indian and 
Moluccan communities, the administrative attitude to black Caribbean 
frustrations and desires can also be described as a policy of pacification. In 
this sense, descendants’ lobby was taken seriously. Some had expected 
much more in gestures (apologies, a national holiday, reparations) and in 
results (addressing social problems, ‘de-traumatizing’, and more aid for the 
former colonies). These expectations, we can safely state, ten years down the 
line, were set too high. What remained were modest gestures of inclusion 
and pacification.
pleasIng everyone, all of The TIme?
Where do we stand now in terms of a wider Dutch familiarity with, and un-
derstanding of the colonial past? 
56 Over the last few years a lot has been said 
on the canon of Dutch history, which is an authoritative collection of the 
most important elements in our national history. Formulating such a canon 
is a perilous undertaking. What is presented as the core of history reflects 
– ideally – the state of academic research, but also, and probably more so, the 
social demand for a recognizable story about the past.
That is where the shoe pinches. Where historians have strongly contra-
dictory views of the past, even among themselves, the questions and desires 
of society are even less univocal. This assessment is all the more tricky where 
significant meaning is attached to the canon, which here and elsewhere in 
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multicultural Netherlands, the call for an authoritative historical canon is 
linked to the need for intellectual and normative anchors for a nation that is 
apparently adrift, confused by the blurring of its own borders and identity 
by ‘Europe’ and immigration.
57
In its elucidation of the canon of Dutch history, the state-commissioned 
Van Oostrom Commission rightly gave short shrift to the high expectations 
surrounding the usefulness of a canon. There is, it wrote, no direct link be-
tween this canon and the advancement of a national identity and only a 
modest relation between the canon and assimilation. Moreover, the com-
mission also stressed that there are legitimate alternatives for its proposals. 
With this the canon was modestly laid down, not as a ‘state pedagogy’ but as 
a beginning or, more precisely, a record of a particular moment which in 
time will be replaced by a new formulation of ‘what every Dutch person 
should know about national history’.
58 The canon will continue to be contro-
versial – the directors of the forthcoming National History Museum, Erik 
Schilp and Valentijn Byvanck, have already expressed their serious doubts.
59 
But, for the time being, the Van Oostrom canon will continue to serve as a 
guideline for public opinion, as there is no officially recognized alternative 
– hence, perhaps, the somewhat more assertive tone of the committee’s final 
report.
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This makes it all the more interesting to see what space this canon offers 
to colonial history and it legacies. Colonialism appears to be relatively gen-
erously distributed across five of the fifty ‘windows’ (topics). There are win-
dows on the voc, on slavery, on Max Havelaar, a nineteenth-century novel 
criticizing colonial rule in Java, and on Suriname and the Netherlands An-
tilles. Various other windows – for instance on King Willem I of the Nether-
lands – have a colonial dimension that is mentioned more in passing. All in 
all far more attention is paid to colonialism, particularly in the West, than 
would have been the case only a few decades ago. How can this be explained? 
Do we now know more about that past? Undoubtedly. But considering we 
know more about almost everything to do with the past, this is not a useful 
explanation. The incorporation of colonial history into the contemporary 
canon reflects a general distancing from a narrow Eurocentrism, but above 
all the fact that this past has come into view with the arrival of postcolonial 
migrants in the Netherlands, thus becoming the history ‘of us all’.
The post-war rediscovery of the colonial past fits within a broader pat-
tern of making room, often with a guilty conscience, for the descendants of 
the victims of our history. The social and, thereby, political willingness to 
acknowledge old injuries and the resultant ‘trauma’ and to deliver justice 
has dramatically increased, partly with a view to inclusion and pacification. imagining colonialism 161
Representatives of groups involved also know how to demand this space and 
to utilize it. This is a good game of identity politics. In this way, new perspec-
tives of colonial history and colonial legacies have found their way into the 
canon, including in the Netherlands.
Precisely which aspects of colonial history should be canonized is 
strongly disputed and depends on the perspective adopted and the meaning 
that people today attach to that perspective. In the Netherlands, as indicated 
above, one more remarkable division comes into play. To make a bold gener-
alization: the pain among migrants from the East Indies has less to do with 
colonialism than the way it ended so abruptly. Migrants from the Caribbe-
an, at least those with African roots, have far more difficulty with colonial-
ism itself and slavery in particular. In this respect the most recent history 
raises surprising new paradoxes. Among Caribbean Dutch there are now 
frustrations about the sudden farewell to Suriname and the perceived ‘re-
colonization’ of the Antilles. The expectations surrounding acknowledge-
ment are contradictory and consequently, not everyone can be satisfied. 
This will continue to be the way with an unfinished colonial past.
Ever more groups are demanding room for their story in the imagination 
of a national past. At worst this leads to memory wars, to a debate in which 
the players are only interested in their own perspective: a Balkanization of 
the past in which everyone adds their own story, obscuring the greater nar-
rative behind lots of smaller discourses. This is an unattractive postmodern 
panorama. At best, cautious attempts are made to reconstruct a broad na-
tional narrative, placed in a European perspective with a pinch of world his-
tory thrown in and a bit of extra space for colonialism and migration stories. 
This is the path chosen by the canon commission. The outcome is somewhat 
surprising. The rediscovery of colonial history has had a considerable effect 
on the canon. The verzuiling, ‘pillarization’, which the first post-war genera-
tions grew up with, has been shifted into a section about the multicultural 
Netherlands. And colonialism, about which they heard almost nothing 
when they were at school, is now strongly represented. Thus, the canon re-
flects the shifts in our historical understanding, which in part was brought 
about by the postcolonial migrations. It is said that the canon reflects a wor-
ried climate in which the Netherlands has ‘mentally withdrawn behind the 
dikes’. But is this the case? Even if the rediscovery of an ‘own’ colonial past 
has something ‘national’ about it, it at least testifies to an increased willing-
ness to interpret ‘national’ more broadly than the Netherlands-on-the-North 
Sea.
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The postcolonial broadening of the canon reflects a willingness to in-
clude ‘newcomers’ who have in fact been fellow citizens for ages. It is a won-162 postcolonial netherlands
derful aim yet absolves no historian, or anyone else who is involved in any 
way, from the responsibility of striving for a certain balance in the recon-
struction of the past, including the colonial past. Trying to please everyone 
all of the time is never a serious option.163
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TransnaTIonalIsm: a TurnIng TIde?
Long gone is the time when migrants, embarking on a new life overseas, 
bade farewell to their homeland forever.
1 Technological developments, 
greater prosperity, and the enormity and complexity of post-war migration 
flows have resulted in transnationalism, in permanent and often intense 
relations between citizens of the countries of origin and immigration. This 
phenomenon has led to a boom in debates and publications over the last few 
decades. A degree of consensus has taken shape around the proposition that 
migrants in foreign countries (are able to) develop multiple orientations 
that connect them simultaneously to their countries of origin and immi-
gration, as well as to ethnic or religious groups, or political movements else-
where. Yet a key question has remained as to whether, in the context of wide-
spread integration, the transnationalism of the first migrants would hold 
strong or lose its intensity over subsequent generations.
2
Studies in transnationalism stress that migrants are able to maintain a 
range of relations between countries of origin and host countries. This leads 
to ‘social spaces’ that transcend geographic, cultural, and political borders, 
involving and changing not only the migrants, but also those who stay be-
hind. The migrant community does not only send money ‘home’; there are 
also political, social, and cultural remittances. Transnationalism thus con-
tains a significant component of community (belonging) and identity. It is 
therefore not surprising that governments in the countries of origin often 
attempt to get a grip on their overseas citizens and whatever they send home 
in terms of money, goods, ideas, and emotions.
3
Countries of immigration respond in different ways to this transnation-
alism. Interference by foreign governments regarding migrants in a coun-
try of immigration are seldom appreciated. The space granted to transna-
tional engagement by migrants varies enormously; the worry that 
transnationalism may stand in the way of integration is an important factor 
in this. National policy in a general sense corresponds with the degree to 164 postcolonial netherlands
which multiculturalism is accepted, but more particularly with indications 
of political or religious radicalism. The idea that transnationalism is more 
or less supplanting the traditional nation state is not convincing in this 
light. Koopmans and Statham defend the opposite view on good grounds, 
namely, that the amount of space a host country provides is a crucial deter-
minant of the strength of transnationalism found there.
4
Dutch postcolonial migrants maintained transnational relations with 
their countries of origin to varying degrees. The question is what these rela-
tions meant and what they continue to mean today for individual citizens 
and organizations, and for the countries themselves. Comparative studies 
of different postcolonial communities indicate that there are clear distinc-
tions between them and that these are in part rooted in both colonial history 
and the changing of the generations. The strength of transnational bonds, 
so the argument of this chapter runs, is currently diminishing, which in 
turn is linked to the disappearance of a sense of community among postco-
lonial migrants in the Netherlands itself.
The various national governments involved have determined the amount 
of room that is available for transnational engagement. The space that the 
Dutch state made available for transnationalism was relatively large, aided 
by the fact that the thorny issue of dual nationality was of minor importance 
to postcolonial migrants. Cultural transnationalism and private develop-
ment aid was not obstructed and has even been praised over the last few de-
cades. Yet the space that was granted to political engagement was also quite 
generous – remarkably more so than other migrants receive today, especial-
ly those from Islamic countries. The initial tolerance of Indisch revanchism 
and the struggle for the rms was not so much evidence of realpolitik than of 
the metropole’s frustrations about losing the East Indies; the desire to keep 
the country’s own minorities happy only began to play a role from the 1970s 
on. Yet the postcolonial bonus began to lose its strength here too. The impor-
tance of good international relations and domestic order came to prevail.
Conversely, Indonesia offered almost no room for the Indisch commu-
nity, nor for Moluccan transnationalism; this frustrated Moluccan rms na-
tionalism in particular.
5 What follows below illustrates that Surinamese 
transnationalism was far more significant. This did not lead Paramaribo to 
a specific policy; the Surinamese political line can be described as floating 
between sympathy and ambivalence, but is, above all, passive. The Antille-
an and Aruban governments so far seem to have felt little, if any need to de-
velop a vision for relations with the ‘seventh island’ – the Antillean commu-
nity in the Netherlands.transnationalism: a turning tide? 165
deColonIzaTIon, mIgraTIon CIrCuITs and generaTIons
We may presume that migrants’ orientation to their country of origin de-
clines with the generations. Memories and loyalties carried by migrants do 
not necessarily vanish in later generations, but they do fade. The recent 
stream of studies on transnationalism provokes the need for a more nu-
anced interpretation of the break, but does not undermine the belief that 
distance and time simply do their work, even in an age when technology and 
prosperity have reduced the meaning of distance.
Measured against passenger traffic, migration, material support, and 
political or cultural influence, relations maintained by the postcolonial 
community with Indonesia are far weaker than relations with Suriname or 
the Antilles. This assessment confirms the assumption that transnational 
relations decline in intensity over time, but this is not the whole story. Mi-
grants from the Netherlands East Indies were anything but a reflection of 
the Indonesian population as a whole; hence their departure cannot be de-
scribed as anything other than a break. The situation for Caribbean mi-
grants was and is utterly different.
Between 1945 and the beginning of the 1960s, almost the entire European 
population of Indonesia left the country – both totoks and those who were 
described as being ‘rooted in the East Indies’. By far the greatest majority of 
these ‘repatriates’ settled in the Netherlands, while substantial minorities 
settled elsewhere, particularly in the United States and Australia. Remigra-
tion not being an option, they were forced to shut the door behind them: 
there was no place for them in the Republic of Indonesia. This applied not 
only in the public realm. Because the Indisch community emigrated en 
masse, albeit in phases, there were only a limited number of significant, en-
during family ties with Indonesia.
6 With the exodus of the Indisch commu-
nity, Indonesia lost a small portion of its population, in terms of numbers, 
whereas most of the migrants lost all their concrete ties with their home-
land. The usual anchors in transnational relations – family and friends, pos-
sessions and investments, a realistic chance of return – did not exist, and 
political relations remained extremely difficult for many years. By the time 
international relations had become normalized, a majority of the Indisch 
community in the Netherlands belonged to the second or third generation; 
there was, by definition, no chain migration; and a significant number of 
Indisch Dutch were the products of mixed relationships.
The development of the Moluccan community was very different be-
cause of the nature of its migration history. At the core of the community 
were demobilized soldiers who would never reconcile themselves to the voy-
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their subsequent dismissal from the army, and to relinquishing the idea of 
an independent Moluccan republic, the rms. The transnational orientation 
of the Moluccan Dutch remained strikingly pronounced. This not only says 
something about the strengths and risks attached to political ideas, but also 
the pressure of continuing family ties and local loyalties, even when there 
were almost no new migrants to swell their numbers. From the Dutch camps 
and, later, housing estates where they lived, many Moluccans kept in con-
tact with the islands, villages, and communities of villages (pela) they came 
from. The hope of return remained a receding horizon, but the sense of be-
ing connected to much larger communities in the Moluccas was kept alive, 
even in the third generation, a large number of whom made short visits to 
the land of their grandparents.
The Caribbean communities in the Netherlands date from a little later, 
but distinguish themselves primarily in that they are both pre-eminently 
transnational. Around 40 per cent of all ‘Surinamese’ and ‘Antilleans’ live in 
the Netherlands. By definition, almost all Surinamese and Antillean Dutch 
have large numbers of family and friends in the country of origin, and vice 
versa. Unlike the Indisch Dutch and Moluccans, the Caribbean community 
in the Netherlands is crucial to those who ‘stayed behind’ in many ways. 
There are also considerable differences within the Caribbean communities. 
Firstly, between the Surinamese and the Antilleans. Almost thirty-five 
years after independence, relations between the Surinamese and the Dutch 
Surinamese populations are still close, but the question of whether this will 
continue is beginning to make itself felt. However often people fly back and 
forth today, to-ing and fro-ing migration has declined drastically, in par-
ticular due to the legal restrictions imposed at the Dutch end and the eco-
nomic and political problems at the Surinamese end. There is increasingly 
less evidence that the second and subsequent generations will hold on to the 
orientation of their (grand)parents. By contrast, the decision to continue 
Kingdom relations still enables Antilleans to settle freely in the Nether-
lands, and vice versa. And there is indeed a lot of to-ing and fro-ing in terms 
of travel and living; most Antilleans in the Netherlands are still first genera-
tion. There are other contrasts within the Surinamese and Antillean com-
munities, which are mainly linked to ethnicity and perhaps class for the 
Surinamese Dutch, while for the Antilleans it is primarily class and island 
of origin that are important.
Apart from whether or not the possibility of return was cut off or not, the 
language factor was crucial to relations between the postcolonial commu-
nities and the country of origin. When they left the Dutch East Indies, most 
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the Moluccans spoke mainly Moluccan Malay, or ‘barracks Malay’ among 
themselves.
7 Language politics in Indonesia soon made Bahasa Indonesia 
the national tongue of the archipelago, over and above the numerous re-
gional languages. Dutch was marginalized and is now a dead language. 
Conversely, among the Indisch and Moluccan communities in the Nether-
lands, only one or two speak modern Indonesian. Among the later genera-
tions of Indisch Dutch, the Malay-Dutch language Petjo is rarely ever spo-
ken. The command of Malayu sini (literally ‘Malay from here’) among 
younger Moluccans is very limited, while High Malay is now only used in 
church services. The ability to communicate back and forth – a condition 
vital for a transnational community to exist – therefore declined within the 
space of only two generations. The question is whether English – used by 
many young Moluccans today as their lingua franca for new communica-
tions channels such as Facebook and the Dutch social networking site Hyves 
– will come to compensate for this.
The situation is utterly different in the case of Suriname.
8 Here, too, each 
ethnic group had its own language, with the Afro-Surinamese language 
Sranantongo serving as the lingua franca. Over the course of the twentieth 
century, Dutch won ground as a consequence of higher levels of education 
and increased local pragmatism. A good command of Dutch was considered 
essential to social advancement, but was also the only language that was ac-
ceptable to all ethnic groups as a national language. The quality of one’s 
Dutch continued to be linked to class, but most of the Surinamese who emi-
grated around 1975 had a fairly good command of the language. It goes with-
out saying that the standard of Dutch improved in the Netherlands in the 
generations that followed and boosted their integration. More importantly, 
in the Republic of Suriname a uniquely local, but otherwise recognizable 
form of Dutch maintained its position after 1975 and even gained ground. 
Language therefore presented no barriers to transnational ties.
The language situation in the Antilles was more complex.
9 During the 
colonial period, Papiamentu developed as the lingua franca of the Leeward 
Islands. This is one of the few Creole languages that has no stigma associat-
ed with lower social class or peripheral ethnicity attached to it. Dutch only 
became more broadly used over the course of the twentieth century through 
the colonial education system. However, unlike in Suriname, it never be-
came widely spoken by the people and to this day Dutch is primarily used in 
education and government. Its domination is in fact limited even in these 
areas. A command of Dutch continued to be strongly associated with the 
middle and upper classes. A majority of pupils in primary and lower level 
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knowledge of the language of the metropole. It is unsurprising, then, that 
the switch from elite to mass migration from the Antilles also transplanted 
the islands’ linguistic and educational issues. This has not benefitted inte-
gration and has meant that the ability of the communities on either side of 
the Atlantic to communicate has continued to depend on Papiamentu, rath-
er than Dutch.
Hence, a command of Dutch unites postcolonial migrants in the Nether-
lands – with each other and with the rest of society – but, paradoxically least 
of all with other Antilleans, even though it is precisely the Antilles that have 
remained part of the Kingdom. Most importantly for transnationalism, it 
was only the Indisch and Moluccan communities who found themselves 
confronted by a deep language gulf. This severely hampered their ability to 
maintain personal relationships, to follow the media, or to collectively re-
flect on the meaning of colonial and postcolonial history. Where their use of 
the media is concerned, postcolonial communities are also extremely well 
integrated. The image of satellite dishes in the Netherlands’ larger cities 
aimed at distant countries of origin (Morocco, Turkey) – an expressive argu-
ment against multiculturalism – is irrelevant in these cases.
CITIzens and TheIr TransnaTIonal orIenTaTIons
The intensity with which migrants from the former colonies and their 
(grand)children maintain relations with the country of origin varies from 
group to group and, we may assume, from generation to generation. Rele-
vant indicators for establishing the importance of transnational relations at 
an individual level are physical and virtual contact, financial and other ma-
terial relations, and the extent to which current affairs are followed.
Transnational relations are least important to the Indisch community. 
This is logical considering the rupture that decolonization and migration 
inflicted on this community. Almost no studies have been carried out on 
this subject. In the early days, all kinds of relations must have been main-
tained: some of the earliest repatriates clung onto the illusion of being able 
to return for a long time; later they put their effort into bringing over those 
who were ‘rooted in the Indies’ and spijtoptanten. They followed the news 
through correspondences and the media. Little is known about material 
support sent to those who stayed behind. It is unlikely that this involved 
large sums, if only because the majority of repatriates were far from well off 
themselves.
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were normalized and the Indisch community was regarded as having suc-
cessfully integrated into what was an increasingly prosperous Netherlands. 
People could now permit themselves to travel as tourists to Indonesia. This 
was largely one-way traffic of a strongly nostalgic nature. This tourism grew 
in fits and starts, more or less echoing the rhythm of political relations be-
tween the two countries. Here and there this led to support from rediscov-
ered families or communities; however, this was never more than moder-
ately significant. Information about developments in Indonesia was 
initially provided by the community that had stayed behind; once again it 
was Tjalie Robinson who set the tone with his Piekerans van een straatslijper 
(Musings of a gadabout) among other writings. But with the last of the repa-
triations in the early sixties, this source dried up and news had to be fol-
lowed primarily through the Dutch media. Tjalie’s Tong Tong magazine had 
a huge readership and carried ‘Indisch’ news, which inevitably became in-
creasingly Dutch; only later did magazines such as Moesson and Archipel 
dedicate space to the modern Indonesia. Because of the language, this In-
disch press, by definition, had no significance in Indonesia itself beyond the 
1950s. In the generations that followed, the split between the Indisch com-
munity and Indonesia grew larger rather than smaller with the arrival of 
new media, from television to Internet, where the choice of language is the 
determining factor.
Illustrative of the gulf separating the Indisch community from contem-
porary Indonesia is the destination of 35 million guilders’ worth of project 
funding from Het Gebaar. Almost none of this money went to projects in In-
donesia; the rare exceptions involved memorials and care for warga negara, 
Indisch who had stayed behind.
10 When asked about how individual pay-
ments were spent – primarily paid out in the Netherlands – only a few said 
they spent the money on family in Indonesia or even on a visit to that coun-
try.
11 The Indisch response to a recent survey among prominent postcolonial 
migrants and organizations was typical. Questions regarding a current and 
future sense of transnational community were answered in a markedly less 
positive way than by respondents from other groups.
12
The focus of the Moluccan community on the islands of origin was stron-
ger for longer. From the late 1970s on, the ideal of the rms was silently aban-
doned, at least as a prospect for Moluccans in the Netherlands; the hope of 
remigration was relinquished. The normalization of relations with Indone-
sia opened up travel opportunities, which paradoxically confronted the 
visitors with the gulf that now separated them from the islands’ inhabit-
ants. In the decades that followed, a small number of Moluccan Dutch visit-
ed the islands. A relatively large number of Moluccan organizations and in-170 postcolonial netherlands
dividuals continued to direct their aid to the islands they originated from. 
The scale of this material help is unknown, but can only have been of limited 
significance for the population of the Moluccas as a whole, which numbers 
more than two million.
13
The Moluccan Dutch were as unrepresentative of the population in the 
country of origin as the Indisch Dutch were. The Moluccans in the Nether-
lands were overwhelmingly Protestant, while the Christian population on 
the Moluccas, which was initially slightly in the majority, is no larger than 
the Muslim population today. Furthermore, the knil personnel, who 
formed the core of the Moluccan migrants, had often served long periods on 
Java or Sumatra and not infrequently had found wives there. Transnational 
solidarity was not, therefore, simply a matter of course and language be-
came a divisive element here too. Moluccans in the Netherlands acquire 
their information about the Moluccan Islands increasingly from media – 
from the periodical Marinjo to contemporary web sites – that exclusively use 
Dutch, even if it is nostalgically peppered with Malay. On the other hand the 
small Moluccan community in the Netherlands is not at all a point of focus 
for the inhabitants of the Moluccan islands. Previously, the censored press 
on the islands ignored their overseas cousins, while today, apart from tour-
ist visits, they are both distant and, literally, hard to understand.
The contrast with Surinamese transnationalism is enormous. Since the 
exodus around 1975, almost everyone in Suriname has friends and relatives 
in the Netherlands. Falling airfares and growing prosperity in the Nether-
lands has led to spectacular growth in the number of flights people take be-
tween the two countries, especially Surinamese living in the Netherlands. 
The value of annual remittances in the form of money and goods in the 1990s 
was estimated to be in the region of 70 million us dollars, almost a third of 
Suriname’s gnp at the time. In 2006, half of all Surinamese households re-
ceived money from the Netherlands, mainly from family members; in that 
year this amounted to between 100 and 125 million euros. The total magni-
tude of these legal donations is feasibly greater that the ‘dowry’ given to Su-
riname by the Netherlands on independence – in 1975 valued at 3.5 billion 
Dutch guilders, which today would be way over 3.5 million euros – and al-
most certainly more important to the alleviation of poverty. However, peo-
ple on both sides of the ocean realize that the continuation of this solidarity 
by later generations of Surinamese Dutch cannot be taken for granted.
14
Surinamese on either side of the Atlantic also had growing access to in-
formation about the political goings on in both countries. The dominance of 
the Dutch language was crucial in this. During the prelude to the exodus, 
Surinamese organizations in the Netherlands brought out magazines, such transnationalism: a turning tide? 171
as de Koerier or de West­Indiër. These were published in small editions and did 
not last long, but they did serve a social and political purpose. During and 
after the mass migration, the Dutch press began to publish more about Su-
riname, in part based on reports in the Surinamese press. Even now, a quar-
ter of a century after independence, reports about Suriname are still usually 
reported on the domestic news pages of the Dutch nationals. As the Suri-
namese population grew, so too did the number of ‘ethnic’ periodicals. 
These were often short-lived, sometimes longer-lasting and, like Weekkrant 
Suriname (1980-2004), had a broad outlook. Since 1983 there has even been a 
scientific journal for Surinamese studies, Oso, in which Surinamese and 
Dutch from both countries publish.
Radio and television were not left behind and broadcast a lot of news 
from Suriname, sometimes taken from local media, but often gathered in-
dependently. Alongside this, the number of local Surinamese-Dutch radio 
stations increased dramatically from the 1970s and Surinamese presenters, 
musicians, actors and sportsmen and -women penetrated the mainstream 
media. Conversely, Surinamese media gradually began to report not less, 
but more news about the Netherlands and, ultimately, adopt entire pro-
grammes from Dutch television. Moreover, the Dutch world service rnwo 
(Radio Nederland Wereld Omroep) has for decades been a popular intermedi-
ary with its considerable offering of Dutch and Caribbean news. Since 2000, 
the number of web sites where information is exchanged about Suriname 
and Surinamese in the Netherlands has grown enormously. In brief, a rami-
fied and busy information network developed that virtually bridged the 
gulf in the Surinamese community.
The Antillean community in the Netherlands only began to grow strong-
ly in number in the 1980s. Prior to this, the expectation of most migrants – 
and certainly students – was that they would return to their home island. 
Then there followed the exodus. Statistics about the rapid growth of the 
community somewhat conceal the circular character Antillean migration 
has retained: levels of remigration are still substantial. This is not only ex-
plained by the relative prosperity of the islands, but also the related fact that 
the islands are still part of the kingdom. People are able to change their 
minds, more than once if necessary. This mobility also conforms with the 
migration traditions of the region, where temporary labour migration has 
been common since the abolition of slavery.
Hence, in the 1990s the ‘Antillean’ community – in fact mainly Curaçaoan 
– became transnational. Here too there was a dramatic increase in the num-
ber of flight movements and, one may assume, intensive virtual contact. But 
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being sent to the Antilles. In view of the absence of any systematic research, 
we can only assume that the level of remittances – perhaps leaving aside the 
drugs-related black market – has never been high; recent research confirms 
this.
15 This may be explained by the fact that the differences in income with-
in this transnational community are minor. Measured against Dutch stan-
dards, Antillean migrants are relatively poor; Antilleans on the islands are 
relatively well off compared with the migrants, but also compared with liv-
ing standards in Indonesia or Suriname.
Antilleans, at least those from the Leeward Islands, communicate with 
each other in Papiamentu. It is therefore not surprising that one of the first 
Antillean publications in the Netherlands, the student magazine Kambio; 
Portabos independiente antijano, bore a Papiamentu title, even if most of the 
articles were in Dutch.
16 Papiamentu would continue to bond the Antillean 
community while sometimes isolating it from its broader surroundings. 
Antillean organizations in the Netherlands nowadays usually choose Dutch 
for their publications, even though Papiamentu continues to be the lan-
guage they use to communicate with each other.
A paradoxical development has taken shape since 1990. An increase in 
Antillean migration to the Netherlands was counterpointed by an increase 
in the Dutch presence on the Antilles – (indirectly) governmental, econom-
ic, but also demographic, and through a steep rise in tourism. This led to 
increased mutual interest, which was reported largely in the Dutch media. 
Once again the Wereldomroep (World Service) served as an intermediary. 
Moreover, on the islands new Dutch language papers were launched and 
Dutch television gained access to Antillean homes through bvn, the Dutch 
language world service TV: the schizophrenic linguistic situation thus be-
came accentuated even further. For decades news from the islands could be 
followed in the Netherlands through the news gathering of the Dutch na-
tional press. Later, local digital newspapers and a large number of web sites 
were added, in both Dutch and Papiamentu. The question for the distant fu-
ture is how long Papiamentu will be sustained in the Netherlands. In time it 
might become a second language for Antillean Dutch – vital mainly to 
maintaining relations with the islands of origin.
posTColonIal organIzaTIons and TransnaTIonal polITICs
As early as 1934, Anton de Kom wrote in Wij slaven van Suriname of ‘the hope 
and courage contained in that one mighty word that I learned abroad: orga-
nization’.
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ruler as a political education. Regardless of which colonial power we look at, 
in the pre-war years migrants from the colonies wrote crucial pages in the 
history of anti-colonialism. Sometimes these were workers, more often in-
tellectuals who began to articulate criticism of colonialism while studying 
in the mother country. This relation remained intact in the early decades 
after the war: migrants worked for decolonization and regarded their stay in 
the metropole as temporary. A remarkable turn then occurred, in the Dutch 
context as well. Independence lost its lustre and return became less and less 
an obvious option.
It is not surprising that migrants from the Netherlands East Indies were 
the least anti-colonial of all; their privileged existence was, after all, closely 
intertwined with the colonial system. Insofar as nationalism existed, it was 
articulated by Indonesian (prior to Indonesian independence) organiza-
tions and individuals, seldom by Indisch ones.
18 The split came about after 
the war. The number of Indonesian students and other migrants soon de-
clined; they wisely kept away from political agitation. The rapidly growing 
Indisch community, on the other hand, objected strongly to decolonization 
and were often extremely resentful about having to accept the loss of the 
East Indies. The Indisch lobby developed in three phases, which became 
gradually more focused on the Netherlands. The first phase, resistance to 
the nationalist assumption of power, was more or less completed by the 
transfer of New Guinea in 1962. The bitterness felt towards Indonesia re-
mained, but politically was of little more than symbolic significance. Mean-
while, a new aim was being striven for: the right to ‘repatriation’ and an ad-
equate reception for the entire Indisch group. These efforts were rewarded 
during the course of the 1960s. After this the Indisch lobby focused mainly 
on symbolic recognition and financial compensation for the suffering and 
damages incurred in the period after 1942, but for a long time it also argued 
against the establishment of warmer interstate relations with the republic.
Insofar as the Indisch community demonstrated any kind of transna-
tional political engagement, it was primarily reactionary. In the period 
leading up to the transfer of New Guinea’s sovereignty, affiliations were 
largely found with political parties on the right which, in Lijphart’s famous 
characterization, had also failed to leave ‘the trauma of decolonization’ be-
hind them.
19 Never did a postcolonial lobby find such a receptive ear in Dutch 
politics; but the aims were soon superseded. What remained was a symbolic 
battle, in which Indisch veterans also asserted themselves. Sukarno re-
mained an anathema, reciprocal state visits were vehemently opposed. It 
would be 2005 before the Dutch government reluctantly admitted ‘1945’ (the 
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year for the formal transfer of sovereignty) as the date marking the end of its 
rule. State visits to and from Japan likewise faced fierce objections. Attempts 
to appease the Indisch community put a spanner in the works of a ‘normal’ 
foreign policy for decades. It did not help that the Indonesian government 
was exceptionally sensitive to ‘reactionary tendencies’ within the Indisch 
community, and for this reason even boycotted the Pasar Malam Besar in 
The Hague for several years.
20
Dutch politicians gradually began to distance themselves from this re-
vanchist politicking, regardless of how much symbolic recognition and 
how many gestures the Indisch lobby harvested at the same time. Relations 
with Indonesia and Japan were normalized, all parties preferring to ignore 
the stickiest issues in bilateral relations rather than stir them up. And wher-
ever witnesses to Dutch ‘excesses’ during the war of decolonization did turn 
up, and they frequently did, they were met with fierce opposition from the 
Indisch generation, albeit primarily from the veterans. The recent issue of 
Dutch war crimes perpetrated in the Javanese village of Rawagede in 1947, 
discussed at length in the Dutch media, are typical of this. The Dutch gov-
ernment finally expressed its deep regret and offered surviving relatives a 
number of development projects by way of modest and indirect compensa-
tion. However, apart from a few exceptions, the Indisch organizations re-
mained silent.
21
The transnationalism of the Moluccan political elite remained longer and 
more violently scarred by the traumatic course of decolonization; this gave 
rise to radical political actions that are unique in the history of the postcolo-
nial Netherlands. The hope that their stay in the Netherlands would be tem-
porary, merely a transitional phase en route to remigration to an indepen-
dent (South) Moluccan republic (rms), was clung onto for many years. 
Initially Dutch politicians, particularly on the right, were sympathetic to-
wards the Moluccans’ frustration regarding their forced demobilization in 
the Netherlands and the struggle for the rms. However, this was not accom-
panied by concrete assistance and by the 1960s The Hague had already begun 
to pursue an integration policy. This gave rise to considerable frustration in 
the Moluccan community and ultimately, in the 1970s, to violent hostage 
taking and hijackings carried out by youths of the second generation. These 
actions were met with complete incomprehension and rejection across the 
political spectrum and resulted in a domestic policy aimed precisely at 
boosting integration into Dutch society. The government was wary about 
putting its fragile relations with Indonesia at risk for the rms, which it 
viewed as a completely unrealistic dream.Moluccan activists surrender after briefly occupying the official residence of the 
Indonesian Ambassador in Wassenaar, near The Hague, 31 August, 1970. This action was 
carried out on the eve of what was, also for Moluccans, the highly controversial visit of 
President Suharto of Indonesia to the Netherlands. The young activists unsuccessfully 
demanded a meeting between Suharto and the rms president-in-exile, J.A. Manusama. 
A meeting between Prime Minister Piet de Jong and Manusama did take place later, but 
to little effect. This possibly contributed to the violent actions that followed later. One 
policeman was killed during the occupation. The ‘Wassenaar 33’ were later convicted and 
imprisoned with sentences ranging from four months to three years. Their popularity 
in Moluccan circles was considerable. (collection international institute for 
social history)
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Reluctantly, and often silently, most Moluccans by the 1980s had begun 
to see that neither the rms nor remigration were realistic objectives. The 
‘struggle’ shifted into a demand for the right to self-determination for the 
Moluccas, a position that Steijlen has termed ‘caretaker nationalism’.
22 After 
this, radical political transnationalism seemed to be heading for extinc-
tion: regardless of how much pent-up sectarian rage fuelled the internal 
struggle, or how frantically the old leaders clung on to the ideal of the rms, 
their influence within the wider Moluccan population was declining. Very 
recently, the new ‘president of the Moluccan government-in-exile’ John Wat-
tilete openly distanced himself from the necessity of a Moluccan Republic 
when he took office – a revisionist view that is not unrelated to the fact that 176 postcolonial netherlands
he is also the first ‘president’ of the second generation.
23 But none of these 
shifts signalled the end of the engagement with the islands. The bloody riots 
between Christians and Muslims on the Moluccas from 1999 to 2001 pro-
voked great agitation in the Netherlands.
This kerusuhan, which left five to seven thousand dead and hundreds of 
thousands of refugees, led to a renewal of Moluccan Dutch identification 
with the islands of their (grand)parents, which many young people had by 
now also visited. Money and equipment was collected, national events were 
organized in which thousands of Moluccans took part, and attempts were 
made to get Dutch politicians involved. This once more underlined how 
strong Moluccan Dutch transnationalism had remained compared with 
other postcolonial migrants.
For a moment it seemed as if the 1970s had been let out of the bottle, as 
radicals once again began to make threats against Dutch politicians and 
scholars who they accused of being too lenient towards Jakarta and too little 
concerned about the Moluccas. The Dutch government found itself forced to 
meet regularly with a new generation of Moluccan Dutch to discuss an issue 
over which it had no jurisdiction. By appealing to the safeguarding of inter-
national human rights – always a thorny issue in the relationship with Indo-
nesia – they pressed the Indonesian government to intervene. Order in the 
Netherlands was preserved, a few minor incidents notwithstanding, and 
the political consequences of these actions remained limited. The Hague, 
after all, allows itself few liberties when it comes to Jakarta, especially with 
regard to sensitive questions such as the Moluccas or Papua (New Guinea).
24 
Whether, in this discouraging context, a new generation of Moluccan Dutch 
will grasp ahold of the renewed orientation is unclear. Yet, it is remarkable 
how often the annual commemoration of the proclamation of the rms con-
tinues to be accompanied by rioting by disaffected youth, who claim that 
the Netherlands has always let them down.
25
Compared with the Indisch and Moluccan communities, Surinamese in the 
Netherlands have had a longer and, on the surface, more successful history 
of political activism. Writer and politician Albert Helman published the 
melancholic Zuid­Zuid­West (South-Southwest) in 1926 in the Netherlands, 
with its biting Multatulian epilogue, in which he declared that the Nether-
lands was responsible for the ‘whithering’ of his homeland. While Helman 
requested greater national engagement, Anton de Kom – not much later – 
formulated the demand for independence. This desire was picked up by stu-
dents of Wie Eegie Sanie in the 1950s and was brought to fulfilment, in part by 
them, in 1975.
26Demonstration for the independence of Suriname, Amsterdam, 1971. In these years, 
demonstrations in favour of independence took place on a fairly regular basis, often 
with strongly-worded slogans. Most photos from the time show Afro-Surinamese and 
indigenous Dutch, rarely Indian or Javanese Surinamese. This is not surprising. The 
majority of the 30,000 Surinamese who lived in the Netherlands around 1970 were 
Creole; moreover, the pursuit of independence fell on sympathetic ears mainly in 
Afro-Surinamese circles. (collection international institute for social 
history)
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However, a paradoxical development occurred at this point. The success 
of the nationalists led indirectly and unintentionally to the exodus to the 
Netherlands. The Surinamese who went to the Netherlands after 1970, not 
only distanced themselves from their country in so doing, but also, silently, 
from the dreams of the nationalist generation. This was complained about 
in Suriname. A few years later Surinamese prime minister Henck Arron 
himself – who had addressed several thousands of compatriots in Amster-
dam in 1974, ‘You do not belong here! You belong in Suriname!’ – in an un-
guarded moment let slip that his country could survive without the ‘schor­
riemorrie’, or riffraff who had taken shelter in the mother country. Opposition 
leader Lachmon, too, spoke frankly of the gulf created by choosing one citi-
zenship or the other.
27
Among Surinamese in the Netherlands – and somewhat more in Afro-
Surinamese periodicals like Famiri than in Indian Surinamese ones, such as 
Aisa Samachar – lip service was initially paid to the doctrine of remigration, 
much to the irritation of the Dutch government who wanted to follow a pol-
icy of integration. Surinamese questioning the illusion of return were often 
treated to furious and, in retrospect, naive reactions.
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immediately following the military coup, optimism about the republic and 
remigration dwindled completely. Migration became primarily a one-way 
affair, but the nostalgia remained.
Although there were demonstrations in the Netherlands in favour of in-
dependence, the influence of Surinamese in the Netherlands on the actual 
negotiations was negligible.
29 It was not until 1980 that the Surinamese com-
munity began to become more politically active. The military coup in 1980, 
the ‘December Murders’, or brutal execution of fifteen political opponents 
in 1982, the guerrilla war, with the absolute trough of the massacre at the 
Maroon village Moiwana in 1986, and the fragility of the subsequent democ-
ratization process in Suriname brought an end to the many illusions about 
switie Sranan (Sweet Suriname) and remigration. Key Surinamese-Dutch 
figures and organizations attempted to influence Dutch government policy. 
This took place in part behind the scenes, which, for instance, benefitted 
opponents of the military regime by securing a relatively generous admit-
tance policy. At the same time a small number of radical left-wing (former) 
students remigrated to lend their support to the ‘revo’.
Most Surinamese organizations were dedicated to democratization and 
were therefore opposed to the military regime. This is all the more logical in 
view of the fact that the Netherlands admitted many prominent opponents 
of the military regime after 1980.
30 That the prosecution for the December 
Murders has continued to be higher up the agenda than the horrors of Moi-
wana reflects the ‘urban’ character of the Surinamese resistance in the Neth-
erlands, in which Maroons were barely represented. Surinamese lobbyists 
had little difficulty in persuading Dutch politicians, who at this time were 
still strongly and often paternalistically engaged with Suriname, to sup-
port them. Their dilemma about devoting themselves to prompting Dutch 
action was that it inevitably brought a degree of loss-of-face. In the period 
when democracy was restored between 1985 and the early 1990s, Dutch as-
sistance was explicitly welcomed by the old parties; thereafter sensitivities 
about sovereignty and interference began to play a significant role once 
again.
31
Insofar as the Surinamese community in the Netherlands has lobbied for 
political goals in Suriname since then, their aims have been more specific, 
for instance the prosecution of military leader Desi Bouterse and company, 
the restoration or continuation of the development aid relationship, or cul-
tural cooperation. The aim was to maintain a ‘special’ relationship, with the 
underlying view that Suriname could not manage without the Netherlands. 
However, the turnout for political gatherings declined after the restoration 
of democracy (1987-1990).
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the political generations in The Hague, the Netherlands shifted towards 
more businesslike relations, while Paramaribo aimed to avoid any sugges-
tion that it was paying too much attention to what was going on in the Neth-
erlands. The recent election of Bouterse as president, in spite of his violent 
putschist past and his conviction in absentia in the Netherlands for drugs 
trafficking, has only widened the gap.
While The Hague took the route of pragmatism and thereby detachment, 
around 2000 the big cities entered into direct cooperative relations with 
Paramaribo, often to the displeasure of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Thus municipal authorities in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague were 
able to demonstrate their engagement – with Suriname, but also with the 
Surinamese-Dutch electorate. Politicians and civil servants of Surinamese 
origin often played a leading role in this; their political hue in the Nether-
lands seems to have been less relevant.
33
The outcome is that Surinamese organizations and politicians in the 
Netherlands have come to focus more on the Netherlands, from issues of 
representation and antiracism to the struggle for the acknowledgement of a 
shared past. Fewer and fewer Surinamese organizations focus primarily on 
projects in Suriname; this number fell drastically in Amsterdam between 
1970 and 2000.
34 Even solidarity shaped by shared ideals came under pres-
sure. Where independence was celebrated between 1975 and 1990 by 10,000 or 
more Surinamese Dutch, this declined thereafter, in part due to decreased 
funding, until the celebrations quietly became marginal.
35
At the same time, and doubtlessly also in response to diminishing en-
gagement, a greater detachment began to take shape on the part of Surina-
me. Surinamese Dutch were no longer referred to as ‘riffraff’ or ‘traitors’. 
These emotional descriptions were part of the initial phase of painful sepa-
ration. Since the 1990s, Suriname has been far more pragmatic and held few 
illusions about the political significance of the former compatriots. It has 
therefore also been more critical: clamourous or prying armchair politi-
cians from the Netherlands were not appreciated in Paramaribo. Former Su-
rinamese Prime Minister, Jules Sedney, appositely summed up this feeling 
some years ago as, ‘He who wants to sit at table should at least be prepared to 
stand in the kitchen. Affinity has to be proven.’ 
36 Surinamese political par-
ties have traditionally had branches in the Netherlands. How much influ-
ence they had in the past can no longer be confirmed, but their current sig-
nificance is not rated highly in Suriname. They generate a bit of money for 
the parent party’s coffers, it is said, and major donors in the Netherlands 
deliver a degree of symbolic status and perhaps some material benefits, dur-
ing visits, but no more. Conversely, the era in which the major Dutch parties Antilleans demonstrating in The Hague, 1 June, 1969. Two days earlier, on 30 May, a 
labour dispute had erupted into a small, politically motivated revolt against the local 
administrative and economic leaders. Large areas of Willemstad’s city centre went up  
in flames. The Dutch army restored order by force of arms – pictures of this seemingly 
colonial intervention were dispatched around the world. This episode led to a rapid 
change of direction in The Hague towards independence for Suriname and the Antilles. 
Many demonstrations would have supported this aim, but ultimately Curaçao and the 
other islands continued, successfully, to resist independence.  (collection kitlv/
royal netherlands institute of southeast asian and caribbean studies 
at leiden)
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had separate committees for Surinamese issues (sometimes combined with 
the Antilles) and maintained contacts with the sister parties across the 
ocean, is long gone.
There has to be some doubt about whether the few who have remigrated 
really form a long-term bridge between the two countries. Surinamese 
Dutch who remigrated, or temporarily returned for work, often met igno-
rance and opposition. The resulting frustration has been consistently ex-
pressed since the 1970s. Authorities in Paramaribo are clear. Remigration is 
not an issue in contemporary Surinamese politics; almost no one in Suri-transnationalism: a turning tide? 181
name expects productive and enterprising Surinamese Dutch to remigrate 
on any significant scale. Some may regret this, but it is accepted. Anyone 
who does return, in most cases for a short time and under good conditions, 
must be sure to avoid any hint of paternalism. Black Dutch too have to prove 
themselves.
There is little evidence of an Antillean political transnationalism. There is 
no pre-war tradition; the few Antilleans who did spend any amount of time 
in the Netherlands as a rule belonged to the local elite and kept their dis-
tance from political issues, with the exception of those who were members 
of the resistance and were killed during the German occupation of the Neth-
erlands, such as George Maduro and Boy Ecury. After the war, at the time 
that Ons Suriname and Wie Eegie Sanie began to propagate nationalist senti-
ments, the Antilles remained quiet. It was not until the 1960s that this began 
to change. Various prominent figures and sympathizers of the Curaçao up-
rising on 30 May, 1969, developed critical opinions of neocolonialism, rac-
ism and the local elite as students in the Netherlands. On the other hand, 
support for the short-lived Curaçaoan revolt was immediately signalled by 
demonstrations in The Hague. The magazine Kontakto Antiyano, for which 
the acclaimed Curaçaoan novelist Frank Martinus Arion wrote, declared it-
self in favour of independence.
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The uprising had paradoxical political consequences. The Netherlands 
was shocked to be reminded of the apparently still acute responsibilities it 
had for the other parts of the kingdom and turned, almost from one day to 
the next, to a radical policy of decolonization. Suriname went along with 
this and became independent in 1975, but the Antilles resolutely rejected the 
‘gift’ of independence. Insofar as there had been any anti-colonialism at all 
in the Antilles, it soon fell silent, both on the islands and in the Netherlands. 
The political struggle of the Antilles has ever since revolved around the right 
to remain within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the right to break up the 
six islands, the right to maximum autonomy, and the right to unhindered 
access to the Netherlands. On the first two fronts, The Hague would ulti-
mately give up its own policy – the independence of the Antilles as a unit of 
six islands. In 2010, the former six-island non-sovereign country of the Neth-
erlands Antilles was subdivided into three countries (Aruba, since 1986; Cu-
raçao; and St Maarten), while the three remaining islands have attained a 
semi-municipal status within the Netherlands; all six refused to consider 
independence. Meanwhile the constant bickering over the limits of autono-
my has continued. Much has been said on the subject of restricting Antille-
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in The Hague and over the past decade openly in parliament, often using 
harsh words – but this has not so far lead to restrictive legislation.
What is striking about these political trajectories is not only the absence 
of serious political mobilization among Antilleans in the Netherlands, but 
also the apparent lack of a need to do so. Considering the structure of politi-
cal relations, this should not come as a surprise. By virtue of the Charter of 
the Kingdom, the Dutch government has to do business with the overseas 
national government(s). The formal negotiating position of these bodies 
used to be strong, so there was generally little need to make Antillean politi-
cal wishes heard separately in the Netherlands as well. Conversely, there was 
little desire on the part of the Antillean community in the Netherlands to 
distance themselves from the standpoints being articulated on the islands. 
Radical anti-colonialism, or open criticism of Antillean politics, were rarely 
articulated in the Netherlands; political engagement among Antilleans is 
limited anyway.
38
However, the Netherlands did provide a new platform for Antillean poli-
tics in one respect, namely, to emphasize the individual characters of the 
different islands. An Aruba Day has been celebrated in the Netherlands ev-
ery year since 1976. This is not just a social event, it was also explicitly part of 
the struggle for a status aparte, separate status, for the island. Once this ideal 
was achieved in 1986, this annual day of celebration became a way of keeping 
the Aruban community on the Netherlands involved with the island. Bo-
naire, Curacao, and the Windward Islands soon followed. Such festivals pre-
sented an opportunity to experience the ‘island feeling’, but also offered a 
platform for setting them apart from the fiction of a united nation of ‘the 
Antilles’ always dominated by Curaçao.
In other respects, political transnationalism remained limited to a few 
moderate initiatives, in which Antillean and prominent Dutch figures po-
litely supported Antillean interests. Examples are the informal advisory 
committee supported in the 1990s by Minister Plenipotentiary ‘Papi’ Jesu-
run, the Stichting Vriendschap voor de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba, the 
Stichting ABC Advies and the Comité 2004 chaired by member of the Royal 
House Pieter van Vollenhoven; bodies with a certain amount of prestige, in-
tellectual capacity, and access to The Hague elite, but without the need or 
scope to adopt radical positions. The same applies to the now defunct Antil-
les commissions of the political parties: consultation and thinking togeth-
er, not confrontation, was the motto.
Organizations like the Antilliaans Netwerk (2000), the ocan mentioned ear-
lier, and maapp created a more distinctly ‘Antillean’ profile for themselves, Whereas The Hague had set course for the speedy independence of the six islands of  
the Netherlands Antilles after 1970, the aim of the islands was precisely the opposite:  
to remain part of the Netherlands. Support for separatism from the other islands grew 
and tied down the Dutch government. Aruba served as crowbar and gained status aparte, 
separate status, as a new country within the kingdom. Years of demonstrations and 
negotiations had preceded this. The small Aruban community in the Netherlands did 
not allow itself to be ignored, as can be seen from this demonstration at Schiphol in 
 1977. The demonstrators are welcoming the champion of separate status, Betico Croes, 
on his way to The Hague to put his case to the government.  (collection national 
archive)
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but their influence on kingdom relations was very limited – administrators 
on the islands at times let it be known that they did not appreciate receiving 
unsolicited advice about their political activities from these ‘Dutch’ groups. 
However, there is one area in which the Antillean parties on both side of the 
ocean have found themselves joining forces: to resist any change to Antil-
leans’ right to unhindered access to Dutch residency and to fight the sepa-
rate registration of Antillean migrants. Here too The Hague was forced to 
withdraw its intended change of course – in response to Antillean pressure 
on both sides of the Atlantic, but also to serious criticism by Dutch institu-
tions on the legal and ethical flaws of restrictive legislation.
It all remained at the level of polite string-pulling and only a radical 
change in direction of Dutch politics will change this. The balance is clear. 184 postcolonial netherlands
The consistent and successful Antillean rejection of independence was not 
a consequence of political agitation in the Netherlands; it did contribute to 
the transnationalization of the Antillean population; and this last develop-
ment more or less obstructs the route to any future transfer of sovereignty. 
The Antilles are not unique in this: the relation between France and its Ca-
ribbean départements is comparable in terms of migration, as is the relation-
ship between the usa and Puerto Rico. The same tensions arise in these 
cases: a resentment towards the metropole that cannot be translated into a 
meaningful struggle for independence; local aversion to migrants interfer-
ing in island politics; united resistance to any hint of limiting migration; 
and numerous latent doubts about how long the migrants and their (grand)
children may continue to be regarded as members of the imagined commu-
nity whose roots are on the islands.
CulTural TransnaTIonalIsm, ‘dIaspora’ and CommunITy
Transnationalism stems from a solidarity between migrants and those who 
stayed behind. Emotions around a divided identity loom large. There is little 
that can be taken for granted when it comes to the notion of identity, and 
postcolonial migrants are not an exception to this rule. What is certain is 
that an awareness of a divided identity does not necessarily or primarily 
need to be linked to a relationship between two countries. Turkish and Mo-
roccan migrants settle in many countries; they are able to identify with 
their country of origin, but also with compatriots in the host country and/
or other European countries, with other citizens of their host country, with 
others of the same religious persuasion all around the world, or they com-
bine several of these identities at the same time. When the term diaspora is 
used, it refers not only to a long-term, perhaps permanent state of ‘being 
away from home’, but also to dispersion across many lands – the Jewish Di-
aspora being the original model.
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The latter does not apply to the postcolonial communities in the Nether-
lands. The vast majority of migrants from the Dutch East Indies, Suriname, 
and the Antilles settled exclusively in the former metropole. Their cultural 
and/or political identity was already strongly linked to the Netherlands. 
Questions of identity and identification now acquired an even stronger bi-
lateral character: how did they then relate themselves to Dutch culture? The 
only groups that showed themselves to be in any way linked to a broader di-
aspora were the Chinese migrants from the colonies and the Surinamese of 
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The Indisch Dutch left a country that rapidly and successfully erased al-
most all cultural traces of Dutch colonialism, with the exception of what is 
still a considerable Christian community. ‘Europeans’ in the East Indies, 
once they had made the journey to the Netherlands, discovered that they 
were not nearly as Dutch as they may once have thought. While they con-
quered a cultural space for themselves in the host country, they lost the con-
nection to modern Indonesian culture. Interest in the republic remained, 
but the distance grew. There is no longer a cultural ‘homeland’ and neither 
does the Indisch community exercise any significant influence on Indone-
sian culture. It is doubtful whether the work of Tjalie Robinson will really 
serve as a ‘blueprint for transnational [Indisch] identity’ for later genera-
tions, as Wim Willems suggests.
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When they arrived in the Netherlands, the Moluccans were culturally far 
less European, which enabled them to hold on to the cultural links with 
their islands of origin. In retrospect, cultural transnationalism does not ap-
ply here: there never was any reciprocal cultural influence – in general terms 
Moluccan transnationalism is more unilateral than is the case for Suriname 
or the Antilles.
41 But from the perspective of the Moluccans in the Nether-
lands, the cultural gulf between the successive generations also became 
wider – because the Moluccans became more firmly integrated into Indone-
sia, but, above all, because the Moluccan Dutch became more Dutch.
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The Surinamese community in the Netherlands seems not only to have 
become more Dutch over the last few decades, but also more explicitly eth-
nic, more Afro-Surinamese, Hindustani or Javanese – and thereby less ‘na-
tional’ than in the country of origin. In Suriname, under the motto ‘unity in 
diversity’, all were supposed to live up to the ideal of building a nation; in the 
Netherlands the various groups increasingly went their own way. The name 
‘Surinamese’ became narrowed down to apply to the Afro-Surinamese – a 
step back in time. The surprising gesture by the black players in the junior 
Dutch football team in 2007, who on winning the European football cham-
pionships did a lap of honour carrying the Surinamese flag, was promptly 
welcomed or condemned as ‘proof’ of continuing solidarity with the land of 
their parents. But regardless of what the true meaning of such a symbolic 
claim to an identity might be, this display of the flag propagated ‘Surinam-
ese’ as primarily belonging to Creole Dutch.
This return to colonial modes of ethnic pillars (verzuiling) became appar-
ent in ethnic organizations and in the handling of cultural heritage, first 
and foremost advocated in the Hindustani Surinamese press.
43 Inherent to 
this was a strong contrast between external orientations. The history of the 
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the Netherlands too, such pioneers as Anton de Kom and Wie Eegie Sanie ex-
hibited an orientation towards the Black Atlantic, long before the phrase 
had been coined. However, this African orientation has remained diffuse 
among Creole Surinamese. There is no demonstrable country of origin and, 
moreover, events on that continent for many years gave little cause for pride.
This contrasts strongly with the spectacular surge in enthusiasm for In-
dia and Indian culture among the Hindustani Surinamese, from classical 
culture to contemporary Bollywood. Looking back, hints of this could al-
ready be found in the way in which Hindustani Surinamese organizations 
focused on religion and culture from their inception, just as they had in Su-
riname. In the Netherlands, Hindustani Surinamese began more distinctly 
to form part of a wider diaspora, which linked them to ‘overseas Indians’ in 
numerous countries around the world and, for the majority, with Hindu-
ism. Where the first generation was initially focused predominantly on Su-
riname and only in a spiritual sense on India, for subsequent generations 
the sense of a diaspora seems to have become more important. It cannot be 
presumed that Suriname will remain the main focus of their attention in 
future.
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A similar development is conceivable for the Muslim Hindustani Suri-
namese minority and for the Javanese Surinamese. They were initially pre-
dominantly identified as Surinamese, later predominantly as Muslims. 
They too organized themselves along religious lines as soon as they arrived 
in the Netherlands, but within their own (linguistic) community and did 
not join up with other Muslims from Turkey or Morocco. Yet in both groups 
there seems to be evidence of a slight increase in curiosity for the country of 
origin, in part fed by a degree of interest from India and Indonesia. Even so, 
integration in the Netherlands and an orientation towards a world religion 
will have a greater impact on them in the long-term than the Surinamese 
intermezzo or their ancestors’ country of origin. Consequently, Surinamese 
Muslims have become active in umbrella organizations where, thanks to 
the postcolonial language bonus, they are often able to serve as mediators. 
Once again the conclusion that thrusts itself forward is that an overarching 
‘Surinamese’ identity in the Netherlands – which sixty-five years ago was 
obviously and almost exclusively Creole, thirty years ago still evidently so, 
but with broader ethnic overtones – will lose its significance within a few 
generations.
The colonial construction of the six islands of the Netherlands Antilles 
never gave rise to a strong sense of nationhood. It is therefore unsurprising 
that Antilleans in the Netherlands also mainly identify with their own is-
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lands closer together as only they speak Papiamentu (or, in the case of Aru-
ba, the slightly different variant of Papiamento). But within one, or at most 
two generations, Antillean Dutch will have to answer the classic question: 
what is the price they are willing to pay to hold on to a dysfunctional lan-
guage in a new society – the question also arises in a less extreme form on the 
islands themselves. What is striking, though not surprising considering 
the central position language occupies in the Antillean identity, is that the 
dilemma is so little discussed by Antilleans in the Netherlands. For the time 
being, Antillean transnationalism, in its more recent manifestation – con-
tinuing two-way traffic, and the language factor – is strong at an individual 
level, but already becoming comparatively weak in the fields of organiza-
tions and political engagement.
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For all other groups of postcolonial migrants, transnationalism appears 
to wane or, in the case of the Indisch Dutch, to disappear almost entirely. 
This is unsurprising in light of the lessons of migration history – rather it is 
extraordinary that Moluccan transnational engagement, despite the lack of 
realistic political prospects or remigration, has remained so strong for so 
long.
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Transnationalism not only binds migrants to the country of origin and 
vice versa, it also connects – harmoniously or otherwise – migrants, their 
families, networks, and organizations: after all, they share an interest in, 
concern about, and identifications with the country of origin. The weaken-
ing of transnationalism, therefore, also implies a vanishing sense of com-
munity among postcolonial migrants in the Netherlands. In this sense, the 
persistence of Moluccan (trans)nationalism, which not infrequently was 
enforced by the Moluccan community, is also understood as a means that 
was deployed – deliberately or otherwise – to keep Moluccans in the Nether-
lands together as a community. This worked for a long time, but even this 





The Dutch experience of postcolonial migrations was not unique. A number 
of other countries found themselves confronting migration flows from 
their former colonies at the end of the Second World War. In Europe this 
particularly applied to the United Kingdom, France and, somewhat later, 
Portugal. Mass migration unexpectedly brought these countries – and the 
Netherlands – face to face with their colonial histories, with the issue of in-
tegration, and the position of colonialism and postcolonial migration in the 
nation’s imagination. There was more room for the latter in the British and 
Dutch model of moderate multiculturalism than there was in France and 
Portugal.
Postcolonial migrations were part of a far broader migration process 
which dramatically changed the face of post-war Europe. It also brought Is-
lam to Western Europe on an hitherto unprecedented scale. In France, a 
large proportion of the postcolonial migrants were Muslim, which was not 
the case in Portugal or the Netherlands; the United Kingdom occupied the 
middle ground in this respect. This was to give rise to remarkable differ-
ences in the debates about integration and postcolonial nationhood.
A comparison between the Dutch experience and the experiences of the 
United Kingdom, France, and Portugal lies at the heart of this chapter. A 
number of other countries are also discussed, particularly former European 
colonial powers which were not confronted with postcolonial migrations. 
The question is whether these countries, unhampered by a postcolonial 
lobby, developed different views on colonialism.
The phenomenon of postcolonial migration to the former metropole is 
not limited to the old Europe. The United States, as well as Japan and Russia, 
received millions of post-war repatriates who were mainly migrants from 
their former colonies. In the case of the United States there are many paral-
lels with Europe, both in issues surrounding integration and in debates 
about colonialism and postcolonial relations. It seems typical of a complete-an international perspective 189
ly different approach to history that such debates were virtually absent in 
Japan and Russia.
1
mIgraTIons In posT-war europe
Viewed from the perspective of 1945, the post-war changes Europe was to 
undergo were almost inconceivable. The war had cost the lives of millions, 
among whom six million murdered Jews. The devastation was immense in 
other respects as well. Europe was destitute and disillusioned.
Migration was one response to this situation. Millions of people migrat-
ed from Western and Southern Europe to distant continents. Millions from 
Eastern Europe, while they still had a choice, chose the West in preference to 
the newly developing Eastern Bloc. Millions of Volksdeutsche (Germans liv-
ing abroad), fleeing or having been expelled from Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, moved to West Germany. Migrants sought refuge across the 
borders; borders were repositioned over the heads of local populations. 
Shortly after the war, European states were ethnically more uniform than 
they had been for centuries. Furthermore, until 1989, the new map of the 
continent was marked by a deep and apparently stable political divide.
In less than two decades, most West-European colonial empires col-
lapsed. The outcome was not the economic catastrophe gloomily predicted 
by many. Instead, Western Europe experienced three decades of spectacular 
economic growth. This miracle was in some measure possible due to the 
mass migration of low-skilled workers from Southern Europe, the former 
colonies, and Turkey and Morocco. But, by the mid 1970s economic growth 
had stagnated and the transition to a postindustrial society had begun to 
take shape. Opportunities for low-skilled labour dwindled. Western Euro-
pean countries now had a mind to curb immigration and encouraged labour 
migrants to return to their countries of origin. The opposite occurred. The 
reuniting of families and chain migration to all Western European welfare 
states led to a sharp increase in ‘non-Western’ populations, which further 
expanded with the immigration of political and economic refugees from 
sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.
The unintended and undesired creation of multicultural societies in the 
western part of Europe from the 1970s on, from Sweden to Spain, became the 
subject of increasingly anxious debates. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
opening up of the Eastern Bloc not only meant political upheaval, it also set 
in motion a new, now westward, wave of migration. Consequently, the pop-
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Europe attracted almost no migrants and remained ethnically relatively ho-
mogeneous, or at least quiet – former Yugoslavia being the shocking excep-
tion here.
Much has been said about ‘traumatic’ events in recent European history. 
Notwithstanding the sometimes absurd inflation of this concept, it is clear 
that the traumas suffered and kept alive were not the same for the whole 
continent. Almost all of Europe had been involved in the war. Bitterness and 
sorrow abounded everywhere. Humiliation was a common feature of the 
memory, except in the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Shame – 
about crimes committed, collaboration, ‘looking the other way’ – were only 
addressed later, that is, in the West.
In part as a consequence of the war, Western European states lost their 
colonial empires. This was indeed experienced as a ‘loss’ and often described 
in terms of trauma. With the exception of Russia, Eastern Europe had no 
colonial history. Contrastingly, Eastern European countries did have a his-
tory of being ‘colonized’ – by the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires, and then 
by the Nazis and the Soviet Union. In the Soviet era, the memory of the war 
and the Holocaust was narrowed down to a comprehensive narrative in 
which communism had conquered the fascist excesses of capitalism. Only 
after 1989 did it become apparent that the ‘new’ Europe above all had to deal 
with what was broadly experienced as forty-five years of oppression by the 
Soviet Union. Eastern Europeans saw themselves as victims; there was little 
room for critical reflection on anti-Semitism, let alone the treatment of such 
minorities as the Roma. Later accusations of collaboration referred sooner 
to collaboration with the Soviet Union than the Nazis.
European memory accordingly remained completely asymmetrical, as 
has been convincingly argued by historian Tony Judt in Postwar, in the sense 
of there being sharply contrasting views of European history. But the ways 
in which migration from outside Europe and ethnic differences are viewed 
also turned out to vary enormously. If postcolonial immigration was met 
with great scepticism in Western Europe, in Eastern European countries 
there is little knowledge and even less affinity with the history that preceded 
it – and therefore, it seems, little sympathy for the logic of postcolonial mi-
grant communities in Western Europe. How this tension will be resolved is 
unclear. The outcome will be decisive in relation to the question of whether 
modern Europe, in the spirit of Judt, can really be, or become, an example for 
the world at large.
2
The former colonial metropoles lay to the west of the Berlin Wall. After 
the Second World War, four countries received considerable numbers of mi-
grants from their former colonies – if we limit ourselves to the migration an international perspective 191
flow directly linked to the decolonization process, this amounted to be-
tween five and six million people.
3 Two of these countries – France and the 
United Kingdom – had a serious labour shortage immediately after the war 
and welcomed these migrants. The Netherlands began recruiting labour in 
the 1960s, but almost none from its colonies. Portugal was traditionally an 
exporter of labour; its late decolonization process did not lead to immigra-
tion until the 1970s. Hence, the context of postcolonial migrations varied 
enormously. This is also true of the histories that preceded them: the pres-
ence in France and the United Kingdom of migrants from the colonies had 
always been more significant. Moreover, the French and British had both 
made extensive use of colonial troops in both World Wars.
Postcolonial migration is not the same as labour migration and the de-
gree to which both kinds overlap varies considerably from country to coun-
try. This is also true of other potential overlaps. The Western-European mi-
norities debate has increasingly become a debate about Islam. This may be 
one-sided and nonsensical, but it is a fact. From this perspective, it is rele-
vant to note that the vast majority of postcolonial migrants in France were 
Muslim, while this overlap is small in the Netherlands and negligible in Por-
tugal; the number of Muslims among British postcolonial migrants lies be-
tween these two extremes.
A close look at the sending countries also reveals a highly varied picture. 
Most Southern European migrants have settled in France. The former 
French, part colonial, part informal empire in the Maghrib generated not 
only a large number of migrants to France, but also to other European coun-
tries. From Turkey, which had no European colonial history, migrants 
spread to almost all Western European countries. Migrants from the French 
and Dutch Caribbean migrated almost exclusively to their own metropoles. 
The largest proportion of migrants from the British West Indies, however, 
has settled in the United States, rather than the United Kingdom. The de-
colonization of Asia and the Middle East generated a relatively modest 
stream of migrants, with the exception of the Dutch East Indies and British 
India. The migration most directly linked to the decolonization of sub-Sa-
haran Africa headed for Portugal, Belgium, and the United Kingdom; in the 
case of the latter, the migrants were mostly ‘twice migrants’, ethnic Indians 
who had settled in Africa. Alongside Africa and Asia, Eastern Europe has 
also become a major supplier of labour over the last two decades. Many of 
these migrants will no doubt eventually become Western Europe citizens 
too.
Europe’s history of post-war migration therefore generates a mosaic that 
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countries – France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Portugal – 
which faced large-scale postcolonial migration, within which a distinction 
can be made between European ‘repatriates’ and former colonial subjects.
4 
By way of throwing the Dutch context into relief, the following paragraphs 
sketch the migration histories of these three countries and their relation-
ships with decolonization, their societies’ reactions to it, and the place of 
colonial history in the debates about national identity.
franCe: republICan dIlemmas
Unlike most countries on the European mainland, France became a land of 
immigration as early as the late nineteenth century.
5 Successive govern-
ments and political majorities explicitly encouraged this immigration. 
Natural population growth was low, especially compared with its great rival 
Germany, which put France at an economic and military disadvantage. Im-
migration could compensate for this. Migrants had to become French citi-
zens as quickly as possible, for this to work, which initially meant they had 
to make the French language and culture, including republican values, their 
own. Immigrants consequently became part of a far larger project to turn all 
the inhabitants of the highly divided ‘hexagon’ into French citizens. But this 
was still a long way off. On the eve of the First World War, half of the citizens 
of France spoke poor French, if any at all.
The migrants initially came from Belgium and Italy, later Poland and 
Spain and, after the Second World War, mainly Portugal. There were violent 
incidents of local resistance to the newcomers. Generally speaking, howev-
er, the settling and assimilation of these immigrants passed off relatively 
smoothly. The process was retrospectively labelled a success story; le creuset 
français – the European version of the (supposed) American melting pot. The 
explanations are obvious. On the whole there were enough jobs and if there 
were not, the migrants moved on; the immigrants had no social or political 
rights that put them in a position to negotiate as a separate group; there was 
no strong ethnic or cultural difference between the immigrants and the 
French ‘norm’, which was itself in rapid development.
The French political, intellectual, and academic elites of the republic 
long regarded le creuset français as the most relevant national narrative of 
migration and assimilation. France supposedly welcomed immigrants, as 
long as they were willing to convert to republican values and norms. The 
immigrants were thus guided in the same direction as the inhabitants of 
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cess were the strictly centralized education system and a solemn, at times 
quasi-religious glorification of the magnificence of the republic. After all, it 
had given the world the ideals of liberté, equalité, fraternité and could, there-
fore, claim the moral high ground. Thus, President Charles de Gaulle was 
able to speak gladly of a pact between the magnificence of France and the 
freedom of the entire world.
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There are other, very different stories to be told of this enlightened state, 
especially if we take the colonial dimension into account. Long before the 
French Revolution, France had already established a number of colonies. 
The opportunity to allow the new ideals to take root overseas during the 
revolutionary period was deliberately repulsed. For a moment, France was 
the first country to abolish African slavery in the New World, but this revo-
lutionary decision was not implemented and Napoleon revoked it. French 
colonialism made a second start after 1830, first in the Maghrib and South-
East Asia, later in sub-Saharan Africa. Colonization was in many cases ac-
companied by bloody wars and oppression. Later in the nineteenth century 
a new, noble ideal was brought to bear, broadly supported by the republican 
elite: French colonialism had a mission civilisatrice, a civilizing mission. 
How fortunate the colonized peoples who were touched by the civilizing of-
fensive of the superior French culture!
Even if the link with exemplary republican ideals was unique, the idea of 
a civilizing offensive was not exceptional. The British spoke of ‘the white 
man’s burden’, the Dutch, somewhat later, referred to a ‘debt of honour’ and 
the resulting task of ‘ethical politics’; other countries employed similar ar-
guments. Meanwhile, this colonial discourse above all served to justify a 
policy in which the international power positions, prestige, and wealth of 
the colonial powers took priority. Britain and France would also make exten-
sive use of colonial troops during both World Wars. France was unique in the 
sense that it also regarded its colonies as a source of labour for the metropole 
itself. Hence, shortly after the slaughter of the First World War, several hun-
dreds of thousands of workers from North Africa and Indo-China were 
brought to France – always explicitly on a temporary basis and as second 
choice after Europeans.
After the Second World War the French authorities opted for a strict im-
migration policy. Immediately after the war there were extensive discus-
sions about whether migration from outside Europe, primarily from the 
French colonial world, was acceptable. There was widespread agreement 
that European immigration was infinitely preferable. However, the argu-
ment that non-Europeans would be insufficiently able to adapt was eventu-
ally swept from the table: it was felt that the nation’s institutions were ro-194 postcolonial netherlands
bust enough to sustain the French integration model. The argument was 
also a pragmatic one: they had little choice, because the flow of Europeans 
would never be large enough.
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Thus, concern about migrants from the (former) colonies would domi-
nate immigration and next the French migration debate. In the first three 
decades after the war (les trentes glorieuses) the French economy expanded 
enormously and there was an almost constant demand for more labour. 
There was still labour migration from within Europe, now primarily from 
Portugal, but its relative significance declined. Demand was largely met by 
spontaneous migration from French Algeria and the former Maghrib pro-
tectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, as well as state-organized migration 
from the French Caribbean provinces of Guadeloupe and Martinique. The 
bloody war of decolonization in Algeria, which ended in 1962, also led to the 
‘repatriation’ of a million French citizens (pieds noirs) who had settled there 
and more than 100,000 harkis, colonial troops and their families, who were 
predominantly Muslims. The history of the pieds noirs is reminiscent of 
that of the Indisch Dutch, while the history of the harkis resembles that of 
the Moluccans.
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As long as the economy grew, migrant labourers had enough work and 
did not leave much of an imprint on society, either demographically or cul-
turally, this (post)colonial migration passed off relatively peacefully. All 
this changed in the mid 1970s. Economic crisis and restructuring led to a 
drastic rise in unemployment, which in turn led to laws aimed at curbing 
immigration. In the circle around President Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, mi-
grants from the Maghrib were now referred to in candidly xenophobic 
terms.
9 Restrictive legislation was ineffective and even had the opposite ef-
fect: migrants who had already settled stayed and now also brought over 
their families. In the decades that followed, France, now a welfare state, ex-
perienced a strong influx of asylum seekers and economic refugees from Af-
rica, Asia, and Eastern Europe, a number of whom never acquired legal sta-
tus. Meanwhile, a second and then third generation of ‘migrants’ was 
growing up who were legally and, in part, culturally French, but who fell 
socio-economically way below the French average. A disproportionate 
number was living in the worst parts of the banlieues, suburbs, of the big cit-
ies, especially Paris, Marseille and Lyon.
Where the 1980s and ‘90s saw tentative experiments in a previously in-
conceivable broadening of the meaning of citizenship (le droit à la différence), 
by 2000 this debate had already become less relaxed. On the one hand there 
was severe criticism of the alleged unwillingness of the Maghrib communi-
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Islam and colonial history for the nation; the primacy of the secular state 
remained intact, but the debate inevitably marred the lofty image of gran-
deur and the colonial mission civilisatrice.
Then there were the massive riots in the autumn of 2005, which gave rise 
to fierce debates. Had the French model failed? Were non-Western migrants 
really willing and capable of fully integrating? What role does Islam play in 
this and how does it relate to laïcité, laicization, a principle that was only 
made law in 1907, but which derives from a 1789 revolutionary principle that 
religion belongs in the private domain? Should national identity be 
strengthened, redefined? 
10 Under President Nicolas Sarkozy, himself the 
son of a migrant, assimilation continued to be the motto. In 2007, he estab-
lished a new ministry for Immigration and National Identity, with identity 
explicitly defined in the term of the classical republican tradition.
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What is striking is that participants in the debates about ‘the nation’ are 
primarily French (and white), while broader studies of background and the 
current significance of migration and ethnicity in post-war France are often 
written by Anglophone foreigners. Striking, but it would seem also typical 
of a rather introspective national elite, which for so long relied on the self-
evident superiority of the French integration machine and which was un-
able or unwilling to see the numerous other signals. This was exacerbated 
even further by the rejection of much-loathed Anglo-Saxon multicultural-
ism and objections to the identification of separate ethnic groups, let alone 
the registration of their socio-economic, cultural and other characteristics. 
After all, this does not fit the image of a nation that thinks along the lines of 
equal citizens rather than a segmented society.
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This attitude also explains why, right up to the present day, only very 
rough and contradictory estimates exist of the numbers of first, second and 
third generation non-Western ‘migrants’ in France – more than five million 
French citizens among a total of sixty-four million, most originating from 
the Maghrib, others from the French Antilles (around 500,000) and French 
Indo-China (100,000 – 150,000). Most migrants from sub-Saharan Africa 
come from the former French colonies in that region, many of whom were 
unable to acquire citizenship in the first generation. In sharp contrast to the 
Dutch situation, in France the category ‘non-Western’ overlaps almost en-
tirely with ‘postcolonial’ (the most important exception being 400,000 
Turks) and ‘Muslim’ (with the exception of the Antilleans). Both facts play a 
major part in the French debates.
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Long before the riots of 2005, the English-language literature warned of 
a dangerous geographical concentration of socio-economic deprivation, in 
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regarding discrimination and police conduct.
14 Following the 2005 riots, it 
was widely believed that it was not the background or the course of the riots 
that was new, but rather the vast scale and long duration. Most of the aca-
demic analyses did not place ‘Islam’ high on the list of causes. The profile of 
the rioters was of young, French citizens who had no issue with French cul-
ture as such; who identified themselves firstly as French, and only secondly 
as something else (and then more in terms of country of origin than reli-
gion); and who above all felt angry and aggrieved because in their experi-
ence the republic did not live up to its promises of inclusion. Furthermore, 
it has been noted that there was a complete absence of leadership or political 
articulation: the riots were in this sense literally unguided.
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Reactions from the French government were contradictory. Sarkozy, 
then still a minister, spoke in militant terms about scum who had to be 
firmly clamped down upon; while President Jacques Chirac, in a moving 
television speech, expressed sympathy for the underlying frustrations, 
thereby opening doors for a more pragmatic approach to minority issues. 
This was also because factors such as ethnicity and discrimination could 
now be named. France therefore gradually turned away from a ‘colour blind-
ness’ which had been self-inflicted in the name of lofty republican ideals. 
Even a pragmatic interpretation of the Anglo-Saxon model of multicultur-
alism could now be discussed: diversité cautiously became the motto.
This does not mean that the principles of national unity and laïcité have 
been jettisoned. On the contrary, the debates in the French media about Is-
lam and, above all, the need to exclude it as much as possible from public 
life, continue unimpeded. The outcome of the protracted ‘headscarf crisis’ 
(1999-2004) proved that France is considerably more principled than other 
European countries and consequently continues to reject more firmly the 
wearing of religious symbols in state institutions. The republic will not al-
low itself to be overruled that easily. A significant symbol of the wide range 
of interpretations of integration, even among immigrants is that the black 
headmaster who refused to allow Muslim girls wearing headscarves into 
his school is himself originally from Martinique.
16
The position of Afro-Caribbean migrants is ambivalent. Coming from 
the overseas provinces, like Antilleans in the Netherlands, they have free 
access to France. In the 1960s, Antilleans were actively recruited to ease the 
labour shortage, but also to reduce the populations on the islands. Tradi-
tionally they had a strong postcolonial bonus in the areas of language and 
religion, which translated into a relatively smooth integration process, but 
also into a tendency to feel superior to other migrants. However, the real 
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often observed that Antilleans in France suffer from racism and exclusion 
almost as much as other ‘migrants’ – which in turn has led to a stronger ten-
dency towards identity politics and a distancing from a republican ideology 
that has not lived up to its own pretensions.
17
Amidst this tense atmosphere, an even fiercer debate erupted not long 
ago on the subject of the colonial past. What is striking, from a Dutch per-
spective, is how broad these debates were and that they were held at such an 
elevated intellectual level, but also the polemical tone they set. With good 
reason people speak of a guerre de mémoires. By far the most sensitive theme 
is the Algerian bloody war of independence, which had such a traumatic 
impact that it took three decades before a public debate was possible at all.
18 
That ferocity, it would seem, not only affects France’s resentment regarding 
the darker side of its own history, it also reflects the slowly dawning, painful 
realization that the republic, internationally and morally, is no longer the 
enlightening example its elites believed it for so long to be. The aversion to 
‘identity politics’ by ethnic minorities within its own borders fits in a repub-
lican tradition which allowed little scope for difference. But it also reflects 
legitimate concerns regarding the disappearance of French identity (‘Bal-
kanization’) and the ‘tribalization’ of history.
The unITed KIngdom: brITIshness and mulTICulTuralIsm
The debate about national identity in the United Kingdom also has a long 
history, which was not initially related to either migration or Europe, but to 
the relationship between the centre and periphery of the United Kingdom 
itself: dominant England on the one hand and on the other hand Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland – and, of course, Ireland prior to its indepen-
dence.
19 This tension has never abated and has even grown over the last few 
decades, as revealed by the report Citizenship and belonging: What is British­
ness? (2005). Inhabitants of Scotland and Wales defined themselves in the 
first instance not as British, but as Scottish or Welsh. White English identi-
fied themselves as English, followed by British. Only one category of British 
citizens described themselves as being in the first instance British: ethnic 
minorities in England, who use ‘British’ as an appropriately broad term and 
associate ‘English’ with what in the Netherlands is called the autochthon 
population, and some associate Englishness with racism.
20
The United Kingdom has a long colonial history and ruled over an empire 
that was larger and mightier than any other European empire ever. The his-
tory of British immigration history stretches way back and from the begin-198 postcolonial netherlands
ning was partly linked to the colonial empire. However, up until the Second 
World War, the largest numbers of new Britons came from Ireland and con-
tinental Europe. After the war, immigration soared. This was in part a con-
sequence of the dynamic of decolonization – an estimated 300,000 to 
400,000 Britons returned to the metropole.
21 Next, the number of labour mi-
grants grew rapidly. Throughout virtually the whole of the post-war period, 
the majority of these continued to come from Ireland and continental Eu-
rope; a new development was the substantial influx of migrants from the 
(former) colonies, initially mainly from the British Caribbean, and later 
British India and Africa. Citizens of the British Commonwealth had unre-
stricted access to settle in the uk between 1948 to 1962. This permission was 
revoked in response to a surge in migration from the (former) colonies. In 
the decade that followed the law was tightened ever further, so that postco-
lonial migration henceforth became extremely difficult.
22
As on the continent, the restrictive legislation of the early 1970s coincid-
ed with the end of a long period of economic growth, rising unemployment, 
and concerns about ethnic tensions. And in the United Kingdom, immigra-
tion continued: where in the 1960s and ‘70s there was an emigration surplus, 
the immigration volume has been growing ever since.
In British statistics, as in the United States, colour and/or ethnicity have 
been documented for several decades without restraint. This was consid-
ered indispensable to the formation of an effective minorities policy.
23 In 
1959 the number of non-whites was estimated to be a few tens of thousands, 
in 2001 this was 4.5 million, around 8 per cent of the 55 million British citi-
zens.
24 Besides postcolonial migrants and the later flow of refugees and la-
bour migrants from Africa and Asia, Eastern European migration became 
more significant after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent 
expansion of the European Union; the number of migrant Poles alone is es-
timated at around a quarter of a million.
By far the majority of non-white immigrants comes from the former col-
onies. Until the 1960s these were mostly Caribbean migrants, since then 
there have been more Asians: more than two million British citizens have 
roots in the former South Asian colonies, more than half a million in the 
Caribbean. The overlap between ‘postcolonial’ and ‘Muslim’ is smaller than 
in France. More than half of the more than two million Britons of South 
Asian heritage are Muslims (mainly from Pakistan and Bangladesh), the 
rest are Hindu or Sikh (and mainly from India). The British of (Afro-)Carib-
bean descent are on the whole Christian.
25
Early on immigration gave rise to unadulterated racist reactions and race 
riots, which resulted in the Commission for Racial Equality (cre) being set an international perspective 199
up as early as 1976. The cre was charged with identifying sources of racial 
tension and advising both government and society on anti-racist policy. Its 
foundation demonstrated that the issue had been recognized and was a first 
step in the direction of a multicultural policy. The cre remain intact even 
under the long-lasting reign of the Conservative Party, first under Margaret 
Thatcher, followed by John Major. Although not endorsed by central govern-
ment, the traditionally left-wing big cities adopted a policy of multicultur-
alism, which became the norm in the 1980s. And when Tony Blair came to 
power with New Labour in 1997, a moderate multiculturalism became stan-
dard across the country.
26
This multiculturalism, inspired by the Canadian and to a lesser extent 
American models, strived for integration but either did not make cultural 
assimilation a top priority, or rejected it entirely as a concern of government 
policy. In the meantime, a growing degree of differentiation between the 
different postcolonial communities was beginning to take shape in the new 
generations. Hindus and Sikhs were socio-economically most successful, 
while Muslims from former British India were the least successful; the Ca-
ribbean British come in between.
27 Where once the terms ‘white’ and ‘black’ 
were used, today the minimal and again hopelessly inadequate differentia-
tion between ‘white, black and Asian’ is used.
28
The debate about British multiculturalism revolved not only around the 
question of the diverging socio-economic development of the different 
groups, which brought with it such issues as school dropout rates, (youth) 
unemployment, potential ghetto forming, and deviant behaviour. Ques-
tions of social cohesion, marginalization, and identification with British 
culture were also debated. The discussion intensified after 9/11 and especial-
ly after the bloody London Tube and bus bombings on 7 July, 2005. Besides a 
call for repressive, stricter immigration restrictions, the question was in-
evitably raised again about whether multiculturalism had underestimated 
the need for social cohesion – and whether integration was indeed possible 
without a certain degree of assimilation.
Among the things that emerges from these debates is that many promi-
nent participants in the debate themselves come from postcolonial back-
grounds and that they hold highly conflicting viewpoints.
29 Both these 
characteristics underscore the fact that the public debate in Britain is far 
more sophisticated than in continental Europe. Moreover, the prominent 
role played by British institutions – which still include the cre, now part of 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission – stands out, as does the fact 
that successive prime ministers have explicitly been involved in these de-
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pragmatic multiculturalism, which for many years was a complete anathe-
ma in France and surrounded by many more question marks elsewhere in 
continental Europe.
In the self-image of the United Kingdom, the colonial empire has tradi-
tionally occupied an important and positive position. After the Second 
World War this was augmented by the proud realization that it was the only 
country among the European Allies that had not been occupied and that it 
had made major sacrifices to achieve victory. This image of the war has re-
mained intact and continues to buoy up a particular British sense of pride.
30 
Conversely, the colonial past has also been subjected to highly critical as-
sessment over past decades, far more than in most former colonial metropo-
les – perhaps with the exception of the Netherlands.
That precisely British colonialism should be so thoroughly examined in 
part arises from the sheer range of the Empire and the apparently banal fact 
that it left behind English as the language of intellectual debate wherever it 
went – in the academically prominent usa, but also in India, the Caribbean, 
and so on. Also pivotal was the influence of postcolonial migrants, includ-
ing scholars from West Indian backgrounds, such as Stuart Hall and Paul 
Gilroy, who founded the British version of Postcolonial Studies. Recently, 
the extensive critiques of colonialism and its legacies led, rather predict-
ably, to an academic revisionism, which re-emphasized the positive role of 
Empire.
31
Much earlier than in France, and probably the Netherlands too, colonial 
history and postcolonial migrants were key themes in all debates about 
multiculturalism and the nation. Recent British debates about social cohe-
sion and nationality have given rise to a paradox in this respect.
32 Where the 
rediscovery of the colonial past in France led to fierce polemics, the same 
history no longer seems to play such a divisive role in the United Kingdom 
today. It appears the country has come to terms with the past: there is a rela-
tively broad acceptance that the acknowledgement of (the darker aspects of) 
colonialism is important as an inclusive gesture to contemporary citizens 
of colonial heritage. This was most strikingly illustrated by the massive and 
self-critical commemoration of the bicentenary of the abolition of the At-
lantic slave trade (1807-2007).
33
This confessional self-criticism on the part of the state clearly does not 
stand in the way of a positive approach to British heritage. Not long after his 
government had distanced itself from more radical interpretations of mul-
ticulturalism, Blair declared that the core of the national identity comprised 
certain essential values, which included ‘British heritage’ – he then added 
that this would always include room for multicultural diversity.
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less, the message was clear: in the service of social cohesion, a national iden-
tity that is rooted in the past should be talked about more often and with 
greater pride, without this leading to the exclusion of minorities.
It is ironic that Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown, was just as unable to 
define national identity more precisely than ‘that Britain has something to 
say to the rest of the world about the values of freedom, democracy and the 
dignity of the people that you stand for’.
35 This is a view that is close to the 
French self-image of being a moral compass to the world. Somewhat later, in 
the memorandum The governance of Britain (2007), the Labour government 
declared that the British self-image was far less clearly defined than the 
French one and that this was precisely why a description of national identity 
was called for. This was to be sought in history, institutions, values, and 
mentality – the parallel with the debate held in the Netherlands over the last 
few years is manifest.
36
The question in the British debates is not so much whether the high val-
ues of the colonial empire were met – there are few who would make that 
claim – but whether this colonialism is discussed openly enough today and 
whether postcolonial migrants and their children have been given equal op-
portunities. Postcolonial intellectuals like Gilroy, a severe critic of New La-
bour, believe this is absolutely not the case. However, even according to his 
own analysis, he appears to occupy a lonely position in the political and in-
tellectual debate.
37
Meanwhile, the increasing diversity between and within groups of post-
colonial and other migrants makes it ever harder to plausibly forge direct 
and generalized continuities between colonial and postcolonial experienc-
es. Spokespersons for various groups have emphasized exactly these differ-
ences – the joint ‘black’ antiracism of Asian and Caribbean Britons already 
made way for distinctions between them in the 1980s. Opposite ‘Black Brit-
ons’ – from the Caribbean or Africa – are the ‘British South Asian, or ‘BrA-
sians’ for short, but within this last category Sikhs and Hindus resist asso-
ciation with the Muslim community.
38 For the purposes of everyday policy, 
the notion ‘postcolonial’ as a description seems to be becoming ever less 
relevant – colonial background is not even discussed in the report Our shared 
future (2007) by the Commission on Integration & Cohesion.
39
porTugal: reluCTanT re-mIgranTs
After five centuries of colonialism in Asia, Africa and Brazil, by the end of 
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colonies (Angola and Mozambique) and a series of smaller colonies in Asia 
and Africa. Most Asian enclaves were taken over by India or China in the 
decades that followed. These take-overs spurred the small-scale migration 
of the Eurasian elites to Portugal, where they integrated silently. East Timor 
was occupied by Indonesia for many years (1975-1999) after its independence; 
the scale of migration to Portugal was small. The independence of Portu-
guese Africa, on the other hand (1975), led to a massive migration of more 
than half a million Portuguese retornados. The immigration of Africans 
from the former colonies – primarily Angola and the Cape Verde Islands, far 
fewer from Mozambique – occurred later and was not directly related to the 
decolonization process; this applies a fortiori for the recent growth of the 
Brazilian community. Together these groups are estimated to number less 
than 150,000. Like earlier retornados, these migrants speak Portuguese, but 
they do not immediately acquire Portuguese citizenship when they arrive. 
Over the last few years they have had to compete with a similar-sized influx 
of Eastern European migrants.
40
These successive rounds of postcolonial migrations broke with a long 
tradition in which poor Portugal had predominantly been a country of emi-
gration: initially to its own colonies in the interwar years and mainly to 
France after the war. The decolonization of 1975 was directly related to the 
Carnation Revolution (1974), which brought an end to a prolonged dictator-
ship and opened the way for modernization and accession to the European 
Union (1986). The unforeseen arrival of large numbers of retornados to the 
still poor Portugal bore many parallels with the Indisch migration to the 
Netherlands: dissatisfaction regarding their cold reception, but also rapid 
integration. Unlike the Indisch Dutch, however, the retornados were over-
whelmingly white and were not recognizable as a separate ‘ethnic’ group. 
The initial fear that they would undermine the still fragile, young democ-
racy turned out to be unfounded.
41
Portugal has now integrated into Europe and has developed strongly in 
many ways. Today there are considerable ethnic minorities in the country, 
from elsewhere in Europe and from the Maghrib. Once again the rapid emer-
gence of a multicultural society has led to debates about the position of mi-
grants and the nature of national identity. Insofar as colonial history has 
been accommodated within this, it is certainly not with the same tone of 
self-criticism – rather, it appears there is a certain nostalgia for the time 
when Portugal still belonged to the vanguard of European colonialism.
42 
Any retort from the (re-)migrant groups is limited; not least because the re­
tornados were so closely linked to colonialism, albeit in the final, already 
anachronistic phase. Again their history recalls the pieds noirs and Indisch 
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a TypICal Case: slavery In european memorIal CulTure
The combination of contrite acknowledgement and symbolic gestures not 
only typifies the Dutch attitude to slavery, but equally that of the British and 
French. The United Kingdom commemorated the bicentenary of the aboli-
tion of slavery with a deluge of memorials, exhibitions, television pro-
grammes, research projects, publications, educational projects and more.
43 
The mood was humble, very different to earlier commemorations which, 
with their emphasis on abolition, presented a heroic image of British hu-
manity and somewhat obscured the preceding centuries of unabated slave 
trade and slavery.
44
Expressions of regret (no explicit apologies) marked the commemora-
tions in 2007. There was plenty of room for critical reflection on British tradi-
tions and for the West Indian community – around half a million souls in 
the uk – to participate and express their views. No other government in Eu-
rope has provided so much support or made so much money available – more 
than two million euros – to such ends. The efforts of Tony Blair’s Labour 
Party reflected a symbolic multiculturalism; the expression of regret was a 
sign to descendants of their inclusion in the British nation. Institutions like 
the Church of England and the bbc made explicit contributions. Here too 
successful integration preceded the lobby: ‘Black Britons’ already occupied 
prominent positions in both the cabinet and the national church and broad-
casting corporation. There was of course criticism, on the one hand com-
plaints about exaggerated self-criticism and a glossing over of African com-
plicity in the slave trade, and on the other that there was too little attention 
for African or Caribbean perspectives. The dilemma is in part a question of 
presentation – how much misery and anger can be dispensed upon an un-
prepared white audience without it simply switching off? – but also of con-
flicting interpretations of the past and how that should be commemorated 
today. The debate around black-versus-white perspectives, so frequently 
conducted in the Netherlands, cropped up here too.
Divisions also remained on the question of whether and how the past af-
fects the present and whether this gives rise to obligations. These are in fact 
political questions. Are contemporary racism and the unmistakable depri-
vation suffered by many Black Britons rooted in the slavery era? Does British 
society have a debt to pay, should a form of reparation be part of this, and if 
so who should receive it? The answers to such questions varied enormously, 
as the British government had predicted.
45 The familiar dilemma was that 
radical standpoints were incompatible with the intention to make ‘2007’ a 
truly national commemoration. All in all, the year of commemoration in 
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views without looking to force a consensus. That openness squares with 
Britain’s relatively long experience of multiculturalism.
In France, the nation’s involvement in the slave trade and slavery was 
publicly rediscovered late on; during the 1989 celebrations marking the bi-
centenary of the French Revolution with its lofty ideals, this delicate subject 
was basically ignored. The situation was very different in 1998, 150 years af-
ter the abolition of slavery. Demonstrations began in the former colonies, 
but the largest was a march in Paris in which 40,000 Antilleans took part 
demanding official acknowledgement of France’s involvement in slavery. 
That such a massive march was needed to break through the government’s 
aversion to identity politics is very telling. The British and Dutch govern-
ments, which both operate more within a tradition of moderate multicul-
turalism, did not require such robust encouragement – a calm lobby and a 
couple of petitions sufficed.
Evidently, the Chirac government was now prepared to make resolute 
gestures. It supported a private member’s bill by Christiane Taubira, mem-
ber of parliament for the overseas département of French Guyana, which con-
demned the slave trade and slavery as crimes against humanity. With its 
unanimous parliamentary acceptance of the bill, which also stipulated that 
the subject should be given a ‘suitable’ place in education and research, the 
French government went much further on paper that its British and Dutch 
counterparts.
46
The Taubira law became a symbol of redress for the Antillean popula-
tion, not only for the citizens of the overseas Caribbean provinces, but also 
for the half a million Antilleans living in France.
47 It is also in line with a 
broader debate about integration issues and the dissatisfaction of postcolo-
nial migrants, in which a consistent argument is that the republic does not 
live up to its lofty principles. And yet this bill did not mention apologies or 
concrete reparations. The call to give the past a ‘suitable’ place remained 
vague. In this sense the law seemed to be an uncontroversial, but also fairly 
intangible gesture. To illustrate: at the commemoration of Haiti’s bicente-
nary (2004), the colony which had liberated itself from France and slavery, 
the French government refrained from any significant engagement.
In 2005, the Taubira law hit the headlines once again. In that year the 
French parliament adopted a second colonial commemoration law – this 
one called for school curriculums to emphasize the positive role of colonial-
ism, especially in Algeria. This provoked heated discussions not only on the 
merits of that particular law, but also on the wider question of whether the 
French state should be allowed to define past events and prescribe what 
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of historians and secondly a question of personal judgment? And so the de-
bate turned from slavery to ‘history laws’. Two more such laws had mean-
while been adopted – the first regarding Holocaust denial, antisemitism 
and racism, the second the Armenian genocide – and the way seemed open 
for an inundation of many more bills.
The debate began not so much with the Taubira law, but with the law 
about the ‘positive role’ of colonialism. A triumph for a lobby of Algerian 
pieds noirs, a triumph for the chauvinists, and an open invitation to polar-
ization. A storm of protests followed, initially only directed at the law itself. 
But it was not long before President Jacques Chirac himself vetoed the law in 
2005, declaring that it was not the responsibility of the state to tell histori-
ans how to interpret the past. This has not prevented his successor, Nicolas 
Sarkozy, on several occasions from explicitly demanding attention for the 
positive aspects of colonialism.
48
Logically, the debate continued: if a law that praised colonialism was un-
acceptable, was a law condemning slavery appropriate? In the French press 
various letters were published from prominent historians who rejected any 
form of governmental interference in the business of history. After all, so 
the argument went, we do not live in a totalitarian state. The debate was car-
ried out with a great deal of passion and erudition. Its ferocity reflected 
broader concerns about the sustainability of the republican ideal of an undi-
vided nation, a certain distaste for including the memories and views of mi-
grants in the discourse about the nation, but also, quite rightly, concerns 
about intellectual freedom.
49
This last concern was only reinforced by a bizarre court case brought by 
a radical Antillean organization against a respected historian, Olivier Pétré-
Grenouillé. He had publicly rejected the term ‘genocide’, had pointed to the 
existence of slavery in numerous cultures, in particular Arab culture, and 
had underlined the role played by African merchants. He was promptly 
charged with defending the European slave trade and slavery and thereby 
denying a crime against humanity. This led to furious polemics in which 
the Taubira law came under fire as ‘state-led pedagogy’.
50
The court case, which was eventually thrown out, did no service to the 
‘business’ of the commemoration of slavery and colonialism in general. 
Touches of intolerant fanaticism and totalitarian practices began increas-
ingly to stick to the otherwise legitimate rediscovery of colonialism and 
slavery. And so Pierre Nora, the great man behind the project of lieux de mé­
moire that has been imitated around the globe, co-authored a furious Pam-
phlet, Liberté pour l’histoire. As chair of the foundation of the same name, he 
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tempt at state-led pedagogy. Historical research can only thrive in a climate 
of complete and utter intellectual freedom, accordingly, abolish the ridicu-
lous laws that restrict this freedom and, above all, do not devise any new 
ones, their argument resounded. Keep the realms of memory (mémoire) and 
history (histoire) separate and press historians not to fall into the trap of be-
coming lackeys for minorities who want to render their collective memory 
the status of truth.
51
No well-meaning person would dare say that Nora or Chandernagor were 
wrong, at least when it comes to freedom of thought and interpretation. Yet, 
respected opponents, such as Benjamin Stora and Patrick Weil, argued that 
it was not so much intellectual freedom that was at stake and that the issue 
of expressions of regret was, in fact, marginal. According to their view, the 
state, by definition, determines which key moments from the past should be 
commemorated and how. Just look at all the historical monuments, the 
school books, the annual celebrations on 14 July or the remembrance of the 
two World Wars. It is no good suddenly screaming blue murder just because 
all sorts of new and more critical desires are being articulated around na-
tional memorial culture.
52
What the long-term effect of the Taubira law will be is hard to say. As in 
the cases of Britain and the Netherlands, ‘rediscovery’ initially received 
broad support, but friction soon arose around more radical views and expec-
tations. The pacification and symbolic inclusion of postcolonial migrants 
were also the driving force behind government policy in France. Hence, the 
emphasis shifted from Africa and the Caribbean to Europe. This was appo-
sitely illustrated by the date chosen for the annual commemoration of slav-
ery and its abolition by a national commission in Paris: 10 May. This date 
bears absolutely no relation to colonial history and slavery and simply refers 
to the day on which the French senate unanimously accepted the Taubira 
law.
53
The comparison between the commemoration of slavery in these three 
countries generates a picture largely of parallels. The presence of descen-
dants who acquire sufficient influence to put the subject on the agenda; the 
official emphasis on shame and regret, while simultaneously avoiding apol-
ogies that might lead to compensation claims; the provision of modest 
means which are deployed for general, mainly education goals; the tension 
between radical demands and expectations, on the one hand, and a moder-
ate governmental policy of pacification on the other; and issues surround-
ing white-versus-black perspectives. The most obvious differences between 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands on one side and France on the oth-
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their responses to a discourse that undermines a nation’s positive self-im-
age. The French debate reveals more pride in the nation’s history, but also 
more defensiveness.
Other comparisons can also be drawn. No less striking than the sudden 
trend for recognition in these three countries is the continuing silence else-
where in Europe. Portugal was the frontrunner among trans-Atlantic slave 
traders and slavery was not abolished in the Spanish colony of Cuba until 
1886, later than in all of the other European colonies. And yet in these two 
countries there is no question of a national debate or signs of recognition. 
The same applies to Denmark, which also once trafficked slaves between Af-
rica and its own slave colonies in the Caribbean. This silence is largely ex-
plained by the absence of communities of slave descendants who could put 
this issue on the agenda. Moreover, the view of the relatively distant past for 
these two Iberian lands might be obscured by their more recent histories of 
civil war, dictatorship and poor development – the memory of an illustrious 
colonial past is cherished like balsam on an open wound.
54
The question of whether ‘the descendants’ – regardless of the African and 
the Caribbean countries involved – have much to gain from gestures or ac-
knowledgement can barely be answered. Concrete measures have remained 
limited and it seems improbable that anything fundamentally different 
will follow. The likelihood of reparations really being paid is minimal. What 
remains is recognition, which is expected to have an inclusive effect, easing 
the way for Afro-Caribbean citizens to identify with the nation. The effec-
tiveness of this approach seems obvious, but is almost impossible to verify. 
Even less certain is whether social gestures of contrition and self-criticism 
will lead to the ‘self-liberation’ of the descendants, to a break with an alleged 
cultural trauma.
Thus considered, the recent rediscovery of slavery remains somewhat 
noncommittal and the West-European memorial cycle seems to be nearing 
completion. Slavery has been actively recalled, but has remained in the past 
tense; a history, moreover, that is not important to everyone to the same 
degree. This ending could hardly be any different in a multicultural society 
with diverse memorial traditions. Between a single undivided national dis-
course and the dividing up of the past into innumerable ethnic narratives, 
there are many possible compromises. But the stronger the heterogeneity of 
the citizens, the more impossible the task to construct a national narrative 
that is satisfactory to all.208 postcolonial netherlands
ColonIal pasT and posTColonIal mIgraTIons:  
a broad ComparIson
The presence or absence of substantial postcolonial communities have had 
a major influence on the public debate about the colonial past. This assump-
tion lends itself to a broader examination than just the memory of slavery. 
Beyond the four ‘key countries’ named above – the United Kingdom, France, 
the Netherlands, and Portugal – there is a handful of other European coun-
tries with a colonial history. Their treatment of the past, or rather their scant 
interest in it, would seem to support the hypothesis of a link with postcolo-
nial migration.
Of the remaining European countries with a colonial history, only Bel-
gium was still a colonial power at the end of World War ii. On the eve of in-
dependence in 1960 around 95,000 Belgians lived in Belgian Congo and 
Rwanda; the majority repatriated and fitted without too much difficulty 
back into a life in what for most was the land of their birth. The number of 
African migrants from the former colonies has never been large in Belgium 
and is today estimated to be no more than 15,000 to 20,000. Their numbers 
are nothing compared with the number of Belgians with roots in the 
Maghrib or Turkey. The African migrants do not play a leading role in reflec-
tions on Belgian colonialism. The dominance of white repatriates among 
the postcolonial migrants provides the most obvious explanation for the 
absence, at least until very recently, of a debate on Belgian colonialism.
55
Spain is a special case. With Portugal, Spain was the pioneer of European 
colonialism in the Americas, but also in Asia and Africa. Around 1900, what 
remained of the colonial empire was broken up, except for the enclaves Ceu-
ta and Melilla in Morocco and the African colonies which had been acquired 
late in the day. Equatorial Guinea became independent in 1968, Spanish 
West Africa was handed over to Morocco in 1976; this did not lead to any mi-
gration worth mentioning. Up until the 1970s, Spain was a country of emi-
gration. This rapidly changed thereafter, in line with the country’s modern-
ization. The majority of the migrants were European, followed by Spanish 
Americans and Africans, mainly from Morocco.
56 The sizeable Spanish-
American migration flow was a reversal. Until 1970, many millions of Span-
iards had settled in Spanish America, while the number moving in the op-
posite direction had remained minimal. The recent reversal was led by 
economic factors, which for Spanish-American migrants includes the post-
colonial bonus in terms of language, religion, and conditions for legaliza-
tion.
The Spanish view of its own colonial past is traditionally marked by 
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Americas (1492) had been organized as a major celebration of national pride 
and an optimistic confirmation of the role Spain might play as a leader of the 
international hispanidad. It soon became clear that this nationalist dis-
course would have to be toned down and the emphasis was moved from ‘dis-
covery’ to ‘meeting’. At the same time space was created for a more critical 
approach to colonization, in particular with a nod to the indigenous popu-
lation. However, these compromises were primarily aimed at appeasing the 
Spanish American republics, rather than ‘postcolonial’ minorities in Spain 
itself – they let little of themselves be heard in this context, their primary 
concern being to acquire Spanish nationality and thereby European citizen-
ship.
The colonial pasts of Denmark, Italy, and Germany seem almost forgot-
ten, because they are almost a century behind us and because there is no 
postcolonial community to keep this history alive. Danish expansion 
stretched for centuries across Scandinavia, Iceland, and Greenland. Den-
mark also played a small part in the African slave trade, possessed a few 
plantation colonies in the Caribbean from the early seventeenth century, 
and had a trading post in India. When Denmark sold its Caribbean Virgin 
Islands to the United States in 1917, the curtain fell on the tropics for the 
Danes bringing an early end to this colonialism, no postcolonial migration 
and, indeed, almost no debate about its colonial past. The history of Danish 
involvement in the slave trade and slavery seems to have been entirely for-
gotten beyond a small circle of historians. Insofar as there is a vague Danish 
memory of the Caribbean, it is nostalgic rather than critical. This is all the 
more interesting because the Danish self-image lies fairly close to the Dutch: 
a small, progressive country which places a great deal of importance on hu-
man rights.
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Italy’s modern imperialist era did not last long. At the end of the nine-
teenth century it colonized Somalia and Eritrea, followed by Libya (1912) 
and, under Benito Mussolini, Ethiopia (1935). During the Second World War 
Italy was forced to relinquish its colonial possessions, after which several 
hundred thousand Italians were repatriated; they did not amount to an 
  influential community. There were almost no African postcolonial mi-
grants to Italy.
58 This colonial history has attracted little interest outside   
a small academic circle, even though colonialism was closely related to   
the formation of the Italian nation, both in the early republic and under   
Fascism. The few researchers working in this field almost unanimously 
speak of deliberate silencing. This ‘forgetting’ corresponds with the link to 
Fascism, with the abrupt break during the war which meant that Italy was 
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sence of mass immigration from the former African colonies.
Some overtures by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi towards Libya 
therefore seem surprising. As a consequence of earlier political expressions 
of regret (1991) for the excesses of Italian colonialism in Libya, in 2008 Ber-
lusconi agreed to pay a kind of compensation, which is unique. The Italian 
gesture of five billion us dollars’ worth of investments cannot be explained 
as a response to domestic pressure and certainly not to pressure from a post-
colonial lobby, but should probably be put down entirely to geopolitical con-
siderations. Berlosconi’s counterpart, Colonel Muammar Khaddafi, prom-
ised Italy would be given priority when it came to investment in Libya’s gas 
and oil industry and Libyan support in tackling illegal immigration. Doubts 
about ethical motivations are strengthened by the fact that there is no ques-
tion of Italian overtures to other former colonies where Italian colonialism 
was far more invasive – including the use of nerve gas by Mussolini’s troops 
in Ethiopia.
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 It was not until the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the late nineteenth century 
that Germany became a colonial power.
60 However, it was forced to give up 
its African colonies after the First World War. There was almost no migra-
tion from the colonies to Germany during the few decades of its colonial 
rule. German historians have recently rediscovered the colonial past, which 
has since been given a modest position on school curriculums. The question 
often posed in this context is whether or not there was a continuity between 
colonial racism and the violence of Nazism that followed later.
61 A hundred 
years on, in 2004, the German government acknowledged the brutal sup-
pression of the Herero and Nama peoples in Namibia as genocide, but did 
not link this to compensation.
That it was so long before the colonial past was reflected upon and that it 
is still rarely the subject of broader debate, can in part be attributed to the 
short duration of German colonialism and the absence of a postcolonial 
community. No less important here is that fact that the German culture of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung (roughly translated as the struggle to come to 
terms with the past) was almost entirely focused on the legacies of the two 
World Wars, particularly the second, and the Shoah. Then, after 1989, there 
came a string of new historical and moral questions around the subject of 
East Germany – it seems the national memory has been more or less satu-
rated by self-examination.
The picture therefore seems to be clear. Wherever there is an absence of 
substantial postcolonial migrant communities, the chances are that the co-
lonial past will be forgotten or silenced. Where such communities do exist, 
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previous relationship with the colonial system. Where primarily voices 
critical of the colonial past are put on the agenda, the response of govern-
ments and intellectual elites reflects how great the influence of the ideology 
of multiculturalism is.
All this has limited relevance to a notion of memorial culture outside 
Europe. The formation of the Soviet Union can be understood as a Russian 
colonial project; the implosion of the ussr was followed by the repatriation 
of millions of ethnic Russians, coinciding with smaller-scale emigration of 
ethnic minorities from Russia. However, in the smaller, now ethnically 
more homogeneous Russian core of the former Soviet empire, this did not 
lead to a national debate about the merits of the Soviet Union as a colonial 
project and even less so to a discussion of special treatment for these postco-
lonial migrants.
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Something similar applies to Japan, which colonized Korea in the early 
twentieth century and, in the 1930s, violently occupied part of China during 
the prelude to the Second World War. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, 
millions of Japanese colonists were repatriated, mainly from Korea. The in-
tegration of these postcolonial migrants passed off relatively smoothly. But 
there was no room for their stories and even less for a broader critical reflec-
tion on the colonialism that preceded it, or on the role of Japan as an aggres-
sor during the war.
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Postcolonial memorial culture in the United States has more in common 
with what in Europe is gradually becoming a familiar mix of self-criticism 
and regret, without being accompanied by many concrete gestures, than 
with the Japanese and Russian aversion to such critical self-examination. 
However, unlike Europe, the us was chiefly concerned with ‘colonized’ do-
mestic minorities, namely, the indigenous population and the descendants 
of enslaved Africans. The influence of postcolonial migrants on the debate 
about nationhood was not great. Strictly speaking, this context only relates 
to post-war, ongoing immigration from the self-governing Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico associated with the United States, which has many parallels 
with Antillean migration to France and the Netherlands. Puerto Rican intel-
lectuals have had some influence on the American multiculturalism debate. 




So, every country has its own characteristics. What might we describe as 
being typically Dutch in this context? We might first look at the nature and 
scale of postcolonial migrations. In terms of the demographic significance 
for the country as a whole, the parallels with the British, French and Portu-
guese experiences are clear. In terms of the diversity of postcolonial migra-
tions, relating to the location and nature of the former colonies, France and 
the United Kingdom are comparable with the Netherlands. In almost all 
cases, postcolonial migration was an unintended spin-off of decoloniza-
tion; the Netherlands experience is no different. Like France, the Nether-
lands is still politically tied to a number of its former colonies, which means 
postcolonial migration is ongoing; herein lies a parallel with the United 
States too.
The characteristics of postcolonial migrants varied greatly and so too 
their integration. The most relevant comparisons involve the three princi-
pal European countries. In all cases the migrants benefitted from a postco-
lonial bonus, at least in terms of a right to settle, but also more often in terms 
of cultural capital; the significance of this bonus by definition declined 
with the generations. Measured in terms of socio-economic class and educa-
tion levels, repatriates from the Dutch East Indies were by and large better 
off than migrants from Suriname and the Antilles. This translated into the 
somewhat distorted image of an entirely ‘smooth assimilation’. The simi-
larities between the Indisch Dutch, the pied noirs, the retornados, and, per-
haps, repatriates from the British Empire, also extended into a less critical, 
sometimes plainly nostalgic relationship with the colonial system.
Postcolonial communities were – in part internally – divided along par-
tially overlapping lines of class and ethnicity. As in all other countries, mi-
grants met a great deal of incomprehension and silent, everyday racism in 
the Netherlands. However, unlike France and the United Kingdom, there 
were almost no race riots. Besides, what continues to be peculiar to the Neth-
erlands is that only a minority of postcolonial migrants are Muslim, where-
as a large majority of other non-Western migrants are Islamic. This is simi-
lar to the situation in Portugal and in stark contrast to the British and French 
experience. The more the minorities debate in the Netherlands comes to re-
volve around ‘Islam’, the more accepted non-Muslim postcolonial migrants 
probably become.
In all cases the meaning of the notion of ‘community’ and thereby ‘post-
colonial identity’ became more problematic with the changing generations. 
Again, levels of exogamy had a major impact here. In all cases exogamy was 
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factor. Exogamy is low among British and Dutch Muslims and Hindus, 
higher in France, but also there it is lower than among Antilleans. Moreover, 
the example of Hindus, and in Britain Sikhs, illustrates that low exogamy is 
not necessarily a hindrance to successful socio-economic integration.
Integration did not always proceed smoothly. The Moluccan group ar-
rived in the Netherlands with a disadvantage similar to the harkis in France; 
their drawn-out engagement with the struggle for an independent Moluc-
can republic is, however, unique. The integration of a large proportion of the 
Afro-Caribbean population of the Netherlands was more successful than 
many pessimists had predicted; however, a considerable underclass has 
perpetuated a culture of poverty. Here the parallels with the French and, 
above all, the British Caribbean communities is painfully clear. Of the 
Asian-Surinamese communities, it would seem that the Hindu majority are 
most successful in socio-economic terms; here lies an obvious parallel with 
Hindus in the United Kingdom.
With the exception of the short-lived Moluccan actions, the Netherlands 
had no experience of militant postcolonial resistance to the status quo. In-
sofar as postcolonial migrants integrated only moderately well – measured 
according to concrete criteria such as education and employment – this was 
not a reflection of any resistance, but rather a reflection of some mix of inca-
pability and discrimination. Ethnic subcultures highly critical of colonial-
ism and the postcolonial Netherlands did develop, but this did not amount 
to a radical rejection. In the Netherlands, as in other parts of Europe, this 
type of radicalism was exclusively expressed in Muslim fundamentalist 
circles, which in the Netherlands did not stem from colonial history.
Conversely, government policy for postcolonial migrants in the Nether-
lands was inclusive and aimed to promote identification. This initially just 
involved immigration and integration policies, but later, through the deci-
sion to adopt a mild form of multiculturalism, also symbolic gestures in 
response to the identity politics of the different communities. Hence the 
Netherlands, like the United Kingdom and somewhat more flexibly than 
France with its strongly unitary republican tradition, became enriched by 
postcolonial monuments and institutions, festivals and memorial days. Ac-
cordingly, this history and its aftermath became canonized. As it turned 
out, this was all the more defensible, because none of the postcolonial 
groups voiced positions that were incompatible with broadly held interpre-
tations of the values and norms of society at large.
In this light, there is little reason to think that the recent widespread 
criticism in the Netherlands of multiculturalism will lead to a different 
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Islam and the alleged rejection of acculturation by large groups of Muslims. 
This suspicion does not pertain to postcolonial ‘communities’, which are 
gradually becoming more integrated and, through exogamy, more diluted, 
and who for decades have fought for recognition precisely from within an 
explicitly Dutch frame of reference.215
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‘posTColonIal’ (In The) neTherlands
Post-war, the Netherlands became richer, less segmented (verzuild), ethni-
cally more diverse, and more embedded in Europe. Immigration and mi-
grants have been controversial subjects of debate for sixty-five years now, 
but nevertheless, in that time the Netherlands admitted vast numbers of 
newcomers and became multicultural. This change raised the issue of how 
migrants and their children related and ought to relate to Dutch culture. 
Inevitably, the question that then had to be answered is what that culture, or 
identity, actually was. The answer has remained controversial; that the an-
swer in 1945 would have been different from the answer in 1975 or 2005 is 
obvious.
The post-war rebuilding of the Netherlands was initially tackled with 
backs turned to history. In the early post-war years of ‘discipline and asceti-
cism’ there was no time to dwell on past suffering – this attitude was also 
made easier because the section of the population that had been most hit by 
the war had been exterminated elsewhere and by others. It was not until well 
into the 1960s that the few surviving Jews began to be heard and the persecu-
tion of the Jews became part of the nation’s memorial culture. In the decades 
that followed it was precisely the Holocaust and the powerlessness or un-
willingness to prevent this genocide that set the benchmark for moralizing 
debates about the nation’s history, the nation, and the treatment of post-war 
migrants. The lot of the Jews became a horrible frame of reference, but also a 
model in the struggle for symbolic and financial reparations.
1
The discovery that yet another traumatic wartime history was alive on 
Dutch soil took a long time to emerge. Only in the 1980s did the repatriates 
from the Netherlands East Indies begin to make strides in their battle to win 
a place in national World War ii commemorations. For strategic reasons, at 
times rationalized in shockingly opportunistic ways, reference was made to 
the earlier acknowledgement of recent Jewish history, including the mate-
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held frustration about suffering that was not understood and rights that 
were denied. The expression of such emotions was increasingly felt to be 
justified and publicly and politically legitimized. And, indeed, remorseful 
gestures of recognition have been an essential feature of Dutch politics since 
the 1970s. Recognition of past suffering, recognition of society’s shortcom-
ings, recognition of the right to symbolic and perhaps financial gestures; 
this was to become a model for postcolonial identity politics.
2
Meanwhile, emotion began to penetrate further into the heart of a soci-
ety that had previously been reputed for its level-mindedness and which was 
still a privileged nation where it was rare for anything to happen that af-
fected the citizenry as a whole. The arrival of television played a major part 
in this. By far the largest post-war disaster, the North Sea flood (watersnood) 
of 1953, which cost the lives of 1800 people in Zealand, was only processed 
and remembered in private silence for decades. And yet more recent and, in 
terms of the number of fatalities, considerably less disastrous calamities – 
plane crashes on Tenerife, in Faro and Eindhoven, or the firework-factory 
disaster in Enschede – were immediately surrounded by far more public at-
tention. Wherever immigrants were involved in an air crash, the commem-
oration took on the character of a political gesture of inclusion, as highlight-
ed by the royal displays of sorrow and speeches by politicians following the 
crash of a Surinam Airways flight from the Netherlands just prior to land-
ing in Suriname, and after the Bijlmer Disaster in which an El Al cargo plane 
crashed into a block of flats in the predominantly black south-east area of 
Amsterdam. Even a recent, small plane crash in Suriname, more than thirty 
years after the transfer of sovereignty, elicited condolences from the Queen 
and the Prime Minister.
3
Suffering and grieving became ritualized, as witnessed in the many si-
lent marches against ‘mindless violence’, or even trivialized, as in the fu-
neral of the popular Dutch singer André Hazes (2004). All this is evidence of 
a far-reaching popularization of taste and fashion, but also the democrati-
zation of public memory. The criteria have become ever less clear. Where 
more space is granted to accommodate the recognition of individual suffer-
ing, the need for arbitration grows if the risk of losing meaning and com-
munality in commemoration is to be avoided. Which stories of the past 
ought to be considered important today? The time has passed when politi-
cians and intellectuals from the dominant political or spiritual trends 
served as self-evident authorities on national identity. As their authority 
waned, the discourse of inclusion came under pressure, marking the end of 
a politics of ‘reasoned tolerance’, in which a matter-of-fact adoption of diver-
sity was broadly, if not always enthusiastically accepted. Typical of this was ‘postcolonial’ (in the) netherlands 217
the way the Van Oostrom Commission itself spelled out that even its official 
canon of Dutch history was a result of choices and historicity; even more 
typical is the curtailing of its breadth ever since, from being prescriptive to 
at best directional for Dutch schools.
4
Where the intellectual approach to identity is characterized by qualifica-
tions and room for diversity, in the ‘street’, and recently in politics, the tone 
is much harder – among migrants who demanded space for their own cul-
tures and views of the past, and who used to find a willing ear among politi-
cians, but equally among large sections of the non-immigrant white Dutch 
who have long ceased to blindly follow politically-led instructions for a 
broadening of the idea of ‘national identity’. The leading radical-right politi-
cal leader, Geert Wilders, tellingly translated this sentiment in his criticism 
of Princess Maxima’s perfectly defensible qualification of the idea of a ho-
mogeneous Dutch identity as ‘well-meaning, politically-correct poppy-
cock’.
5
posTColonIal mIgranTs:  
InTegraTIon, IdenTIfICaTIon, CommunITy
The population of the Netherlands doubled in the space of sixty-five years, 
partly through immigration, creating a society that was more ethnically di-
verse than ever before. This process was ushered in by the repatriations from 
the Netherlands East Indies. The cliché of the smooth assimilation of these 
repatriates is not unjustified; their social integration ran smoothly, in part 
due to their strong postcolonial bonus. Yet this highly diverse group of ‘re-
patriates’ nurtured many misgivings about the culture of the country of ar-
rival, with its poor understanding and lack of interest in its East Indian his-
tory. This must have hindered their identification with the Netherlands 
– ironically, but also painfully for a group which, in the East Indies, had al-
ways identified with the ‘mother country’.
And yet there was no question of willfully keeping a distance from Dutch 
society. On the contrary, from the start exogamy was so strong that while 
there is already a fourth generation of Indisch Dutch, it has become ever 
more inappropriate to regard the Indisch ‘community’ as a distinct group. 
‘Indisch’ came increasingly to be seen as a non-exclusive choice of identity, 
which was further enhanced by the fact that transnational ties are weak – 
there is far more nostalgia for the lost East Indies, or something vaguely 
Asian, than there is meaningful engagement with the Indonesia of today.
The indignation surrounding the lack of understanding and compensa-
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in the Netherlands, led to an ever better organized and more successful 
struggle for symbolic recognition and financial compensation from the 
1960s on. Its success – though still scandalously modest, according to many 
in the Indisch group – reflected a heightened sensitivity in Dutch society, 
certainly in political circles, for the identity claims of minorities. In the case 
of the Indisch Dutch, such gestures also reflected an appreciation of their 
smooth integration. Throughout this history it was crucial that the Indisch 
community was represented by authoritative members of high social sta-
tus, considerable cultural capital, and excellent contacts among the elites of 
the post-war Netherlands.
What anthropologist Lizzy van Leeuwen refers to as the Indisch ‘struggle 
for culture and identity’ was a struggle on two fronts. Besides the political 
disputes surrounding the way things were settled after the war, there was 
the recurring issue of the recognition of a unique identity, embodied by 
Tjalie Robinson. The silent continuation of Indisch traditions and the orga-
nization of events such as Pasar Malam Besar were very important for open-
ing up a national culture that, although verzuild, in all other respects was 
fairly homogeneous. Indisch emancipation slowly evened out, but now the 
path had been laid for the moderate multiculturalism that followed. Indisch 
cultural broker Ellen Derksen expressed this appositely in her speech to 
open the thirtieth Pasar Malam (1988): ‘The Indisch Dutch have not silently 
assimilated away, they have silently imprinted their mark on Dutch soci-
ety.’ 
6 In the meantime, the paradox has only become more pronounced: the 
more recognition Indisch culture and identity acquired, the less clear its 
significance for the next generations became.
The integration of the Moluccan community passed less smoothly. It was 
a long time before there was room to identify with the Netherlands, along-
side and instead of identifying with the Moluccas. This laborious integra-
tion process was in part due to the low levels of education among the first 
generation. The problems were exacerbated by the engagement, sometimes 
enforced, with the struggle for an independent Moluccan republic (rms). 
The decision to choose this political identity obstructed engagement with 
the Netherlands for many years.
No other postcolonial migrant group battled so militantly for recogni-
tion – although the struggle for an independent rms was never a realistic 
aim and only later, hesitatingly, was reformulated as a call for respect and 
space for a Moluccan identity in the Netherlands. The Hague’s attitude to-
wards the Moluccan community developed from neglect and distance to 
inclusionary engagement in response to militant Moluccan actions. Con-
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lation of an integration policy. All the Dutch parliament’s gestures revolved 
around recognition, inclusion, and support for integration, but stayed well 
away from the political struggle.
In the Moluccan community too, the question began to arise about what 
constituted Moluccan identity, beyond the rms, and, above all, to what de-
gree one could speak of a shared identity distinguishing Moluccans from 
other Dutch citizens. This debate in part developed as a consequence of gen-
erational change. The time when the vast majority of Moluccans lived in 
camps, then housing estates, is over. Exogamy is also high now among Mo-
luccans. Once again, there is little that can be taken for granted in the terms 
‘community’ and ‘identity’.
More than two decades passed before the next postcolonial influx ar-
rived. The Surinamese exodus took place at the same time as Mediterranean 
migration got under way and the Netherlands became irrevocably multicul-
tural – and was reeling from the shock. The integration of the Surinamese 
migrants in the end proceeded better than initially expected and certainly 
better than was the case for most other non-Western migrants. The postco-
lonial bonus did its job, even though the Surinamese community remained 
more strongly divided along class lines than the Indisch. Soon only lip ser-
vice was being paid to the ideal of remigration. This strengthened identifi-
cation with the Netherlands, all the more considering the rapid growth of 
the second generation, which is now already producing a third.
The Moluccan community was relatively homogenous when it arrived in 
the Netherlands, the Indisch community more strongly divided along class-
colour axes. But these differences were nothing compared with the con-
trasts in the Surinamese community. Colonial Suriname was described as 
an ethnically verzuild, segmented society. This verzuiling was not simply 
perpetuated in the Netherlands, but even enhanced: the nationalist dis-
course of ethnic fraternization served no purpose here. This was not so 
much a process of active avoidance, even less of conflict among the various 
segments, but simply of each group going its own way. Only in terms of po-
litical engagement with the country of origin was there something resem-
bling a ‘Surinamese’ voice, especially in the protests against the military 
dictatorship in the 1980s, but this later subsided.
Consequently, there was no such thing as an undivided Surinamese 
community, but at most ethnic subgroups none of whom resisted integra-
tion in the Netherlands and who all showed every sign of identifying with 
the country they had arrived in. There were also clear contrasts. The integra-
tion of the Afro-Surinamese group occurred partially along demographic 
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more outspoken than the Indisch Dutch about their right to retain their own 
identity; this could be more easily accommodated in a society that was now 
moving towards moderate multiculturalism. The official acknowledge-
ment of the Dutch slavery of the past fitted within this framework. But 
again, one must question how relevant it is to speak of a separate, Afro-Suri-
namese community and identity, now and certainly in the future.
If a strong and fairly demarcated, unique postcolonial identity applies 
anywhere, then it applies to Surinamese Dutch with Asian ancestors. Of 
course, this affirms very traditional views of frozen ethnicity. The Hindu 
majority of Hindustani Surinamese has continued to link its own identity 
to the religion, and towards India and the Indian diaspora. Muslim Hindu-
stanis and Javanese Surinamese continue to link their identity to their reli-
gion, which does not seem to interfere in any way with their identification 
with the Netherlands. However, exogamy among Dutch of Asian-Surinam-
ese origin is far lower than in any other postcolonial group, the effect of 
which is at least a delay to the weakening of community ties. Besides, it is 
remarkable that these groups have only rarely articulated a desire for recog-
nition or political gestures. Apparently the room available to practice iden-
tity was sufficient and there was no urgent need to demand apologies for the 
colonial past.
Due to the continuing status of non-sovereignty, the final stage of post-
colonial migration, from the Antilles, has not reached its conclusion. The 
Antillean community shares its slavery history with Afro-Surinamese 
Dutch, but in itself is also a fragmented community. This is largely a conse-
quence of the language gap. Apart from the memory of slavery and colonial-
ism, the perception of identity within the Antillean community to a large 
extent revolves around Papiamentu and, moreover, the island of origin – the 
vast majority of Antilleans stem from Curaçao.
The fact that Papiamentu is the first language for the great majority of 
Antilleans in the Netherlands severely devalued their postcolonial bonus. 
The Antillean community is also divided along class lines. This, combined 
with high levels of exogamy, raises questions about how long it will make 
sense to speak of an undivided Antillean, or even Curaçaoan community 
and identity in the Netherlands. Complicating this further is the fact that 
Antillean migration continues to be circular, so that both communities 
continue to influence each other.
This short summary of the developments of the last six decades under-
lines the stark contrasts that exist, but also suggests clear convergences. An 
erosion of the meaning of ‘community’ and ‘identity’ is apparent in most 
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stem from the colonial era, and by the changing of the generations and high 
degrees of exogamy; only the Asian-Surinamese communities require sub-
tle distinctions to be made within this conclusion. The degree of transna-
tional orientation here varies from group to group, but is on the decline ev-
erywhere; in the past, transnationalism only obstructed an identification 
with the Netherlands in the case of the Moluccan Dutch.
The postcolonial bonus worked for all migrants from the former colo-
nials, but to differing degrees. All benefitted from unhindered access to the 
Netherlands, but the cultural capital that was tied to the Netherlands was 
unequally distributed. In the first instance, this was a question of class, but 
also of other colonial legacies, which were unfavourable for Moluccans and 
later Antilleans. The significance of the postcolonial bonus diminishes 
with the changing of the generations, at least in its supporting role during 
the process of integration. All second generation migrants, whether they 
stem from Morocco, Turkey, Suriname, or wherever, enjoy Dutch citizen-
ship. Formally, opportunities are evenly distributed, the education system 
corrects, at least in part, the inequalities that used to exist and in so doing 
eradicates the potential linguistic and cultural bonus that migrants from 
the former colonies used to enjoy.
What remains of the bonus will ultimately be no more than a rhetorical 
element: ‘We are here because you were there.’ Spokespeople from the post-
colonial communities have made good use of that comparative advantage. 
Their access to the media and politicians highlights the fact that these 
claims did not so much precede integration, as follow it; that is how the bo-
nus worked. With identity issues finally on the agenda, colonial history, lit-
tle by little, gained a more prominent position in the reformulation of the 
nation’s history. Yet, when it comes to expanding the view of what is Dutch 
culture, the postcolonial element appears to have lost its advantage over 
other migrant cultures.
‘Race’ has played almost no part in this book, neither has racism. This is 
not to say that there was or is no racism in the Netherlands, nor that this was 
irrelevant to integration and identification with the Netherlands. All post-
colonial migrants were confronted with racism and xenophobia, in all cases 
this led to frustration and anger, which ultimately stimulated the articula-
tion of identity claims. However, the question is how far racism played and, 
above all, will continue to play a role in binding the various postcolonial 
communities together.
We might begin by arguing that racism in the past did not determine 
how postcolonial migrants were treated. The bonus of the unhindered right 
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cases – remained intact for a long time, despite xenophobia and despite the 
fact that the admittance of postcolonial migrants served no economic pur-
pose. Postcolonial concerns about state respectability were decisive, even if 
the admittance of postcolonial migrants was and is judged more negatively 
by many Dutch. At the same time, this broader society learnt how to deal 
with migrants of a different colour from the former colonies. It has often 
been remarked that beneath the gloss of proverbial Dutch tolerance there 
often lay and lies avoidance, indifference and, sometimes, unadulterated 
racism. Yet at the same time, the growing acceptance of ethnically mixed 
relations, precisely with partners with colonial roots, illustrates that this 
zeitgeist is neither universal nor immutable.
7 That exogamy has remained 
relatively low among Hindustanis and Javanese Surinamese primarily 
stems from their own religiously motivated rejection of such mixed rela-
tions, not of imposed isolation.
The space accorded postcolonial migrants to publicly express their own 
identities has noticeably increased over the last few decades and is reflected 
in the debates about Dutch culture and history. With this the government 
attempted to stimulate identification with the Netherlands – there is a rea-
son why commemorations of the colonial past so often emphasize contem-
porary ‘bonding’. While this is difficult to substantiate, it would appear that 
all this postcolonial acknowledgement and commemorating has indeed 
fulfilled the purpose of building bridges between old contradictions. The 
source of frustration surrounding metropolitan denial has certainly reced-
ed considerably.
8
Dutch debates around minorities and nation have hardened over the past 
decade or so. Wherever borders are drawn more sharply, a renewed ethnici-
zation soon takes shape. Opposition can have the effect of slowing down the 
erosion of communities. Something similar threatens to take shape – un-
evenly – in the Netherlands through the over-simplification of the minori-
ties debate to a problem around or with Islam. It is possible that the small 
minority of Muslims among postcolonial immigrants may feel that they 
too are being addressed and may consequently develop a stronger need to 
highlight their religious identity.
What is striking about the debates over the last few years is that postco-
lonial migrants have figured only rarely, and when they have, it has usually 
been in a positive sense, as in the exemplary assimilated Indisch Dutch and 
the Surinamese, who are believed to be heading in the same direction. The 
most discussed postcolonial problem revolves around Antillean youths, but 
this is a debate in which not culture, but class should be seen as the prime 
factor. A widespread backlash against postcolonial communities is not on ‘postcolonial’ (in the) netherlands 223
the cards, which is good news for these groups. The flip side of this seems to 
be that, in the absence of a political offensive to isolate them, the erosion of 
these communities will continue.
new Ideas abouT The ‘neTherlands’
The contemporary view of Dutch history and culture grants far more space 
to the (post)colonial dimension than was the case in 1950 or 1970, at least in-
sofar as this image is directly or indirectly set by the government. The iden-
tity politics of the different postcolonial communities has played a decisive 
factor here. This is not to say, of course, that the average Dutch citizen at-
taches the same importance to the colonial past and its legacies as citizens 
with roots in the colonies. Interest, knowledge, and above all the emotional 
value associated with this vary enormously.
It is therefore not simply a question of postcolonial migrant versus ‘the 
rest’. As little as postcolonial migrants have distinguished themselves in 
demonstrating any particular engagement with other migrants – and why 
should they? – equally, nothing attests to mutual interest, let alone solidar-
ity, among the different postcolonial communities. Just as no ethnically 
defined group has such a homogenous identity that it necessarily leads to 
identity politics, it is equally absurd to expect there to be a single postcolo-
nial voice.
9
The complaint that ‘the Dutch’ know, understand, and appreciate so lit-
tle about their colonial history and about the resultant cultures is part of the 
standard repertoire for all of these postcolonial groups. However, anyone 
attending any postcolonial commemorative events will immediately notice 
that the people who are present, alongside the members of the community 
involved, are primarily white Dutch. Caribbean Dutch have no interest in 
Indisch commemorations, while Indisch Dutch, Moluccans, or Hindustan-
is will rarely show their faces at commemorations of slavery, and postcolo-
nial Dutch rarely attend remembrance events marking the Nazi occupation 
and the Holocaust, and so on – people remember and celebrate, first and 
foremost, in their own circles supplemented by a few white Dutch who have 
become involved through personal relations, or who attend in an official ca-
pacity. This is a sobering conclusion, which highlights the impossibility of 
translating all identity-based claims to a memorial culture into a truly 
shared, national narrative. The government may facilitate and legitimize a 
broad and inclusive remembering, but it cannot enforce it. Society is simply 
too heterogeneous and democratic, and the ethnic and historical identifica-
tions too diverse.224 postcolonial netherlands
The post-war struggle for recognition by postcolonial organizations has 
generated increasing understanding, recognition, and concrete gestures 
since the 1970s. That the grassroots allowed themselves to be more easily 
mobilized for concrete causes than for abstract desires is logical and illus-
trated by the broad Indisch support for the battle for backpay. Perhaps with 
the exception of the Moluccan ideal of the rms, the struggle for more ideal-
istic goals remained largely an issue for minorities in each group. Only a 
fraction of the Indisch ‘community’ was actively involved in the Indisch 
House, and the same goes for participation by the Afro-Caribbean popula-
tion in the annual commemoration of slavery. The irony is that the accep-
tance of postcolonial identity claims tempered justified indignation about 
the silencing of the past, while at the same time contributing to the loss of 
meaning for the postcolonial parties involved – the cry for recognition had, 
after all, been one of the anchors in the formation of communities and ac-
tion.
A decisive factor in the treatment of postcolonial identity claims was 
that they appealed to generally accepted precepts of what in the Netherlands 
was considered appropriate and morally correct, but also that they were ul-
timately politically innocent, or at least were made so. It became acceptable 
and even the done thing, to adopt a critical approach to the colonial past 
with reference to the self-image of a freedom-loving, humanitarian nation. 
Indirectly, the wholehearted recognition of the fact that these norms had 
not been adhered to in the colonies accentuated the self-congratulatory im-
age of an exemplary nation. However, where radical claims were problem-
atic for national interests, pragmatism prevailed over testimony. ‘Regret’ 
was frequently mentioned, but ‘apologies’ never, for fear of compensation 
claims in the case of the Atlantic slave trade, or war crimes in Indonesia. The 
importance of good international relations also prevailed over sympathy 
for the frustrations of the migrant communities – see the rejection of the 
rms, the rapid reconciliation with Japan, and the eventual acknowledge-
ment of ‘1945’ as marking the end of colonial rule in the Netherlands East 
Indies. This last symbolic gesture, towards Indonesia, which had been so 
long awaited, reflected how long the ‘Indisch generation’ had exerted its 
considerable influence.
It is almost impossible to judge what the outcome of sixty-five years of 
facing up to the colonial past has been, broadly speaking. What this book 
mainly documents is the struggle for a space for postcolonial perspectives 
in the nation’s image and governmental responses to it, but also in the world 
of culture, education and science. A picture can be sketched of this official 
canonization, but it does not answer the question as to whether this has had Demonstration at the National Monument to Slavery, Amsterdam, 27 October, 2006,  
in response to the statement about the voc by then-Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balken-
ende. Balkenende had praised the ‘voc mentality’ in parliament. There was little 
reaction from the Indisch or Moluccan camps, but this statement provoked great 
agitation in Surinamese circles. Under the motto that the voc era was also the era of  
the wic, the slave trade, and slavery in the Caribbean colonies, demonstrations were 
held for ‘rehabilitation, apologies, and reparations’. Balkenende later said that it had 
never been his intention to offend anyone and certainly not to gloss over slavery. 
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an impact on society at large, or not. There has been no systematic research 
into what the Dutch, of any background, know about history and the diverse 
cultures in their own country. The couple of surveys that have been carried 
out over the last few years suggest a certain interest and sensitivity for ‘colo-
nial issues’, but it is unclear as to how representative this is. It is not evident 
that the shame about slavery felt by readers of the glossy Historisch Nieuws­
blad is any more representative of the mood in the Netherlands today than 
right-wing populist tirades to the contrary.226 postcolonial netherlands
What is clear is that the current canonical image of colonial history is 
full of inconsistencies and new silences, in part due to the active input of the 
postcolonial communities in the game of forgetting, commemorating and 
silencing. Many examples have been given in the previous chapters: the voc 
is remembered with pride, while the wic evokes only shame; linked to this, 
the narrowing of colonial slavery to the West and the nonsensical reduction 
of West Indian history to slavery; and the tendency to reduce the history of 
the Indisch Dutch to the twentieth century, in particular to the Second 
World War, repatriation, and a suffering that was silenced or denied for too 
long.
The postcolonial struggle corrected old silences, but allowed others to per-
sist and generated new ones. The exposure of these old silences was a re-
sponse to a gradually more self-critical attitude in Dutch intellectual and 
political circles. Everything revolved around the acknowledgement of ne-
glect and discrimination, past and present. For strategic reasons, recogni-
tion could not easily be demanded in anything other than an assertive tone 
and with indignant reference to past and present victimhood. Yet this atti-
tude was often at odds with critical self-examination. Consequently, the 
identification of colonialism, racism, and colonial war with the ‘Nether-
lands’ obscured the fact that colour distinctions and open racism were inex-
tricably linked to Indisch history, that the Indisch community was a privi-
leged product of that colonialism, that Moluccan soldiers derived their 
existence and status from their unconditional loyalty to the Netherlands 
and the House of Orange; or, likewise, that colour consciousness and ethnic 
distinction continues to characterize Caribbean cultures.
The canonization of decolonization was also half-hearted. First, there 
were decades of refusing to accept the end of the Dutch East Indies and espe-
cially the manner of its demise. This was a refusal to surrender to the course 
of modern history, an attitude The Hague only dared break with once the 
first ‘Indisch generation’, including the veterans, had all but withered away. 
Next there was the usually self-silenced trauma of the exodus from Surina-
me. Unlike the repatriates and military from the East Indies, this migration 
was not forced, but rather reflected a lack of faith in the country and its lead-
ership, and the fiasco of nationalism. The final step was a gradual distanc-
ing from the less fortunate compatriots who stayed behind. This is a painful 
conclusion, which seldom led to open self-reflection and was smothered in 
silence, buried under discourses of shattering other, older silences, in par-
ticular around slavery. The history of the Republic of Suriname served only 
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room for heroic orations here either and so the Antillean claim on Dutch 
memorial culture primarily limits itself to the paradoxical combination of 
stressing centuries-old bonds and the injustice of slavery and cultural sup-
pression alike.
But most striking is perhaps the moralizing that surrounds the writing 
of colonial historiography and the public image of this past as presented in 
museums and the media – all the more striking since accusations of silenc-
ing and suppressing the colonial past have not subsided.
10 The last few years 
have revealed a strong desire not only to turn over stones and lift veils, but 
also to (pre)judge, accuse, pardon, or express sympathy for the past. In this 
there is only one precedent: the memory of the Nazi occupation of the Neth-
erlands and above all the persecution of the Jews. This penchant for moral-
izing – which has all but disappeared in studies about class war and the la-
bour movement, about verzuiling and a fortiori about earlier episodes of 
Dutch history – corresponds seamlessly with the context in which the colo-
nial past was rediscovered, a combination of postcolonial identity claims 
and a willingness to make inclusive gestures.
This imbalance is not surprising; it merely highlights the social con-
struction of canonization. However, in the end, it is not just the historian, 
but anyone who is interested in national and colonial history and every par-
ticipant in the debate about nationhood who would be better served by a 
more balanced representation of the colonial dimension of the nation’s his-
tory. Hence, one would prefer a picture that is less defined by group perspec-
tives and moralizing ruminations on who and what ‘we’ were and are.
This point has by no means been reached and the existence of a multitude 
of voices will undoubtedly remain the rule – and yet the canonizing of na-
tional history at the very least demands an open debate on the tension be-
tween ‘ethnic’ perspectives and a shared canon. A recent survey of advocates 
and organizations in postcolonial communities produced interesting out-
comes in this respect and disproved any hopeful belief that the chapter on 
the symbolic inclusion of postcolonial migrants had meanwhile reached its 
happy conclusion.
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Almost all respondents from all groups answered negatively the ques-
tion of whether the history and culture of ‘their’ group was now sufficiently 
known about and understood by Dutch society, in particular in education 
and museums. The Netherlands, most believed, is still insufficiently open 
to colonial history and the background to postcolonial migration. Opinions 
about the current history canon varied. All groups sensed a certain degree of 
shame in the Netherlands about this past. Where Moluccans, Surinamese, 
and Antilleans regard this embarrassment as justified, the views of the In-228 postcolonial netherlands
disch Dutch – not surprisingly perhaps, considering their own entangle-
ment in this history – were divided.
Being addressed as a representative of a specific community, the respon-
dents, of course, answered from that personal perspective. Nonetheless, it is 
remarkable that even these active and engaged citizens barely identified 
with other postcolonial groups and displayed only limited interest in them. 
When asked whether they felt they belonged to a postcolonial community, 
only a few answered wholeheartedly ‘yes’.
A distinct majority of the respondents from all the groups articulated 
another thorny issue, namely the ongoing sense that the historiography 
and image of their own group was still not being defined enough by people 
from their own group. The dominance of ‘white’ researchers in the estab-
lished ‘white’ bastions has been remarked upon for decades, but has indeed 
changed little. Yet, according to most of those questioned, this does not lead 
to the outcomes of the research being less acceptable, neither did they be-
lieve that researchers from the respondents’ own circles would, by defini-
tion, produce better work. However, the sense of disadvantage and the idea 
that the government has not corrected or stimulated enough is strong 
among active postcolonial citizens.
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The most extreme view, in the tone of ‘you lot don’t understand a thing’, 
was articulated early on and sometimes in plain vitriol, by Tjalie Robinson 
and others in his Indisch circle.
13 The same argument was more recently ex-
pressed by the demand for the history of slavery to be finally studied from a 
‘black’ perspective, a point of departure that is propagated by the National 
Institute for the Study of Dutch Slavery and its Legacy (NiNsee), among oth-
ers. In this approach, which has become dominant throughout the ‘Black 
Atlantic’, the more intuitive Indisch approach (‘they don’t understand a 
thing’) is rendered with a heavier theoretical foundation, leaning strongly 
on developments in the areas of cultural studies and postcolonial studies in 
the United States. Preferring this dichotomy of black versus white perspec-
tives is, from an academic point of view, at the very least contestable; yet it 
tellingly illustrates how the rediscovery of the colonial past does not simply 
revolve around making neutral facts visible.
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InTermezzo: InTernaTIonal herITage polICy
Before the Second World War, in the words of sociologist Jacques van Doorn, 
the Netherlands East Indies were ‘our greatest investment, not only in eco-
nomic terms, but also culturally and morally’.
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Dutch citizens spent time in the colony, far greater numbers of Dutch were 
indirectly involved with the Dutch East Indies through these ‘colonialists’ 
– who included top industrialists and later such statesmen as prime minis-
ter Hendrik Colijn.
16 The colony also contributed to the cultural life of the 
metropole. In the realm of the belle-lettres, these were mainly Indisch and 
totok authors, writing under such pseudonyms as Multatuli or Melatti van 
Java, or their own names, such as Louis Couperus, Augusta de Wit, or Mad-
elon Szekely-Lulofs. Beyond literature, Dutch interest mainly focused on 
the indigenous cultures, from the visual arts and music to religion and cul-
ture in an anthropological sense. This interest was often orientalist in the 
way it regarded the indigenous populations as bearers of distinctly strange 
cultures, but was nonetheless of interest and quality. 
Large numbers of Dutch researchers, from the nineteenth century on, 
built scientific careers on studying the nature and culture of the archipela-
go. Many members of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(knaw) had worked in the East Indies. A sizeable number of the alumni of 
Delft and Wageningen found employment in the East Indies and the num-
ber of ‘Indisch’ dissertations in law, literature, economics, and agricultural 
science was substantial. The government supported the foundation of insti-
tutions that were specifically focused on the Netherlands East Indies, such 
as the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal­,Land­ en Volkenkunde (kitlv, today Roy-
al Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, 1851), 
the Indisch Genootschap (Indisch Society, 1861), and the Koloniaal Instituut 
(Colonial Institute, 1924). Societies like the Koninklijk Nederlands Aardrijks­
kundig Genootschap (knag, Royal Dutch Geographical Society, 1873), fo-
cused not exclusively, but predominantly on the Netherlands East Indies. 
Whether or not the Netherlands did anything ‘magnificent’ overseas, it cer-
tainly benefitted its own scientific and intellectual infrastructure.
17
The small European/Indisch minority in the archipelago was rarely the 
subject of political discussion or anthropological interest. Post-war, this 
contributed to the remarkable situation of the huge lack of understanding 
the Eurasians encountered on their arrival in the Netherlands. To its indig-
nation, this group was labelled as utterly different from other Dutch citi-
zens – because ‘rooted in the East Indies’. They not only looked physically 
different, it was also thought that their culture would also not easily assim-
ilate. The Netherlands East Indies belonged to the canon of the day, but the 
Indo barely at all.
The little interest there was for the West corresponded with the limited 
interests the Dutch had there and the small size of the population, but it also 
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none at all. Illustrative of this is the pre-war acquisitions policy of the Dutch 
colonial museums, in which there was at most scant attention for the native 
American Indian and Maroon cultures of Suriname. For Asian Surinamese 
culture researchers generally preferred to look to the root cultures in Asia 
itself, whereas the Afro-Caribbean cultures were regarded as corruptions, 
‘bastard cultures’, rather than interesting creolizations of European and Af-
rican cultures.
It has become commonplace to speak of a post-war suppression of colo-
nial history. Henk Wesseling, referring to the 1960s, spoke of a ‘cut-out, ban-
ished, vanished’ colonial past which had been given no time to be processed 
into history. Even if this view sometimes seems too routinely tied to the 
trauma of the abrupt decolonization, it is defended with solid arguments. 
University curricula for the Indies were discontinued; the Indisch career 
circuit disappeared; the Dutch East Indies shrunk, even in history school-
books; the Indisch dimension of World War ii was ignored, and so on. The 
first post-war retrospectives of the Netherlands East Indies, published by 
prominent colonial figures, exuded a sense of frustration about a rudely in-
terrupted mission.
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Yet it remains paradoxical that forgetting was so widespread at the same 
time as 300,000 repatriates settled in the Netherlands and almost 120,000 
veterans returned home to a country where the pre-war generations had 
been brought up with the understanding that the distant East Indies were 
extremely important. The immediate answer is that it was not so much for-
getting, at least not for those who had lived in the Dutch East Indies, but that 
the act of remembrance was banished from the public realm. That silencing, 
moreover, did not last long. The public rediscovery of this history took place 
in an atmosphere in which the repatriates who were calling out for recogni-
tion suddenly found themselves confronted with moralistic questions 
about the legitimacy of colonialism. Yet at the same time, the Netherlands 
was developing a sense of guilt in its engagement with the Indisch Dutch. 
All this helped the Indisch generation to create an active community of peo-
ple who had shared the same fate.
19 The Caribbean migrants followed a dif-
ferent trajectory and somewhat later. They had no more forgotten their own 
history than the Indisch Dutch had theirs. Along with their integration they 
acquired the space to have this history more widely remembered. The differ-
ence, however, was that they were never accused of being colonial, ‘on the 
wrong side of history’. They had the moral advantage of not having been per-
petrators or collaborators, but victims of a system that was discredited post 
hoc.
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tivity for migrants from the colonies – hence room for identity claims and a 
public acknowledgement of their history and culture. Over the last decade 
the Dutch government began to invest substantial amounts in ‘minorities’ 
cultural heritage’. Considering the previous history, it was only logical that 
postcolonial migrants would be given priority. Indisch Dutch and Moluc-
cans consequently began to receive more attention in museum environ-
ments than ever before and institutions such as the Rijksmuseum and Tro-
penmuseum began, somewhat shamefully, to collect and exhibit Caribbean 
artefacts, encouraged by The Hague and in the hope of attracting new audi-
ences.
This new interest generated renewed attention for cultural cooperation 
with the countries of origin. The previous history had been disheartening. 
The foundation Sticusa, set up immediately after the war to facilitate cul-
tural cooperation between the Netherlands and the (former) colonies, was 
almost immediately dismissed as colonial by Indonesia. For the former col-
onies remaining in the Kingdom (Suriname and the Antilles) Sticusa did 
work for a long time – until 1975 in the case of Suriname and 1988 for the An-
tilles – but here too its neocolonial image proved fatal.
20
Cultural and historical cooperation developed in different ways. With 
Indonesia it ran parallel to a political dynamic that has only recently become 
more relaxed, partly because The Hague has slowly moved away from unso-
licited and misplaced missionary zeal. Apart from projects in the areas of 
monument conservation, archive preservation, and bilateral historical 
conferences, there was little room for exchange on the themes of a colonial 
past, which in Indonesia was now simply regarded as an anathema and com-
pletely closed chapter. The republic continued, undiminished, the policy 
introduced by the Japanese, who had banned the use of the Dutch language 
and colonial symbols; in the historiography the colonizer was allocated ei-
ther marginal or antagonistic roles.
21 Bilateral cultural cooperation, as well 
as Dutch heritage policy, had to be neutral, above all. In practice this came 
down to a lot of attention for ‘refined’ art from Java and Bali, ‘primitive’ art 
from the former outlying provinces, little of the culture of the vast Muslim 
majority of the archipelago, almost nothing about the colonial period, and 
even less about the pre-war Indisch subculture. The gulf between interna-
tional and domestic Indisch-oriented heritage policy remained huge; it 
could hardly be any other way.
22
Cultural exchange with the Caribbean had a different dynamic. Postco-
lonial sensitivities were no less, while the dominance of the Dutch in the 
relationship was overwhelming, due to the enormous differences in scale 
and wealth. However, Dutch interest in cooperation waned after Sticusa was 232 postcolonial netherlands
discontinued.
23 Unlike Indonesia, the recent revival of interest in cultural 
exchange with Suriname and the Antilles – primarily using Dutch funds – 
fits perfectly with the inclusive gestures made to postcolonial migrants in 
the Netherlands. This is also easier, because there is no sense of a deep cul-
tural divide between the communities on either side of the ocean.
Only recently, apparently beyond the shame of the last few decades, has 
The Hague begun to develop an international cultural policy in which the 
colonial dimension is given a central role. Six of the seven focus countries 
are former colonies or had colonial settlements: Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia, 
Sri Lanka, Suriname, South Africa.
24 Countries like the United States, Japan, 
and China, which in the past were also ‘touched’ by the voc and wic, are not 
targeted because strong cultural cooperation already exists here and no ex-
tra impulse is needed. Conversely, the exclusion of a country like Guyana – 
neighbouring Suriname and a Dutch colony until the beginning of the 
nineteenth century – merely reflects how cultural policy is also explicitly a 
component in a broader foreign policy. Guyana is inconsequential for the 
contemporary Netherlands, and there is therefore no strong reason for de-
veloping a joint heritage policy.
What is striking about recent Dutch international cultural policy is that, 
compared with the domestic treatment of the colonial past, moral issues 
and a moralizing tone are far less prominent.
25 This firstly reflects the com-
position of the partners. Countries like Ghana, Sri Lanka, and South Africa 
have no inclination to ‘celebrate’ their Dutch colonial histories, but do wel-
come a joint policy for material heritage and research. For a long time Brazil 
was even the driving force behind the ‘rediscovery’ of the Dutch period 
(1630-1654): relieved, the Netherlands could join in with a view in which the 
wic, and in particular Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, are associated 
with promising developments, religious tolerance, flourishing arts and sci-
ences, not the slave trade or oppression. The regret expressed on more than 
one occasion to Ghana for the Dutch involvement in the Atlantic slave trade 
was more a response to domestic sensitivities than something desired by 
the Ghanaian government.
Hardly surprisingly, an almost proportional relation seems to exist be-
tween the proximity of the colonial past and the burden it bears. No wonder, 
then, that cultural cooperation with Indonesia has rarely gone beyond run-
ning the gauntlet – the turbulence of decolonization has long obscured the 
view of the colonial history that preceded it. Yet there are signs of normal-
ization and depoliticization, even if they were interrupted by the voc cele-
brations, which were not appreciated by Jakarta. Since then, The Hague has 
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trace of chauvinism is anxiously avoided. The commemoration of four cen-
turies of Dutch presence in the archipelago is regarded very differently in 
Indonesia and the Netherlands. Where in Indonesia the significance of colo-
nialism is highly moderated and Indisch or Moluccan history barely ad-
dressed, in the Netherlands the ‘Dutch East Indies’ continue to dominate the 
memory. Two different versions of the past to serve two different audiences.
The relation between the proximity of the colonial past and the burden of 
that colonial past is far more influential in the cultural cooperation with 
Suriname and – in Kingdom relations – the Antilles. The fact that both are 
Dutch colonial creations and are still seriously dependent on the former 
metropole only serves to strengthen this. The consequence is paradoxical. 
The recent revival in The Hague of interest in cultural cooperation on joint 
heritage also answers the desires of the Antillean and Surinamese commu-
nities in the Netherlands. Hence, as more has been researched, written, and 
exhibited about the West, the centre of gravity has shifted further to to-
wards the Netherlands. Suriname and the Antilles have become increas-
ingly the receivers of research, writings, and exhibitions carried out in the 
Netherlands, by Dutch who might not have a Caribbean heritage. The con-
servation of monuments or archives is no different: the means, initiative, 
and actors come largely from the Netherlands.
Another dilemma is emerging. The communality of the past was set by 
colonialism, slavery, contract labour and, more recently, the exodus to the 
Netherlands. Whatever one thinks about that history, it has remained un-
mistakably decisive and shared. This is why it is possible to focus so much 
attention on cultural cooperation and why it is done. However, among An-
tilleans and Surinamese on both sides of the ocean there is a strong pen-
chant for focusing on precisely the culture that is regarded as their ‘own’ and 
far less on what is associated with the Netherlands: Sranantongo, Sarnami 
or Papiamentu, rather than (Caribbean variants of) Dutch; oral traditions, 
religion outside, or on the margins of, Christendom, and much, much more.
This dilemma does not arise in collaborations with Indonesia. Dutch 
heritage institutions house innumerable artefacts and a wealth of knowl-
edge about the archipelago and its inhabitants, but there is no question of an 
Indonesian desire for the Netherlands to continue its early scientific and 
museological role. Where this is expected, in Suriname and the Antilles, it 
raises interesting questions about postcolonial cultural policy. Papiamentu 
has been spoken in the Kingdom for centuries, including on an island (Bo-
naire) which has recently become a Dutch municipality; should this lan-
guage have the same status as Frisian? And what about the West-Indian Eng-
lish spoken on the Windward Islands? Does a shared cultural heritage policy 234 postcolonial netherlands
extend to cultural developments after political independence? In Surina-
me, does the oral history of the Hindustanis in the rice district of Nickerie or 
the Maroons in the interior, prior to 1975, belong to a shared cultural heri-
tage, and what followed thereafter not? The answers to these kinds of ques-
tions are largely political, as is the issue of what status should be ascribed to 
migrant cultures in the Netherlands.
This interlude about foreign policy underlines the fact that cultural her-
itage is far from neutral; that in the postcolonial Netherlands ‘foreign’ is 
constantly transected by ‘domestic’; that in the realm of heritage policy, this 
also forces choices to be made that have barely become the subject of public 
or political debate. And that, once again, it is clear that the way we treat colo-
nial heritage and colonial history, both now and in the past, reflects most of 
all the ever-changing present.
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posTColonIal sTudIes In The neTherlands,  
a mIssed opporTunITy?
The previous chapter placed the post-war experiences of the Netherlands in 
a broader context. That history was unique in the sense that successive, 
highly diverse postcolonial migrations were separate from the migration 
from Islamic countries that took place on a similar scale. Postcolonial mi-
grants were, on the whole, better equipped for socio-economic integration 
and were culturally closer to Dutch society. This translated into a high de-
gree of exogamy and a strong identification with the Netherlands.
Dutch society received migrants neither with open arms, nor without 
prejudice. In the 1980s, it was reluctantly acknowledged that the Nether-
lands had become a multicultural society and a moderate form of multicul-
turalism was accepted. This has remained more or less intact ever since, 
even if attitudes towards Islam over the last decade have become more dis-
missive. However, this has barely affected postcolonial migrants, a minor-
ity of whom are Muslim.
In embracing a cautious multiculturalism, the Netherlands was closer 
to the British model than France or Portugal, where there was less accep-
tance of postcolonial identity claims. In a broader sense, it is remarkable 
how much more commonplace a critical reflection on one’s own colonial 
past and gestures of recognition towards postcolonial migrants became in 
North-Western European countries than in the Iberian countries. If we draw 
even broader comparisons, what emerges is that Europe and the United 
States are far more open to these issues than the former colonial powers of 
Japan and Russia. Evidently, something like a ‘Western’ norm for historical ‘postcolonial’ (in the) netherlands 235
accountability emerged after the Second World War.
The struggle of migrants, in particular migrants from the former colo-
nies, for their view of colonial history to be recognized is closely linked to 
pre-war movements such as négritude in France and, in the academic realm, 
primarily the post-war rise of postcolonial studies in the Anglo-Saxon 
world. Recent studies have remarked upon the fact that even once a debate 
on colonialism and its legacies had developed, this school found few sup-
porters in the Netherlands.
27 The question is not only whether this observa-
tion is correct and what the explanation might be, but if so, whether much 
has been missed.
Before these questions may be answered, a few exceedingly brief remarks 
about postcolonial studies are apposite.
28 This is an approach to colonial his-
tory and the contemporary legacies of this history with a strong emphasis 
on taking a ‘contesting’ view, based on the assumption that most scientific 
knowledge was produced from an implicitly colonial paradigm and contin-
ues to be so. Supporters of postcolonial studies aimed to correct and cross-
out that prejudiced Western, colonial gaze, an aim which for most of its 
practitioners was not only interpreted as an academic task, but also a politi-
cal one. By extension, postcolonial studies were often explicitly deployed to 
serve social and political aims, such as anti-colonialism and antiracism. In 
this a link was drawn to the postmodern approach of cultural studies, which 
had gained prominence mainly in American universities in the 1980s, but 
also with the neo-Marxist-inspired subaltern studies in India and else-
where. The result was a strong focus on the ‘holy trinity’ of class, ethnicity 
and gender.
The first question – is it true that postcolonial studies in the Netherlands 
hardly developed? – can be answered in the affirmative without much 
equivocation. There is no widespread tradition of reflecting on the colonial 
past, even less so of an explicitly postcolonial paradigm. Before the Second 
World War, a number of somewhat dispersed anti-colonial publications did 
appear in the Netherlands and the colonies, but apart from their political 
and ideological significance, they had no academic pretensions or reverber-
ations.
29
The end of the Second World War also brought an intellectual fracture 
between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Indonesian historiography was 
marked by a mixture of antagonism towards colonialism and a downplay-
ing of the significance of the Netherlands in the history of the archipelago, 
but also by scant interest in theoretical reflection and debate. In the Nether-
lands it was mainly the sociologist J.A.A. van Doorn who devoted studies to 
continuities between colonial policy in the Dutch East Indies and Dutch mi-236 postcolonial netherlands
norities policy. However, in this work he remained far removed from the ter-
minology and political positions commonly used in postcolonial studies.
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The modest growth in Caribbean studies since the 1970s took place with-
in the context of the exodus to the Netherlands. The centre of gravity was 
and remained in the Netherlands and the former colonies have continued to 
be receivers, rather than producers of this academic work. Surinamese or 
Antillean authors did begin to stir up the debate about the colonial past, but 
only a few from academic positions. Sociologist Philomena Essed, original-
ly from Suriname, published a number of studies on racism in the 1980s 
based on a postcolonial paradigm; however, her work met with few positive 
responses in academia. The Hindustani-Surinamese columnist and author, 
Anil Ramdas, initially linked himself to postcolonial studies, but then 
seems to have made a complete u-turn, even if he did remain committed to 
the idea of identity as choice, a proposition in part derived from the work of 
Stuart Hall.
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Hence, it was a remarkably long time before the paradigm of postcolonial 
studies won broader support in the Dutch debate about colonialism, though 
still modest and predominantly by ‘white’ scholars. Beyond literary and cul-
tural studies, there was no formation of a school. Many historians and an-
thropologists were later to some degree inspired by postcolonial studies, 
but only a few, and all female – Frances Gouda, Lizzy van Leeuwen, Susan 
Legêne, Gloria Wekker – explicitly set themselves up as supporters, even 
their work is usually fairly removed from the radical Anglo-Saxon version of 
postcolonialism.
Why is there no strong tradition of postcolonial studies in the Nether-
lands? The most obvious explanation is the absence of a widely shared colo-
nial and postcolonial experience and language in the former Dutch empire. 
The colonies had relatively little to do with each other – the course of post-
war decolonization underlines this – and there has never been much soli-
darity or even mutual interest among postcolonial migrants in the Nether-
lands. The Dutch language disappeared from Indonesia, while in the 
Antilles it is still unpopular and rarely standard. Only in Suriname did it 
gradually become the language of the people. Unlike English, the Dutch lan-
guage does not bond the former empire and serves only to recall colonial 
domination. There is, therefore, no broad language community that can 
cast a collective critical look on Dutch colonialism.
Moreover, strategic choices have evidently been made within postcolo-
nial migrant groups. By far the majority of talented postcolonial (and other) 
migrants chose to study medicine, economics, or law as a passport to social 
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social sciences was many times smaller. Whether they were then given equal 
opportunities is open to discussion; preferential treatment was, in any 
event, rare. Whatever the case, few to date have achieved positions in estab-
lished academic and heritage institutions, where ‘white’ Dutch continue to 
dominate. This has also contributed to the recruitment field for postcolo-
nial studies remaining small. Additionally, where postcolonial studies was 
explicitly left-wing and anti-colonial, this political orientation was far from 
typical of the Indisch and Moluccan ‘community’.
There might well be another explanation, but it is speculative and all the 
more debatable. The rise of American and British postcolonial studies took 
place in polarized societies with a strong racist element, which in the United 
States was even anchored in law until the 1960s. Postcolonial studies not 
only aimed to broaden horizons, but also to adopt political positions in a 
polarized social climate. It is not my assertion in this book that there was no 
racism, or thinly disguised ethnocentrism, in the Netherlands; the oppo-
site is more plausible.
32 However, there were almost no instances of race riots 
and open expressions of xenophobia were, until recently, an anathema. This 
was beneficial to the social climate, but not conducive to the rise of postco-
lonial studies.
The question ‘Why is there no postcolonial studies?’ may give the im-
pression that the absence of such a tradition is exceptional and a great lack. 
As far as the first point is concerned, the popularity of postcolonial studies 
has remained largely an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon. Even in France, which 
in view of its long academic tradition of political engagement would seem 
an obvious candidate, this approach has remained marginal. In Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, the postcolonial paradigm caught on here and there, 
but primarily through academics who had diverted to American universi-
ties.
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The question remains as to whether any of this is a great deficiency. 
Without doubt, the testators of postcolonial studies such as Edward Said 
had a major influence on the development of a curative ‘source criticism’ of 
Western traditions and interpretations of the non-Western world. The un-
conventional work of West Indian Britons such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gil-
roy on black culture in a postmodern world provided inspiring reflections 
on the (dis)continuities between the colonial and postcolonial world. Pro-
tagonists of postcolonial studies, moreover, offered academic inspiration 
and support to the identity claims of postcolonial migrants. All this was 
important to the postcolonial debate in the Netherlands, which was so slow 
to get going.
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However, on the way, the problems associated with postcolonial studies 238 postcolonial netherlands
began to weigh more heavily.
35 First, there was a strong tendency towards 
uncompromising political correctness, which in practice led to a theoreti-
cally contestable strategic essentialism and, at times, to useless black-ver-
sus-white thinking.
36 Moreover, the continuities between the present and 
the past were more often stipulated than proven through references to em-
pirical arguments and with due consideration of the immense range of local 
variety; the intractability of ethnic contradictions was too easily ascribed to 
colonialism; and the distinction between ‘memory’ and ‘history’ was fre-
quently understated or simply missed. In more extreme versions, the em-
phasis on the ‘multivocality’ of experiences and interpretations of (post)
colonial reality led to an excessive problematization of the methodological 
conventions of mainstream scholarship and, thereby, disastrous isolation. 
The irony is that much of what was explicitly intended to be emancipatory in 
postcolonial studies ultimately got bogged down in horrible jargon and ter-
minological hairsplitting among insiders. In short then, from a ‘conven-
tional’ academic perspective this school suffered from a shortage of concep-
tual clarity and empirical foundations.
37
Viewed thus, one wonders whether it is really regrettable that the Nether-
lands developed little in the way of an Anglo-Saxon postcolonial studies tra-
dition. Future research into Dutch colonialism and its effects on the present 
will continue to consider postcolonial issues, but ultimately it will have to 
employ solid, empirical, and comparative research – an argument that most 
supporters of a moderate version of the postcolonial paradigm who are 
working in the Netherlands will also endorse. Meanwhile, it remains re-
markable how ‘white’ almost all the research and cultural heritage institu-
tions still are and how little representative of postcolonial Netherlands. 
This is problematic, even if one need not presume that postcolonial mi-
grants would carry out fundamentally different or better research.
The fuTure of The ColonIal pasT
Postcolonial communities brought colonial history with them to the Neth-
erlands. This rediscovered past thus acquired a bright future. The space 
available for this past today may still be too modest in the eyes of many 
Dutch who cherish their (post)colonial roots, but it is unmistakably greater 
than it ever has been since the loss of the Dutch East Indies and also more 
explicitly self-critical than ever before. Established institutions such as the 
Rijksmuseum and new competitors like the National Historical Museum 
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and their migrants. Old colonial institutions such as kitlv/Royal Institute 
of Southeast Asian and Caribbean studies and the Tropenmuseum extend-
ed their mission to include postcolonial history and Dutch citizens with 
colonial roots. The press, popular and specialized magazines, publications, 
university courses, exhibitions on the colonies, ‘race’ and ethnicity, and, of 
course, the official history canon – all these testify to a new postcolonial 
sensitivity that has developed over the last ten to twenty years.
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This postcolonial debate is an appropriate, albeit not always balanced 
correction of earlier neglect and distortions. However, this does not in any 
way mean that a clear course has been set. If we assume that the rediscovery 
of colonial history and its legacies was rooted in the postcolonial migra-
tions, then we have to ask how long and how profound and effective this 
impulse will remain. The answer to this question is perhaps sobering. The 
rediscovery of the past was forced by migrants who derived their identities 
primarily from that past and old colonial obligations. The irony is that it is 
precisely their colonial antecedents that gave them the cultural capital to 
express their desires and to engage in successful lobbying. But what of later 
generations? To begin with, the high frequency of relationships outside 
their own communities meant they developed a more layered identity, in 
which the (post)colonial was merely one dimension. The recognition that 
the first generation(s) managed to extract through adopting a strategic es-
sentialism is for them a given, the thought that this past might also define 
them to the bone has become increasingly less self-evident.
Postcolonial identity, in other words, is ever more a matter of choice. Dis-
tancing oneself from a one-dimensional choice gradually became easier be-
cause the Netherlands, which was becoming ever less uniform, had to begin 
to accommodate other cultures and other views of national identity. Mi-
grants from the colonies also found a more willing ear because their claims 
now pertained to a history that had, indeed, been shared for centuries. Cer-
tainly, this struggle for recognition was not easy and certainly not linear. 
However, the strongest counterforce to a broadening of the notion of the 
Dutch nation has not been aimed at postcolonial migrants, but at Muslims 
– two categories which share only a small margin of overlap.
But this is not the end of the story. Postcolonial migrants may frequently 
feel they have an advantage over other migrants and indeed a right to one, 
but in practice this advantage is declining noticeably – not only in terms of 
the postcolonial bonus, but also in the realm of recognition. Despite the re-
cent successes of the radical right, a willingness to make inclusive gestures 
to towards cultural minorities still dominates political thought in the 
Netherlands. In this context the rhetorical advantage of a notion like ‘colo-240 postcolonial netherlands
nial legacy’ over ‘moderate Islam’ is declining.
The struggle for recognition primarily, and logically, occurred within 
the nation’s borders. The Indisch generation identified almost exclusively 
with the Netherlands. Radical Moluccans referred to freedom movements 
elsewhere in the world only for a short while. The Afro-Caribbean call for the 
acknowledgement of slavery had a more explicit international orientation, 
with the ‘Black Atlantic’ as the frame of reference. But here too, political ac-
tions had a national focus. The recurring claim was that the Dutch nation, 
that every Dutch person, was indirectly involved in that colonial past and its 
legacies – an involvement that began to acquire the emotional charge of 
complicity.
But the character of the nation that was being addressed was also under-
going rapid change. A confusing diversity arose; alongside a large number 
of postcolonial citizens, there was a no less significant number of migrant 
communities from elsewhere. Mutual understanding between the postco-
lonial communities was limited and there was no natural sense of solidarity 
with other migrant groups. In a nation where the number of new citizens 
with no previous ties to the Netherlands was growing, demands for the co-
lonial past to be recognized were increasingly drowned out by other voices 
in a cacophony of identity claims. But where each group wants to add its own 
‘thing’ to the idea of nationhood, without paying much attention to what is 
important to other groups, there is little hope for a community of all citi-
zens.
 At the same time, the Netherlands became more and more a European 
country and this also undermined the postcolonial argument. ‘Old Europe’ 
was dominated by countries with colonial pasts. This did not mean that 
these countries were, as a matter of course, more receptive to desires sur-
rounding the recognition of the colonial past – as pointed out earlier, there 
was resistance everywhere and the amounts of openness varied greatly from 
country to country. The successes of the postcolonial lobby remained lim-
ited and above all national. A broader, European identity politics of postco-
lonial migrants failed to arise. Conversely, it is striking that although Brus-
sels formulated all kinds of development policies for the former colonies, it 
took almost no initiative in the area of a shared, European colonial cultural 
heritage – even though there were ample opportunities to do so, both in Eu-
rope and overseas, and in terms of material and immaterial heritage. The 
Netherlands, traditionally firmly oriented towards Europe, made no moves 
in this direction either.
And this is where the tide for postcolonial arguments also begins to ebb. 
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rarely show any interest in this aspect of European history, and show even 
less understanding of the emotions that still circulate in ‘Old Europe’ re-
garding special relations with the former colonies, or for compensation 
claims by postcolonial minorities. The Western European sensitivity 
around questions of ‘race’ or ethnicity are absent in Eastern Europe; oppres-
sion for these new member states recalls their own experiences with Nazism 
and Communism, not their own part in the subjection of others, let alone in 
distant tropical lands. In other words, in the new, enlarged Europe, colonial 
history and its legacies do not carry the same weight as for the old guard.
New Europe is still in the midst of coming to terms with its painful re-
cent history. As with every imagining of history, it is not just about what is 
remembered, but equally about what has been deliberately diminished, 
suppressed, or shut out. This book emphasizes the battle against forgetting 
(the colonial past), and understanding and sympathy resonate throughout 
for the postcolonial migrants’ desire for their history to become part of 
Dutch memory. However, within a broader European context we cannot 
avoid two sobering conclusions. Firstly, that the current exercises in Euro-
pean commemoration underline that forward-looking historiography must 
also contain an element of deliberate closure – otherwise, in view of the di-
visions and often extreme violence of the continental past, a mental Euro-
pean unification is inconceivable.
39 Next, where the notion of ‘Europe’ is so 
strongly construed around achievements, on the one hand, and the desire to 
close a dark chapter, on the other, the room available to a discourse that 
links the rediscovery of Europe’s colonial past to moral condemnation and 
compensation claims shrivels.
The rediscovery of the (post)colonial past is not a new beginning, but the 
closure of a long history. In the Netherlands as well – and not only because 
the government likes to see its own gestures as providing closure. The post-
war corrections to (post)colonial forgetting and silencing were extracted, in 
part, as a consequence of successful integration. Now we are witnessing the 
evaporation of the postcolonial bonus, community and identity. Descen-
dants of colonial subjects of the past have become, in the first instance, 
Dutch and then European citizens. They will gradually identify less and less 
with their colonial roots; this ever more distant past will simply be one ele-
ment in what they consider to be their identity. Where generations succeed 
each other, where forgetting and silencing make way for recognition and 
commemoration, the motivation for the organization and collective experi-
ence of old wounds has weakened – in this sense the dynamics around 1 July 
or 15 August are no different than 4/5 May.
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then, gradually rearing its head less and less frequently. There is no reason to 
think that this will be any different for the colonial past in the long term. 
The Netherlands has, of course, become postcolonial. It is impossible to 
imagine Dutch society without migrants from the former colonies and their 
children and their cultural contribution, and there is far greater awareness 
of colonialism and its after effects today than, say, in 1960 or 1980. It is un-
clear whether all this has changed the image the Dutch have of themselves 
or their country. What is certain is that other issues are higher on the agenda 
now; insofar as these relate to migrants, they relate to different ones, name-
ly Muslims. This too has perhaps made it easier to be a Dutch citizen with 
(post)colonial roots.
The Netherlands has become postcolonial over the last sixty-five years 
– almost a lifetime – but at the same time the postcolonial minorities have 
become Dutch and the significance of their colonial background has begun 
to evaporate. The postcolonial move to catch up on the debate about national 
identity is almost completed. Not to everyone’s satisfaction, but there is 
nothing unusual about this either. Consensus about ‘the nation’ continues 
to be a receding horizon.noTes
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The Netherlands is home to one million citizens with roots in  
the former colonies Indonesia, Suriname and the Antilles.  
Entitlement to Dutch citizenship, pre-migration acculturation  
in Dutch language and culture as well as a strong rhetorical  
argument (‘We are here because you were there’) were strong  
assets of the first generation. This ‘postcolonial bonus’ indeed 
facilitated their integration. In the process, the initial distance  
to mainstream Dutch culture diminished.
Postwar Dutch society went through serious transformations.  
Its once lilywhite population now includes two million non- 
Western migrants and the past decade witnessed heated debates 
about multiculturalism. The most important debates about the 
postcolonial migrant communities centered on acknowledgement 
and the inclusion of colonialism and its legacies in the national 
memorial culture. This resulted in state-sponsored gestures, 
ranging from financial compensation to monuments. The en- 
semble of such gestures reflect a guilt-ridden and inconsistent 
attempt to ‘do justice’ to the colonial past and to Dutch citizens  
with colonial roots.
Postcolonial Netherlands is the first scholarly monograph to address 
these themes in an internationally comparative framework. Upon 
its publication in the Netherlands (2010) the book elicited much 
praise, but also serious objections to some of the author’s theses, 
such as his prediction about the diminishing relevance of post-
colonial roots.
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